The presence of fear: How subjective fear, not physiological changes, shapes the experience of presence.

When we become engrossed in novels, films, games, or even our own wandering thoughts, we can feel present in a reality distinct from the real world. Although this subjective sense of presence is, presumably, a ubiquitous aspect of conscious experience, the mechanisms that produce it are unknown. Correlational studies conducted in virtual reality have shown that we feel more present when we are afraid, motivating claims that physiological changes contribute to presence; however, such causal claims remain to be evaluated. Here, we report two experiments that test the causal role of subjective and physiological components of fear (i.e., activation of the sympathetic nervous system) in generating presence. In Study 1, we validated a virtual reality simulation capable of inducing fear. Participants rated their emotions while they crossed a wooden plank that appeared to be suspended above a city street; at the same time, we recorded heart rate and skin conductance levels. Height exposure increased ratings of fear, presence, and both measures of sympathetic activation. Although presence and fear ratings were correlated during height exposure, presence and sympathetic activation were unrelated. In Study 2, we manipulated whether the plank appeared at height or at ground level. We also captured participants' movements, which revealed that alongside increases in subjective fear, presence, and sympathetic activation, participants also moved more slowly at height relative to controls. Using a mediational approach, we found that the relationship between height exposure and presence on the plank was fully mediated by self-reported fear, and not by sympathetic activation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion in motion: perceiving fear in the behaviour of individuals from minimal motion capture displays.

The ability to quickly and accurately recognise emotional states is adaptive for numerous social functions. Although body movements are a potentially crucial cue for inferring emotions, few studies have studied the perception of body movements made in naturalistic emotional states. The current research focuses on the use of body movement information in the perception of fear expressed by targets in a virtual heights paradigm. Across three studies, participants made judgments about the emotional states of others based on motion-capture body movement recordings of those individuals actively engaged in walking a virtual plank at ground-level or 80 stories above a city street. Results indicated that participants were reliably able to differentiate between height and non-height conditions (Studies 1 & 2), were more likely to spontaneously describe target behaviour in the height condition as fearful (Study 2) and their fear estimates were highly calibrated with the fear ratings from the targets (Studies 1-3). Findings show that VR height scenarios can induce fearful behaviour and that people can perceive fear in minimal representations of body movement.

Erratum: Dissociating the physiological components of unconscious emotional responses.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/nix021.][This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/nix021.].

Dissociating the physiological components of unconscious emotional responses.

Conscious emotional processing is characterized by a coordinated set of responses across multiple physiological systems. Although emotional stimuli can evoke certain physiological responses even when they are suppressed from awareness, it is not known whether unconscious emotional responses comprise a similar constellation or are confined to specific systems. To compare physiological responses to emotional stimuli with and without awareness, we measured a range of responses while participants viewed positive, negative and neutral images that were accompanied by noise bursts to elicit startle reflexes. We measured four responses simultaneously - skin conductance and heart rate changes in response to the images themselves; and startle eye-blink and post-auricular reflexes in response to the noise bursts that occurred during image presentation. For half of the participants, the images were masked from awareness using continuous flash suppression. The aware group showed the expected pattern of response across physiological systems: emotional images (regardless of valence) evoked larger skin conductance responses (SCRs) and greater heart rate deceleration than neutral images, negative images enhanced eye-blink reflexes and positive images enhanced post-auricular reflexes. In contrast, we found a striking dissociation between measures for the unaware group: typical modulation of SCRs and post-auricular reflexes, but no modulation of heart rate deceleration or eye-blink reflexes. Our findings suggest that although some physiological systems respond to emotional stimuli presented outside of awareness, conscious emotional processing may be characterized by a broad and coordinated set of responses across systems.

Solutions to the new threats to academic freedom?

In my commentary on Francesca Minerva's article 'New Threats to Academic Freedom', I agree with her contention that the existence of the Internet has given rise to new and very serious threats to academic freedom. I think that it is crucial that we confront those threats, and find ways to eliminate them, which I believe can be done. The threats in question involve both authors and editors. In the case of authors, I argue that the best solution is not anonymous publication, but publication using pseudonyms, and I describe how that would work. In the case of editors, my proposal is a website that a number of journals would have access to, where papers that editors judge to be clearly worthy of publication, but whose publication seems likely to set off a firestorm of public and media protest, could be published without any indication of the journal that had accepted the paper for publication.

Value, obligation and the asymmetry question.

Is there a prima facie obligation to produce additional individuals whose lives would be worth living? In his paper 'Is it good to make happy people?', Stuart Rachels argues not only that there is, but, also, that precisely as much weight should be assigned to the quality of life that would be enjoyed by such potential persons, if they were to be actualized, as to the quality of life enjoyed by actually existing persons. In response, I shall argue, first, that Rachels' view is exposed to very serious objections, and secondly, that his arguments in support of his position involve a crucial assumption, which cannot be sustained, concerning the relation between, on the one hand, propositions about good-making and bad-making properties, and, on the other, propositions about right-making and wrong-making ones. I shall then argue that there is a very plausible position concerning the conditions under which an action can be morally wrong which entails the following asymmetry: there is a prima facie obligation not to bring into existence individuals whose lives are not worth living, but there is no corresponding obligation to create additional individuals whose lives would be worth living.