The state of integrated disease surveillance in seven countries: a synthesis report.

OBJECTIVES: Integrated disease surveillance (IDS) offers the potential for better use of surveillance data to guide responses to public health threats. However, the extent of IDS implementation worldwide is unknown. This study sought to understand how IDS is operationalized, identify implementation challenges and barriers, and identify opportunities for development. STUDY DESIGN: Synthesis of qualitative studies undertaken in seven countries. METHODS: Thirty-four focus group discussions and 48 key informant interviews were undertaken in Pakistan, Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Sweden, Canada, and England, with data collection led by the respective national public health institutes. Data were thematically analysed using a conceptual framework that covered governance, system and structure, core functions, finance and resourcing requirements. Emerging themes were then synthesised across countries for comparisons. RESULTS: None of the countries studied had fully integrated surveillance systems. Surveillance was often fragmented, and the conceptualization of integration varied. Barriers and facilitators identified included: 1) the need for clarity of purpose to guide integration activities; 2) challenges arising from unclear or shared ownership; 3) incompatibility of existing IT systems and surveillance infrastructure; 4) workforce and skills requirements; 5) legal environment to facilitate data sharing between agencies; and 6) resourcing to drive integration. In countries dependent on external funding, the focus on single diseases limited integration and created parallel systems. CONCLUSIONS: A plurality of surveillance systems exists globally with varying levels of maturity. While development of an international framework and standards are urgently needed to guide integration efforts, these must be tailored to country contexts and guided by their overarching purpose.

Severe chickenpox disease and seroprevalence in Sweden - implications for general vaccination.

OBJECTIVES: To describe the current panorama of severe chickenpox disease and seroprevalence in Sweden, as a basis for the approaching decision on universal vaccination. METHODS: Patients discharged with an International Classification of Diseases 10th revision-code for chickenpox (B01-B01.9) in eight pediatric and infectious diseases departments in Stockholm and Gothenburg in 2012-2014 were included in the study and their medical charts were reviewed. Further, residual serum samples collected from 11 laboratories across Sweden were analyzed for varicella zoster IgG-antibodies to investigate age-specific seroprevalence. RESULTS: A total of 218 children and 46 adults were included in this hospital-based study; 87.2% of children and 63.0% of adults had complications. An underlying condition was not associated with an increased risk of complication. Dehydration (31.7%), bacterial skin infections (29.8%) and neurological involvement (20.6%) were the most frequent complications in children. Among adult cases, 63% were born abroad. The seroepidemiological analysis included 957 patient samples. Seroprevalence was 66.7% at 5 years and 91.5% at 12 years. Infants and adolescents/adults were overrepresented among admitted patients compared to seroprevalence data. CONCLUSIONS: Half of all complications in hospitalized chickenpox cases were seen in previously healthy children, which supports universal childhood vaccination. Adult migrants was a risk group for chickenpox hospitalization. Age-specific seroprevalence was similar to neighboring countries.

Health disparities based on neighbourhood and social conditions: Open Comparisons-an indicator-based comparative study in Sweden.

OBJECTIVE: The overarching goal of the Swedish public health policy is to create the right societal conditions for good and equitable health throughout the population and to reduce avoidable health inequalities within a generation. The objective of this article is to highlight the main findings of the Open Comparisons in Public Health (OCPH) 2019 study. STUDY DESIGN: The OCPH is a longitudinal indicator-based comparative study, encompassing 39 public health indicators with results from Sweden's 21 regions and 290 municipalities. METHODS: Descriptive statistics and 95% confidence intervals were used to compare results between municipalities, regions and time points. Correlation analysis was used to study the strength of the relationship between the results of municipalities and their socio-economic conditions. RESULTS: Across the population, levels of health are good and have, in some areas, improved over recent decades. However, some significant health disparities remain according to neighbourhood, sex, age and educational background. Health disparities related to the level of education are often larger than those between women and men, and there are larger differences within a region than between regions. Health disparities have, in some cases, increased, such as for life expectancy. CONCLUSION: If health equity is to be achieved, leaders at all levels must collaborate and advocate for political action and local efficient public health interventions to eliminate health disparities as a result of neighbourhood and social conditions.

High incidence of Plasmodium vivax malaria in newly arrived Eritrean refugees in Sweden since May 2014.

Since May 2014, an increase in Plasmodium vivax malaria has been observed in Sweden. As of 31 August 2014, 105 malaria cases have been reported in newly arrived Eritrean refugees, 84 of them P. vivax. The patients were mainly young men and reported migration through Ethiopia and/or Sudan. Severe anaemia and long symptom duration reflect inadequate healthcare during migration. Countries currently hosting Eritrean refugees need to consider P. vivax malaria in this group of migrants.

Increased incidence of invasive group A streptococcal infections in Sweden, January 2012-February 2013.

The incidence of invasive group A streptococcal infections in Sweden was 6.1 per 100,000 population in 2012, the highest since the disease became notifiable in 2004. Furthermore, January and February 2013 marked a dramatic increase of cases notified, partly explainable by an increase of emm1/T1 isolates, a type previously shown to cause severe invasive disease more often than other types. Healthcare providers in Sweden and health authorities in neighbouring countries have been informed about this increase.

Micro-simulation of a smallpox outbreak using official register data.

To explore the efficacy of four vaccine-based policy strategies (ring vaccination, targeted vaccination, mass vaccination, and pre-vaccination of healthcare personnel combined with ring vaccination) for controlling smallpox outbreaks in Sweden, disease transmission on a spatially explicit social network was simulated. The mixing network was formed from high-coverage official register data of the entire Swedish population, building on the Swedish Total Population Register, the Swedish Employment Register, and the Geographic Database of Sweden. The largest reduction measured in the number of infections was achieved when combining ring vaccination with a pre-vaccination of healthcare personnel. In terms of per dose effectiveness, ring vaccination was by far the most effective strategy. The results can to some extent be adapted to other diseases and environments, including other countries, and the methods used can be analysed in their own right.

Economic consequences to society of pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009 - preliminary results for Sweden.

Experiments using a microsimulation platform show that vaccination against pandemic H1N1 influenza is highly cost-effective. Swedish society may reduce the costs of pandemic by about SEK 2.5 billion (approximately EUR 250 million) if at least 60 per cent of the population is vaccinated, even if costs related to death cases are excluded. The cost reduction primarily results from reduced absenteeism. These results are preliminary and based on comprehensive assumptions about the infectiousness and morbidity of the pandemic, which are uncertain in the current situation.

European concepts for the domestic transport of highly infectious patients.

Highly infectious diseases involve clinical syndromes ranging from single to multiorgan infections and pose a constant threat to the public. In the absence of a definite treatment for most causative agents, patients benefit from maximum supportive care as clinical conditions may deteriorate in the short term. Hence, following initial case identification and isolation, rapid transportation to a specialized treatment unit must be considered in order to minimize the risk of secondary infections, but this is limited by available infrastructure, accessible care en route and the patient's clinical condition. Despite the development of consensus curricula for the clinical management of highly infectious patients, medical transportation lacks a common European approach. This article describes, as examples, three current European concepts for the domestic relocation of highly infectious patients by ground vehicles and aircraft with respect to national legislation and geography.

Introduction of human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination in Sweden.

The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (NBH) decided that a vaccine that protects against cervical cancer caused by human papillomavirus (HPV) should be included in the childhood vaccination directive as a nationwide-programme targeting 12-year-old girls from 2010 as a part of the school-health programme. Currently, vaccination of girls 13-18 years of age is covered by the public insurance. In this paper we describe the decision-making process behind the introduction of HPV vaccination in Sweden.

Development of a matrix to evaluate the threat of biological agents used for bioterrorism.

Adequate public health preparedness for bioterrorism includes the elaboration of an agreed list of biological and chemical agents that might be used in an attack or as threats of deliberate release. In the absence of counterterrorism intelligence information, public health authorities can also base their preparedness on the agents for which the national health structures would be most vulnerable. This article aims to describe a logical method and the characteristics of the variables to be brought in a weighing process to reach a priority list for preparedness. The European Union, in the aftermath of the anthrax events of October 2001 in the United States, set up a task force of experts from multiple member states to elaborate and implement a health security programme. One of the first tasks of this task force was to come up with a list of priority threats. The model, presented here, allows Web-based updates for newly identified agents and for the changes occurring in preventive measures for agents already listed. The same model also allows the identification of priority protection action areas.

Coverage of hepatitis B vaccination in Swedish healthcare workers.

The aim of this study was to assess how well the guidelines on vaccination against hepatitis B had been implemented among healthcare workers (HCWs) at risk for blood exposure. A point-prevalence survey was conducted in six departments of a university hospital in Sweden: the emergency room, intensive care unit, postoperative unit, surgical theatre, department of anaesthesiology and the laboratory for blood chemistry. All HCWs who worked in these departments during the 24h of the survey were asked to complete a questionnaire. In total, 369 questionnaires were analysed. Seventy-nine percent (293/369) of HCWs had received at least one dose of vaccine, but only 40% (147/369) reported that they were fully vaccinated and 21% (76/369) had not been vaccinated at all. The majority of unvaccinated HCWs (72/76, 95%) stated that they would accept vaccination if offered. The main barrier to better compliance with the guidelines is not lack of acceptance among the employees but the failure of the employer to ensure that policies are implemented.

Basic Surveillance Network, a European database for surveillance data on infectious diseases.

The Basic Surveillance Network was started in 2000 and is one of the networks on infectious diseases funded by the European Commission. The network collects and makes readily available basic surveillance data on infectious diseases from all the 'old' (pre-2004) European Union member states. The aim is to provide easy access to descriptive data that already exist in national databases, so that it is possible to monitor and compare incidence trends for infectious diseases in the EU member states. The list of diseases covered by the network has recently been expanded from 10 initial 'pilot' diseases to over 40 diseases listed by the EU to be under surveillance. In the near future, the new member states will be invited to participate in the network. Data are case-based and comprise date of onset of disease, age and sex. Only a very short list of disease specific additional variables, such as country of infection or immunisation status, is collected. Classification of cases (possible, probable, confirmed) is specified according to EU case definitions. The participants of the network have access to an internal web site were all the data is presented in tables and graphs. An open website is available for the public at https://www.eubsn.org./BSN/

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of glanders and melioidosis and bioterrorism-related glanders and melioidosis.

Glanders and melioidosis are two infectious diseases that are caused by Burkholderia mallei and Burkholderia pseudomallei respectively. Infection may be acquired through direct skin contact with contaminated soil or water. Ingestion of such contaminated water or dust is another way of contamination. Glanders and melioidosis have both been studied for weaponisation in several countries in the past. They produce similar clinical syndromes. The symptoms depend upon the route of infection but one form of the disease may progress to another, or the disease might run a chronic relapsing course. Four clinical forms are generally described: localised infection, pulmonary infection, septicaemia and chronic suppurative infections of the skin. All treatment recommendations should be adapted according to the susceptibility reports from any isolates obtained. Post-exposure prophylaxis with trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole is recommended in case of a biological attack. There is no vaccine available for humans.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of brucellosis and bioterrorism-related brucellosis.

Interest in Brucella species as a biological weapon stems from the fact that airborne transmission of the agent is possible. It is highly contagious and enters through mucous membranes such as the conjunctiva, oropharynx, respiratory tract and skin abrasions. It has been estimated that 10-100 organisms only are sufficient to constitute an infectious aerosol dose for humans. Signs and symptoms are similar in patients whatever the route of transmission and are mostly non-specific. Symptoms of patients infected by aerosol are indistinguishable from those of patients infected by other routes. Regimens containing doxycycline plus streptomycin or doxycycline plus rifampin are effective for most forms of brucellosis. Isolation of patients is not necessary. Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole and fluoroquinolones also have good results against Brucella, but are associated with high relapse rates when used as monotherapy. The combination of ofloxacin plus rifampicin is associated with good results. Even if there is little evidence to support its utility for post-exposure prophylaxis, doxycycline plus rifampicin is recommended for 3 to 6 weeks.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of plague and bioterrorism-related plague.

Yersinia pestis appears to be a good candidate agent for a bioterrorist attack. The use of an aerosolised form of this agent could cause an explosive outbreak of primary plague pneumonia. The bacteria could be used also to infect the rodent population and then spread to humans. Most of the therapeutic guidelines suggest using gentamicin or streptomycin as first line therapy with ciprofloxacin as optional treatment. Persons who come in contact with patients with pneumonic plague should receive antibiotic prophylaxis with doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 7 days. Prevention of human-to-human transmission via patients with plague pneumonia can be achieved by implementing standard isolation procedures until at least 4 days of antibiotic treatment have been administered. For the other clinical types of the disease, patients should be isolated for the first 48 hours after the initiation of treatment.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of haemorrhagic fever viruses and bioterrorism-related haemorrhagic fever viruses.

Haemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are a diverse group of viruses that cause a clinical disease associated with fever and bleeding disorder. HFVs that are associated with a potential biological threat are Ebola and Marburg viruses (Filoviridae), Lassa fever and New World arenaviruses (Machupo, Junin, Guanarito and Sabia viruses) (Arenaviridae), Rift Valley fever (Bunyaviridae) and yellow fever, Omsk haemorrhagic fever, and Kyanasur Forest disease (Flaviviridae). In terms of biological warfare concerning dengue, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and Hantaviruses, there is not sufficient knowledge to include them as a major biological threat. Dengue virus is the only one of these that cannot be transmitted via aerosol. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and the agents of haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome appear difficult to weaponise. Ribavirin is recommended for the treatment and the prophylaxis of the arenaviruses and the bunyaviruses, but is not effective for the other families. All patients must be isolated and receive intensive supportive therapy.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of smallpox and bioterrorism-related smallpox.

Smallpox is a viral infection caused by the variola virus. It was declared eradicated worldwide by the Word Health Organization in 1980 following a smallpox eradication campaign. Smallpox is seen as one of the viruses most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The variola virus exists legitimately in only two laboratories in the world. Any new case of smallpox would have to be the result of human accidental or deliberate release. The aerosol infectivity, high mortality, and stability of the variola virus make it a potential and dangerous threat in biological warfare. Early detection and diagnosis are important to limit the spread of the disease. Patients with smallpox must be isolated and managed, if possible, in a negative-pressure room until death or until all scabs have been shed. There is no established antiviral treatment for smallpox. The most effective prevention is vaccination before exposure.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of tularaemia and bioterrorism-related tularaemia.

Francisella tularensis is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to initiate human infection. Inhalational tularaemia following intentional release of a virulent strain of F. tularensis would have great impact and cause high morbidity and mortality. Another route of contamination in a deliberate release could be contamination of water. Seven clinical forms, according to route of inoculation (skin, mucous membranes, gastrointestinal tract, eyes, respiratory tract), dose of the inoculum and virulence of the organism (types A or B) are identified. The pneumonic form of the disease is the most likely form of the disease should this bacterium be used as a bioterrorism agent. Streptomycin and gentamicin are currently considered the treatment of choice for tularemia. Quinolone is an effective alternative drug. No isolation measures for patients with pneumonia are necessary. Streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline or ciprofloxacin are recommended for post-exposure prophylaxis.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of botulism and bioterrorism-related botulism.

Botulism is a rare but serious paralytic illness caused by botulinum toxin, which is produced by the Clostridium botulinum. This toxin is the most poisonous substance known. It 100 000 times more toxic than sarin gas. Eating or breathing this toxin causes illness in humans. Four distinct clinical forms are described: foodborne, wound, infant and intestinal botulism. The fifth form, inhalational botulism, is caused by aerosolised botulinum toxin that could be used as a biological weapon. A deliberate release may also involve contamination of food or water supplies with toxin or C. botulinum bacteria. By inhalation, the dose that would kill 50% of exposed persons (LD50) is 0.003 microgrammes/kg of body weight. Patients with respiratory failure must be admitted to an intensive care unit and require long-term mechanical ventilation. Trivalent equine antitoxins (A,B,E) must be given to patients as soon as possible after clinical diagnosis. Heptavalent human antitoxins (A-G) are available in certain countries.

Basic Surveillance Network, a European database for surveillance data on infectious diseases.

The Basic Surveillance Network was started in 2000 and is one of the networks on infectious diseases funded by the European Commission. The network collects and makes readily available basic surveillance data on infectious diseases from all the 'old' (pre-2004) European Union member states. The aim is to provide easy access to descriptive data that already exist in national databases, so that it is possible to monitor and compare incidence trends for infectious diseases in the EU member states. The list of diseases covered by the network has recently been expanded from 10 initial 'pilot' diseases to over 40 diseases listed by the EU to be under surveillance. In the near future, the new member states will be invited to participate in the network. Data are case-based and comprise date of onset of disease, age and sex. Only a very short list of disease specific additional variables, such as country of infection or immunisation status, is collected. Classification of cases ( possible, probable, confirmed) is specified according to EU case definitions. The participants of the network have access to an internal web site were all the data is presented in tables and graphs. An open website is available for the public at https://www.eubsn.org./BSN/.