Fulfilment of intention and desire in children's judgements of emotion for sociomoral events.

This study investigated whether children appreciate that enacting an intention can emotionally affect an agent separately from whether the agent's desire is fulfilled. Children ages 5-11 years and adults heard several vignettes about an agent who intended to take another child's toy in which the agent's intention was either enacted or blocked and desire was fulfilled or unfulfilled. The effect of intention on judgements of the agent's emotion varied according to desire fulfilment and age. Overall, participants judged that an agent who acted intentionally to fulfil a desire felt happier than an agent whose intention was blocked. When the agent's desire was unfulfilled, the effect of enacting an intention varied by age. Five- to 6-year-olds judged that acting intentionally could decrease the negative emotion associated with an unfulfilled desire. The findings show relatively early appreciation of intentionality in children's judgements of emotion. Happy victimizer attributions decreased between 5 and 8 years, but attributions of positive emotion to transgressors did not vary by intentionality. The relationships between intentionality, agency, and emotion are discussed.

Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment.

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.