Indicators of trustworthiness in lay-friendly research summaries: Scientificness surpasses easiness.

Lay readers' trust in scientific texts can be shaped by perceived text easiness and scientificness. The two effects seem vital in a time of rapid science information sharing, yet have so far only been examined separately. A preregistered online study was conducted to assess them jointly, to probe for author and text trustworthiness overlap, and to investigate interindividual influences on the effects. N = 1467 lay readers read four short research summaries, with easiness and scientificness (high vs low) being experimentally varied. A more scientific writing style led to higher perceived author and text trustworthiness. Higher personal justification belief, lower justification by multiple-sources belief, and lower need for cognitive closure attenuated the influence of scientificness on trustworthiness. However, text easiness showed no influence on trustworthiness and no interaction with text scientificness. Implications for future studies and suggestions for enhancing the perceived trustworthiness of research summaries are discussed.

Belief updating when confronted with scientific evidence: Examining the role of trust in science.

In one exploratory study (N = 985) and one preregistered study (N = 1100), we investigated whether trust in science influences belief change on a medico-scientific issue when laypersons are confronted with scientific evidence. Moreover, we tested whether individuals with high trust in science trust science "blindly," meaning that their trust in a scientific claim's source prevents them from adequately evaluating the claim itself. Participants read eight fictitious studies on the efficacy of acupuncture, which were experimentally manipulated regarding direction (evidence favoring acupuncture vs diverging evidence) and quality (high vs low; only Study 2). Acupuncture-related beliefs were measured before and after reading. Moderator and mediator analyses showed that the magnitude of belief change indeed depends on trust in science. Furthermore, we found that people with high trust in science are better able to evaluate the quality of scientific studies, which, in turn, protects them from being influenced by low-quality evidence.

When freedom of choice leads to bias: How threat fosters selective exposure to health information.

Selective exposure to online health information can be ascribed to two related defense motives: the motivation to confirm one's subjective perceptions and the motivation to protect relevant parts of the self-image, such as physical integrity. Our aim was to identify how these motives come into effect in the context of a health threat (fictitious feedback on an alleged heart disease risk). In a preregistered online study with N = 763 participants, we analyzed the impact of perceived and suggested risk on the degree of bias in selecting risk-related information on a fictitious Google search results page. Applying a 2 × 2 design with the experimental factor "risk feedback" and the quasi-experimental factor "perceived risk," we formulated six hypotheses. First, we expected a main effect of perceived risk on selective exposure to information suggesting no risk, and second, we hypothesized a main effect of perceived risk on mean quality rating of information suggesting a risk. Third, we proposed a main effect of risk feedback on selective exposure to information which suggests no risk, and fourth, we proposed a main effect of risk feedback on mean quality rating of information suggesting a risk. Fifth, we expected an interaction effect between perceived and suggested risk, and sixth, we proposed an interaction effect between perceived and suggested risk in different forms for each of the four conditions on quality ratings. Only the third hypothesis was confirmed: Receiving information which suggested a health risk increased the tendency to select information denying the risk. Additional exploratory analyses revealed moderator effects of health information literacy and participant age on the aforementioned relationships. In sum, our results underline the crucial role of defense motives in the context of a suggested health threat.

A comparison between different ways to assess demands-abilities fit in higher education: Empirical results and recommendations for research practice.

Researchers studying person-environment fit can choose between various measurement approaches. Even though these measures are distinctly different, they often get used interchangeably, which makes interpreting the results of person-environment fit studies difficult. In the present article, we contrast the most commonly used measurement approaches for person-environment fit in higher education and compare them in terms of explained variance. We obtained data on the fit as well as subjective and objective study-related outcomes of N = 595 university students. We analyzed the fit between the demands of the study program and the abilities of the student, using the algebraic, squared and absolute difference score, response surface analysis (RSA), and direct fit as measurement approaches. Our results indicate that RSA explains the most variance for objective outcomes, and that direct fit explains the most variance for subjective outcomes. We hope that this contribution will help researchers distinguish the different measurement approaches of demands-abilities fit (and ultimately person-environment fit) and use them accordingly.

Do Open-Science Badges Increase Trust in Scientists Among Undergraduates, Scientists, and the Public?

In three experimental studies, we investigated whether badges for open-science practices have the potential to affect trust in scientists and topic-specific epistemic beliefs by student teachers (n = 270), social scientists (n = 250), or the public (n = 257), all of whom were at least 16 years old. Furthermore, we analyzed the moderating role of epistemic beliefs for badges and trust. Each participant was randomly assigned to two of three conditions: badges awarded, badges not awarded, and no badges (control). In all samples, our Bayesian analyses indicated that badges influence trust as expected, with one exception in the public sample: An additional positive effect of awarded badges (compared with no badges) was not supported. For students and scientists, we found evidence for the relation of badges and epistemic beliefs as well as epistemic beliefs and trust. Further, we found evidence for the absence of moderation by epistemic beliefs.

To Have the Best Interest at Heart: Analyzing the Match Between Laypersons' Interests and Publication Activity in Psychology.

There is a growing public interest in science and, by extension, in psychology, and human behavior. Yet, detailed investigations on whether academic psychological research activity matches lay interests are still scarce. In addition, while lay-friendly communication of research findings becomes continually more important, it is unclear which subfields of psychological research are particularly interesting to laypeople. To address these research gaps, we carried out an explorative study of psychological literature included in two large reference databases, one with a German (PSYNDEX) and one with an international (PsycInfo) scope. The years of 2018-2020 were scanned for articles belonging to one of 20 topic areas assessed as most interesting by lay participants in a previous study. We determined and compared the share of empirical research and research syntheses for each topic area and database and computed rank correlations between lay interest and academic publication volume. Results suggest a positive relationship between lay interest and academic publication activity specifically for research syntheses. Additionally, topic areas associated with clinical psychology offered a large share of research syntheses, while other topic areas such as "Psychodynamics" or "Industrial & Organizational Psychology" encompassed a smaller share of syntheses. Finally, we outline perspectives for long-term monitoring of psychology-related lay interests. Thus, the present study connects academic activity with the public interest in psychology by identifying and quantifying research syntheses for topics garnering the most lay interest.

Open science and public trust in science: Results from two studies.

In two studies, we examined whether open science practices, such as making materials, data, and code of a study openly accessible, positively affect public trust in science. Furthermore, we investigated whether the potential trust-damaging effects of research being funded privately (e.g. by a commercial enterprise) may be buffered by such practices. After preregistering six hypotheses, we conducted a survey study (Study 1; N = 504) and an experimental study (Study 2; N = 588) in two German general population samples. In both studies, we found evidence for the positive effects of open science practices on trust, though it should be noted that in Study 2, results were more inconsistent. We did not however find evidence for the aforementioned buffering effect. We conclude that while open science practices may contribute to increasing trust in science, the importance of making use of open science practices visible should not be underestimated.

Protect ya Grandma! The Effects of Students' Epistemic Beliefs and Prosocial Values on COVID-19 Vaccination Intentions.

The present study investigates epistemic beliefs (beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing) and prosocial values as predictors of COVID-19 vaccination intentions. As a first hypothesis, we posit that beliefs in justification by authority will positively relate to vaccination intentions. Second, we expect a positive relationship between prosocial values and vaccination intentions. Third, we hypothesize that beliefs in justification by authority moderate the relationship between prosocial values and vaccination intentions, so that the positive correlation between prosocial values and vaccination intentions becomes stronger with increasing beliefs in justification by authority. Hypotheses were tested in a sample of N = 314 German university students, a group with rather high mobility, who, when vaccinated, will increase the chance of attaining herd immunity. Hypotheses were tested using correlational and multiple regression analyses. Results revealed a highly significant positive relationship between justification by authority and vaccination intentions, whereas both hypotheses that included prosocial values did not yield significant results. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that the relationship between justification by authority and vaccination intentions was mediated by beliefs in the safety and effectiveness of the vaccines. Furthermore, significant negative relationships were found between personal justification and vaccination intentions as well as between justification by multiple sources and vaccination intentions. These results highlight the crucial role of science and public health communication in fostering vaccination intentions regarding COVID-19.

Will COVID-19-related economic worries superimpose health worries, reducing nonpharmaceutical intervention acceptance in Germany? A prospective pre-registered study.

Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as stay-at-home orders aim at curbing the spread of the novel coronavirus, SARS-COV-2. In March 2020, a large proportion of the German population supported such interventions. In this article, we analyse whether the support for NPI dwindle with economic worries superimposing virus-related worries in the months to follow. We test seven pre-registered1 hypotheses using data from the German COSMO survey (Betsch, Wieler, Habersaat, et al. 2020), which regularly monitors behavioural and psychological factors related to the pandemic. The present article covers the period from March 24, 2020 to July 7, 2020 (Ntotal  = 13,094), and, in addition, includes a validation study providing evidence for the reliability and validity of the corresponding COSMO measures (N = 612). Results revealed that virus-related worries decreased over time, whereas economic worries remained largely constant. Moreover, the acceptance of NPIs considerably decreased over time. Virus-related worries were positively associated with acceptance of NPIs, whereas this relationship was negative regarding economic worries (albeit smaller and less consistent). Unexpectedly, no interactions between virus-related worries and economic worries were found. We conclude that individual differences in virus-related and economic threat perceptions related to COVID-19 play an important role in the acceptance of NPIs.

Disentangling the process of epistemic change: The role of epistemic volition.

BACKGROUND: Many interventions on epistemic beliefs (i.e., individual beliefs about knowledge and knowing) are based on Bendixen and Rule's Integrative Model for Personal Epistemology Development. Empirically, however, the model is still insufficiently validated. This is especially true for its epistemic volition component - a will or desire to actively change one's beliefs. AIMS: To experimentally scrutinize the role of epistemic volition, we investigated (incremental) effects on epistemic change of an epistemic volition intervention. SAMPLE: 412 psychology students enrolled at German universities completed the study. METHODS: We employed a randomized pre-post design with three experimental groups that differed in the administered epistemic volition and resolvable controversies interventions. The purpose of the latter was to initiate an epistemic change process, thereby laying the foundation for the epistemic volition intervention. Both data collection and interventions were conducted online. In addition to self-report measures, we applied a complementary source evaluation task to analyse epistemic change. RESULTS: Even though we found small- to medium-sized changes in epistemic beliefs, these changes did not differ between experimental conditions. Exploratory analyses suggested, however, that source evaluation task performance might have been promoted by the epistemic volition intervention and that - across experimental groups - manipulation check measures on both interventions interacted positively. CONCLUSION: Ultimately, we failed to separate the effects that our epistemic volition intervention had on epistemic change from these of the resolvable controversies intervention. Nonetheless, our study makes some strong contributions to - and interconnects - the growing bodies of research on epistemic change and multiple source use.

Person- and Situation-Specific Factors in Discounting Science via Scientific Impotence Excuses.

Munro (2010, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00588.x) found that individuals, when confronted with belief-disconfirming scientific evidence, resist this information by concluding that the topic at hand is not amenable to scientific investigation-a scientific impotence excuse. We strived to replicate this finding and to extend this work by analyzing other factors that might lead to scientific impotence excuses. As a person-specific factor, we analyzed the role of epistemic beliefs, and as a situational factor, we focused on the contradictoriness of the evidence at hand. Three sets of hypotheses were preregistered. In an experimental 2 × 3 online study drawing on a general population sample of N = 901 participants, we first assessed our participants' prior beliefs on the effects of acupuncture versus massaging (pro acupuncture vs. no opinion). One experimental group then read fictitious empirical evidence claiming superiority of acupuncture, another group read evidence speaking against acupuncture, and a third group read conflicting evidence (i.e., a mix of pro- and contra-findings). Scientific impotence excuses were measured by a newly developed questionnaire. Our first hypothesis, which suggested that participants believing in the superiority of acupuncture would make stronger scientific impotence excuses when confronted with belief-disconfirming findings, was confirmed. A second hypothesis suggested that scientific impotence excuses would be stronger when individuals were confronted with evidence exhibiting a "nature" that contradicts their topic-specific epistemic beliefs. This hypothesis was partially supported. A third hypothesis suggested that individuals confronted with conflicting evidence would make stronger scientific impotence excuses, and this was again confirmed. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Combining Intra- and Interindividual Approaches in Epistemic Beliefs Research.

We combined inter- and intraindividual approaches to investigate university students' biology- and psychology-specific specific epistemic beliefs (beliefs about the nature and structure of knowledge). We expected that university students would perceive the discipline of biology as more absolute and less multiplistic than the discipline of psychology (intraindividual perspective). Furthermore, we expected students from so-called "hard" disciplines to perceive biology as more absolute and less multiplistic than students from soft disciplines (interindividual perspective). Finally, we expected that students from hard disciplines, compared to their peers from soft disciplines, would perceive stronger differences between biology and psychology (combined perspective). Hypotheses were tested, using Bayes factors, in N = 938 university students from a multitude of disciplines. Results revealed that university students perceive biology as considerably more absolute and less multiplistic compared to psychology. However, the findings also suggest that there are no strong interindividual differences between students from hard and soft disciplines regarding the perception of biology. Finally, results revealed that students enrolled in harder disciplines perceive a slightly stronger difference between biology and psychology. In sum, intraindividual effects were considerably stronger, which elicits doubt that students from hard disciplines espouse a fundamentally different set of epistemic beliefs than their peers from soft disciplines.

Why do we want health information? The goals associated with health information seeking (GAINS) questionnaire.

Objective: Individual goals of health information seeking have been widely neglected by previous research, let alone systematically assessed. The authors propose that these goals may be classified on two dimensions, namely coping focus (problem versus emotion oriented) and regulatory focus (promotion versus prevention oriented).Methods: Based on this classification, the authors developed the 16-item Goals Associated with Health Information Seeking (GAINS) questionnaire measuring the four goals 'understanding', 'action planning', 'hope' and 'reassurance' on four scales, and a superordinate general need for health information. Three studies were conducted to assess the psychometric properties of the questionnaire.Results: In the first two studies (N = 150 and N = 283), internal consistency of the scales was acceptable to very good, and all items had a satisfying discriminatory power. Factorial validity was corroborated by an acceptable model fit in confirmatory factor analyses. In the third study, which included a patient sample (N = 502), the questionnaire proved to be suitable for its target group and nomological relationships with personality as well as with situational variables providing evidence for construct validity.Conclusion: The GAINS is a reliable and valid assessment tool, which enables researchers and practitioners to identify an individual's goals related to health information seeking.

Mechanisms of Epistemic Change-Under Which Circumstances Does Diverging Information Support Epistemic Development?

Background: The number of studies on how to foster change toward advanced epistemic beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing) is continuously growing because these beliefs are an important predictor of learning outcomes. In past intervention studies, presenting diverging information (e.g., descriptions of studies yielding contradictory results) reliably led to epistemic change. However, prior research insufficiently examined which aspects of diverging information affect these changes. Aims: We investigated (1) if epistemic change differs depending on the (un)resolvability of contradictory information, (2) to what extent explicitly reflecting on diverging information supports epistemic change and (3) how topic-specific diverging information affects topic-and domain-specific epistemic beliefs. All confirmatory hypotheses were preregistered at OSF. Additionally, several exploratory analyses were conducted. Method: To examine the research questions, we employed a simple randomized pre-post design with four experimental groups. N = 185 psychology students participated in the study. Experimental groups differed in the kind of diverging information included: Students either read (1) information on students applying learning strategies (control), (2) unresolvable, or (3a) resolvable controversial information on gender stereotyping. In the latter condition (3b), an additional group of participants deliberately resolved apparent contradictions in a writing task. Results: Confirmatory latent change analyses revealed no significant group differences in epistemic change (i.e., beliefs in the control group also changed toward advanced epistemic beliefs). Using a different methodological approach, subsequent exploratory analyses nevertheless showed that presenting diverging information on gender stereotypes produced stronger topic-specific epistemic change and change in justification beliefs in the treatment groups in contrast to the control group. However, effects in the treatment groups did not differ significantly depending on the resolvability of presented controversies or for the group which was instructed explicitly to integrate controversial findings. Conclusion: Contrary to our expectations, diverging information seems to foster epistemic change toward advanced beliefs regardless of the resolvability of presented information, while no final conclusion concerning effects of reflection could be drawn. Moreover, our findings indicate that effects of topic-specific interventions are more pronounced on topic-specific measures. However, this relationship may vary depending on the epistemic belief dimension (e.g., justification beliefs) under investigation.

Correction: Pre-service teachers' perceived value of general pedagogical knowledge for practice: Relations with epistemic beliefs and source beliefs.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0184971.].

Epistemic beliefs as predictors of epistemic emotions: Extending a theoretical model.

BACKGROUND: The cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions states that if students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (e.g., complex and contradictory), cognitive incongruity arises. This, in turn, entails negative emotional consequences. AIMS: The epistemic nature of contradictory learning materials might be perceived differently depending on whether individuals resolve the contradictions or not. Therefore, extending the cognitive incongruity model, the present paper argues that cognitive (in)congruity also depends on how individuals act on the learning materials. We expect that only if students resolve contradictory scientific claims (e.g., by identifying moderators), more advanced epistemic beliefs (e.g., evaluativism) have positive emotional effects and vice versa. SAMPLE: A field-experimental study with N = 86 undergraduate psychology students was conducted. METHOD: Using a multiple-texts approach, participants were first presented controversial evidence on gender stereotyping from 18 different (fictional) studies. In contrast to similar multiple-texts approaches, all contradictions could be resolved by identifying the contextual factors that a certain type of stereotype discrimination occurs in ('resolvable controversies'). After reading, the experimental group was asked to resolve the contradictions, whereas two control groups read the same texts, but were not required to resolve the controversies. RESULTS: Results revealed that absolute beliefs positively and evaluativistic beliefs negatively predict negative emotions, but only if students were instructed to resolve the contradictions. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest that extending the cognitive incongruity model by how students deal with controversial learning materials might be worthwhile.

Pre-service teachers' perceived value of general pedagogical knowledge for practice: Relations with epistemic beliefs and source beliefs.

Pre-service teachers tend to devalue general pedagogical knowledge (GPK) as a valid source for deriving successful teaching practices. The present study investigated beliefs about knowledge sources and epistemic beliefs as predictors for students' perceived value of GPK. Three pre-registered hypotheses were tested. We expected beliefs that GPK originates from scientific sources to entail a devaluation of GPK (Hypothesis 1). Concerning epistemic beliefs, we expected absolute beliefs to positively, and multiplistic beliefs to negatively predict pre-service teachers' perceived practical value of GPK (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we expected relationships between epistemic beliefs and pre-service teachers' perceived practical value of GPK to be confounded by epistemic trustworthiness, perceived topic-specific consistency and topic-specific familiarity (Hypothesis 3). In a study using a split plot design, 365 pre-service teachers were presented with four texts on different educational research topics. For each topic, three text versions were constructed. Even though they were invariant in content, these versions varied in a way that the results were allegedly generated by a practitioner, an expert or by means of a scientific study. Unexpectedly, results showed that research findings allegedly generated by means of a scientific study were associated with a higher perceived value of (topic-specific) GPK for practice (Hypothesis 1). As expected, the perceived value of GPK for practice was predicted by topic-specific multiplism and domain-specific absolutism (Hypothesis 2). These predictive effects were confounded by expertise evaluations of the source and the consistency of prior beliefs with the presented research results (Hypothesis 3). In summary, our results suggest that source beliefs might not be responsible for the devaluation of GPK, but that beliefs on the nature and structure of GPK (i.e., epistemic beliefs) might play an even more important role in this respect. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Assessing epistemic sophistication by considering domain-specific absolute and multiplicistic beliefs separately.

BACKGROUND: Particularly in higher education, not only a view of science as a means of finding absolute truths (absolutism), but also a view of science as generally tentative (multiplicism) can be unsophisticated and obstructive for learning. Most quantitative epistemic belief inventories neglect this and understand epistemic sophistication as disagreement with absolute statements. AIMS: This article suggests considering absolutism and multiplicism as separate dimensions. Following our understanding of epistemic sophistication as a cautious and reluctant endorsement of both positions, we assume evaluativism (a contextually adaptive view of knowledge as personally constructed and evidence-based) to be reflected by low agreement with both generalized absolute and generalized multiplicistic statements. SAMPLES: Three studies with a total sample size of N = 416 psychology students were conducted. METHODS: A domain-specific inventory containing both absolute and multiplicistic statements was developed. Expectations were tested by exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and correlational analyses. RESULTS: Results revealed a two-factor solution with an absolute and a multiplicistic factor. Criterion validity of both factors was confirmed. Cross-sectional analyses revealed that agreement to generalized multiplicistic statements decreases with study progress. Moreover, consistent with our understanding of epistemic sophistication as a reluctant attitude towards generalized epistemic statements, evidence for a negative relationship between epistemic sophistication and need for cognitive closure was found. CONCLUSIONS: We recommend including multiplicistic statements into epistemic belief questionnaires and considering them as a separate dimension, especially when investigating individuals in later stages of epistemic development (i.e., in higher education).