A "Goldilocks zone" for mind-wandering reports? A secondary data analysis of how few thought probes are enough for reliable and valid measurement.

Mind-wandering assessment relies heavily on the thought probe technique as a reliable and valid method to assess momentary task-unrelated thought (TUT), but there is little guidance available to help researchers decide how many probes to include within a task. Too few probes may lead to unreliable measurement, but too many probes might artificially disrupt normal thought flow and produce reactive effects. Is there a "Goldilocks zone" for how few thought probes can be used to reliably and validly assess individual differences in mind-wandering propensity? We address this question by reanalyzing two published datasets (Study 1, n = 541; Study 2, ns ≈ 260 per condition) in which thought probes were presented in multiple tasks. Our primary analyses randomly sampled probes in increments of two for each subject in each task. A series of confirmatory factor analyses for each probe "bin" size tested whether the latent correlations between TUT rate and theoretically relevant constructs like working memory capacity, attention-control ability, disorganized schizotypy, and retrospective self-reported mind wandering changed as more probes assessed the TUT rate. TUT rates were remarkably similar across increasing probe-bin sizes and zero-order correlations within and between tasks stabilized at 8-10 probes; moreover, TUT-rate correlations with other latent variables stabilized at about 8 thought probes. Our provisional recommendation (with caveats) is that researchers may use as few as 8 thought probes in prototypical cognitive tasks to gain reliable and valid information about individual differences in TUT rate.

Interpolated testing and content pretesting as interventions to reduce task-unrelated thoughts during a video lecture.

Considerable research has examined the prevalence and apparent consequences of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) in both laboratory and authentic educational settings. Few studies, however, have explored methods to reduce TUTs during learning; those few studies tested small samples or used unvalidated TUT assessments. The present experimental study attempted to conceptually replicate or extend previous findings of interpolated testing and pretesting effects on TUT and learning. In a study of 195 U.S. undergraduates, we investigated whether interpolated testing (compared to interpolated restudy) and pretesting on lecture-relevant materials (compared to pretesting on conceptually related but lecture-irrelevant materials) would reduce TUTs during a video lecture on introductory statistics. Subjects completed either a content-matched or content-mismatched pretest on statistics concepts and then watched a narrated lecture slideshow. During the lecture, half of the sample completed interpolated tests on the lecture material and half completed interpolated restudy of that material. All subjects responded to unpredictably presented thought probes during the video to assess their immediately preceding thoughts, including TUTs. Following the lecture, students reported on their situational interest elicited by the lecture and then completed a posttest. Interpolated testing significantly reduced TUT rates during the lecture compared to restudying, conceptually replicating previous findings-but with a small effect size and no supporting Bayes-factor evidence. We found statistical evidence for neither an interpolated testing effect on learning, nor an effect of matched-content pretesting on TUT rates or learning. Interpolated testing might have limited utility to support students' attention, but varying effect sizes across studies warrants further work.

Linking the dynamics of cognitive control to individual differences in working memory capacity: Evidence from reaching behavior.

We used a technique known as reach tracking to investigate how individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) relate to the functioning of two processes proposed to underlie cognitive control: a threshold adjustment process that temporarily inhibits motor output in response to signals of conflict and a controlled selection process that recruits top-down control to guide stimulus-response translation. Undergraduates (N = 135) performed two WMC tasks (updating counters and symmetry span) and a reach-tracking version of the Eriksen flanker task. Consistent with previous research using button-press flanker tasks, WMC significantly correlated with response time (RT) performance, with higher WMC scores corresponding to smaller congruency effects. Given that RTs reflect the combined functioning of multiple processes underlying cognitive control, we interpreted this effect to reflect a general link between WMC and both the threshold adjustment process and controlled selection process. We also found a significant association between WMC and participants' reach trajectories, with higher WMC scores corresponding to more direct reach movements on incongruent trials involving stimulus-response overlap with the preceding trial. We interpreted this effect to reflect a more specific link between WMC and the functioning of the controlled selection process. We discuss the observed links between WMC and cognitive control in relation to the unity and diversity of executive functions framework and in relation to the role of prefrontal and striatal dopamine in supporting adaptive cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports.

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility-restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they'd been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn't offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some "good news"-that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods-and some "bad news"-that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

Individual differences in task-unrelated thought in university classrooms.

This study investigated what academic traits, attitudes, and habits predict individual differences in task-unrelated thought (TUT) during lectures, and whether this TUT propensity mediates associations between academic individual differences and course outcomes (final grade and situational interest evoked by material). Undergraduates (N = 851) from ten psychology classes at two US universities responded to thought probes presented during two early-course lectures; they also indicated sitting in the front, middle, or back of the classroom. At each probe, students categorized their thought content, such as indicating on-task thought or TUT. Students also completed online, academic-self-report questionnaires at the beginning of the course and a situational interest questionnaire at the end. Average TUT rate was 24% but individuals' rates varied widely (SD = 18%). TUT rates also increased substantially from the front to back of the classroom, and modestly from the first to second half of class periods. Multiple-group analyses (with ten classroom groups) indicated that: (a) classroom media-multitasking habits, initial interest in the course topic, and everyday propensity for mind-wandering and boredom accounted for unique variance in TUT rate (beyond other predictors); (b) TUT rate accounted for unique (modest) variance in course grades and situational interest; and (c) classroom media multitasking and propensity for mind-wandering and boredom had indirect associations with course grades via TUT rate, and these predictor variables, along with initial interest, had indirect associations with end-of-term situational interest via TUT rate. Some academic traits and behaviors predict course outcomes in part because they predict off-task thought during class.

The Worst Performance Rule, or the Not-Best Performance Rule? Latent-Variable Analyses of Working Memory Capacity, Mind-Wandering Propensity, and Reaction Time.

The worst performance rule (WPR) is a robust empirical finding reflecting that people's worst task performance shows numerically stronger correlations with cognitive ability than their average or best performance. However, recent meta-analytic work has proposed this be renamed the "not-best performance" rule because mean and worst performance seem to predict cognitive ability to similar degrees, with both predicting ability better than best performance. We re-analyzed data from a previously published latent-variable study to test for worst vs. not-best performance across a variety of reaction time tasks in relation to two cognitive ability constructs: working memory capacity (WMC) and propensity for task-unrelated thought (TUT). Using two methods of assessing worst performance-ranked-binning and ex-Gaussian-modeling approaches-we found evidence for both the worst and not-best performance rules. WMC followed the not-best performance rule (correlating equivalently with mean and longest response times (RTs)) but TUT propensity followed the worst performance rule (correlating more strongly with longest RTs). Additionally, we created a mini-multiverse following different outlier exclusion rules to test the robustness of our findings; our findings remained stable across the different multiverse iterations. We provisionally conclude that the worst performance rule may only arise in relation to cognitive abilities closely linked to (failures of) sustained attention.

Working memory capacity and the antisaccade task: A microanalytic-macroanalytic investigation of individual differences in goal activation and maintenance.

The association between working memory capacity (WMC) and the antisaccade task, which requires subjects to move their eyes and attention away from a strong visual cue, supports the claim that WMC is partially an attentional construct (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). Specifically, the WMC-antisaccade relation suggests that WMC helps maintain and execute task goals despite interference from habitual actions. Related work has recently shown that mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) and reaction time (RT) variability (Unsworth, 2015) are also related to WMC and they partially explain WMC's prediction of cognitive abilities. Here, we tested whether mind-wandering propensity and intraindividual RT variation account for WMC's associations with 2 antisaccade-cued choice RT tasks. In addition, we asked whether any influences of WMC, mind wandering, or intraindividual RT variation on antisaccade are moderated by (a) the temporal gap between fixation and the flashing location cue, and (b) whether targets switch sides on consecutive trials. Our quasi-experimental study reexamined a published dataset (Kane et al., 2016) comprising 472 subjects who completed 6 WMC tasks, 5 attentional tasks with mind-wandering probes, 5 tasks from which we measured intraindividual RT variation, and 2 antisaccade tasks with varying fixation-cue gap durations. The WMC-antisaccade association was not accounted for by mind wandering or intraindividual RT variation. WMC's effects on antisaccade performance were greater with longer fixation-to-cue intervals, suggesting that goal activation processes-beyond the ability to control mind wandering and RT variability-are partially responsible for the WMC-antisaccade relation. (PsycINFO Database Record

A combined experimental and individual-differences investigation into mind wandering during a video lecture.

A combined experimental-correlational study with a diverse sample (N = 182) from 2 research sites tested a set of 5 a priori hypotheses about mind wandering and learning, using a realistic video lecture on introductory statistics. Specifically, the study examined whether students' vulnerability to mind wandering during the lecture would predict learning from, and situational interest in, the video and also whether longhand note-taking would help reduce mind wandering, at least for some students. One half of the participants took notes during the video, and all were subsequently tested on lecture content without notes. Regression and mediation analyses indicated that (a) several individual-differences variables (e.g., pretest score, prior math interest, classroom media multitasking habits) uniquely predicted in-lecture mind wandering frequency; (b) although the note-taking manipulation did not reduce mind wandering at the group level, note-taking still reduced mind wandering for some individuals (i.e., those with lower prior knowledge and those who took notes of high quality and quantity); (c) mind wandering uniquely predicted both learning (posttest) and situational interest outcomes above and beyond all other individual-differences variables; (d) moreover, mind wandering significantly mediated the effects of several individual differences; and, finally, (e) not all types of mind wandering were problematic-in fact, off-task reflections about lecture-related topics positively predicted learning. These results, which were generally robust across the 2 sites, suggest that educationally focused cognitive research may benefit from considering attentional processes during learning as well as cognitive and noncognitive individual differences that affect attention and learning. (PsycINFO Database Record

For Whom the Mind Wanders, and When, Varies Across Laboratory and Daily-Life Settings.

Undergraduates ( N = 274) participated in a weeklong daily-life experience-sampling study of mind wandering after being assessed in the lab for executive-control abilities (working memory capacity; attention-restraint ability; attention-constraint ability; and propensity for task-unrelated thoughts, or TUTs) and personality traits. Eight times a day, electronic devices prompted subjects to report on their current thoughts and context. Working memory capacity and attention abilities predicted subjects' TUT rates in the lab, but predicted the frequency of daily-life mind wandering only as a function of subjects' momentary attempts to concentrate. This pattern replicates prior daily-life findings but conflicts with laboratory findings. Results for personality factors also revealed different associations in the lab and daily life: Only neuroticism predicted TUT rate in the lab, but only openness predicted mind-wandering rate in daily life (both predicted the content of daily-life mind wandering). Cognitive and personality factors also predicted dimensions of everyday thought other than mind wandering, such as subjective judgments of controllability of thought. Mind wandering in people's daily environments and TUTs during controlled and artificial laboratory tasks have different correlates (and perhaps causes). Thus, mind-wandering theories based solely on lab phenomena may be incomplete.

Dealing with prospective memory demands while performing an ongoing task: Shared processing, increased on-task focus, or both?

Prospective memory (PM) is the cognitive ability to remember to fulfill intended action plans at the appropriate future moment. Current theories assume that PM fulfillment draws on attentional processes. Accordingly, pending PM intentions interfere with other ongoing tasks to the extent to which both tasks rely on the same processes. How do people manage the competition between PM and ongoing-task demands? Based on research relating mind wandering and attentional control (Kane & McVay, 2012), we argue that people may not only change the way they process ongoing-task stimuli when given a PM intention, but they may also engage in less off-task thinking than they otherwise would. That is, people focus more strongly on the tasks at hand and dedicate considerable conscious thought to the PM goal. We tested this hypothesis by asking subjects to periodically report on their thoughts during prototypical PM (and control) tasks. Task-unrelated thought rates dropped when participants performed an ongoing task while holding a PM intention versus performing the ongoing task alone (Experiment 1), even when PM demands were minimized (Experiment 2) and more so when PM execution was especially rewarded (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that PM demands not only elicit a cost to ongoing-task processing, but they also induce a stronger on-task focus and promote conscious thoughts about the PM intention. (PsycINFO Database Record

Correction to Kane et al. (2016).

Reports an error in "Individual differences in the executive control of attention, memory, and thought, and their associations with schizotypy" by Michael J. Kane, Matt E. Meier, Bridget A. Smeekens, Georgina M. Gross, Charlotte A. Chun, Paul J. Silvia and Thomas R. Kwapil (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2016[Aug], Vol 145[8], 1017-1048). There were errors in Table 3 and Table 7 (these transcription errors were limited to descriptive statistics in the Tables and did not affect any inferential statistics). In Table 3, the ARRO-TUT and LETT-TUT variables had incorrect values for Mean [95% CI], SD, Skew, Kurtosis, and N. In Table 7, the same values (plus Min and Max) were incorrect for the SEM-SART variable. The correct values for these measures are presented in the correction (the values for Min and Max were correct as set in Table 3, but are repeated below for clarity). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2016-29680-001.) A large correlational study took a latent-variable approach to the generality of executive control by testing the individual-differences structure of executive-attention capabilities and assessing their prediction of schizotypy, a multidimensional construct (with negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid factors) conveying risk for schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive deficits, the schizotypy literature is equivocal. Subjects completed tasks of working memory capacity (WMC), attention restraint (inhibiting prepotent responses), and attention constraint (focusing visual attention amid distractors), the latter 2 in an effort to fractionate the "inhibition" construct. We also assessed mind-wandering propensity (via in-task thought probes) and coefficient of variation in response times (RT CoV) from several tasks as more novel indices of executive attention. WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and RT CoV were correlated but separable constructs, indicating some distinctions among "attention control" abilities; WMC correlated more strongly with attentional restraint than constraint, and mind wandering correlated more strongly with attentional restraint, attentional constraint, and RT CoV than with WMC. Across structural models, no executive construct predicted negative schizotypy and only mind wandering and RT CoV consistently (but modestly) predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy; stalwart executive constructs in the schizophrenia literature-WMC and attention restraint-showed little to no predictive power, beyond restraint's prediction of paranoia. Either executive deficits are consequences rather than risk factors for schizophrenia, or executive failures barely precede or precipitate diagnosable schizophrenia symptoms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Individual differences in the executive control of attention, memory, and thought, and their associations with schizotypy.

A large correlational study took a latent-variable approach to the generality of executive control by testing the individual-differences structure of executive-attention capabilities and assessing their prediction of schizotypy, a multidimensional construct (with negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid factors) conveying risk for schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive deficits, the schizotypy literature is equivocal. Subjects completed tasks of working memory capacity (WMC), attention restraint (inhibiting prepotent responses), and attention constraint (focusing visual attention amid distractors), the latter 2 in an effort to fractionate the "inhibition" construct. We also assessed mind-wandering propensity (via in-task thought probes) and coefficient of variation in response times (RT CoV) from several tasks as more novel indices of executive attention. WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and RT CoV were correlated but separable constructs, indicating some distinctions among "attention control" abilities; WMC correlated more strongly with attentional restraint than constraint, and mind wandering correlated more strongly with attentional restraint, attentional constraint, and RT CoV than with WMC. Across structural models, no executive construct predicted negative schizotypy and only mind wandering and RT CoV consistently (but modestly) predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy; stalwart executive constructs in the schizophrenia literature-WMC and attention restraint-showed little to no predictive power, beyond restraint's prediction of paranoia. Either executive deficits are consequences rather than risk factors for schizophrenia, or executive failures barely precede or precipitate diagnosable schizophrenia symptoms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Working Memory Capacity, Mind Wandering, and Creative Cognition: An Individual-Differences Investigation into the Benefits of Controlled Versus Spontaneous Thought.

Should executive control, as indicated by working memory capacity (WMC) and mind-wandering propensity, help or hinder creativity? Sustained and focused attention should help guide a selective search of solution-relevant information in memory and help inhibit uncreative, yet accessible, ideas. However, unfocused attention and daydreaming should allow mental access to more loosely relevant concepts, remotely linked to commonplace solutions. Three individual-differences studies inserted incubation periods into one or two divergent thinking tasks and tested whether WMC (assessed by complex span tasks) and incubation-period mind wandering (assessed as probed reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) predicted post-incubation performance. Retrospective self-reports of Openness (Experiment 2) and mind-wandering and daydreaming propensity (Experiment 3) complemented our thought-probe assessments of TUT. WMC did not correlate with creativity in divergent thinking, whereas only the questionnaire measure of daydreaming, but not probed thought reports, weakly predicted creativity; the fact that in-the-moment TUTs did not correlate divergent creativity is especially problematic for claims that mind-wandering processes contribute to creative cognition. Moreover, the fact that WMC tends to strongly predict analytical problem solving and reasoning, but may not correlate with divergent thinking, provides a useful boundary condition for defining WMC's nomological net. On balance, our data provide no support for either benefits or costs of executive control for at least one component of creativity.