Phonological Ambiguity Detection Outside of Consciousness and Its Defensive Avoidance.

Freud proposes that in unconscious processing, logical connections are also (heavily) based upon phonological similarities. Repressed concerns, for example, would also be expressed by way of phonologic ambiguity. In order to investigate a possible unconscious influence of phonological similarity, 31 participants were submitted to a tachistoscopic subliminal priming experiment, with prime and target presented at 1 ms. In the experimental condition, the prime and one of the 2 targets were phonological reversed forms of each other, though graphemically dissimilar (e.g., "nice" and "sign"); in the control condition the targets were pseudo-randomly attributed to primes to which they don't belong. The experimental task was to "blindly" pick the choice most similar to the prime. ERPs were measured with a focus on the N320, which is known to react selectively to phonological mismatch in supraliminal visual word presentations. The N320 amplitude-effects at the electrodes on the midline and at the left of the brain significantly predicted the participants' net behavioral choices more than half a second later, while their subjective experience is one of arbitrariness. Moreover, the social desirability score (SDS) significantly correlates with both the behavioral and the N320 brain responses of the participants. It is proposed that in participants with low SDS the phonological target induces an expected reduction of N320 and this increases their probability to pick this target. In contrast, high defensive participants have a perplexed brain reaction upon the phonological target, with a negatively peaking N320 as compared to control and this leads them to avoid this target more often. Social desirability, which is understood as reflecting defensiveness, might also manifest itself as a defense against the (energy-consuming) ambiguity of language. The specificity of this study is that all of this is happening totally out of awareness and at the level of very elementary linguistic distinctions.

Processing of a Subliminal Rebus during Sleep: Idiosyncratic Primary versus Secondary Process Associations upon Awakening from REM- versus Non-REM-Sleep.

Primary and secondary processes are the foundational axes of the Freudian mental apparatus: one horizontally as a tendency to associate, the primary process, and one vertically as the ability for perspective taking, the secondary process. Primary process mentation is not only supposed to be dominant in the unconscious but also, for example, in dreams. The present study tests the hypothesis that the mental activity during REM-sleep has more characteristics of the primary process, while during non-REM-sleep more secondary process operations take place. Because the solving of a rebus requires the ability to non-contexually condensate the literal reading of single stimuli into a new one, rebus solving is a primary process operation by excellence. In a replication of the dream-rebus study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967), a rebus, which consisted of an image of a comb (German: "Kamm") and an image of a raft (German: "Floß"), resulting in the German rebus word "kampflos" (Engl.: without a struggle), was flashed subliminally (at 1 ms) to 20 participants before going to sleep. Upon consecutive awakenings participants were asked for a dream report, free associations and an image description. Based on objective association norms, there were significantly more conceptual associations referring to Kamm and Floß indexing secondary process mentation when subjects were awakened from non-REM sleep as compared to REM-awakenings. There were not significantly more rebus associations referring to kampflos indexing primary process mentation when awakened from REM-sleep as compared to non-REM awakenings. However, when the associations were scored on the basis of each subject's individual norms, there was a rebus effect with more idiosyncratic rebus associations in awakenings after REM than after non-REM-sleep. Our results support the general idea that REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the secondary process.

P3b, consciousness, and complex unconscious processing.

How can perceptual consciousness be indexed in humans? Recent work with ERPs suggests that P3b, a relatively late component, may be a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). This proposal dovetails with currently prevailing cognitive theory regarding the nature of conscious versus unconscious processes, which holds that the latter are simple and very brief, whereas consciousness is ostensibly required for more durable, complex cognitive processing. Using a P3b oddball paradigm, we instead show that P3b and even later, related slow wave activity occur under rigorously subliminal conditions. Additional principal component analysis (PCA) further differentiated the presence of both P3a and P3b components, demonstrating that the latter indeed occurred subliminally. Collectively, our results suggest that complex, sustained cognitive processing can occur unconsciously and that P3b is not an NCC after all.

Extremely rigorous subliminal paradigms demonstrate unconscious influences on simple decisions.

While showing unconscious influences on complex decisions is indeed difficult, relevant awareness in relatively simpler subliminal paradigms is more easily assessed. Utilizing objective detection (vs. more typical identification or classification) tasks to assess awareness overcomes longstanding residual methodological problems, and prior work using such methods (e.g., Snodgrass & Shevrin 2006) clearly shows unconscious influences on simple decisions.

Subliminal unconscious conflict alpha power inhibits supraliminal conscious symptom experience.

Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses, cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets. With alpha power as a marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an individual's unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning.

Subliminal affect valence words change conscious mood potency but not valence: is this evidence for unconscious valence affect?

Whether or not affect can be unconscious remains controversial. Research claiming to demonstrate unconscious affect fails to establish clearly unconscious stimulus conditions. The few investigations that have established unconscious conditions fail to rule out conscious affect changes. We report two studies in which unconscious stimulus conditions were met and conscious mood changes measured. The subliminal stimuli were positive and negative affect words presented at the objective detection threshold; conscious mood changes were measured with standard manikin valence, potency, and arousal scales. We found and replicated that unconscious emotional stimuli produced conscious mood changes on the potency scale but not on the valence scale. Were positive and negative affects aroused unconsciously, but reflected consciously in potency changes? Or were the valence words unconscious cognitive causes of conscious mood changes being activated without unconscious affect? A thought experiment is offered as a way to resolve this dilemma.

Unconscious inhibition and facilitation at the objective detection threshold: replicable and qualitatively different unconscious perceptual effects.

Although the veridicality of unconscious perception is increasingly accepted, core issues remain unresolved [Jack, A., & Shallice, T. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition, 79, 161-196], and sharp disagreement persists regarding fundamental methodological and theoretical issues. The most critical problem is simple but tenacious-namely, how to definitively rule out weak conscious perception as an alternative explanation for putatively unconscious effects. Using a direct task and objectively undetectable stimuli, the current experiments demonstrate clearly reliable unconscious perceptual effects, which differ qualitatively from weakly conscious effects in fundamental ways. Most importantly, the current effects correlate negatively with stimulus detectability, directly rebutting the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems [Reingold, E., & Merikle, P. (1988). Using direct and indirect measures to study perception without awareness. Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 563-575; Reingold, E., & Merikle, P. (1990). On the inter-relatedness of theory and measurement in the study of unconscious processes. Mind and Language, 5, 9-28)], which all predict positive correlations. Moreover, the current effects are entirely bidirectional [Katz, (2001). Bidirectional experimental effects. Psychological Methods, 6, 270-281)] and radically uncontrollable, including below-chance performance despite intentions to facilitate. In contrast, weakly conscious effects on direct measures are unidirectional, facilitative, and potentially controllable. Moreover, these qualitative differences also suggest that objective and subjective threshold phenomena are fundamentally distinct, rather than the former simply being a weaker version of the latter [Merikle, P., Smilek, D., Eastwood, J. (2001). Perception without awareness: Perspectives from cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79, 115-134]. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between rather than conflate these methods. Further, the current effects reinforce recent work [e.g. Naccache, L., Blandin, E., & Dehaene, S. (2002). Unconscious masked priming depends on temporal attention. Psychological Science, 13, 416-424] demonstrating that unconscious effects, although not selectively controllable, are nonetheless mediated by strategic and individual difference factors, rather than being immune to such influences as long thought.

Anxiety, attributional thinking,and the primary process.

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well-established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions--all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3-5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10-point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a significant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth finding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.

Unconscious perception: a model-based approach to method and evidence.

Unconscious perceptual effects remain controversial because it is hard to rule out alternative conscious perception explanations for them. We present a novel methodological framework, stressing the centrality of specifying the single-process conscious perception model (i.e., the null hypothesis). Various considerations, including those of SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), suggest that conscious perception functions hierarchically, in such a way that higher level effects (e.g., semantic priming) should not be possible without lower level discrimination (i.e., detection and identification). Relatedly, alternative conscious perception accounts (as well as the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems-Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990) predict positive relationships between direct and indirect measures. Contrariwise, our review suggests that negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships are found, providing strong evidence for unconscious perception and further suggesting that conscious and unconscious perceptual influences are functionally exclusive (cf. Jones, 1987), in such a way that the former typically override the latter when both are present. Consequently, unconscious perceptual effects manifest reliably only when conscious perception is completely absent, which occurs at the objective detection (but not identification) threshold.

Characterization of event related potentials using information theoretic distance measures.

Analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs) using signal processing tools has become extremely widespread in recent years. Nonstationary signal processing tools such as wavelets and time-frequency distributions have proven to be especially effective in characterizing the transient phenomena encountered in event-related potentials. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of event-related potentials collected during a psychological experiment where two groups of subjects, spider phobics and snake phobics, are shown the same set of stimulus: A blank stimulus, a neutral stimulus and a spider stimulus. We introduce a new approach, based on time-frequency distributions, for analyzing the ERPs. The difference in brain activity before and after a stimulus is presented is quantified using distance measures as adapted to the time-frequency plane. Three different distance measures, including a new information theoretic distance measure, are applied on the time-frequency plane to discriminate between the responses of the two groups of subjects. The results illustrate the effectiveness of using distance measures combined with time-frequency distributions in differentiating between the two classes of subjects and the different regions of the brain.

A temporal dissociation of subliminal versus supraliminal fear perception: an event-related potential study.

Current theories of emotion suggest that threat-related stimuli are first processed via an automatically engaged neural mechanism, which occurs outside conscious awareness. This mechanism operates in conjunction with a slower and more comprehensive process that allows a detailed evaluation of the potentially harmful stimulus (LeDoux, 1998). We drew on the Halgren and Marinkovic (1995) model to examine these processes using event-related potentials (ERPs) within a backward masking paradigm. Stimuli used were faces with fear and neutral (as baseline control) expressions, presented above (supraliminal) and below (subliminal) the threshold for conscious detection. ERP data revealed a double dissociation for the supraliminal versus subliminal perception of fear. In the subliminal condition, responses to the perception of fear stimuli were enhanced relative to neutral for the N2 "excitatory" component, which is thought to represent orienting and automatic aspects of face processing. By contrast, supraliminal perception of fear was associated with relatively enhanced responses for the late P3 "inhibitory" component, implicated in the integration of emotional processes. These findings provide evidence in support of Halgren and Marinkovic's temporal model of emotion processing, and indicate that the neural mechanisms for appraising signals of threat may be initiated, not only automatically, but also without the need for conscious detection of these signals.

The priority of primary process categorizing: experimental evidence supporting a psychoanalytic developmental hypothesis.

Earlier work has provided experimental evidence for the existence of the primary and secondary process mental organization posited by Freud and has demonstrated that primary process effects are the more active unconsciously (Brakel et al. 2000). Primary and secondary processes were assessed by a categorization test in which qualitatively different principles could be used. In new experiments using the same stimuli, another significant implication of Freud's model was tested: that primary process mental organization has developmental priority. In these experiments, which studied 559 participants ranging in age from 3 to 80, it was found (1) that primary process mentation predominates in preschoolers; (2) that it is not until around age 7 that primary process organization is supplanted by secondary process organization; and (3) that after age 7 the predominance of secondary process organization remains remarkably stable throughout the life span.

A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression.

In previous research Libet (1966) discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for neural activation of consciousness, suggesting the possibility that this neurophysiological time factor is a necessary condition for the development of repression.