Promoting racial equity in COVID-19 resource allocation.

Due to COVID-19's strain on health systems across the globe, triage protocols determine how to allocate scarce medical resources with the worthy goal of maximising the number of lives saved. However, due to racial biases and long-standing health inequities, the common method of ranking patients based on impersonal numeric representations of their morbidity is associated with disproportionately pronounced racial disparities. In response, policymakers have issued statements of solidarity. However, translating support into responsive COVID-19 policy is rife with complexity. Triage does not easily lend itself to race-based exceptions. Reordering triage queues based on an individual patient's racial affiliation has been considered but may be divisive and difficult to implement. And while COVID-19 hospital policies may be presented as rigidly focused on saving the most lives, many make exceptions for those deemed worthy by policymakers such as front-line healthcare workers, older physicians, pregnant women and patients with disabilities. These exceptions demonstrate creativity and ingenuity-hallmarks of policymakers' abilities to flexibly respond to urgent societal concerns-which should also be extended to patients of colour. This paper dismantles common arguments against the confrontation of racial inequity within COVID-19 triage protocols, highlights concerns related to existing proposals and proposes a new paradigm to increase equity when allocating scarce COVID-19 resources.

Helping Children Hurt Themselves: Why Pediatricians Ought to Support Adolescent Football Players in Their Athletic Goals.

Participation in sports such as football puts youth-athletes at high risk of injury. Helmets cannot protect players from the possibility of traumatic brain injury, and repeated concussive injuries can lead to chronic traumatic encephalopathy later in life. In light of such facts, the morally appropriate role of physicians who treat patient-athletes comes into question. I argue that pediatricians ought to be committed to a high level of shared decision making, whereby their goal, rather than being to provide the medically best advice (which, let's be honest, would be to not play football at all), would be to provide the medically best advice in light of patients' honestly professed plans and goals. If patient-athletes see their doctor as an ally, who wants them on the field as much as they want to be there, they will be more likely to trust their pediatrician to help in the realization of those goals, even if they report an injury. While this approach could feel like a medical betrayal, in that the physician could feel complicit in helping a patient to continue engaging in high-risk behavior, I argue that medical outcomes will be better than if patient-athletes see physicians as an obstruction to their athletic goals.

The Compromising Interpretive Model as a Harm Reduction Strategy for Families that Have Chosen High School Football.

In a reply to Ross, I argue that, as head injuries often lack external indicators, it is imperative that youth-patient-athletes themselves be convinced to report these injuries. Parents, although part of the pediatric triad, will be no help if the adolescent chooses to conceal the information from them as well. Further, I explain why a more deliberate focus on the role of parents in this relationship does not alter my support of the compromising interpretive model as a harm reduction strategy.

Valuing lives and allocating resources: a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource distribution.

In this paper, I argue that the 'modified youngest first' principle provides a morally appropriate criterion for making decisions regarding the distribution of scarce medical resources, and that it is morally preferable to the simple 'youngest first' principle. Based on the complete lives system's goal of maximizing complete lives rather than individual life episodes, I argue that essential to the value we see in complete lives is the first person value attributed by the experiencer of that life. For a life to be 'complete' or 'incomplete,' the subject of that life must be able to understand the concept of a complete life, to have started goals and projects, and to know what it would be for that life to be complete. As the very young are not able to do this, it can reasonably be said that their characteristically human lives have not yet begun, giving those accepting a complete lives approach good reason to accept the modified youngest first principle over a simple 'youngest first' approach.