Effectiveness of BNT162b2 mRNA vaccine third doses and previous infection in protecting against SARS-CoV-2 infections during the Delta and Omicron variant waves; the UK SIREN cohort study September 2021 to February 2022.

Third doses of COVID-19 vaccines were widely deployed following the primary vaccine course waning and the emergence of the Omicron-variant. We investigated protection from third-dose vaccines and previous infection against SARS-CoV-2 infection during Delta-variant and Omicron-variant (BA.1 & BA.2) waves in our frequently PCR-tested cohort of healthcare-workers. Relative effectiveness of BNT162b2 third doses and infection-acquired immunity was assessed by comparing the time to PCR-confirmed infection in boosted participants with those with waned dose-2 protection (≥254 days after dose-2), by primary series vaccination type. Follow-up time was divided by dominant circulating variant: Delta 07 September 2021 to 30 November 2021, Omicron 13 December 2021t o 28 February 2022. We used a Cox regression model with adjustment/stratification for demographic characteristics and staff-type. We explored protection associated with vaccination, infection and both. We included 19,614 participants, 29% previously infected. There were 278 primary infections (4 per 10,000 person-days of follow-up) and 85 reinfections (0.8/10,000 person-days) during the Delta period and 2467 primary infections (43/10,000 person-days) and 881 reinfections (33/10,000) during the Omicron period. Relative Vaccine Effectiveness (VE) 0-2 months post-3rd dose (3rd dose) (3-doses BNT162b2) in the previously uninfected cohort against Delta infections was 63% (95% Confidence Interval (CI) 40%-77%) and was lower (35%) against Omicron infection (95% CI 21%-47%). The relative VE of 3rd dose (heterologous BNT162b2) was greater for primary course ChAdOX1 recipients, with VE 0-2 months post-3rd dose over ≥68% higher for both variants. Third-dose protection waned rapidly against Omicron, with no significant difference between two and three BNT162b2 doses observed after 4-months. Previous infection continued to provide additional protection against Omicron (67% (CI 56%-75%) 3-6 months post-infection), but this waned to about 25% after 9-months, approximately three times lower than against Delta. Infection rates surged with Omicron emergence. Third doses of BNT162b2 vaccine provided short-term protection, with rapid waning against Omicron infections. Protection associated with infections incurred before Omicron was markedly diminished against the Omicron wave. Our findings demonstrate the complexity of an evolving pandemic with the potential emergence of immune-escape variants and the importance of continued monitoring.

Effect of second booster vaccinations and prior infection against SARS-CoV-2 in the UK SIREN healthcare worker cohort.

Background: The protection of fourth dose mRNA vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 is relevant to current global policy decisions regarding ongoing booster roll-out. We aimed to estimate the effect of fourth dose vaccination, prior infection, and duration of PCR positivity in a highly-vaccinated and largely prior-COVID-19 infected cohort of UK healthcare workers. Methods: Participants underwent fortnightly PCR and regular antibody testing for SARS-CoV-2 and completed symptoms questionnaires. A multi-state model was used to estimate vaccine effectiveness (VE) against infection from a fourth dose compared to a waned third dose, with protection from prior infection and duration of PCR positivity jointly estimated. Findings: 1298 infections were detected among 9560 individuals under active follow-up between September 2022 and March 2023. Compared to a waned third dose, fourth dose VE was 13.1% (95% CI 0.9 to 23.8) overall; 24.0% (95% CI 8.5 to 36.8) in the first 2 months post-vaccination, reducing to 10.3% (95% CI -11.4 to 27.8) and 1.7% (95% CI -17.0 to 17.4) at 2-4 and 4-6 months, respectively. Relative to an infection >2 years ago and controlling for vaccination, 63.6% (95% CI 46.9 to 75.0) and 29.1% (95% CI 3.8 to 43.1) greater protection against infection was estimated for an infection within the past 0-6, and 6-12 months, respectively. A fourth dose was associated with greater protection against asymptomatic infection than symptomatic infection, whilst prior infection independently provided more protection against symptomatic infection, particularly if the infection had occurred within the previous 6 months. Duration of PCR positivity was significantly lower for asymptomatic compared to symptomatic infection. Interpretation: Despite rapid waning of protection, vaccine boosters remain an important tool in responding to the dynamic COVID-19 landscape; boosting population immunity in advance of periods of anticipated pressure, such as surging infection rates or emerging variants of concern. Funding: UK Health Security Agency, Medical Research Council, NIHR HPRU Oxford, Bristol, and others.

Early Warning Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variants, United Kingdom, November 2021-September 2022.

Since June 2020, the SARS-CoV-2 Immunity and Reinfection Evaluation (SIREN) study has conducted routine PCR testing in UK healthcare workers and sequenced PCR-positive samples. SIREN detected increases in infections and reinfections and delected Omicron subvariant waves emergence contemporaneous with national surveillance. SIREN's sentinel surveillance methods can be used for variant surveillance.

A prospective study of risk factors associated with seroprevalence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in healthcare workers at a large UK teaching hospital.

OBJECTIVES: To describe the risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection in UK healthcare workers (HCWs). METHODS: We conducted a prospective sero-epidemiological study of HCWs at a major UK teaching hospital using a SARS-CoV-2 immunoassay. Risk factors for seropositivity were analysed using multivariate logistic regression. RESULTS: 410/5,698 (7·2%) staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. Seroprevalence was higher in those working in designated COVID-19 areas compared with other areas (9·47% versus 6·16%) Healthcare assistants (aOR 2·06 [95%CI 1·14-3·71]; p=0·016) and domestic and portering staff (aOR 3·45 [95% CI 1·07-11·42]; p=0·039) had significantly higher seroprevalence than other staff groups after adjusting for age, sex, ethnicity and COVID-19 working location. Staff working in acute medicine and medical sub-specialities were also at higher risk (aOR 2·07 [95% CI 1·31-3·25]; p<0·002). Staff from Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds had an aOR of 1·65 (95% CI 1·32 - 2·07; p<0·001) compared to white staff; this increased risk was independent of COVID-19 area working. The only symptoms significantly associated with seropositivity in a multivariable model were loss of sense of taste or smell, fever, and myalgia; 31% of staff testing positive reported no prior symptoms. CONCLUSIONS: Risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection amongst HCWs is highly heterogeneous and influenced by COVID-19 working location, role, age and ethnicity. Increased risk amongst BAME staff cannot be accounted for solely by occupational factors.

A2B-COVID: A Tool for Rapidly Evaluating Potential SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Events.

Identifying linked cases of infection is a critical component of the public health response to viral infectious diseases. In a clinical context, there is a need to make rapid assessments of whether cases of infection have arrived independently onto a ward, or are potentially linked via direct transmission. Viral genome sequence data are of great value in making these assessments, but are often not the only form of data available. Here, we describe A2B-COVID, a method for the rapid identification of potentially linked cases of COVID-19 infection designed for clinical settings. Our method combines knowledge about infection dynamics, data describing the movements of individuals, and evolutionary analysis of genome sequences to assess whether data collected from cases of infection are consistent or inconsistent with linkage via direct transmission. A retrospective analysis of data from two wards at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust during the first wave of the pandemic showed qualitatively different patterns of linkage between cases on designated COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 wards. The subsequent real-time application of our method to data from the second epidemic wave highlights its value for monitoring cases of infection in a clinical context.

Superspreaders drive the largest outbreaks of hospital onset COVID-19 infections.

SARS-CoV-2 is notable both for its rapid spread, and for the heterogeneity of its patterns of transmission, with multiple published incidences of superspreading behaviour. Here, we applied a novel network reconstruction algorithm to infer patterns of viral transmission occurring between patients and health care workers (HCWs) in the largest clusters of COVID-19 infection identified during the first wave of the epidemic at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, UK. Based upon dates of individuals reporting symptoms, recorded individual locations, and viral genome sequence data, we show an uneven pattern of transmission between individuals, with patients being much more likely to be infected by other patients than by HCWs. Further, the data were consistent with a pattern of superspreading, whereby 21% of individuals caused 80% of transmission events. Our study provides a detailed retrospective analysis of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and sheds light on the need for intensive and pervasive infection control procedures.

The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, presents a global public health challenge. Hospitals have been at the forefront of this battle, treating large numbers of sick patients over several waves of infection. Finding ways to manage the spread of the virus in hospitals is key to protecting vulnerable patients and workers, while keeping hospitals running, but to generate effective infection control, researchers must understand how SARS-CoV-2 spreads. A range of factors make studying the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in hospitals tricky. For instance, some people do not present any symptoms, and, amongst those who do, it can be difficult to determine whether they caught the virus in the hospital or somewhere else. However, comparing the genetic information of the SARS-CoV-2 virus from different people in a hospital could allow scientists to understand how it spreads. Samples of the genetic material of SARS-CoV-2 can be obtained by swabbing infected individuals. If the genetic sequences of two samples are very different, it is unlikely that the individuals who provided the samples transmitted the virus to one another. Illingworth, Hamilton et al. used this information, along with other data about how SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted, to develop an algorithm that can determine how the virus spreads from person to person in different hospital wards. To build their algorithm, Illingworth, Hamilton et al. collected SARS-CoV-2 genetic data from patients and staff in a hospital, and combined it with information about how SARS-CoV-2 spreads and how these people moved in the hospital . The algorithm showed that, for the most part, patients were infected by other patients (20 out of 22 cases), while staff were infected equally by patients and staff. By further probing these data, Illingworth, Hamilton et al. revealed that 80% of hospital-acquired infections were caused by a group of just 21% of individuals in the study, identifying a 'superspreader' pattern. These findings may help to inform SARS-CoV-2 infection control measures to reduce spread within hospitals, and could potentially be used to improve infection control in other contexts.

Rebooting medical education with virtual grand rounds during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Social distancing during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has necessitated drastic changes in the practice of hospital medicine, including the cancellation of many educational activities. At the same time, the emergence of a new disease with a rapidly evolving knowledge base has mandated timely educational updates. To resolve this conflict in our hospital, we substituted 'traditional' grand rounds with 'virtual' grand rounds delivered over Zoom, consisting of a local situation report and operational update, followed by a specialty-specific clinical presentation on management of COVID-19. Attendance was greatly increased (mean 384 attendees) compared to traditional grand rounds (mean 44 attendees) and included a diverse audience of medical professionals. Feedback was overwhelmingly positive, with >80% of responders stating that the sessions would or might inform their clinical practice. COVID-19 has therefore provided an opportunity to modernise grand rounds, and develop a new model matching the needs of medical education beyond the pandemic.

Streamlining SARS-CoV-2 confirmatory testing to reduce false positive results.

BACKGROUND: Confirmatory testing of SARS-CoV-2 results is essential to reduce false positives, but comes at a cost of significant extra workload for laboratories and increased turnaround time. A balance must be sought. We analysed our confirmatory testing pathway to produce a more refined approach in preparation for rising case numbers. METHODS: Over a 10-week low prevalence period we performed confirmatory testing on all newly positive results. Turnaround time was measured and results were analysed to identify a threshold that could be applied as a cut-off for future confirmatory testing and reduce overall workload for the laboratory. RESULTS: Between 22/06/20 and 31/08/20 confirmatory testing was performed on 108 newly positive samples, identifying 32 false positive results (30 %). Turnaround time doubled, increasing by an extra 17 h. There was a highly statistically significant difference between initial Relative Light Unit (RLU) of results that confirmed compared to those that did not, 1176 vs 721 (P < 0.00001). RLU = 1000 was identified as a suitable threshold for confirmatory testing in our laboratory: with RLU ≥ 1000, 55/56 (98 %) confirmed as positive, whereas with RLU < 1000 only 12/38 (32 %) confirmed. CONCLUSIONS: False positive SARS-CoV-2 tests can be identified by confirmatory testing, yet this may significantly delay results. Establishing a threshold for confirmatory testing streamlines this process to focus only on samples where it is most required. We advise all laboratories to follow a similar process to identify thresholds that trigger confirmatory testing for their own assays, increasing accuracy while maintaining efficiency for when case numbers are high.

Specificity and positive predictive value of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid amplification testing in a low-prevalence setting.

OBJECTIVES: When the prevalence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is low, many positive test results are false positives. Confirmatory testing reduces overdiagnosis and nosocomial infection and enables real-world estimates of test specificity and positive predictive value. This study estimates these parameters to evaluate the impact of confirmatory testing and to improve clinical diagnosis, epidemiological estimation and interpretation of vaccine trials. METHODS: Over 1 month we took all respiratory samples from our laboratory with a patient's first detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA (Hologic Aptima SARS-CoV-2 assay or in-house RT-PCR platform), and repeated testing using two platforms. Samples were categorized by source, and by whether clinical details suggested COVID-19 or corroborative testing from another laboratory. We estimated specificity and positive predictive value using approaches based on maximum likelihood. RESULTS: Of 19 597 samples, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in 107; 52 corresponded to first-time detection (0.27% of tests on samples without previous detection). Further testing detected SARS-CoV-2 RNA once or more ('confirmed') in 29 samples (56%), and failed to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA ('not confirmed') in 23 (44%). Depending upon assumed parameters, point estimates for specificity and positive predictive value were 99.91-99.98% and 61.8-89.8% respectively using the Hologic Aptima SARS-CoV-2 assay, and 97.4-99.1% and 20.1-73.8% respectively using an in-house assay. CONCLUSIONS: Nucleic acid amplification testing for SARS-CoV-2 is highly specific. Nevertheless, when prevalence is low a significant proportion of initially positive results fail to confirm, and confirmatory testing substantially reduces the detection of false positives. Omitting additional testing in samples with higher prior detection probabilities focuses testing where it is clinically impactful and minimizes delay.

A blueprint for the implementation of a validated approach for the detection of SARS-Cov2 in clinical samples in academic facilities.

The COVID-19 pandemic is expanding at an unprecedented rate. As a result, diagnostic services are stretched to their limit, and there is a clear need for the provision of additional diagnostic capacity. Academic laboratories, many of which are closed due to governmental lockdowns, may be in a position to support local screening capacity by adapting their current laboratory practices. Here, we describe the process of developing a SARS-Cov2 diagnostic workflow in a conventional academic Containment Level 2 laboratory. Our outline includes simple SARS-Cov2 deactivation upon contact, the method for a quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase PCR detecting SARS-Cov2, a description of process establishment and validation, and some considerations for establishing a similar workflow elsewhere. This was achieved under challenging circumstances through the collaborative efforts of scientists, clinical staff, and diagnostic staff to mitigate to the ongoing crisis. Within 14 days, we created a validated COVID-19 diagnostics service for healthcare workers in our local hospital. The described methods are not exhaustive, but we hope may offer support to other academic groups aiming to set up something comparable in a short time frame.

Combined Point-of-Care Nucleic Acid and Antibody Testing for SARS-CoV-2 following Emergence of D614G Spike Variant.

Rapid COVID-19 diagnosis in the hospital is essential, although this is complicated by 30%-50% of nose/throat swabs being negative by SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid amplification testing (NAAT). Furthermore, the D614G spike mutant dominates the pandemic and it is unclear how serological tests designed to detect anti-spike antibodies perform against this variant. We assess the diagnostic accuracy of combined rapid antibody point of care (POC) and nucleic acid assays for suspected COVID-19 disease due to either wild-type or the D614G spike mutant SARS-CoV-2. The overall detection rate for COVID-19 is 79.2% (95% CI 57.8-92.9) by rapid NAAT alone. The combined point of care antibody test and rapid NAAT is not affected by D614G and results in very high sensitivity for COVID-19 diagnosis with very high specificity.

Point of Care Nucleic Acid Testing for SARS-CoV-2 in Hospitalized Patients: A Clinical Validation Trial and Implementation Study.

There is an urgent need for rapid SARS-CoV-2 testing in hospitals to limit nosocomial spread. We report an evaluation of point of care (POC) nucleic acid amplification testing (NAAT) in 149 participants with parallel combined nasal and throat swabbing for POC versus standard lab RT-PCR testing. Median time to result is 2.6 (IQR 2.3-4.8) versus 26.4 h (IQR 21.4-31.4, p < 0.001), with 32 (21.5%) positive and 117 (78.5%) negative. Cohen's κ correlation between tests is 0.96 (95% CI 0.91-1.00). When comparing nearly 1,000 tests pre- and post-implementation, the median time to definitive bed placement from admission is 23.4 (8.6-41.9) versus 17.1 h (9.0-28.8), p = 0.02. Mean length of stay on COVID-19 "holding" wards is 58.5 versus 29.9 h (p < 0.001). POC testing increases isolation room availability, avoids bed closures, allows discharge to care homes, and expedites access to hospital procedures. POC testing could mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on hospital systems.

Effective control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between healthcare workers during a period of diminished community prevalence of COVID-19.

Previously, we showed that 3% (31/1032)of asymptomatic healthcare workers (HCWs) from a large teaching hospital in Cambridge, UK, tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in April 2020. About 15% (26/169) HCWs with symptoms of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) also tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (Rivett et al., 2020). Here, we show that the proportion of both asymptomatic and symptomatic HCWs testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 rapidly declined to near-zero between 25th April and 24th May 2020, corresponding to a decline in patient admissions with COVID-19 during the ongoing UK 'lockdown'. These data demonstrate how infection prevention and control measures including staff testing may help prevent hospitals from becoming independent 'hubs' of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and illustrate how, with appropriate precautions, organizations in other sectors may be able to resume on-site work safely.

Screening of healthcare workers for SARS-CoV-2 highlights the role of asymptomatic carriage in COVID-19 transmission.

Significant differences exist in the availability of healthcare worker (HCW) SARS-CoV-2 testing between countries, and existing programmes focus on screening symptomatic rather than asymptomatic staff. Over a 3 week period (April 2020), 1032 asymptomatic HCWs were screened for SARS-CoV-2 in a large UK teaching hospital. Symptomatic staff and symptomatic household contacts were additionally tested. Real-time RT-PCR was used to detect viral RNA from a throat+nose self-swab. 3% of HCWs in the asymptomatic screening group tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. 17/30 (57%) were truly asymptomatic/pauci-symptomatic. 12/30 (40%) had experienced symptoms compatible with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)>7 days prior to testing, most self-isolating, returning well. Clusters of HCW infection were discovered on two independent wards. Viral genome sequencing showed that the majority of HCWs had the dominant lineage B∙1. Our data demonstrates the utility of comprehensive screening of HCWs with minimal or no symptoms. This approach will be critical for protecting patients and hospital staff.

Patients admitted to NHS hospitals are now routinely screened for SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), and isolated from other patients if necessary. Yet healthcare workers, including frontline patient-facing staff such as doctors, nurses and physiotherapists, are only tested and excluded from work if they develop symptoms of the illness. However, there is emerging evidence that many people infected with SARS-CoV-2 never develop significant symptoms: these people will therefore be missed by 'symptomatic-only' testing. There is also important data showing that around half of all transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 happen before the infected individual even develops symptoms. This means that much broader testing programs are required to spot people when they are most infectious. Rivett, Sridhar, Sparkes, Routledge et al. set out to determine what proportion of healthcare workers was infected with SARS-CoV-2 while also feeling generally healthy at the time of testing. Over 1,000 staff members at a large UK hospital who felt they were well enough to work, and did not fit the government criteria for COVID-19 infection, were tested. Amongst these, 3% were positive for SARS-CoV-2. On closer questioning, around one in five reported no symptoms, two in five very mild symptoms that they had dismissed as inconsequential, and a further two in five reported COVID-19 symptoms that had stopped more than a week previously. In parallel, healthcare workers with symptoms of COVID-19 (and their household contacts) who were self-isolating were also tested, in order to allow those without the virus to quickly return to work and bolster a stretched workforce. Finally, the rates of infection were examined to probe how the virus could have spread through the hospital and among staff ­ and in particular, to understand whether rates of infection were greater among staff working in areas devoted to COVID-19 patients. Despite wearing appropriate personal protective equipment, healthcare workers in these areas were almost three times more likely to test positive than those working in areas without COVID-19 patients. However, it is not clear whether this genuinely reflects greater rates of patients passing the infection to staff. Staff may give the virus to each other, or even acquire it at home. Overall, this work implies that hospitals need to be vigilant and introduce broad screening programmes across their workforces. It will be vital to establish such approaches before 'lockdown' is fully lifted, so healthcare institutions are prepared for any second peak of infections.