Do Not Worry That Generative AI May Compromise Human Creativity or Intelligence in the Future: It Already Has.

Technology alters both perceptions of human intelligence and creativity and the actual processes of intelligence and creativity. Skills that were once important for human intelligence, for example, computational ones, no longer hold anywhere near the same importance they did before the age of computers. The advantage of computers is that they may lead us to focus on what we believe to be more important things than what they have replaced. In the case of penmanship, spelling, or arithmetic computation, such an argument could bear fruit. But in the case of human creativity, the loss of creative skills and attitudes may be a long-term loss to humanity. Generative AI is replicative. It can recombine and re-sort ideas, but it is not clear that it will generate the kinds of paradigm-breaking ideas the world needs right now to solve the serious problems that confront it, such as global climate change, pollution, violence, increasing income disparities, and creeping autocracy.

A Novel Approach to Measuring an Old Construct: Aligning the Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Cognitive Flexibility.

A successful adjustment to dynamic changes in one's environment requires contingent adaptive behaviour. Such behaviour is underpinned by cognitive flexibility, which conceptually is part of fluid intelligence. We argue, however, that conventional approaches to measuring fluid intelligence are insufficient in capturing cognitive flexibility. We address the discrepancy between conceptualisation and operationalisation by introducing two newly developed tasks that aim at capturing within-person processes of dealing with novelty. In an exploratory proof-of-concept study, the two flexibility tasks were administered to 307 university students, together with a battery of conventional measures of fluid intelligence. Participants also provided information about their Grade Point Averages obtained in high school and in their first year at university. We tested (1) whether an experimental manipulation of a requirement for cognitive inhibition resulted in systematic differences in difficulty, (2) whether these complexity differences reflect psychometrically differentiable effects, and (3) whether these newly developed flexibility tasks show incremental value in predicting success in the transition from high school to university over conventional operationalisations of fluid intelligence. Our findings support the notion that cognitive flexibility, when conceptualised and operationalised as individual differences in within-person processes of dealing with novelty, more appropriately reflects the dynamics of individuals' behaviour when attempting to cope with changing demands.

An Empirical Test of the Concept of the Adaptively Intelligent Attitude.

This study provides an empirical test of a previously proposed assertion that intelligence as adaptation has an attitudinal as well as an ability component. The ability component deals with what the basic knowledge and skills are that underlie intelligence, and how much of each one an individual has. The attitudinal component deals with how an individual chooses to deploy the abilities they have. In other words, to what use are the abilities put? It is argued that it is impossible fully to separate the measurement of the ability component from the attitudinal one. In a diverse population, even taking an intelligence test will show itself to involve an attitude toward the test, which may enhance or detract from performance, as when one sees the test as irrelevant or harmful to one's life, or as a sociocultural misfit to one's life experience. To succeed, people need not only to have abilities, but attitudes that put those abilities to effective use to accomplish individuals' life goals. In the study, we found that intelligent attitudes are related, but non-identical, to germane constructs, such as wisdom, the need for cognition, creativity, and openness to experience. Scores on the attitudinal measure were not related to scores on tests of fluid intelligence and academic abilities/achievement. Thus, the range of attitudes regarding how to deploy intelligence can vary over ability levels.

Dual-process model of courage.

Courage is one of the most significant psychological constructs for society, but not one of the most frequently studied. This paper presents a process model of courage consisting of decision-based pathways by which one comes to enact a courageous action. We argue the process of courage begins with a trigger involving an actor(s) and a situation(s). The actor(s) then engage(s) in four key assessments concerning (a) immediacy of the situation, (b) meaningfulness, value, and relevance to the actor, (c) adequacy of efficacy to act, and (d) decision to act with courage. The central component of this process entails an approach-avoidance conflict involving assessments of perceived risks and potential noble outcomes of acting with courage. The decision to act may result in courageous actions assuming it satisfies the four elements: intentionality, objective and substantial risk, a noble purpose, and meaning in time and place. Courageous actions have consequences. Finally, the consequences shape the actors' experience, which feeds into the trigger, closing the loop. Potential moderators of the courage process as well as potential tests of the model have been discussed.