The effects of facial appearance on measures of generalized trust.

Research suggests various associations between generalized trust and a wide range of economic, political, and social dimensions. Despite its importance, there is considerable debate about how best to measure generalized trust. One recent solution operationalizes generalized trust as the average of trust ratings across a small set of trust domains and human faces. Here, we investigate whether heterogeneity in facial appearance affects the psychometric properties of these new instruments. In a survey experiment conducted with a sample of U.S. adults (n = 5001), we randomly assigned respondents to one of five conditions that varied the features of human and AI-synthesized faces. Irrespective of the condition, respondents rated each face along four trust domains. We find that facial heterogeneity has negligible effects on the measurement validity and measurement equivalence of these new instruments. Small differences are observed on a subset of faces for some psychometric tests. These findings contribute to a growing body of work using faces to measure generalized trust, and demonstrate the utility of using AI-synthesized faces in social science research more broadly.

The rise of online dating and racial homogamy in marriage.

The rise of online dating has the potential to transform marriage outcomes, as it may alter how individuals are matched with partners. To capture the population-level effects of the rise of online dating, we examine how changes in marital racial homogamy from 2008 to 2016 are associated with changes in online dating within local dating markets. We use data from Google Trends and the American Community Survey with fixed-effects regression models to control for differences across dating markets. Our results suggest that the rise of online dating has not substantially influenced trends in racial homogamy, either nationally or within metropolitan areas.

State coercion, moral attitudes, and tax compliance: Evidence from a national factorial survey experiment of income tax evasion.

Why do some people comply with their obligation to pay taxes while others do not? Scholars of tax behavior, particularly economists and political scientists, have relied on models of state coercion and state reciprocity to answer this question. Neither state coercion nor state reciprocity, however, sufficiently account for individuals who voluntarily comply with their tax obligations to the state. We offer a third explanation, derived from the new sociology of morality and moral psychology, suggesting that two types of moral attitudes (moral imperatives and moral alignment) affect tax compliance. Using a factorial survey experiment of income tax evasion and a survey questionnaire administered to a nationally representative random sample of U.S. adults, we provide a systematic test of the three different models of tax compliance. The results yield strong support for moral attitudes (both moral imperatives and moral alignment) and state coercion, but little support for state reciprocity. We review the implications of our findings in the discussion and conclusion.

From the general to the specific: How social trust motivates relational trust.

When people form beliefs about the trustworthiness of others with respect to particular matters (i.e., when individuals trust), theory suggests that they rely on preexistent cognitive schemas regarding the general cooperativeness of individuals and organizations (i.e., social trust). In spite of prior work, the impact of social trust on relational trust-or what Russell Hardin (2002) calls trust as a three-part relation where actor A trusts actor B with reference to matter Y-is not well established. Four vignette experiments were administered to Amazon.com Mechanical Turk workers (N = 1388 and N = 1419) and to public university undergraduate students (N = 995 and N = 956) in order to investigate the relationship between social trust and relational trust. Measures of general social trust and particular social trust produced statistically equivalent effects that were positively associated with relational trust. Political trust, however, was statistically unrelated to relational trust. These results support the idea that people rely on schemas and stereotypes concerned with the general cooperativeness and helpfulness of others when forming beliefs about another person's trustworthiness with respect to a particular matter at hand.

Power-use in cooperative competition: a power-dependence model and an empirical test of network structure and geographic mobility.

Although the social exchange paradigm has produced a vibrant research program, the theoretical tradition is rarely used to model the structure of social networks outside of experiments and simulations. To address this limitation, we derive power-dependence predictions about network structure and geographic mobility-the outcomes of power-use-and test these predictions using complete data on competition networks and travel schedules among amateur sports teams. Poisson regression and exponential random graph models provide strong support for our predictions. The findings illustrate exchange dynamics in which status resources desired by teams, coupled with the availability of geographically proximal alternatives, create power and dependence that dictate where and with whom teams compete. Although evidence supports Georg Simmel's classic proposition that networks form on the basis of values and propinquity, we show that this complex dynamic is conditional on power and dependence. We conclude by discussing implications and directions for future research.

Cooperation without culture? The null effect of generalized trust on intentional homicide: a cross-national panel analysis, 1995-2009.

Sociologists, political scientists, and economists all suggest that culture plays a pivotal role in the development of large-scale cooperation. In this study, I used generalized trust as a measure of culture to explore if and how culture impacts intentional homicide, my operationalization of cooperation. I compiled multiple cross-national data sets and used pooled time-series linear regression, single-equation instrumental-variables linear regression, and fixed- and random-effects estimation techniques on an unbalanced panel of 118 countries and 232 observations spread over a 15-year time period. Results suggest that culture and large-scale cooperation form a tenuous relationship, while economic factors such as development, inequality, and geopolitics appear to drive large-scale cooperation.

A blessing and a curse? Political institutions in the growth and decay of generalized trust: a cross-national panel analysis, 1980-2009.

Despite decades of research on social capital, studies that explore the relationship between political institutions and generalized trust-a key element of social capital-across time are sparse. To address this issue, we use various cross-national public-opinion data sets including the World Values Survey and employ pooled time-series OLS regression and fixed- and random-effects estimation techniques on an unbalanced panel of 74 countries and 248 observations spread over a 29-year time period. With these data and methods, we investigate the impact of five political-institutional factors-legal property rights, market regulations, labor market regulations, universality of socioeconomic provisions, and power-sharing capacity-on generalized trust. We find that generalized trust increases monotonically with the quality of property rights institutions, that labor market regulations increase generalized trust, and that power-sharing capacity of the state decreases generalized trust. While generalized trust increases as the government regulation of credit, business, and economic markets decreases and as the universality of socioeconomic provisions increases, both effects appear to be more sensitive to the countries included and the modeling techniques employed than the other political-institutional factors. In short, we find that political institutions simultaneously promote and undermine generalized trust.