Statistical prediction alone cannot identify good models of behavior.

The dissociation between statistical prediction and scientific explanation advanced by Bowers et al. for studies of vision using deep neural networks is also observed in several other domains of behavior research, and is in fact unavoidable when fitting large models such as deep nets and other supervised learners, with weak theoretical commitments, to restricted samples of highly stochastic behavioral phenomena.

Temporal correspondence in perceptual organization: Reciprocal interactions between temporal sensitivity and figure-ground segregation.

How do visual representations account for time? Is it the case that they represent time by themselves possessing temporal properties (temporal mirroring) or by atemporal markers/tags (temporal tagging)? This question has been asked for the past 5 decades and more, in neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. To address this debate, we designed a study to test temporal correspondence. We tested whether a temporal property (flicker frequency) could influence figure-ground segregation, and in turn, reciprocally, whether a figure-ground segregation would alter a temporal property (here, temporal resolution). We manipulated flicker frequency of dots on either side of an ambiguous edge in Experiment 1 and asked participants to indicate the figural region. In Experiment 2, we measured temporal sensitivity using a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task in both figural and ground regions. We showed temporal correspondence by showing specifically that figure-ground segregation depends on flicker frequency differences between two regions in ambiguous displays, where slow-flickering regions are seen as figural (Experiment 1). Reciprocally, in Experiment 2, we showed that participants performed a temporal-order judgment task better when the task had to be performed on a region seen as background compared with the same region seen as a figure. We show how relatively slower flickering regions are seen as figural, and correspondingly, seeing a region as figural is associated with a poorer temporal resolution. Our results collectively allow us to demonstrate a tight temporal correspondence in figure-ground perception, which could be explained using the parvocellular and magnocellular pathways, the two major retino-geniculo-cortical pathways.

Letting it go: The interplay between mind wandering, mindfulness, and creativity.

A creative idea is always appreciated. However, it is still unclear as to what helps people in coming up with creative ideas. The current chapter explores how mind wandering, mindfulness and meditation influence creative ideation. Most specifically, we explore the cognition behind each of these faculties and how they interact to enable us in navigating across our internal and external environments constantly. In this chapter, we also discuss an empirical study that examines mind-wandering tendencies in two types of creativity tasks-convergent and divergent, by manipulating task difficulty. The findings of our study provide evidence in support of the process theories that indicate mind wandering is based on the nature of creative tasks being performed and mind wandering tendencies are higher in the divergent compared to the convergent task. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on how understanding the cognition of meditators provides insights to creative thought process and explores avenues of study for such complex and subjective cognitive faculties.

Accurate knowledge about feature diagnosticities leads to less preference for unidimensional strategy.

In classification learning of artificial stimuli, participants learn the perfectly diagnostic dimension better than the partially diagnostic dimensions. Also, there is a strong preference for a unidimensional categorization based on the perfectly diagnostic dimension. In a different experimental procedure, called array-based classification task, participants do not exhibit a preference for a unidimensional categorization. In Experiment 1, we replicate the above results. In Experiment 2, we show that when participants learn the partially diagnostic features through repeated testing, there is a decrease in unidimensional categorization. We use Bayesian modeling to show that only those participants who learned the diagnosticity of a dimension with a high level of accuracy (≥ 75%) used the dimension for categorization. Our results show that whenever accurate knowledge about feature diagnosticities is available, there is a lesser preference for unidimensional categorization. Our results provide a possible explanation for the preference of unidimensional categorization in classification and observation learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Dynamic Functional Connectivity of Emotion Processing in Beta Band with Naturalistic Emotion Stimuli.

While naturalistic stimuli, such as movies, better represent the complexity of the real world and are perhaps crucial to understanding the dynamics of emotion processing, there is limited research on emotions with naturalistic stimuli. There is a need to understand the temporal dynamics of emotion processing and their relationship to different dimensions of emotion experience. In addition, there is a need to understand the dynamics of functional connectivity underlying different emotional experiences that occur during or prior to such experiences. To address these questions, we recorded the EEG of participants and asked them to mark the temporal location of their emotional experience as they watched a video. We also obtained self-assessment ratings for emotional multimedia stimuli. We calculated dynamic functional the connectivity (DFC) patterns in all the frequency bands, including information about hubs in the network. The change in functional networks was quantified in terms of temporal variability, which was then used in regression analysis to evaluate whether temporal variability in DFC (tvDFC) could predict different dimensions of emotional experience. We observed that the connectivity patterns in the upper beta band could differentiate emotion categories better during or prior to the reported emotional experience. The temporal variability in functional connectivity dynamics is primarily related to emotional arousal followed by dominance. The hubs in the functional networks were found across the right frontal and bilateral parietal lobes, which have been reported to facilitate affect, interoception, action, and memory-related processing. Since our study was performed with naturalistic real-life resembling emotional videos, the study contributes significantly to understanding the dynamics of emotion processing. The results support constructivist theories of emotional experience and show that changes in dynamic functional connectivity can predict aspects of our emotional experience.

The Blursday database as a resource to study subjective temporalities during COVID-19.

The COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns triggered worldwide changes in the daily routines of human experience. The Blursday database provides repeated measures of subjective time and related processes from participants in nine countries tested on 14 questionnaires and 15 behavioural tasks during the COVID-19 pandemic. A total of 2,840 participants completed at least one task, and 439 participants completed all tasks in the first session. The database and all data collection tools are accessible to researchers for studying the effects of social isolation on temporal information processing, time perspective, decision-making, sleep, metacognition, attention, memory, self-perception and mindfulness. Blursday includes quantitative statistics such as sleep patterns, personality traits, psychological well-being and lockdown indices. The database provides quantitative insights on the effects of lockdown (stringency and mobility) and subjective confinement on time perception (duration, passage of time and temporal distances). Perceived isolation affects time perception, and we report an inter-individual central tendency effect in retrospective duration estimation.

Cardiac-Brain Dynamics Depend on Context Familiarity and Their Interaction Predicts Experience of Emotional Arousal.

Our brain continuously interacts with the body as we engage with the world. Although we are mostly unaware of internal bodily processes, such as our heartbeats, they may be influenced by and in turn influence our perception and emotional feelings. Although there is a recent focus on understanding cardiac interoceptive activity and interaction with brain activity during emotion processing, the investigation of cardiac-brain interactions with more ecologically valid naturalistic emotional stimuli is still very limited. We also do not understand how an essential aspect of emotions, such as context familiarity, influences affective feelings and is linked to statistical interaction between cardiac and brain activity. Hence, to answer these questions, we designed an exploratory study by recording ECG and EEG signals for the emotional events while participants were watching emotional movie clips. Participants also rated their familiarity with the stimulus on the familiarity scale. Linear mixed effect modelling was performed in which the ECG power and familiarity were considered as predictors of EEG power. We focused on three brain regions, including prefrontal (PF), frontocentral (FC) and parietooccipital (PO). The analyses showed that the interaction between the power of cardiac activity in the mid-frequency range and the power in specific EEG bands is dependent on familiarity, such that the interaction is stronger with high familiarity. In addition, the results indicate that arousal is predicted by cardiac-brain interaction, which also depends on familiarity. The results support emotional theories that emphasize context dependency and interoception. Multimodal studies with more realistic stimuli would further enable us to understand and predict different aspects of emotional experience.

A wrinkle in and of time: Contraction of felt duration with a single perceptual switch.

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property through specialized mechanisms or that time is represented through the temporality of experiences themselves. To add to this debate, we investigate alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered through perceptual switches while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. We predicted that if perceived time is a function of temporally evolving conscious content, then a break in it (here via a perceptual switch) would also lead to a break in felt time. In three experiments, we showed participants a Necker cube that was manipulated to induce a perceptual switch (experiments 1(a) and 1(b)) or left to switch on its own (experiment 2). We asked participants to report both perceptual switches and felt durations (experiments 1(a) and 2) or only estimate time (experiment 1(b)). Over these three experiments, we find evidence of contraction of felt time in trials with a perceptual switch, consistent with the idea that perceived time is a function of temporally evolving conscious experience. Additionally, we present a phenomenological demonstration to support our empirical data. Overall, the study provides evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Is perceptual learning always better at task-relevant locations? It depends on the distractors.

The role of attention in task-irrelevant perceptual learning has been contested. Attention has been studied in the past using distractor-type manipulations. Hence, during an initial exposure phase, we manipulated distractor similarity within a set of six gratings, to study its effects on perceptual learning at task-relevant and task-irrelevant locations. Of these six gratings, one was at a task-relevant location, one at a task-irrelvant location, which shared the orientation with the task-relevant grating, and the rest (four) were distractor gratings. The orientations of the distractor gratings were all either the same (homogeneous) or different from each other (heterogeneity). We hypothesized that learning at the task-irrelevant location would be worse than learning at the task-relevant location when distractors are heterogeneous and vice versa when the distractors are homogeneous. Participants were initially exposed to a grating set; they reported contrast changes at only one prespecified task-relevant location. This grating was grouped based on orientation with a task-irrelevant grating presented at the furthermost distractor location and presented alongside four control-distractors (homogeneous or heterogeneous). In the testing phase, orientation discrimination performance was measured at task-relevant, task-irrelevant (grouped), and control-distractor locations. Participants were exposed and tested sequentially, each day for 5 days. Participants learned and performed better at the task-irrelevant location compared to the task-relevant location with homogenous distractors and vice versa with heterogenous distractors. The poorer learning at the task-relevant location compared to the task-irrelevant location challenges current models of perceptual learning. Selection mechanisms driven by the nature of distractors influence perceptual learning at both task-relevant and task-irrelevant locations.

Time and time again: a multi-scale hierarchical framework for time-consciousness and timing of cognition.

Temporality and the feeling of 'now' is a fundamental property of consciousness. Different conceptualizations of time-consciousness have argued that both the content of our experiences and the representations of those experiences evolve in time, or neither have temporal extension, or only content does. Accounting for these different positions, we propose a nested hierarchical model of multiple timescales that accounts for findings on timing of cognition and phenomenology of temporal experience. This framework hierarchically combines the three major philosophical positions on time-consciousness (i.e. cinematic, extensional and retentional) and presents a common basis for temporal experience. We detail the properties of these hierarchical levels and speculate how they could coexist mechanistically. We also place several findings on timing and temporal experience at different levels in this hierarchy and show how they can be brought together. Finally, the framework is used to derive novel predictions for both timing of our experiences and time perception. The theoretical framework offers a novel dynamic space that can bring together sub-fields of cognitive science like perception, attention, action and consciousness research in understanding and describing our experiences both in and of time.

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception.

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.

Yes! I love my mother as much as myself: Self- and mother-association effects in an Indian sample.

Information associated with the self is preferentially processed compared to information associated with others. However, cultural differences appear to exist in the way information is processed about those close to us like our mothers. In Eastern compared with Western cultures, information about the mother seems to be processed as well as our self. However, it is not clear whether this lack of difference is due to familiarity or would extend to processing arbitrary perceptual information associated with different categorical labels. The current study employs a perceptual association paradigm in which category labels like self, mother, and none are associated with arbitrary shapes to study self versus mother processing in an Indian sample. We hypothesised that there would be no difference between self and mother processing given the familial and collectivistic tendencies in India. Participants in two experiments performed a matching task between a shape and a pre-assigned category label, with self, mother, and none as categories in Experiment 1A and self, friend, and none as categories in Experiment 1B. As expected, analysis of response times (RT), accuracies, and signal detection theoretic measures showed that information about mother is processed as well as self in Experiment 1A, but this effect is not present with friend in Experiment 1B. Moreover, participants' processing for the self-associated information gets attenuated depending upon the other close person category used in the task (friend vs. mother) indicating that self-information processing is dynamically dependent on the categorical contexts in which such processing takes place. Our findings have implications for understanding the processing of self-associated information across cultures and contexts.

Intended emotions influence intentional binding with emotional faces: Larger binding for intended negative emotions.

The effect of emotions on Intentional binding (IB) is equivocal. In addition, most studies on IB have not manipulated emotional content of intentions. This study investigates the effect of intended and outcome emotions using emotional faces (happy or disgust face in experiment 1 and a happy or angry face in experiment 3). To see whether the effects are due to priming, we used instructions with a happy-disgust pair in experiment 2 and happy-angry pair in experiment 4. Outcome emotional faces were not predictable. Results showed that intending a negative emotional face resulted in shorter action-outcome interval judgments compared to a happy face irrespective of the emotional content of the outcome face. This effect was absent in experiments 2 and 4 with instructed emotions. In addition to showing the importance of having explicit intentions, the results show that emotional content of our intentions does influence IB possibly due to prospective mechanisms.

Hedonic impacts of gains versus losses of time: are we loss averse?

A large part of our daily activities involves judging the psychological value of time. This study tested a previously less explored aspect about whether people are loss averse for time - i.e. do losses of time loom larger than corresponding gains? Using comparative hedonic judgments, the impact of prospective gains versus losses of time was examined for common contexts like waiting and local travel based on suggestions by typical navigation apps. The magnitude of time was varied without an explicit reference point (experiment 1) and with a clear reference without any overt consequence (experiment 2). The contextual nature of outcome along with magnitude was also manipulated (experiment 3). Prospective gains loomed as larger or equal to losses for low magnitudes while there was a trend of losses to loom larger than gains only for high magnitudes of time. These results weaken the empirical evidence for loss aversion and highlight its magnitude-dependent nature thus presenting a nuanced perspective to the affective psychology of time.