Of ugly gains and happy losses: An event-related potential study of interactions of the intrinsic and acquired valence of emotional pictures.

During the last decades, event-related potential research on the processing of intrinsic and acquired valence has made great progress, but the two dimensions rarely varied simultaneously. Only that way, however, can we investigate whether the acquisition of extrinsic valence varies with intrinsic valence and whether intrinsic and acquired valence share the same brain mechanisms. Forty-five participants performed associative learning of gains and losses, using pictures varying on intrinsic valence (positive, negative) and outcome (90 % gain, 50 %/50 %, 90 % loss). 64-channel EEG was recorded. During acquisition, one picture from each valence/outcome combination was repeatedly presented, followed by abstract outcome information (+10 ct, -10 ct) at the predefined probability. In the test phase, participants pressed buttons to earn the real gains and avoid the real losses associated with the pictures. Here, effects of outcome and/or its congruence with intrinsic valence were observed for RT, error rate, frontal theta power, posterior P2, P300, and LPP. Moreover, outcome systematically affected post-test valence and arousal ratings. During acquisition, a contingency effect (90 % > 50 %) on amplitude of a frontal negative slow wave accompanied the progress of learning, independently of outcome, valence, and congruence. The relative absence of outcome effects during acquisition suggests "cold" semantic rather than genuinely affective processing of gains and losses. However, with real gains and losses in the test phase, "hot" affective processing took place, and outcome and its congruence with intrinsic valence influenced behavior and neural processing. Finally, the data suggest both shared and distinct brain mechanisms of intrinsic and acquired valence.

The influence of selective attention to specific emotions on the processing of faces as revealed by event-related brain potentials.

Event-related potential studies using affective words have indicated that selective attention to valence can increase affective discrimination at early perceptual stages. This effect most likely relies on neural associations between perceptual features of a stimulus and its affective value. Similar to words, emotional expressions in human faces are linked to specific visual elements. Therefore, selectively attending to a given emotion should allow for the preactivation of neural networks coding for the emotion and associated first-order visual elements, leading to enhanced early processing of faces expressing the attended emotion. To investigate this, we employed an expression detection task (N = 65). Fearful, happy, and neutral faces were randomly presented in three blocks while participants were instructed to respond only to one predefined target level of expression in each block. Reaction times were the fastest for happy target faces, which was accompanied by an increased occipital P1 for happy compared with fearful faces. The N170 yielded an arousal effect (emotional > neutral) while both components were not modulated by target status. In contrast, the early posterior negativity (EPN) arousal effect tended to be larger for target compared with nontarget faces. The late positive potential (LPP) revealed large effects of status and expression as well as an interaction driven by an increased LPP specifically for nontarget fearful faces. These findings tentatively indicate that selective attention to facial affect may enhance early emotional processing (EPN) even though further research is needed. Moreover, late controlled processing of facial emotions appears to involve a negativity bias.

Dollars do not determine detection: Monetary value associated with unexpected objects does not affect the likelihood of inattentional blindness.

Conscious perception often fails when an object appears unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). Although various factors have been identified that modulate the likelihood of this failure of awareness, it is not clear whether the monetary reward value associated with an object can affect whether or not this object is detected under conditions of inattention. We hypothesised that unexpectedly appearing objects that contain a feature linked to high value, as established via reward learning in a previous task, would subsequently be detected more frequently than objects containing a feature linked to low value. A total of 537 participants first learned the association between a perceptual feature (colour) and subsequent reward values (high, low, or none reward). Afterwards, participants were randomly assigned to a static (Experiment 1) or dynamic (Experiment 2) inattentional blindness task including an unexpected object associated with high, low, or none reward. However, no significant effect of the previously learned value on the subsequent likelihood of detection was observed. We speculate that artificial monetary value, which is known to affect attentional capture, is not strong enough to determine whether or not an object is consciously perceived.

The posterior semantic asymmetry (PSA): specific to written not auditory semantic word processing.

The present study replicates the finding of a posterior semantic asymmetry (PSA; Koppehele-Gossel et al., Brain Lang 157-158:35-43, 2016), a lateralized event-related potential (ERP) suggested to reflect semantic activation from visually presented single words. This ERP negativity, derived from the subtraction of right-side from left-side scalp activity, again peaked around 300 ms at temporoparietal electrodes and was more pronounced in a semantic task, compared to both a silent naming task and a passive viewing task. With analogous tasks, no comparable negativity was found for auditorily presented words. This suggests that the PSA specifically reflects visual-verbal semantic activation. For auditory words, a later variation with the demands on semantic processing was observed for a left-lateralized late positive potential (500-800 ms), which, however, showed a remarkably similar topography as the PSA. Thus, while semantic processing of visual and auditory words converges on left temporoparietal brain areas, the exact patterns of brain electrical activation in terms of time course and polarity are different.

The posterior semantic asymmetry (PSA): An early brain electrical signature of semantic activation from written words.

This study replicates and extends the findings of Koppehele-Gossel, Schnuerch, and Gibbons (2016) of a posterior semantic asymmetry (PSA) in event-related brain potentials (ERPs), which closely tracks the time course and degree of semantic activation from single visual words. This negativity peaked 300 ms after word onset, was derived by subtracting right- from left-side activity, and was larger in a semantic task compared to two non-semantic control tasks. The validity of the PSA in reflecting the effort to activate word meaning was again attested by a negative correlation between the meaning-specific PSA increase and verbal intelligence, even after controlling for nonverbal intelligence. Extending prior work, current source density (CSD) transformation was used. CSD results were consistent with a left temporo-parietal cortical origin of the PSA. Moreover, no PSA was found for pictorial material, suggesting that the component reflects early semantic processing specific to verbal stimuli.

What's past is past: Neither perceptual preactivation nor prior motivational relevance decrease subsequent inattentional blindness.

Inattentional blindness-the phenomenon that clearly visible, yet currently unexpected objects go unnoticed when our attention is focused elsewhere-is an ecologically valid failure of awareness. It is currently subject to debate whether previous events and experiences determine whether or not inattentional blindness occurs. Using a simple two-phase paradigm in the present study, we found that the likelihood of missing an unexpected object due to inattention did not change when its defining characteristic (its color) was perceptually preactivated (Experiment 1; N = 188). Likewise, noticing rates were not significantly reduced if the object's color was previously motivationally relevant during an unrelated detection task (Experiment 2; N = 184). These results corroborate and extend recent findings questioning the influence of previous experience on subsequent inattentional blindness. This has implications for possible countermeasures intended to thwart the potentially harmful effects of inattention.

Detection of deception: Event-related potential markers of attention and cognitive control during intentional false responses.

Successful deception requires the coordination of multiple mental processes, such as attention, conflict monitoring, and the regulation of emotion. We employed a simple classification task, assessing ERPs to further investigate the attentional and cognitive control components of (instructed) deception. In Experiment 1, 20 participants repeatedly categorized visually presented names of five animals and five plants. Prior to the experiment, however, each participant covertly selected one animal and one plant for deliberate misclassification. For these critical items, we observed significantly increased response times (RTs), error rates, and amplitudes of three ERP components: anterior P3a indicating the processing of task relevance, medial-frontal negativity reflecting conflict monitoring, and posterior P3b indicating sustained visual attention. In a blind identification of the individual critical words based on a priori defined criteria, an algorithm using two behavioral and two ERP measures combined showed a sensitivity of 0.73 and a specificity of 0.95, thus performing far above chance (0.2/0.2). Experiment 2 used five clothing and five furniture names and successfully replicated the findings of Experiment 1 in 25 new participants. For detection of the critical words, the algorithm from Experiment 1 was reused with only slight adjustments of the ERP time windows. This resulted in a very high detection performance (sensitivity 0.88, specificity 0.94) and significantly outperformed an algorithm based on RT alone. Thus, at least under controlled laboratory conditions, a highly accurate detection of instructed lies via the attentional and cognitive control components is feasible, and benefits strongly from combined behavioral and ERP measures.

Motivated malleability: Frontal cortical asymmetry predicts the susceptibility to social influence.

Humans, just as many other animals, regulate their behavior in terms of approaching stimuli associated with pleasure and avoiding stimuli linked to harm. A person's current and chronic motivational direction - that is, approach versus avoidance orientation - is reliably reflected in the asymmetry of frontal cortical low-frequency oscillations. Using resting electroencephalography (EEG), we show that frontal asymmetry is predictive of the tendency to yield to social influence: Stronger right- than left-side frontolateral activation during a resting-state session prior to the experiment was robustly associated with a stronger inclination to adopt a peer group's judgments during perceptual decision-making (Study 1). We posit that this reflects the role of a person's chronic avoidance orientation in socially adjusted behavior. This claim was strongly supported by additional survey investigations (Studies 2a, 2b, 2c), all of which consistently revealed that trait avoidance was positively linked to the susceptibility to social influence. The present contribution thus stresses the relevance of chronic avoidance orientation in social conformity, refining (yet not contradicting) the longstanding view that socially influenced behavior is motivated by approach-related goals. Moreover, our findings valuably underscore and extend our knowledge on the association between frontal cortical asymmetry and a variety of psychological variables.

Affective priming and cognitive load: Event-related potentials suggest an interplay of implicit affect misattribution and strategic inhibition.

Prior research suggests that the affective priming effect denoting prime-congruent evaluative judgments about neutral targets preceded by affective primes increases when the primes are processed less deeply. This has been taken as evidence for greater affect misattribution. However, no study so far has combined an experimental manipulation of the depth of prime processing with the benefits of ERPs. Forty-seven participants made like/dislike responses about Korean ideographs following 800-ms affective prime words while 64-channel EEG was recorded. In a randomized within-subject design, three levels of working-memory load were applied specifically during prime processing. Affective priming was significant for all loads and even tended to decrease over loads, although efficiency of the load manipulation was confirmed by reduced amplitudes of posterior attention-sensitive prime ERPs. Moreover, ERPs revealed greater explicit affective discrimination of the prime words as load increased, with strongest valence effects on central/centroparietal N400 and on the parietal/parietooccipital late positive complex under high load. This suggests that (a) participants by default tried to inhibit the processing of the prime's affect, and (b) inhibition more often failed under cognitive load, thus causing emotional breakthrough that resulted in a binding of affect to the prime and, hence, reduced affect misattribution to the target. As a correlate of affective priming in the target ERP, medial-frontal negativity, a well-established marker of (low) stimulus value, increased with increasing negative affect of the prime. Findings support implicit prime-target affect transfer as a major source of affective priming, but also point to the role of strategic top-down processes.

The winner takes it all: Event-related brain potentials reveal enhanced motivated attention toward athletes' nonverbal signals of leading.

Observers of sports can reliably estimate who is leading or trailing based on nonverbal cues. Most likely, this is due to an adaptive mechanism of detecting motivationally relevant signals such as high status, superiority, and dominance. We reasoned that the relevance of leading athletes should lead to a sustained attentional prioritization. To test this idea, we recorded electroencephalography while 45 participants saw brief stills of athletes and estimated whether they were leading or trailing. Based on these recordings, we assessed event-related potentials and focused on the late positive complex (LPC), a well-established signature of controlled attention to motivationally relevant visual stimuli. Confirming our expectation, we found that LPC amplitude was significantly enhanced for leading as compared to trailing athletes. Moreover, this modulation was significantly related to behavioral performance on the score-estimation task. The present data suggest that subtle cues related to athletic supremacy are reliably differentiated in the human brain, involving a strong attentional orienting toward leading athletes. This mechanism might be part of an adaptive cognitive strategy that guides human social behavior.

A brain electrical signature of left-lateralized semantic activation from single words.

Lesion and imaging studies consistently indicate a left-lateralization of semantic language processing in human temporo-parietal cortex. Surprisingly, electrocortical measures, which allow a direct assessment of brain activity and the tracking of cognitive functions with millisecond precision, have not yet been used to capture this hemispheric lateralization, at least with respect to posterior portions of this effect. Using event-related potentials, we employed a simple single-word reading paradigm to compare neural activity during three tasks requiring different degrees of semantic processing. As expected, we were able to derive a simple temporo-parietal left-right asymmetry index peaking around 300ms into word processing that neatly tracks the degree of semantic activation. The validity of this measure in specifically capturing verbal semantic activation was further supported by a significant relation to verbal intelligence. We thus posit that it represents a promising tool to monitor verbal semantic processing in the brain with little technological effort and in a minimal experimental setup.

Multiple neural signatures of social proof and deviance during the observation of other people's preferences.

Detecting one's agreement with or deviation from other people, a key principle of social cognition, relies on neurocognitive mechanisms involved in reward processing, mismatch detection, and attentional orienting. Previous studies have focused on explicit depictions of the (in)congruency of individual and group judgments. Here, we report data from a novel experimental paradigm in which participants first rated a set of images and were later simply confronted with other individuals' ostensible preferences. Participants strongly aligned their judgments in the direction of other people's deviation from their own initial rating, which was neither an effect of regression toward the mean nor of evaluative conditioning (Experiment 1). Most importantly, we provide neurophysiological evidence of the involvement of fundamental cognitive functions related to social comparison (Experiment 2), even though our paradigm did not overly boost this process. Mismatches, as compared to matches, of preferences were associated with an amplitude increase of a broadly distributed N400-like deflection, suggesting that social deviance is represented in the human brain in a similar way as conflicts or breaches of expectation. Also, both early (P2) and late (LPC) signatures of attentional selection were significantly modulated by the social (mis)match of preferences. Our data thus strengthen and valuably extend previous findings on the neurocognitive principles of social proof.

From Positivity to Negativity Bias: Ambiguity Affects the Neurophysiological Signatures of Feedback Processing.

Previous studies on the neurophysiological underpinnings of feedback processing almost exclusively used low-ambiguity feedback, which does not fully address the diversity of situations in everyday life. We therefore used a pseudo trial-and-error learning task to investigate ERPs of low- versus high-ambiguity feedback. Twenty-eight participants tried to deduce the rule governing visual feedback to their button presses in response to visual stimuli. In the blocked condition, the same two feedback words were presented across several consecutive trials, whereas in the random condition feedback was randomly drawn on each trial from sets of five positive and five negative words. The feedback-related negativity (FRN-D), a frontocentral ERP difference between negative and positive feedback, was significantly larger in the blocked condition, whereas the centroparietal late positive complex indicating controlled attention was enhanced for negative feedback irrespective of condition. Moreover, FRN-D in the blocked condition was due to increased reward positivity (Rew-P) for positive feedback, rather than increased (raw) FRN for negative feedback. Our findings strongly support recent lines of evidence that the FRN-D, one of the most widely studied signatures of reinforcement learning in the human brain, critically depends on feedback discriminability and is primarily driven by the Rew-P. A novel finding concerned larger frontocentral P2 for negative feedback in the random but not the blocked condition. Although Rew-P points to a positivity bias in feedback processing under conditions of low feedback ambiguity, P2 suggests a specific adaptation of information processing in case of highly ambiguous feedback, involving an early negativity bias. Generalizability of the P2 findings was demonstrated in a second experiment using explicit valence categorization of highly emotional positive and negative adjectives.

Not quite so blind: Semantic processing despite inattentional blindness.

We often fail to detect clearly visible, yet unexpected objects when our attention is otherwise engaged, a phenomenon widely known as inattentional blindness. The potentially devastating consequences and the mediators of such failures of awareness have been studied extensively. Surprisingly, however, hardly anything is known about whether and how we process the objects that go unnoticed during inattentional blindness. In 2 experiments, we demonstrate that the meaning of objects undetected due to inattentional blindness interferes with the classification of attended stimuli. Responses were significantly slower when the semantic content of an undetected stimulus contradicted that of the attended, to-be-judged object. We thus clarify the depth of the "blindness" caused by inattention, as we provide compelling evidence that failing to detect the unexpected does not preclude its processing, even at postperceptual stages. Despite inattentional blindness, our mind obviously still has access to something as refined as meaning. (PsycINFO Database Record

Social proof in the human brain: Electrophysiological signatures of agreement and disagreement with the majority.

Perceiving one's deviance from the majority usually instigates conformal adjustments of one's own behavior to that of the group. Using ERPs, we investigated the mechanisms by which agreeing and disagreeing with the majority are differentially represented in the human brain and affect subsequent cognitive processing. Replicating previous findings obtained in a slightly different paradigm, we found that learning about one's disagreement with the majority, as compared to learning about one's agreement with the majority, elicited a mediofrontal feedback negativity. Moreover, an enhanced posterior late positive complex was observed during the processing of agreement as compared to disagreement. Finally, when the to-be-judged faces were viewed for a second time, a stronger posterior P2 was observed for faces on whose judgment one had previously agreed with the majority than for those on which one had disagreed. We thus demonstrate that the brain places particular emphasis on the encoding of the rewarding experience of finding strong social proof for one's judgments. Likewise, having experienced agreement on the judgment of a certain item affects even the later reanalysis of this very item, as previous agreement increases early attention, as reflected in the P2. These findings corroborate and extend previous results and theories on the neurocognitive principles of social influence.

Assessing and correcting for regression toward the mean in deviance-induced social conformity.

Our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social conformity has recently advanced due to the employment of neuroscience methodology and novel experimental approaches. Most prominently, several studies have demonstrated the role of neural reinforcement-learning processes in conformal adjustments using a specifically designed and frequently replicated paradigm. Only very recently, the validity of the critical behavioral effect in this very paradigm was seriously questioned, as it invites the unwanted contribution of regression toward the mean. Using a straightforward control-group design, we corroborate this recent finding and demonstrate the involvement of statistical distortions. Additionally, however, we provide conclusive evidence that the paradigm nevertheless captures behavioral effects that can only be attributed to social influence. Finally, we present a mathematical approach that allows to isolate and quantify the paradigm's true conformity effect both at the group level and for each individual participant. These data as well as relevant theoretical considerations suggest that the groundbreaking findings regarding the brain mechanisms of social conformity that were obtained with this recently criticized paradigm were indeed valid. Moreover, we support earlier suggestions that distorted behavioral effects can be rectified by means of appropriate correction procedures.

Some See It, Some Don't: Exploring the Relation between Inattentional Blindness and Personality Factors.

Human awareness is highly limited, which is vividly demonstrated by the phenomenon that unexpected objects go unnoticed when attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). Typically, some people fail to notice unexpected objects while others detect them instantaneously. Whether this pattern reflects stable individual differences is unclear to date. In particular, hardly anything is known about the influence of personality on the likelihood of inattentional blindness. To fill this empirical gap, we examined the role of multiple personality factors, namely the Big Five, BIS/BAS, absorption, achievement motivation, and schizotypy, in these failures of awareness. In a large-scale sample (N = 554), susceptibility to inattentional blindness was associated with a low level of openness to experience and marginally with a low level of achievement motivation. However, in a multiple regression analysis, only openness emerged as an independent, negative predictor. This suggests that the general tendency to be open to experience extends to the domain of perception. Our results complement earlier work on the possible link between inattentional blindness and personality by demonstrating, for the first time, that failures to consciously perceive unexpected objects reflect individual differences on a fundamental dimension of personality.

Weak encoding of faces predicts socially influenced judgments of facial attractiveness.

Conforming to the majority can be seen as a heuristic type of judgment, as it allows the individual to easily choose the most accurate or most socially acceptable type of behavior. People who process the currently to-be-judged items in a superficial, heuristic way should tend to conform to group judgment more than people processing these items in a systematic and elaborate way. We investigated this hypothesis using electroencephalography (EEG), analyzing whether the strength of neural encoding of faces was related to the tendency to adopt a group's evaluative judgments regarding these faces. As expected, we found that the amplitude of the N170, a specific neural correlate of face encoding, was inversely related to conformity across participants: The weaker the faces were encoded, the more the majority response regarding the faces' attractiveness was adopted instead of relying on the actual qualities of the faces. Applying neurophysiological methodology, we thus provide support for previous claims, based on behavioral data and theorizing, that social conformity is a heuristic type of judgment. We propose that weak encoding of judgment-relevant information is a typical, possibly even necessary, precursor of socially adjusted judgments, irrespective of one's current motivational goal (i.e., to be accurate or accepted).

Does semantic preactivation reduce inattentional blindness?

We are susceptible to failures of awareness if a stimulus occurs unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere. Such inattentional blindness is modulated by various parameters, including stimulus attributes, the observer's cognitive resources, and the observer's attentional set regarding the primary task. In three behavioral experiments with a total of 360 participants, we investigated whether mere semantic preactivation of the color of an unexpected object can reduce inattentional blindness. Neither explicitly mentioning the color several times before the occurrence of the unexpected stimulus nor priming the color more implicitly via color-related concepts could significantly reduce the susceptibility to inattentional blindness. Even putting the specific color concept in the main focus of the primary task did not lead to reduced inattentional blindness. Thus, we have shown that the failure to consciously perceive unexpected objects was not moderated by semantic preactivation of the objects' most prominent feature: its color. We suggest that this finding reflects the rather general principle that preactivations that are not motivationally relevant for one's current selection goals do not suffice to make an unexpected object overcome the threshold of awareness.

Neural sensitivity to social deviance predicts attentive processing of peer-group judgment.

The detection of one's deviance from social norms is an essential mechanism of individual adjustment to group behavior and, thus, for the perpetuation of norms within groups. It has been suggested that error signals in mediofrontal cortex provide the neural basis of such deviance detection, which contributes to later adjustment to the norm. In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to demonstrate that, across participants, the strength of mediofrontal brain correlates of the detection of deviance from a peer group's norms was negatively related to attentive processing of the same group's judgments in a later task. We propose that an individual's perception of social deviance might bias basic cognitive processing during further interaction with the group. Strongly perceiving disagreement with a group could cause an individual to avoid or inhibit this group's judgments.