Mean rating difference scores are poor measures of discernment: The role of response criteria.

Many interventions aim to protect people from misinformation. Here, we review common measures used to assess their efficacy. Some measures only assess the target behavior (e.g., ability to spot misinformation) and therefore cannot determine whether interventions have overly general effects (e.g., erroneously identifying accurate information as misinformation). Better measures assess discernment, the ability to discriminate target from non-target content. Discernment can determine whether interventions are overly general but is often measured by comparing differences in mean ratings between target and non-target content. We show how this measure is confounded by the configuration of response criteria, leading researchers to incorrectly conclude that an intervention improves discernment. We recommend using measures from signal detection theory, such as the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, to assess discernment.

Effects of inductive learning and gamification on news veracity discernment.

This preregistered study tests a novel psychological intervention to improve news veracity discernment. The main intervention involved inductive learning (IL) training (i.e., practice discriminating between multiple true and fake news exemplars with feedback) with or without gamification. Participants (N = 282 Prolific users) were randomly assigned to either a gamified IL intervention, a nongamified version of the same IL intervention, a no-treatment control group, or a Bad News intervention, a notable web-based game designed to tackle online misinformation. Following the intervention (if applicable), all participants rated the veracity of a novel set of news headlines. We hypothesized that the gamified intervention would be the most effective for improving news veracity discernment, followed by its nongamified equivalent, then Bad News, and finally the control group. The results were analyzed with receiver-operating characteristic curve analyses, which have previously never been applied to news veracity discernment. The analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between conditions and the Bayes factor indicated very strong evidence for the null. This finding raises questions about the effectiveness of current psychological interventions and contradicts prior research that has supported the efficacy of Bad News. Age, gender, and political leaning all predicted news veracity discernment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Action slips in food choices: A measure of habits and goal-directed control.

We report a new, simple instrumental action-slip task, which sets goal-directed action against putative S-R associations. On each training trial, participants were presented with one of two stimuli (blue or green coloured screen). One stimulus (S1) signalled that one joystick response (R1-left or right push) would earn one of two rewards (O1-jellybeans or Pringles points). A second stimulus (S2) signalled a different instrumental relationship (S2:R2-O2). On each test trial, participants were told which outcome could be earnt (O1/O2) on that trial. They were required to withhold responding until the screen changed colour to S1 or S2. On congruent test trials, the stimulus presented (e.g., S1) was associated with the same response (R1) as the outcome available on that trial (O1). On incongruent test trials, in contrast, the outcome (e.g., O1) preceded a stimulus that was associated with a different response (e.g., S2). Hence, in order to obtain the outcome (O1) on incongruent trials, participants were required to suppress any tendency they might have to make the response associated with the stimulus (R2 in response to S2). In two experiments, participants made more errors on incongruent than congruent trials. This result suggests that, on incongruent trials, the stimulus drove responding (e.g., S2 increased R2 responding) in a manner that was inconsistent with goal-directed action (e.g., R1 responding to obtain O1)-an action slip. The results are discussed in terms of popular dual-process theories of instrumental action and a single-process alternative.

Pre-testing effects are target-specific and are not driven by a generalised state of curiosity.

Guessing an answer to an unfamiliar question prior to seeing the answer leads to better memory than studying alone (the pre-testing effect), which some theories attribute to increased curiosity. A similar effect occurs in general knowledge learning: people are more likely to recall information that they were initially curious to learn. Gruber and Ranganath [(2019). How curiosity enhances hippocampus-dependent memory: The prediction, appraisal, curiosity, and exploration (PACE) framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(12), 1014-1025] argued that unanswered questions can cause a state of curiosity during which encoding is enhanced for the missing answer, but also for incidental information presented at the time. If pre-testing similarly induces curiosity, then it too should produce better memory for incidental information. We tested this idea in three experiments that varied the order, nature and timing of the incidental material presented within a pre-testing context. All three experiments demonstrated a reliable pre-testing effect for the targets, but no benefit for the incidental material presented before the target. This pattern suggests that the pre-testing effect is highly specific and is not consistent with a generalised state of curiosity.

The benefits of impossible tests: Assessing the role of error-correction in the pretesting effect.

Relative to studying alone, guessing the meanings of unknown words can improve later recognition of their meanings, even if those guesses were incorrect - the pretesting effect (PTE). The error-correction hypothesis suggests that incorrect guesses produce error signals that promote memory for the meanings when they are revealed. The current research sought to test the error-correction explanation of the PTE. In three experiments, participants studied unfamiliar Finnish-English word pairs by either studying each complete pair or by guessing the English translation before its presentation. In the latter case, the participants also guessed which of two categories the word belonged to. Hence, guesses from the correct category were semantically closer to the true translation than guesses from the incorrect category. In Experiment 1, guessing increased subsequent recognition of the English translations, especially for translations that were presented on trials in which the participants' guesses were from the correct category. Experiment 2 replicated these target recognition effects while also demonstrating that they do not extend to associative recognition performance. Experiment 3 again replicated the target recognition pattern, while also examining participants' metacognitive recognition judgments. Participants correctly judged that their memory would be better after small than after large errors, but incorrectly believed that making any errors would be detrimental, relative to study-only. Overall, the data are inconsistent with the error-correction hypothesis; small, within-category errors produced better recognition than large, cross-category errors. Alternative theories, based on elaborative encoding and motivated learning, are considered.

Pretesting boosts item but not source memory.

Two experiments examined the effect of pretesting on target recognition and source memory. In an initial encoding phase, participants attempted to learn the common English definitions of rare English words. For each rare word, the participants either guessed the definition of the rare English word before it was revealed (Pretest condition) or just studied the complete word pair without first guessing the definition (Read-only condition). To manipulate source information, the targets were either presented in different colours (Experiment 1) or lists (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the participants correctly recognised more targets from Pretest trials than Read-only trials, but showed no difference in source memory. Pretesting, therefore, appears to improve target recognition memory, but not memory for contextual information. The results are discussed in relation to semantic and episodic theories of the pretesting effect.

Pretesting boosts recognition, but not cued recall, of targets from unrelated word pairs.

Attempting to retrieve the answer to a question on an initial test can improve memory for that answer on a subsequent test, relative to an equivalent study period. Such retrieval attempts can be beneficial even when they are unsuccessful, although this benefit is usually only seen with related word pairs. Three experiments examined the effects of pretesting for both related (e.g., pond-frog) and unrelated (e.g., pillow-leaf) word pairs on cued recall and target recognition. Pretesting improved subsequent cued recall performance for related but not for unrelated word pairs, relative to simply studying the word pairs. Tests of target recognition, by contrast, revealed benefits of pretesting for memory of targets from both related and unrelated word pairs. These data challenge popular theories that suggest that the pretesting effect depends on partial activation of the target during the pretesting phase.

Human appetitive Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer: a goal-directed account.

Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks assess the impact of environmental stimuli on instrumental actions. Since their initial translation from animal to human experiments, PIT tasks have provided insight into the mechanisms that underlie reward-based behaviour. This review first examines the main types of PIT tasks used in humans. We then seek to contribute to the current debate as to whether human PIT effects reflect a controlled, goal-directed process, or a more automatic, non-goal-directed mechanism. We argue that the data favour a goal-directed process. The extent to which the major theories of PIT can account for these data is then explored. We discuss a number of associative accounts of PIT as well as dual-process versions of these theories. Ultimately, however, we favour a propositional account, in which human PIT effects are suggested to be driven by both perceived outcome availability and outcome value. In the final section of the review, we present the potential objections to the propositional approach that we anticipate from advocates of associative link theories and our response to them. We also identify areas for future research.

Selective effects of errorful generation on recognition memory: the role of motivation and surprise.

The current research examined the effects of errorful generation on memory, focusing particularly on the roles of motivation and surprise. In two experiments, participants were first presented with photographs of faces and were asked to associate four facts with each photograph. On Generate trials, the participants guessed two of the facts (Guess targets) before those correct facts, and another two correct facts (Study targets), were revealed. On the remaining Read trials, all four facts were presented without a guessing stage. In Experiment 1, participants also ranked their motivation to know the answers before they were revealed, or their surprise on learning the true answers. Guess targets were subsequently better recognised than the concurrently presented, non-guessed Study targets. Guess targets were also better recognised than Read targets, and recognition of Study and Read targets did not differ. Errorful generation also increased self-reported motivation, but not surprise. Experiment 2 showed that the results of Experiment 1 can outlive a 20-minute delay, and that they generalise to a more challenging recognition test. Together, the results suggest that errorful generation improves memory specifically for the guessed fact, and this may be linked to an increase in motivation to learn that fact.

Goal-directed control in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

The current article concerns human outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT), where Pavlovian cues selectively invigorate instrumental responses that predict common rewarding outcomes. Several recent experiments have observed PIT effects that were insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations, which has been taken as evidence of an automatic "associative" mechanism. Other similar studies observed PIT effects that were sensitive to devaluation, which suggests a more controlled, goal-directed process. Studies supporting the automatic approach have been criticized for using a biased baseline, whereas studies supporting the goal-directed approach have been criticized for priming multiple outcomes at test. The current experiment addressed both of these issues. Participants first learned to perform two instrumental responses to earn two outcomes each (R1-O1/O3, R2-O2/O4), before four Pavlovian stimuli (S1-S4) were trained to predict each outcome. One outcome that was paired with each instrumental response (O3 and O4) was then devalued, so that baseline response choice at test would be balanced. Instrumental responding was then assessed in the presence of each individual Pavlovian stimulus, so that only one outcome was primed per trial. PIT effects were observed for the valued outcomes (ts > 3.96, ps < .001) but not for the devalued outcomes (F < 1, Bayes Factor10 = .29). Hence, when baseline response choice was equated and only one outcome was primed per test trial, PIT was sensitive to outcome devaluation. The data therefore support goal-directed models of PIT. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice.

The extent to which human outcome-response (O-R) priming effects are automatic or under cognitive control is currently unclear. Two experiments tested the effect of cognitive load on O-R priming to shed further light on the debate. In Experiment 1, two instrumental responses earned beer and chocolate points in an instrumental training phase. Instrumental response choice was then tested in the presence of beer, chocolate, and neutral stimuli. On test, a Reversal instruction group was told that the stimuli signalled which response would not be rewarded. The transfer test was also conducted under either minimal (No Load) or considerable (Load) cognitive load. The Non-Reversal groups showed O-R priming effects, where the reward cues increased the instrumental responses that had previously produced those outcomes, relative to the neutral stimulus. This effect was observed even under cognitive load. The Reversal No Load group demonstrated a reversed effect, where response choice was biased towards the response that was most likely to be rewarded according to the instruction. Most importantly, response choice was at chance in the Reversal Load condition. In Experiment 2, cognitive load abolished the sensitivity to outcome devaluation that was otherwise seen when multiple outcomes and responses were cued on test. Collectively, the results demonstrate that complex O-R priming effects are sensitive to cognitive load, whereas the very simple, standard O-R priming effect is more robust.

Extinguishing cue-controlled reward choice: Effects of Pavlovian extinction on outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the finding that presenting Pavlovian predictors of outcomes can enhance the vigor of instrumental responding for those same outcomes. Three experiments examined the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) extinction. In Experiment 1, participants first learnt to perform different instrumental responses to earn different outcomes. In a separate Pavlovian training phase, certain stimuli were established as Pavlovian signals of the different outcomes. Some of these Pavlovian stimuli were then extinguished (they were presented alone, without any outcome), while others were not. A final transfer test measured the extent to which these Pavlovian cues biased instrumental response choice. Consistent with previous work, the observed PIT effects were immune to Pavlovian extinction; the non-extinguished and extinguished cues produced PIT effects that did not significantly differ in size. In Experiment 2, response choice was tested in the presence of compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. Response choice was highly sensitive to the extinction manipulation under these circumstances. Experiment 3 tested whether this sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction was a direct effect of the associative strength of the Pavlovian cues present, or an indirect effect of cue salience. The results provide unique evidence to suggest that PIT is a direct consequence of the strength of the Pavlovian associations. (PsycINFO Database Record

Evidence of a goal-directed process in human Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Cues that signal rewards can motivate reward-seeking behaviors, even for outcomes that are not currently desired. Three experiments examined this phenomenon, using an outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) design and an outcome devaluation procedure. In Experiment 1, participants learned to perform one response to earn crisps points and another response to earn popcorn points. One outcome was then devalued by adulterating it to make it taste unpleasant. On test, overall response choice was biased toward the outcome that had not been devalued, indicating goal-directed control. Stimuli that signaled crisps and popcorn also biased instrumental response choice toward their respective outcomes (a PIT effect). Most importantly, the strength of this bias was not influenced by the devaluation manipulation. In contrast, Experiment 2 demonstrated that when stimuli signaled equal probability of the two outcomes, cue-elicited response choice was sensitive to the devaluation manipulation. Experiment 3 confirmed this conclusion by demonstrating a selective avoidance of the cued, devalued outcome. Together, these data support a goal-directed model of PIT in which expected outcome probability and value make independent contributions to response choice. (PsycINFO Database Record

Miss it and miss out: Counterproductive nonspatial attentional capture by task-irrelevant, value-related stimuli.

Recent studies of visual search suggest that learning about valued outcomes (rewards and punishments) influences the likelihood that distractors will capture spatial attention and slow search for a target, even when those value-related distractors have never themselves been the targets of search. In the present study, we demonstrated a related effect in the context of temporal, rather than spatial, selection. Participants were presented with a temporal stream of pictures in a fixed central location and had to identify the orientation of a rotated target picture. Response accuracy was reduced if the rotated target was preceded by a "valued" distractor picture that signaled that a correct response to the target would be rewarded (and an incorrect response punished), relative to a distractor picture that did not signal reward or punishment. This effect of signal value on response accuracy was short-lived, being most prominent with a short lag between distractor and target. Impairment caused by a valued distractor was observed if participants were explicitly instructed regarding its relation to reward/punishment (Exps. 1, 3, and 4), or if they could learn this relationship only via trial-by-trial experience (Exp. 2). These findings show that the influence of signal value on attentional capture extends to temporal selection, and also demonstrate that value-related distractors can interfere with the conscious perception of subsequent target information.

Drug cue reactivity involves hierarchical instrumental learning: evidence from a biconditional Pavlovian to instrumental transfer task.

RATIONALE: Drug cue reactivity plays a crucial role in addiction, yet the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. According to the binary associative account, drug stimuli retrieve an expectation of the drug outcome, which, in turn, elicits the associated drug-seeking response (S-O-R). By contrast, according to the hierarchical account, drug stimuli retrieve an expectation that the contingency between the drug-seeking response and the drug outcome is currently more effective, promoting performance of the drug-seeking response (S:R-O). METHODS: The current study discriminated between these two accounts using a biconditional Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) task with 128 alcohol drinkers. A biconditional discrimination was first trained in which two responses produced alcohol and food outcomes, respectively, and these response-outcome contingencies were reversed across two discriminative stimuli (SDs). In the PIT test, alcohol and food cues were compounded with the two SDs to examine their impact on percent alcohol choice in extinction. RESULTS: It was found that alcohol and food cues selectively primed choice of the response that earned that outcome in each SD (p < .001), and this effect was associated with participants' belief that cues signalled greater effectiveness of that response (p < .0001). CONCLUSIONS: The alcohol stimulus could not have selectively primed the alcohol-seeking response through binary S-O-R associations because the drug outcome was equally associated with both responses. Rather, the alcohol stimulus must have retrieved an expectation that the response-alcohol contingency available in the current context was more likely to be effective (S:R-O), which primed performance of the alcohol-seeking response.

The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking.

Two experiments examined the role of propositional and automatic (ideomotor) processes in cue-elicited responding for rewarding outcomes (beer and chocolate). In a training phase, participants earned either chocolate or beer points by making one of two button-press responses. Rewards were indicated by the presentation of chocolate and beer pictures. On test, each trial began with a picture of beer or chocolate, or a blank screen, and choice of the beer versus chocolate response was assessed in the presence of these three pictures. Participants tended to choose the beer and chocolate response in the presence of the beer and chocolate pictures, respectively. In Experiment 1, instructions signalling that the pictures did not indicate which response would be rewarded significantly reduced the priming effect. In Experiment 2, instructions indicating that the pictures signified which response would not be rewarded resulted in a reversed priming effect. Finally, in both experiments, the priming effect correlated with self-reported beliefs that the cues signalled which response was more likely to be reinforced. These results suggest that cue-elicited response selection is mediated by a propositional belief regarding the efficacy of the response-outcome relationship, rather than an automatic ideomotor mechanism.