Implications of pandemic influenza for bioterrorism response.

The 1918-1919 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu) had catastrophic effects upon urban populations in the United States. Large numbers of frightened, critically ill people overwhelmed health care providers. Mortuaries and cemeteries were severely strained by rapid accumulation of corpses of flu victims. Understanding of the outbreak's extent and effectiveness of containment measures was obscured by the swiftness of the disease and an inadequate health reporting system. Epidemic controls such as closing public gathering places elicited both community support and resistance, and fear of contagion incited social and ethnic tensions. Review of this infamous outbreak is intended to advance discussions among health professionals and policymakers about an effective medical and public health response to bioterrorism, an infectious disease crisis of increasing likelihood. Elements of an adequate response include building capacity to care for mass casualties, providing emergency burials that respect social mores, properly characterizing the outbreak, earning public confidence in epidemic containment measures, protecting against social discrimination, and fairly allocating health resources.

Plague as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

Trust, The fragile foundation of contemporary biomedical research.

It is widely assumed that informing prospective subjects about the risks and possible benefits of research not only protects their rights as autonomous decisionmakers, but also empowers them to protect their own interests. Yet interviews with patient-subjects conducted under the auspices of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments suggest this is not always the case. Patient-subjects often trust their physician to guide them through decisions on research participation. Clinicians, investigators, and IRBs must assure that such trust is not misplaced.