Need for Cognition is associated with a preference for higher task load in effort discounting.

When individuals set goals, they consider the subjective value (SV) of the anticipated reward and the required effort, a trade-off that is of great interest to psychological research. One approach to quantify the SVs of levels of difficulty of a cognitive task is the Cognitive Effort Discounting Paradigm by Westbrook and colleagues (2013). However, it fails to acknowledge the highly individual nature of effort, as it assumes a unidirectional, inverse relationship between task load and SVs. Therefore, it cannot map differences in effort perception that arise from traits like Need for Cognition, since individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activities likely do not prefer the easiest level. We replicated the analysis of Westbrook and colleagues with an adapted version, the Cognitive and Affective Discounting (CAD) Paradigm. It quantifies SVs without assuming that the easiest level is preferred, thereby enabling the assessment of SVs for tasks without objective order of task load. Results show that many of the 116 participants preferred a more or the most difficult level. Variance in SVs was best explained by a declining logistic contrast of the [Formula: see text]-back levels and by the accuracy of responses, while reaction time as a predictor was highly volatile depending on the preprocessing pipeline. Participants with higher Need for Cognition scores perceived higher [Formula: see text]-back levels as less effortful and found them less aversive. Effects of Need for Cognition on SVs in lower levels did not reach significance, as group differences only emerged in higher levels. The CAD Paradigm appears to be well suited for assessing and analysing task preferences independent of the supposed objective task difficulty.Protocol registrationThe stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on August 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/CPXTH .

Estimating individual subjective values of emotion regulation strategies.

Individuals have a repertoire of emotion regulation (ER) strategies at their disposal, which they can use more or less flexibly. In ER flexibility research, strategies that facilitate goal achievement are considered adaptive and therefore are subjectively valuable. Individuals are motivated to reduce their emotional arousal effectively and to avoid cognitive effort. Perceived costs of ER strategies in the form of effort, however, are highly subjective. Subjective values (SVs) should therefore represent a trade-off between effectiveness and subjectively required cognitive effort. However, SVs of ER strategies have not been determined so far. We present a new paradigm for quantifying individual SVs of ER strategies by offering monetary values for ER strategies in an iterative process. N = 120 participants first conducted an ER paradigm with the strategies distraction, distancing, and suppression. Afterwards, individual SVs were determined using the new CAD paradigm. SVs significantly predicted later choice for an ER strategy (χ2 (4, n = 119) = 115.40, p < 0.001, BF10 = 1.62 × 1021). Further, SVs were associated with Corrugator activity (t (5, 618.96) = 2.09, p = 0.037, f2 = 0.001), subjective effort (t (5, 618.96) = - 13.98, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.035), and self-reported utility (t (5, 618.96) = 29.49, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.155). SVs were further associated with self-control (t (97.97) = 2.04, p = 0.044, f2 = 0.002), but not with flexible ER. With our paradigm, we were able to determine subjective values. The trait character of the values will be discussed. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on July 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/FN9BT .

Cognitive effort investment: Does disposition become action?

Contrary to the law of less work, individuals with high levels of need for cognition and self-control tend to choose harder tasks more often. While both traits can be integrated into a core construct of dispositional cognitive effort investment, its relation to actual cognitive effort investment remains unclear. As individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment are characterized by a high intrinsic motivation towards effortful cognition, they would be less likely to increase their effort based on expected payoff, but rather based on increasing demand. In the present study, we measured actual effort investment on multiple dimensions, i.e., subjective load, reaction time, accuracy, early and late frontal midline theta power, N2 and P3 amplitude, and pupil dilation. In a sample of N = 148 participants, we examined the relationship of dispositional cognitive effort investment and effort indices during a flanker and an n-back task with varying demand and payoff. Exploratorily, we examined this relationship for the two subdimensions cognitive motivation and effortful-self-control as well. In both tasks, effort indices were sensitive to demand and partly to payoff. The analyses revealed a main effect of cognitive effort investment for accuracy (n-back task), interaction effects with payoff for reaction time (n-back and flanker task) and P3 amplitude (n-back task) and demand for early frontal midline theta power (flanker task). Taken together, our results partly support the notion that individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment exert effort more efficiently. Moreover, the notion that these individuals exert effort regardless of payoff is partly supported, too. This may further our understanding of the conditions under which person-situation interactions occur, i.e. the conditions under which situations determine effort investment in goal-directed behavior more than personality, and vice versa.

The long and the short of it: 5-HTTLPR and moral judgement.

Differences in moral sentiments are widespread. Increasingly, their biological correlates are investigated to elucidate potential sources of divergent moral attitudes and choices. Serotonin is one such potential modulator. We investigated the effects of a functional serotonergic polymorphism, 5-HTTLPR, which was previously linked to moral choices albeit with inconsistent findings. N = 157 healthy young adults completed a set of congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas. In addition to the traditional moral response score, this set allows by using a process dissociation (PD) approach an estimation a deontological and a utilitarian parameter. While there was no main effect of 5-HTTLPR on any of the three moral judgement parameters, there was an interaction effect between 5-HTTLPR and endocrine status on PD parameters, which was mainly due to the deontological but not the utilitarian parameter. In men and free cycling women, LL homozygotes showed reduced deontological tendencies compared to S allele carriers. Contrariwise, in women using oral contraceptives, LL homozygotes had increased deontology parameter scores. Furthermore, LL genotypes in general reported less difficulty in making harmful choices, which were in addition associated with less negative emotions. The findings suggest that 5-HTTLPR might be involved in modulating cognitive and emotional processes contributing to moral decisions.

Stretch Evolution of Electronic Coupling of the Thiophenyl Anchoring Group with Gold in Mechanically Controllable Break Junctions.

The current-voltage characteristics of a single-molecule junction are determined by the electronic coupling Γ between the electronic states of the electrodes and the dominant transport channel(s) of the molecule. Γ is profoundly affected by the choice of the anchoring groups and their binding positions on the tip facets and the tip-tip separation. In this work, mechanically controllable break junction experiments on the N,N'-bis(5-ethynylbenzenethiol-salicylidene)ethylenediamine are presented, in particular, the stretch evolution of Γ with increasing tip-tip separation. The stretch evolution of Γ is characterized by recurring local maxima and can be related to the deformation of the molecule and sliding of the anchoring groups above the tip facets and along the tip edges. A dynamic simulation approach is implemented to model the stretch evolution of Γ, which captures the experimentally observed features remarkably well and establishes a link to the microscopic structure of the single-molecule junction.

Individual differences in inhibitory control are not related to downregulation of negative emotion via distancing.

Evidence suggests that cognitive control and emotional control share partly the same cognitive processes. For example, downregulation of negative emotions requires inhibiting or limiting the expression of a prepotent appraisal of a situation in favor of selecting an alternative appraisal. Although inhibitory control seems to be a particularly relevant process in emotion regulation (ER), previous studies reported inconsistent findings on their relationship, likely because of the application of single task measures in relatively small samples. Therefore, this study implemented a battery of six commonly used inhibitory control tasks in a large sample of young healthy adults (N = 190) and investigated whether inhibitory control is associated with the downregulation of negative emotion. ER was measured via self-reported reappraisal and suppression use and via a laboratory ER task where participants had to distance themselves from emotions in response to negative and neutral pictures. The ER task was accompanied by concurrent physiological measurements of corrugator electromyography (EMG), skin conductance response (SCR), and heart period (HP). Frequentist and Bayesian analyses indicated that inhibitory control was neither associated with self-reported reappraisal and suppression use, nor with successful downregulation of negative emotion via distancing. Compared with HP and SCR, corrugator EMG was the only peripheral physiological measure that was indicative of regulatory success. The findings question the view that inhibitory control represents an underlying process in emotion regulation via distancing, at least at the behavioral level. Further studies should investigate the generalizability of these findings to other ER strategies, tactics, paradigms, and participant groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Need for cognition and burnout in teachers - A replication and extension study.

Burnout has become more prevalent, mainly in social jobs, and there is evidence that certain personality traits protect against burnout. Only recently, studies have focused on investment traits like Need for Cognition (NFC), the stable intrinsic motivation to seek out and enjoy effortful cognitive activities. This study had three aims: First, the replication of findings by Grass et al. (2018), who investigated NFC and the burnout subscale reduced personal efficacy in student teachers, in a sample of 180 teachers. Second, investigating the role of perceived demands and resources in the context of NFC and burnout. And finally, creating an exploratory model for further research. The results indicated that unlike the student sample, the teachers' association of NFC and reduced personal efficacy was mediated by self-control but not reappraisal. Teachers with higher NFC and self-control also had lower burnout because they experienced their resources as fitting to the demands.

Need for cognition does not account for individual differences in metacontrol of decision making.

Humans show metacontrol of decision making, that is they adapt their reliance on decision-making strategies toward situational differences such as differences in reward magnitude. Specifically, when higher rewards are at stake, individuals increase reliance on a more accurate but cognitively effortful strategy. We investigated whether the personality trait Need for Cognition (NFC) explains individual differences in metacontrol. Based on findings of cognitive effort expenditure in executive functions, we expected more metacontrol in individuals low in NFC. In two independent studies, metacontrol was assessed by means of a decision-making task that dissociates different reinforcement-learning strategies and in which reward magnitude was manipulated across trials. In contrast to our expectations, NFC did not account for individual differences in metacontrol of decision making. In fact, a Bayesian analysis provided moderate to strong evidence against a relationship between NFC and metacontrol. Beyond this, there was no consistent evidence for relationship between NFC and overall model-based decision making. These findings show that the effect of rewards on the engagement of effortful decision-making strategies is largely independent of the intrinsic motivation for engaging in cognitively effortful tasks and suggest a differential role of NFC for the regulation of cognitive effort in decision making and executive functions.

The heart as judge: Association of heart rate variability with moral judgement-A replication study.

There is growing research into contributing processes and biological correlates of moral inclinations. Recently, a negative association between utilitarianism and resting heart rate variability (HRV) as an indicator of cardiac vagal tone/parasympathetic activity was reported. We aimed to replicate and extend these findings by additionally investigating the sympathetic parameter electro-dermal activity (EDA), but found no associations in the total sample (N = 157). However, when taking sex and the use of combined oral contraceptives (COC) into account, we found a positive association between HRV and estimated deontology in women using COC and men, while in free cycling women there was a negative association. While no direct replication, our results also point to associations between higher HRV and decreased endorsement of harmful actions that serve a greater good. Unlike HRV, EDA showed no associations with moral judgements. In addition, there were correlations between personality traits and moral judgement.

EEG microstate analysis of emotion regulation reveals no sequential processing of valence and emotional arousal.

In electroencephalography (EEG), microstates are distributions of activity across the scalp that persist for several tens of milliseconds before changing into a different pattern. Microstate analysis is a way of utilizing EEG as both temporal and spatial imaging tool, but has rarely been applied to task-based data. This study aimed to conceptually replicate microstate findings of valence and emotional arousal processing and investigate the effects of emotion regulation on microstates, using data of an EEG paradigm with 107 healthy adults who actively viewed emotional pictures, cognitively detached from them, or suppressed facial reactions. Within the first 600 ms after stimulus onset only the comparison of viewing positive and negative pictures yielded significant results, caused by different electrodes depending on the microstate. Since the microstates associated with more and less emotionally arousing pictures did not differ, sequential processing could not be replicated. When extending the analysis to 2000 ms after stimulus onset, differences were exclusive to the comparison of viewing and detaching from negative pictures. Intriguingly, we observed the novel phenomenon of a microstate difference that could not be attributed to single electrodes. This suggests that microstate analysis can detect differences beyond those detected by event-related potential analysis.

Cognitive Motivation as a Resource for Affective Adjustment and Mental Health.

Background: Depressive symptoms compromise cognitive and self-regulating capacities. Overcoming associated deficits (e.g., attentional bias) demands cognitive effort and motivation. Previous studies on healthy individuals have found cognitive motivation to positively relate to self-regulation and negatively to depressive symptoms. A test of these associations in a clinical sample is lacking. Methods: We assessed cognitive motivation, self-regulation and depressive symptoms by means of well-validated questionnaires in N = 1,060 psychosomatic rehabilitation in-patients before and after treatment. Data were split and analyzed in two steps: We tested previously reported cross-sectional and longitudinal associations of all variables as well as their longitudinal changes in a first sample. Afterward, findings and derived hypotheses were replicated and tested in a second sample. Results: Analyses of both samples confirmed earlier reports on positive associations between cognitive motivation and self-regulation, and negative associations of both with depressive symptoms. While the change in all variables was predicted by their baseline scores, higher baseline cognitive motivation was found to predict stronger improvements in self-regulation, and lower baseline depression scores to predict smaller changes in cognitive motivation and self-regulation. In addition, the change in cognitive motivation partially mediated the association between the changes in depressive symptoms and self-regulation. Conclusion: Based on a large longitudinal data set, the present study expands previous findings and suggests a resource allocation model in which decreasing depressive symptoms lead to a release of capacities benefitting self-regulation directly, and indirectly via cognitive motivation.

Should we keep some distance from distancing? Regulatory and post-regulatory effects of emotion downregulation.

Emotion regulation is an indispensable part of mental health and adaptive behavior. Research into emotion regulation processes has largely focused on the concurrent effects of volitional emotion regulation. However, there is scarce evidence considering post-regulatory effects with regard to neural mechanisms and emotional experiences. Therefore, we compared concurrent effects of cognitive emotion regulation with effects at different (immediate, short- and long-term) time intervals. In an fMRI study with N = 46 (N = 30 at re-exposure) young healthy adults, we compared neuronal responses to negative and neutral pictures while participants had to distance themselves from or to actively permit emotions in response to these pictures. We investigated the temporal dynamics of activation changes related to regulation in cognitive control brain networks as well as in the amygdala during stimulation (concurrent effects, timepoint 1) and post-stimulation (immediate, timepoint 2), as well as during re-exposure with the same pictures after short (10 minutes, timepoint 3) and long (1 week, timepoint 4) time intervals. At timepoint 1, negative pictures (versus neutral pictures) elicited a strong response in regions of affective processing, including the amygdala. Distancing (as compared to permit) led to a decrease of this response, and to an increase of activation in the right middle frontal and inferior parietal cortex. We observed an interaction effect of time (stimulation vs. post-stimulation) and regulation (distance vs. permit), indicating a partial reversal of regulation effects during the post-stimulation phase (timepoint 2). Similarly, after 10 minutes (timepoint 3) and after 1 week (timepoint 4), activation in the amygdala was higher during pictures that participants were previously instructed to distance from as compared to permit. These results show that the temporal dynamics are highly variable both within experimental trials and across brain regions. This can even take the form of paradoxical aftereffects at immediate and persistent effects at prolonged time scales.

Effort beats effectiveness in emotion regulation choice: Differences between suppression and distancing in subjective and physiological measures.

Emotion regulation (ER) can be implemented by different strategies which differ in their capacity to alter emotional responding. What all strategies have in common is that cognitive control must be exercised in order to implement them. The aim of the present preregistered study was to investigate whether the two ER strategies, expressive suppression and distancing, require different amounts of cognitive effort and whether effort is associated with personality traits. Effort was assessed subjectively via ratings and objectively via pupillometry and heart period. In two studies, N = 110 and N = 52 healthy adults conducted an ER paradigm. Participants used suppression and distancing during inspection of positive and negative pictures. They also had the choice to reapply either of the strategies at the end of the paradigm. Although distancing was more effective in downregulation of subjective arousal (Study 1: p < .001, ηp2  = .20; Study 2: p < .001, ηp2  = .207), about two thirds reapplied suppression, because it was perceived as less effortful. Effort was rated significantly lower for suppression compared to distancing (Study 1: p = .042, ηp2  = .04; Study 2: p = .002, ηp2  = .13). However, differences in effort were not reflected in pupillary data or heart period. Broad and narrow personality traits were neither associated with the preferred strategy nor with subjective or physiological effort measures. Findings suggest that people tend to use the ER strategy that is perceived as less effortful, even though it might not be the most effective strategy.

The costs of over-control in anorexia nervosa: evidence from fMRI and ecological momentary assessment.

A growing body of evidence suggests that a high level of self-control may, despite its positive effects, influence cognitive processing in an unfavorable manner. However, the affective costs of self-control have only rarely been investigated. Anorexia nervosa (AN) is an eating disorder that is often characterized by excessive self-control. Here, we used fMRI to explore whether over-control in AN may have negative affective consequences. 36 predominantly adolescent female AN patients and 36 age-matched healthy controls (HC) viewed negative and neutral pictures during two separate fMRI sessions before and after 10 min of rest. We tested whether abnormally elevated neural activity during the initial presentation in a brain region broadly implicated in top-down control, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), could predict subsequent activation in limbic areas relevant to bottom-up affective processing. Using ecological momentary assessment (EMA), we also tested for associations between the aforementioned neuroimaging markers and negative affective states in the two weeks following the experiment. fMRI data revealed that higher initial activation of the dlPFC in AN predicted increased amygdala reactivity during the second fMRI session, which in turn was related to increased self-reported tension during two weeks following the scan. These data suggest that over-control in AN patients may come at a cost including negative affective states on a short (minutes) as well as a longer time scale (days). This mechanism may significantly contribute to the persistence of AN.

No relation of Need for Cognition to basic executive functions.

OBJECTIVE: Need for Cognition (NFC) refers to a personality trait describing the relatively stable intrinsic motivation of individuals to invest cognitive effort in cognitive endeavors. Higher NFC is associated with a more elaborated, central information processing style and increased recruitment of resources in cognitively demanding situations. To further clarify the association between cognitive resources and NFC, we examined in two studies how NFC relates to executive functions as basic cognitive abilities. METHOD: In Study 1, 189 healthy young adults completed an NFC scale and a battery of six commonly used inhibitory control tasks (Stroop, antisaccade, stop-signal, flanker, shape-matching, word-naming). In Study 2, 102 healthy young adults completed the NFC scale and two tasks for each of the three executive functions inhibitory control (go-nogo, stop-signal), shifting (number-letter, color-shape), and working memory updating (two-back, letter-memory). RESULTS: Using a Bayesian approach to correlation analysis, we found no conclusive evidence that NFC was related to any executive function measure. Instead, we obtained even moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. CONCLUSIONS: Both studies add to more recent findings that shape the understanding of NFC as a trait that is less characterized by increased cognitive control abilities but rather by increased willingness to invest effort and exert self-control via motivational processes.

Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control: A latent Variable Analysis.

Inhibitory control represents a central component of executive functions and focuses on the ability to actively inhibit or delay a dominant response to achieve a goal. Although various tasks exist to measure inhibitory control, correlations between these tasks are rather small, partly because of the task impurity problem. To alleviate this problem, a latent variable approach has been previously applied and two closely related yet separable functions have been identified: prepotent response inhibition and resistance to distractor interference. The goal of our study was a) to replicate the proposed structure of inhibitory control and b) to extend previous literature by additionally accounting for speed-accuracy trade-offs, thereby potentially increasing explained variance in the investigated latent factors. To this end, 190 participants completed six inhibitory control tasks (antisaccade task, Stroop task, stop-signal task, flanker task, shape-matching task, word-naming task). Analyses were conducted using standard scores as well as inverse efficiency scores (combining response times and error rates). In line with previous studies, we generally found low zero-order correlations between the six tasks. By applying confirmatory factor analysis using standard reaction time difference scores, we were not able to replicate a satisfactory model with good fit to the data. By using inverse efficiency scores, a two-related-factor and a one-factor model emerged that resembled previous literature, but only four out of six tasks demonstrated significant factor loadings. Our results highlight the difficulty in finding robust inter-correlations between commonly used inhibitory control tasks, even when applying a latent variable analysis and accounting for speed-accuracy trade-offs.

Androgenic morality? Associations of sex, oral contraceptive use and basal testosterone levels with moral decision making.

Aside from cultural, psychological, or situational factors, differences in moral judgements might also be influenced by biological variables. Since previous studies have reported stronger utilitarian tendencies in men, the relationship between testosterone and moral judgments has gained interest. Utilitarian judgements focus on the consequences of an action in terms of a cost-benefit analysis while deontological judgements are based on rules that are independent of an action's outcome or of situational features. We investigated decisions in moral dilemma situations in N = 157 young adults using a process dissociation approach to allow an independent estimate of underlying utilitarianism and deontology. Significant effects of sex (p = .009) and endocrine status (p = .011) on utilitarianism were found with the highest levels in men and the lowest in free cycling women while oral contraceptive users fell in between. Furthermore, there were correlations of salivary testosterone with utilitarianism in free cycling women (r = .303) and with deontology in men (r = -0.263) while no significant associations between testosterone and moral choices were found in oral contraceptive users. However, the duration of contraceptive use correlated negatively with deontology (r = -.316). The findings underscore the role of sex, endocrine status as well as testosterone in moral judgements but also point to specific associations depending on sex and oral contraceptive use.

Dispositional individual differences in cognitive effort investment: establishing the core construct.

BACKGROUND: Individuals tend to avoid effortful tasks, regardless of whether they are physical or mental in nature. Recent experimental evidence is suggestive of individual differences in the dispositional willingness to invest cognitive effort in goal-directed behavior. The traits need for cognition (NFC) and self-control are related to behavioral measures of cognitive effort discounting and demand avoidance, respectively. Given that these traits are only moderately related, the question arises whether they reflect a common core factor underlying cognitive effort investment. If so, the common core of both traits might be related to behavioral measures of effort discounting in a more systematic fashion. To address this question, we aimed at specifying a core construct of cognitive effort investment that reflects dispositional differences in the willingness and tendency to exert effortful control. METHODS: We conducted two studies (N = 613 and N = 244) with questionnaires related to cognitive motivation and effort investment including assessment of NFC, intellect, self-control and effortful control. We first calculated Pearson correlations followed by two mediation models regarding intellect and its separate aspects, seek and conquer, as mediators. Next, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis of a hierarchical model of cognitive effort investment as second-order latent variable. First-order latent variables were cognitive motivation reflecting NFC and intellect, and effortful self-control reflecting self-control and effortful control. Finally, we calculated Pearson correlations between factor scores of the latent variables and general self-efficacy as well as traits of the Five Factor Model of Personality for validation purposes. RESULTS: Our findings support the hypothesized correlations between the assessed traits, where the relationship of NFC and self-control is specifically mediated via goal-directedness. We established and replicated a hierarchical factor model of cognitive motivation and effortful self-control that explains the shared variance of the first-order factors by a second-order factor of cognitive effort investment. CONCLUSIONS: Taken together, our results integrate disparate literatures on cognitive motivation and self-control and provide a basis for further experimental research on the role of dispositional individual differences in goal-directed behavior and cost-benefit-models.

Dispositional cognitive effort investment and behavioral demand avoidance: Are they related?

Individuals tend to avoid cognitive demand, yet, individual differences appear to exist. Recent evidence from two studies suggests that individuals high in the personality traits Self-Control and Need for Cognition that are related to the broader construct Cognitive Effort Investment are less prone to avoid cognitive demand and show less effort discounting. These findings suggest that cost-benefit models of decision-making that integrate the costs due to effort should consider individual differences in the willingness to exert mental effort. However, to date, there are almost no replication attempts of the above findings. For the present conceptual replication, we concentrated on the avoidance of cognitive demand and used a longitudinal design and latent state-trait modeling. This approach enabled us to separate the trait-specific variance in our measures of Cognitive Effort Investment and Demand Avoidance that is due to stable, individual differences from the variance that is due to the measurement occasion, the methods used, and measurement error. Doing so allowed us to test the assumption that self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment is related to behavioral Demand Avoidance more directly by relating their trait-like features to each other. In a sample of N = 217 participants, we observed both self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment and behavioral Demand Avoidance to exhibit considerable portions of trait variance. However, these trait variances were not significantly related to each other. Thus, our results call into question previous findings of a relationship between self-reported effort investment and demand avoidance. We suggest that novel paradigms are needed to emulate real-world effortful situations and enable better mapping between self-reported measures and behavioral markers of the willingness to exert cognitive effort.

Modeling Dynamic Allocation of Effort in a Sequential Task Using Discounting Models.

Most rewards in our lives require effort to obtain them. It is known that effort is seen by humans as carrying an intrinsic disutility which devalues the obtainable reward. Established models for effort discounting account for this by using participant-specific discounting parameters inferred from experiments. These parameters offer only a static glance into the bigger picture of effort exertion. The mechanism underlying the dynamic changes in a participant's willingness to exert effort is still unclear and an active topic of research. Here, we modeled dynamic effort exertion as a consequence of effort- and probability-discounting mechanisms during goal reaching, sequential behavior. To do this, we developed a novel sequential decision-making task in which participants made binary choices to reach a minimum number of points. Importantly, the time points and circumstances of effort allocation were decided by participants according to their own preferences and not imposed directly by the task. Using the computational model to analyze participants' choices, we show that the dynamics of effort exertion arise from a combination of changing task needs and forward planning. In other words, the interplay between a participant's inferred discounting parameters is sufficient to explain the dynamic allocation of effort during goal reaching. Using formal model comparison, we also inferred the forward-planning strategy used by participants. The model allowed us to characterize a participant's effort exertion in terms of only a few parameters. Moreover, the model can be adapted to a number of tasks used in establishing the neural underpinnings of forward-planning behavior and meta-control, allowing for the characterization of behavior in terms of model parameters.