Emotion expression salience and racially biased weapon identification: A diffusion modeling approach.

Racial stereotypes are commonly activated by informational cues that are detectable in people's faces. Here, we used a sequential priming task to examine whether and how the salience of emotion (angry/scowling vs. happy/smiling expressions) or apparent race (Black vs. White) information in male face primes shapes racially biased weapon identification (gun vs. tool) decisions. In two experiments (Ntotal = 546) using two different manipulations of facial information salience, racial bias in weapon identification was weaker when the salience of emotion expression versus race was heightened. Using diffusion decision modeling, we tested competing accounts of the cognitive mechanism by which the salience of facial information moderates this behavioral effect. Consistent support emerged for an initial bias account, whereby the decision process began closer to the "gun" response upon seeing faces of Black versus White men, and this racially biased shift in the starting position was weaker when emotion versus race information was salient. We discuss these results vis-à-vis prior empirical and theoretical work on how facial information salience moderates racial bias in decision-making.

Egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment underlies social inferences about known others varying in similarity and familiarity.

How do people infer the content of another person's mind? One documented strategy-at least when inferring the minds of strangers-entails anchoring on the content of one's own mind and serially adjusting away from this egocentric anchor. Yet, many social inferences concern known others in existing social relationships. In eight experiments with four sets of stimuli, we tested whether an egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism underlies social inferences about known targets, and whether it varies based on the target's similarity and familiarity to oneself. In Experiments 1-7, participants (Ntotal = 4,790) rated themselves and a known target on various characteristics (e.g., preferences, habits, traits), and response times for the target ratings were recorded. An integrative data analysis revealed that, consistent with egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment, the more discrepant the target ratings were from participants' self ratings, the longer participants took to provide target ratings. Importantly, this pattern of anchoring-and-adjustment was stronger for similar (vs. dissimilar) and familiar (vs. unfamiliar) targets, but it emerged in all experimental conditions. Experiment 8 (N = 549) suggested that these results were unlikely to be explained solely by a memory search process. We discuss implications for anchoring-and-adjustment as a mechanism underlying social inferences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?

Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer: (1) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states, (2) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation, (3) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (4) how we represent others' minds is dependent on social context.

Revising mental representations of faces based on new diagnostic information.

Extending evidence for the rapid revision of mental representations of what other people are like, we explored whether people also rapidly revise their representations of what others look like. After learning to ascribe positive or negative behavioral information to a target person and generating a visualization of their face in a reverse-correlation task, participants learned new information that was (a) counter-attitudinal and diagnostic about the person's character or (b) neutral and non-diagnostic, and then they generated a second visualization. Ratings of these visualizations in separate samples of participants consistently revealed revision effects: Time 2 visualizations assimilated to the counter-attitudinal information. Weaker revision effects also emerged after learning neutral information, suggesting that the evaluative extremity of visualizations may dilute when encountering any additional information. These findings indicate that representations of others' appearance may change upon learning more about them, particularly when this new information is counter-attitudinal and diagnostic.

Perspective taking reduces intergroup bias in visual representations of faces.

Intergroup biases shape most aspects of person construal, including lower-level visual representations of group members' faces. Specifically, ingroup members' faces tend to be represented more positively than outgroup members' faces. Here, we used a reverse-correlation paradigm to test whether engaging in perspective taking (i.e., actively imagining another person's mental states) can reduce these biased visual representations. In an initial image-generation experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a minimal group and then composed a narrative essay about an ingroup or an outgroup target person, either while adopting the person's perspective or while following control instructions. Afterward, they generated an image of the person's face in a reverse-correlation image-classification task. Subsequent image-assessment experiments using an explicit rating task, a sequential priming task, and an economic trust game with separate samples of participants revealed that ingroup faces elicited more likability and trustworthiness than did outgroup faces. Importantly, this pattern of intergroup bias was consistently weaker in faces created by perspective takers. Additional image-assessment experiments identified the mouth (i.e., smiling cues) as a critical facial region wherein the interactive effects of group membership and perspective taking emerged. These findings provide initial evidence that perspective taking may be an effective strategy for attenuating, though not for eliminating, intergroup biases in visual representations of what group members look like.

Evaluations of empathizers depend on the target of empathy.

Psychological research on empathy typically focuses on understanding its effects on empathizers and empathic targets. Little is known, however, about the effects of empathy beyond its dyadic context. Taking an extradyadic perspective, we examined how third-party observers evaluate empathizers. Seven experiments documented that observers' evaluations of empathizers depend on the target of empathy. Empathizers (vs. nonempathizers) of a stressful experience were respected/liked more when the empathic target was positive (e.g., children's hospital worker), but not when the target was negative (e.g., White supremacist; Experiments 1 and 2). Empathizers were respected/liked more when responding to a positive target who disclosed a positive experience (i.e., a personal accomplishment), but less when responding to a negative target who disclosed a positive experience (Experiment 3). These effects were partly, but not solely, attributable to the positivity of empathic responses (Experiment 4). Expressing empathy (vs. condemnation) toward a negative target resulted in less respect/liking when the disclosed experience was linked to the source of target valence (i.e., stress from White supremacist job; Experiments 5 through 7), but more respect/liking when the experience was unrelated to the source of target valence (i.e., stress from cancer; Experiment 7). Overall, empathizers were viewed as warmer, but to a lesser extent when responding to a negative target. These findings highlight the importance of considering the extradyadic impact of empathy and suggest that although people are often encouraged to empathize with disliked others, they are not always favored for doing so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Category salience and racial bias in weapon identification: A diffusion modeling approach.

Stereotypes linking Black Americans with guns can have life-altering outcomes, making it important to identify factors that shape such weapon identification biases and how they do so. We report 6 experiments that provide a mechanistic account of how category salience affects weapon identification bias elicited by male faces varying in race (Black, White) and age (men, boys). Behavioral analyses of error rates and response latencies revealed that, when race was salient, faces of Black versus White males (regardless of age) facilitated the classification of objects as guns versus tools. When a category other than race was salient, racial bias in behavior was reduced, though not eliminated. In Experiments 1-4, racial bias was weaker when participants attended to a social category besides race (i.e., age). In Experiments 5 and 6, racial bias was weaker when participants attended to an applicable, yet nonsubstantive category (i.e., the color of a dot on the face). Across experiments, process analyses using diffusion models revealed that, when race was salient, seeing Black versus White male faces led to an initial bias to favor the "gun" response. When a category besides race (i.e., age, dot color) was salient, racial bias in the relative start point was reduced, though not eliminated. These results suggest that the magnitude of racial bias in weapon identification may differ depending on what social category is salient. The collective findings also highlight the utility of diffusion modeling for elucidating how category salience shapes processes underlying racial biases in behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The goal-dependence of level-1 and level-2 visual perspective calculation.

Does tracking another agent's visual perspective depend on having a goal-albeit a remote one-to do so? In 5 experiments using indirect measures of visual perspective taking with a cartoon avatar, we examined whether and how adult perceivers' processing goals shape the incidental tracking of what objects the avatar sees (Level-1 perspective taking) and how the avatar sees those objects (Level-2 perspective taking). Process dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate calculation of the avatar's perspective as the process of focal interest, revealed that both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective calculation were consistently weaker when the avatar's perspective was less relevant for participants' own processing goals. This pattern of goal-dependent perspective tracking was also evident in behavioral analyses of interference from the avatar's differing perspective when reporting one's own perspective (i.e., altercentric interference). These results suggest that, although Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective calculation may operate unintentionally, both also appear to depend on perceivers' processing goals. More generally, these findings advance understanding of processes underlying visual perspective taking and the conditional automaticity with which those processes operate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Time pressure disrupts level-2, but not level-1, visual perspective calculation: A process-dissociation analysis.

Reasoning about other people's mental states has long been assumed to require active deliberation. Yet, evidence from indirect measures suggests that adults and children commonly display behavior indicative of having incidentally calculated both what other agents see (level-1 perspective taking) and how they see it (level-2 perspective taking). Here, we investigated the efficiency of such perspective calculation in adults. In four experiments using indirect measures of visual perspective taking, we imposed time pressure to constrain processing opportunity, and we used process-dissociation analyses to isolate perspective calculation as the process of focal interest. Results revealed that time pressure weakened level-2, but not level-1, perspective calculation-a pattern that was not evident in error-rate analyses. These findings suggest that perspective calculation may operate more efficiently in level-1 than in level-2 perspective taking. They also highlight the utility of the process-dissociation framework for unmasking processes that otherwise may go under-detected in behavior-level analyses.

Are Black Women and Girls Associated With Danger? Implicit Racial Bias at the Intersection of Target Age and Gender.

We investigated whether stereotypes linking Black men and Black boys with violence and criminality generalize to Black women and Black girls. In Experiments 1 and 2, non-Black participants completed sequential-priming tasks wherein they saw faces varying in race, age, and gender before categorizing danger-related objects or words. Experiment 3 compared task performance across non-Black and Black participants. Results revealed that (a) implicit stereotyping of Blacks as more dangerous than Whites emerged across target age, target gender, and perceiver race, with (b) a similar magnitude of racial bias across adult and child targets and (c) a smaller magnitude for female than male targets. Evidence for age bias and gender bias also emerged whereby (d) across race, adult targets were more strongly associated with danger than were child targets, and (e) within Black (but not White) targets, male targets were more strongly associated with danger than were female targets.

Racial bias in implicit danger associations generalizes to older male targets.

Across two experiments, we examined whether implicit stereotypes linking younger (~28-year-old) Black versus White men with violence and criminality extend to older (~68-year-old) Black versus White men. In Experiment 1, participants completed a sequential priming task wherein they categorized objects as guns or tools after seeing briefly-presented facial images of men who varied in age (younger versus older) and race (Black versus White). In Experiment 2, we used different face primes of younger and older Black and White men, and participants categorized words as 'threatening' or 'safe.' Results consistently revealed robust racial biases in object and word identification: Dangerous objects and words were identified more easily (faster response times, lower error rates), and non-dangerous objects and words were identified less easily, after seeing Black face primes than after seeing White face primes. Process dissociation procedure analyses, which aim to isolate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to task performance, further indicated that these effects were driven entirely by racial biases in automatic processing. In neither experiment did prime age moderate racial bias, suggesting that the implicit danger associations commonly evoked by younger Black versus White men appear to generalize to older Black versus White men.

Intergroup visual perspective-taking: Shared group membership impairs self-perspective inhibition but may facilitate perspective calculation.

Reasoning about what other people see, know, and want is essential for navigating social life. Yet, even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults make perspective-taking errors. Here, we examined how the group membership of perspective-taking targets (ingroup vs. outgroup) affects processes underlying visual perspective-taking. In three experiments using two bases of group identity (university affiliation and minimal groups), interference from one's own differing perspective (i.e., egocentric intrusion) was stronger when responding from an ingroup versus an outgroup member's perspective. Spontaneous perspective calculation, as indexed by interference from another's visual perspective when reporting one's own (i.e., altercentric intrusion), did not differ across target group membership in any of our experiments. Process-dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate automatic processes underlying altercentric-intrusion effects, further revealed negligible effects of target group membership on perspective calculation. Meta-analytically, however, there was suggestive evidence that shared group membership facilitates responding from others' perspectives when self and other perspectives are aligned.

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain.

Empathy for pain is often described as automatic. Here, we used implicit measurement and multinomial modeling to formally quantify unintentional empathy for pain: empathy that occurs despite intentions to the contrary. We developed the pain identification task (PIT), a sequential priming task wherein participants judge the painfulness of target experiences while trying to avoid the influence of prime experiences. Using multinomial modeling, we distinguished 3 component processes underlying PIT performance: empathy toward target stimuli (Intentional Empathy), empathy toward prime stimuli (Unintentional Empathy), and bias to judge target stimuli as painful (Response Bias). In Experiment 1, imposing a fast (vs. slow) response deadline uniquely reduced Intentional Empathy. In Experiment 2, inducing imagine-self (vs. imagine-other) perspective-taking uniquely increased Unintentional Empathy. In Experiment 3, Intentional and Unintentional Empathy were stronger toward targets with typical (vs. atypical) pain outcomes, suggesting that outcome information matters and that effects on the PIT are not reducible to affective priming. Typicality of pain outcomes more weakly affected task performance when target stimuli were merely categorized rather than judged for painfulness, suggesting that effects on the latter are not reducible to semantic priming. In Experiment 4, Unintentional Empathy was stronger for participants who engaged in costly donation to cancer charities, but this parameter was also high for those who donated to an objectively worse but socially more popular charity, suggesting that overly high empathy may facilitate maladaptive altruism. Theoretical and practical applications of our modeling approach for understanding variation in empathy are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults.

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.

Active perspective taking induces flexible use of self-knowledge during social inference.

Social life hinges on the ability to infer others' mental states. By default, people often recruit self-knowledge during social inference, particularly for others who are similar to oneself. How do people's active perspective-taking efforts-deliberately imagining another's perspective-affect self-knowledge use? In 2 experiments, we test the flexible self-application hypothesis: that the application of self-knowledge to a perspective-taking target differs based on that person's similarity to oneself. We found consistent evidence that, when making inferences about dissimilar others, perspective taking increased the projection of one's own traits and preferences to those targets, relative to a control condition. When making inferences about similar others, however, perspective taking decreased projection. These findings suggest that self-target similarity critically shapes the inferential processes triggered by active perspective-taking efforts. (PsycINFO Database Record

Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task.

Reasoning about other people's mental states is central to social life. Yet, even neuro-typical adults sometimes have perspective-taking difficulties, particularly when another's perspective conflicts with their own. In two experiments, we examined the cognitive mechanisms underlying an affective factor known to hinder perspective taking in adults: anxiety. Using a level-1 visual perspective-taking task, we found that incidentally experiencing anxiety, relative to neutral feelings and anger, impaired the spontaneous calculation of what another social agent can see. Feeling anxious did not, however, impede perspective calculation with a non-social entity, suggesting that anxiety's disruptive effects may be particularly pronounced for social aspects of cognition. These findings help elucidate the mechanisms underlying the effects of incidental emotions on perspective taking and inform debates about "implicit" forms of mentalizing.

Does Seeing Faces of Young Black Boys Facilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?

Pervasive stereotypes linking Black men with violence and criminality can lead to implicit cognitive biases, including the misidentification of harmless objects as weapons. In four experiments, we investigated whether these biases extend even to young Black boys (5-year-olds). White participants completed sequential priming tasks in which they categorized threatening and nonthreatening objects and words after brief presentations of faces of various races (Black and White) and ages (children and adults). Results consistently revealed that participants had less difficulty (i.e., faster response times, fewer errors) identifying threatening stimuli and more difficulty identifying nonthreatening stimuli after seeing Black faces than after seeing White faces, and this racial bias was equally strong following adult and child faces. Process-dissociation-procedure analyses further revealed that these effects were driven entirely by automatic (i.e., unintentional) racial biases. The collective findings suggest that the perceived threat commonly associated with Black men may generalize even to young Black boys.

Maximizing the Gains and Minimizing the Pains of Diversity: A Policy Perspective.

Empirical evidence reveals that diversity-heterogeneity in race, culture, gender, etc.-has material benefits for organizations, communities, and nations. However, because diversity can also incite detrimental forms of conflict and resentment, its benefits are not always realized. Drawing on research from multiple disciplines, this article offers recommendations for how best to harness the benefits of diversity. First, we highlight how two forms of diversity-the diversity present in groups, communities, and nations, and the diversity acquired by individuals through their personal experiences (e.g., living abroad)-enable effective decision making, innovation, and economic growth by promoting deeper information processing and complex thinking. Second, we identify methods to remove barriers that limit the amount of diversity and opportunity in organizations. Third, we describe practices, including inclusive multiculturalism and perspective taking, that can help manage diversity without engendering resistance. Finally, we propose a number of policies that can maximize the gains and minimize the pains of diversity.

Anxious and egocentric: how specific emotions influence perspective taking.

People frequently feel anxious. Although prior research has extensively studied how feeling anxious shapes intrapsychic aspects of cognition, much less is known about how anxiety affects interpersonal aspects of cognition. Here, we examine the influence of incidental experiences of anxiety on perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Compared with participants experiencing other negative, high-arousal emotions (i.e., anger or disgust) or neutral feelings, anxious participants displayed greater egocentrism in their mental-state reasoning: They were more likely to describe an object using their own spatial perspective, had more difficulty resisting egocentric interference when identifying an object from others' spatial perspectives, and relied more heavily on privileged knowledge when inferring others' beliefs. Using both experimental-causal-chain and measurement-of-mediation approaches, we found that these effects were explained, in part, by uncertainty appraisal tendencies. Further supporting the role of uncertainty, a positive emotion associated with uncertainty (i.e., surprise) produced increases in egocentrism that were similar to anxiety. Collectively, the results suggest that incidentally experiencing emotions associated with uncertainty increase reliance on one's own egocentric perspective when reasoning about the mental states of others.

Perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change: testing an associative self-anchoring account.

The current research adopted a multipronged mediational approach to test an associative self-anchoring account of automatic intergroup evaluation change following perspective taking. We contend that actively contemplating outgroup members' perspectives strengthens associative links between that outgroup and the self, enabling a transfer of positive automatic self-evaluations to the group. A first set of experiments, using both measurement-of-mediation and experimental-causal-chain designs, supported a model in which strengthened self-outgroup associations underlie perspective taking's positive effects on automatic intergroup evaluations. Additional experiments, using a moderation-of-process design, found that the benefits of perspective taking were attenuated when measured or manipulated automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative, preventing positive associative transfer. A final experiment uncovered a practical downstream implication of our causal model, as perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup evaluations were still evident 1 day later. Overall, these findings supported our associative self-anchoring account; additional analyses found no support for an alternative, empathy-based account.