Automatic imitation is reduced in narcissists but only in egocentric perspective-takers.

Narcissism is a prevalent personality trait associated with low concern for others and high self-focus. Congruently, reduced automatic imitation in narcissists was reported in one study (23 participants), but it was not replicated in another (57 participants). In this study, 100 participants completed the previously used narcissism and automatic imitation measures but here along with a visual perspective-taking task allowing to dissociate 4 profiles of perspective-takers. While we confirmed a non-replication at whole-sample level, we did find a reliable negative association between narcissism and automatic imitation among egocentric perspective-takers, that is, characterized as highly self-centered when tasked to adopt someone else's point of view. Our findings shed a new light on whether narcissistic individuals are less sensitive to others, highlight the importance of considering performance-based individual differences within the narcissistic personality, and revisit the recent claim that automatic imitation poorly relates to social functioning by presenting a theoretical framework that questions the sensitivity of the automatic imitation task.

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control.

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent's perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self-other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self-other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self-other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self-other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self-other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self-other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults' performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults' ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

Moral Judgments Depend on Information Presentation: Evidence for Recency and Transfer Effects.

Moral judgements are crucial for social life and rely on the analysis of the agent's intention and the outcome of the agent's action. The current study examines to the influence of how the information is presented on moral judgement. The first experiment investigated the effects of the order in which intention and outcome information was presented. The results showed that participants relied more on the last presented information, suggesting a recency effect. The second experiment required participants to make two types of judgments (wrongness vs. punishment) and manipulated the order of the requested two types of judgments. Results showed an asymmetrical transfer effect whereby punishment judgements, but not wrongness judgements were affected by the order of presentation. This asymmetrical transfer effect was likely linked to the ambiguity of the punishment judgement. Altogether, the study showed that the order in which information was presented and the order in which one was asked to think about the wrongness of an action or the punishment that the action deserves were two factors that should be irrelevant, but actually influenced moral judgements. The influence of these factors was mostly observed during the most difficult judgements, precisely in situations where human decision is called upon, such as in court trials.

Assessing the integrity of the cognitive processes involved in belief reasoning by means of two nonverbal tasks: Rationale, normative data collection and illustration with brain-damaged patients.

Every day, we engage in social interactions with other people which require understanding their as well as our own mental states. Such capacity is commonly referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). Disturbances of ToM are often reported in diverse pathologies which affect brain functioning and lead to problems in social interactions. Identifying ToM deficits is thus crucial to guide the clinicians in the establishment of adequate rehabilitation strategies for patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that ToM is not a unitary function yet currently there are very few standardized tests which allow identifying the type of cognitive processes affected when a patient exhibits a ToM deficit. In the current study, we present two belief reasoning tasks which have been used in previous research to disentangle two types of processes involved in belief reasoning: self-perspective inhibition and the spontaneous inference of another person's belief. A three-step procedure was developed to provide clinicians with the tools to interpret the patients' performances on the tasks. First, these tasks were standardized and normative data was collected on a sample of 124 healthy participants aged between 18 and 74. Data collected showed a decrease in performance as a function of age only in the task that loaded most in spontaneous other-perspective demands. There was however no effect of gender or educational level. Cut-off scores to identify deficits were then calculated for the different age groups separately. Secondly, the three-step procedure was applied to 21 brain-damaged patients and showed a large diversity of profiles, including selective deficits of the two targeted ToM processes. The diversity of profiles shows the importance to take into account the multiple facets of ToM during the diagnosis and rehabilitation of patients with suspected ToM deficits.

The impact of sleep deprivation on visual perspective taking.

Total sleep deprivation (TSD) is known to alter cognitive processes. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to its impact on social cognition. Here, we investigated whether TSD alters levels-1 and -2 visual perspective-taking abilities, i.e. the capacity to infer (a) what can be seen and (b) how it is seen from another person's visual perspective, respectively. Participants completed levels-1 and -2 visual perspective-taking tasks after a night of sleep and after a night of TSD. In these tasks, participants had to take their own (self trials) or someone else's (other trials) visual perspective in trials where both perspectives were either the same (consistent trials) or different (inconsistent trials). An instruction preceding each trial indicated the perspective to take (i.e. the relevant perspective). Results show that TSD globally deteriorates social performance. In the level-1 task, TSD affects the selection of relevant over irrelevant perspectives. In the level-2 task, the effect of TSD cannot be unequivocally explained. This implies that visual perspective taking should be viewed as partially state-dependent, rather than a wholly static trait-like characteristic.

An objective neural signature of rapid perspective taking.

The frequency-tagging approach has generally been confined to study low-level sensory processes and always found related activation over the occipital region. Here for the first time, we investigated with it, high-level socio-cognitive functions, i.e. the processing of what other people are looking at which is referred to as level 1 visual perspective taking (VPT). Sixteen participants were presented with visual scenes alternating at 2.5 Hz which were depicting a person and an object in a room, while recording electrophysiological brain activity. The person orientation and object position changed at every stimulus but the person in the room always faced the object, except on every fifth stimulus. We found responses in the electroencephalography (EEG) spectrum exactly at the frequency corresponding to the presentation of the scenes where the person could not see the object, i.e. 0.5 Hz. While the 2.5 Hz stimulation rate response focused on typical medial occipital sites, the specific 0.5 Hz response was found mainly over a centro-parietal region. Besides a robust group effect, these responses were significant and quantifiable for most individual participants. Overall, these observations reveal a clear measure of level 1-VPT representation, highlighting the potential of EEG frequency-tagging to capture high-level socio-cognitive functions in the brain.

Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning.

A growing body of evidence suggests that adults can monitor other people's beliefs in an efficient way. However, the nature and the limits of efficient belief tracking are still being debated. The present study addressed these issues by testing (a) whether adults spontaneously process other people's beliefs when overt task instructions assign priority to participants' own belief, (b) whether this processing relies on low-level associative processes and (c) whether the propensity to track other people's beliefs is linked to empathic disposition. Adult participants were asked to alternately judge an agent's belief and their own belief. These beliefs were either consistent or inconsistent with each other. Furthermore, visual association between the agent and the object at which he was looking was either possible or impeded. Results showed interference from the agent's belief when participants judged their own belief, even when low-level associations were impeded. This indicates that adults still process other people's beliefs when priority is given to their own belief at the time of computation, and that this processing does not depend on low-level associative processes. Finally, performance on the belief task was associated with the Empathy Quotient and the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, indicating that efficient belief processing is linked to a dispositional dimension of social functioning.

New Insights into the Inter-Individual Variability in Perspective Taking.

This study aimed to test whether individual differences in perspective taking could be explained with two underpinning cognitive dimensions: The ability to handle the conflict between our egocentric perspective and another person's perspective and the relative attentional focus during processing on the egocentric perspective versus another person's perspective. We conducted cluster analyses on 346 participants who completed a visual perspective-taking task assessing performance on these two cognitive dimensions. Individual differences were best reduced by forming four clusters, or profiles, of perspective-takers. This partition reflected a high heterogeneity along both dimensions. In addition, deconstructing the perspective-taking performance into two distinct cognitive dimensions better predicted participants' self-reported everyday life perspective-taking tendencies. Altogether, considering attentional focus and conflict handling as two potential sources of variability allows forming a two-dimensional space that enriches our understanding of the individual differences in perspective taking.

Cathodal Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation on the Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Modulates the Use of Mitigating Circumstances during Moral Judgments.

Recently, a few transcranial magnetic stimulation or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) studies have shown that the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) plays a causal role in moral reasoning especially in cases of accidental harms or attempted harms. The profile of results across studies is, however, not entirely consistent: sometimes the stimulation affects predominantly attempted harms while sometimes the stimulation affects predominantly accidental harms. We argue that such discrepancy could reflect different functional contributions of the rTPJ in moral judgments and that the chosen design parameters or stimulation method may differentially bring to light one or the other functional role of the rTPJ. In the current study, we found that tDCS specifically affected accidental harms but not attempted harms. Low cathodal stimulation of the rTPJ led to a marginally significant increase in the severity of judgments of accidental harms (Experiment 1) while higher cathodal current density led to a highly significant decrease in the severity of judgments of accidental harms (Experiment 2). Our pattern of results in the context of our experimental design can best be explained by a causal role of the rTPJ in processing the mitigating circumstances which reduce a protagonist's moral responsibility. We discuss these results in relation to the idea that the rTPJ may play multiple roles in moral cognition and in relation to methodological aspects related to the use of tDCS.

Impaired spontaneous belief inference following acquired damage to the left posterior temporoparietal junction.

Efficient social interactions require taking into account other people's mental states such as their beliefs, intentions or emotions. Recent studies have shown that in some social situations at least, we do spontaneously take into account others' mental states. The extent to which we have dedicated brain areas for such spontaneous perspective taking is however still unclear. Here, we report two brain-damaged patients whose common lesions were almost exclusively in the left posterior temporoparietal junction (TPJp) and who both showed the same striking and distinctive theory of mind (ToM) deficit. More specifically, they had an inability to take into account someone else's belief unless they were explicitly instructed to tell what that other person thinks or what that person will do. These patients offer a unique insight into the causal link between a specific subregion of the TPJ and a specific cognitive facet of ToM.

I've got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task.

Thinking about how other people represent objects in the world around them is thought to require deliberate effort. In recent years, interactive "joint action" paradigms have shown how social context can affect our cognitive processing. We tested whether people would represent their partner's point of view in a simple team game. Participants played a game in which they had to judge the magnitude of a number either sat alone, or opposite a partner. Importantly they were never asked to judge their partner's point of view. Remarkably, when playing the game as a team, people were better when their partner happened to share their view of the number, such as when seeing a number 8, than when their partner viewed the number to be different, such as when seeing a number 6 that looked like a number 9 to their partner. In two further experiments, we identified the conditions under which the effect was present. Experiment two showed that the effect was only present after observing the prior involvement of one's partner in the task. Experiment 3, showed that the aspect of the stimulus (its magnitude) that participants were sensitive to did not need to be the aspect of the stimulus to which their partner was paying attention.

Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen.

A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as "level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as "level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.

Altercentric interference in level 1 visual perspective taking reflects the ascription of mental states, not submentalizing.

A growing body of work suggests that in some circumstances, humans may be capable of ascribing mental states to others in a way that is fast, cognitively efficient, and implicit (implicit mentalizing hypothesis). However, the interpretation of this work has recently been challenged by suggesting that the observed effects may reflect "submentalizing" effects of attention and memory, with no ascription of mental states (submentalizing hypothesis). The present study employed a strong test between these hypotheses by examining whether apparently automatic processing of another's visual perspective is influenced by experience-dependent beliefs about whether that person can see. Altercentric interference was observed when participants judged their own perspective on stimuli involving an avatar wearing goggles that participants believed to be transparent but not when they believed the goggles to be opaque. These results are consistent with participants ascribing mental states to the avatar and not with the submentalizing hypothesis that altercentric interference arises merely because avatars cue shifts in spatial attention. (PsycINFO Database Record

Can emotions influence level-1 visual perspective taking?

Emotions and perspective-taking are ubiquitous in our daily social interactions, but little is known about the relation between the two. This study examined whether and how emotions can influence even the most basic forms of perspective-taking. Experiment 1 showed that guilt made participants more other-centered in a simple visual perspective-taking task while anger tended to make them more self-centered. These two emotions had, however, no effect on the ability to handle conflicting perspectives. Since the guilt induction method used in Experiment 1 also induced feelings of self-incompetence and shame, Experiment 2 aimed at isolating the effects of these concomitant feelings. Self-incompetence/shame reduced participants' ability to handle conflicting perspectives but did not influence attention allocation. In sum, these results highlight that emotions can affect even the simplest form of perspective-taking and that such influence can be brought about by the modulation of different cognitive mechanisms.

Failed Replication of Oxytocin Effects on Trust: The Envelope Task Case.

The neurohormone Oxytocin (OT) has been one of the most studied peptides in behavioral sciences over the past two decades. Many studies have suggested that OT could increase trusting behaviors. A previous study, based on the "Envelope Task" paradigm, where trust is assessed by the degree of openness of an envelope containing participant's confidential information, showed that OT increases trusting behavior and reported one of the most powerful effects of OT on a behavioral variable. In this paper we present two failed replications of this effect, despite sufficient power to replicate the original large effect. The non-significant results of these two failed replications clearly exclude a large effect of OT on trust in this paradigm but are compatible with either a null effect of OT on trust, or a small effect, undetectable with small sample size (N = 95 and 61 in Study 1 and 2, respectively). Taken together, our results question the purported size of OT's effect on trust and emphasize the need for replications.

Theory of mind difficulties in patients with alcohol dependence: beyond the prefrontal cortex dysfunction hypothesis.

BACKGROUND: Previous studies have shown that alcohol-dependent (AD) individuals have difficulties inferring other people's emotion, understanding humor, and detecting a faux pas. This study aimed at further understanding the nature of such "Theory of Mind" (ToM) difficulties. METHODS: A total of 34 recently detoxified AD and 34 paired controls were compared based on 2 nonverbal and video-based false belief tasks. These tasks were designed to identify 3 different types of deficits: (i) a deficit in dealing with the general task demands, (ii) a selective deficit in self-perspective inhibition, and (iii) a deficit in tracking the other person's mental state. (i) and (ii) are compatible with the hypothesis of a prefrontal cortex dysfunction being at the origin of AD individuals' social difficulties, while (iii) would suggest the possible contribution of a dysfunction of the temporo-parietal junction in explaining the social difficulties. RESULTS: Group analyses highlighted that AD individuals performed worse on the 2 false belief tasks than controls. Individual analyses showed, however, that just under half of the AD individuals were impaired compared to controls. Moreover, most of the AD individuals who were impaired showed a deficit in tracking the other person's belief. This deficit was linked to disease-related factors such as illness duration, average alcohol consumption, and craving but not to general reasoning abilities, depression, anxiety, or demographic variables. CONCLUSIONS: Just under half of the AD individuals tested showed a ToM deficit, and in most cases, the deficit concerned the tracking of other people's mental states. Such a type of deficit has previously been associated with lesions to the temporo-parietal brain areas, indicating that a prefrontal cortex dysfunction may not be the sole origin of the social cognition deficits observed in alcohol dependence.

Clarifying the role of theory of mind areas during visual perspective taking: Issues of spontaneity and domain-specificity.

Visual perspective taking is a fundamental feature of the human social brain. Previous research has mainly focused on explicit visual perspective taking and contrasted brain activation for other- versus self-perspective judgements. This produced a conceptual gap to theory of mind studies, where researchers mainly compared activation for taking another's mental perspective to non-mental control conditions. We compared brain activation for visual perspective taking to activation for non-mental control conditions where the avatar was replaced by directional (arrow, lamp) or non-directional (brick-wall) objects. We found domain-specific activation linked to the avatar's visual perspective in right TPJ, ventral mPFC and ventral precuneus. Interestingly, we found that these areas are spontaneously processing information linked to the other's perspective during self-perspective judgements. Based on a review of the visual perspective taking literature, we discuss how these findings can explain some of the inconsistent/negative results found in previous studies comparing other- versus self-perspective judgements.

Self-perspective inhibition deficits cannot be explained by general executive control difficulties.

Understanding other people's point of view is crucial for successful social interaction but can be particularly challenging in situations where the other person's point view conflicts with our own view. Such situations require executive control processes that help us resist interference from our own perspective. In this study, we examined how domain-general these executive processes are. We report the performance of two pairs of brain-damaged patients who had sustained lesions in different areas of the prefrontal cortex and who showed deficits in classic executive function tasks. The patients were presented with desire reasoning tasks in which two sources of executive control were manipulated: the need to resist interference from one's own desire when inferring someone else's conflicting desire and the need to resist interference from the ascription of an approach motivation when inferring an avoidance-desire. The pattern of performance of the two pairs of patients conformed to a classic double dissociation with one pair of patients showing a deficit in resisting interference from their own perspective but not from the ascription of an approach motivation while the other pair of patients showed the opposite profile. The results are discussed in relation to the specificity of the processes recruited when we resist interference from our own perspective.

From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at.

Two paradigms have shown that people automatically compute what or where another person is looking at. In the visual perspective-taking paradigm, participants judge how many objects they see; whereas, in the gaze cueing paradigm, participants identify a target. Unlike in the former task, in the latter task, the influence of what or where the other person is looking at is only observed when the other person is presented alone before the task-relevant objects. We show that this discrepancy across the two paradigms is not due to differences in visual settings (Experiment 1) or available time to extract the directional information (Experiment 2), but that it is caused by how attention is deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Thus, the mere presence of another person in the field of view is not sufficient to compute where/what that person is looking at, which qualifies the claimed automaticity of such computations.

The BCoS cognitive profile screen: Utility and predictive value for stroke.

OBJECTIVE: We examined the utility of the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS) in discriminating cognitive profiles and recovery of function across stroke survivors. BCoS was designed for stroke-specific problems across 5 cognitive domains: (a) controlled and spatial attention, (b) language, (c) memory, (d) number processing, and (e) praxis. METHOD: On the basis of specific inclusion criteria, this cross-section observational study analyzed cognitive profiles of 657 subacute stroke patients, 331 of them reassessed at 9 months. Impairments on 32 measures were evaluated by comparison with 100 matched healthy controls. Measures of affect, apathy, and activities of daily living were also taken. Between-subjects group comparisons of mean performance scores and impairment rates and within-subject examination of impairment rates over time were conducted. Logistic regressions and general linear modeling were used for multivariate analysis of domain-level effects on outcomes. RESULTS: Individuals with repeated stroke experienced significantly less cognitive recovery at 9 months than those with a first stroke despite similar initial level of cognitive performance. Individuals with left hemisphere lesions performed more poorly than those with right hemisphere lesions, but both groups showed similar extent of recovery at 9 months. BCoS also revealed lesion-side-specific deficits and common areas of persistent problems. Functional outcome at 9 months correlated with domain-level deficits in controlled attention, spatial attention, and praxis over and above initial dependency and concurrent levels of affect and apathy. CONCLUSION: The study demonstrates how BCoS can identify differential cognitive profiles across patient groups. This can potentially help predict outcomes and inform rehabilitation.