Assessing Spontaneous Categorical Processing of Visual Shapes via Frequency-Tagging EEG.

Categorization is an essential cognitive and perceptual process, which happens spontaneously. However, earlier research often neglected the spontaneous nature of this process by mainly adopting explicit tasks in behavioral or neuroimaging paradigms. Here, we use frequency-tagging (FT) during electroencephalography (EEG) in 22 healthy human participants (both male and female) as a direct approach to pinpoint spontaneous visual categorical processing. Starting from schematic natural visual stimuli, we created morph sequences comprising 11 equal steps. Mirroring a behavioral categorical perception discrimination paradigm, we administered a FT-EEG oddball paradigm, assessing neural sensitivity for equally sized differences within and between stimulus categories. Likewise, mirroring a behavioral category classification paradigm, we administered a sweep FT-EEG oddball paradigm, sweeping from one end of the morph sequence to the other, thereby allowing us to objectively pinpoint the neural category boundary. We found that FT-EEG can implicitly measure categorical processing and discrimination. More specifically, we could derive an objective neural index of the required level to differentiate between the two categories, and this neural index showed the typical marker of categorical perception (i.e., stronger discrimination across as compared with within categories). The neural findings of the implicit paradigms were also validated using an explicit behavioral task. These results provide evidence that FT-EEG can be used as an objective tool to measure discrimination and categorization and that the human brain inherently and spontaneously (without any conscious or decisional processes) uses higher-level meaningful categorization information to interpret ambiguous (morph) shapes.

The Facts or the Story? It Takes Both to Sensitize People About Unknown Health Hazards.

Communicating about new or unknown health risks is challenging because it requires audiences to engage with and process novel and often complex health information. This study examines how texts can convey awareness and increase knowledge about health risks people are unaware of. The focus is on how text genre (narrative, expository, and mixed-genre) affects relevant emotional (arousal, transportation) and cognitive outcomes (knowledge and risk severity), measured using both online (electrodermal activity) and offline self-report measures. Mixed-effects model analyses revealed that narrative texts exhibit the highest self-reported arousal, transportation, and risk severity. Additionally, transportation mediates the relationship between text genre and risk severity. Ultimately, mixed-genre texts produced significantly higher arousal peaks and confidence ratings on knowledge posttests compared to expository texts. Taken together, the findings suggest that narrative texts perform better at raising awareness, whereas mixed-genre texts seem more effective in learning. The implications for health risk communication are discussed.

Aesthetics and predictive processing: grounds and prospects of a fruitful encounter.

In the last few years, a remarkable convergence of interests and results has emerged between scholars interested in the arts and aesthetics from a variety of perspectives and cognitive scientists studying the mind and brain within the predictive processing (PP) framework. This convergence has so far proven fruitful for both sides: while PP is increasingly adopted as a framework for understanding aesthetic phenomena, the arts and aesthetics, examined under the lens of PP, are starting to be seen as important windows into our mental functioning. The result is a vast and fast-growing research programme that promises to deliver important insights into our aesthetic encounters as well as a wide range of psychological phenomena of general interest. Here, we present this developing research programme, describing its grounds and highlighting its prospects. We start by clarifying how the study of the arts and aesthetics encounters the PP picture of mental functioning (§1). We then go on to outline the prospects of this encounter for the fields involved: philosophy and history of art (§2), psychology of aesthetics and neuroaesthetics (§3) and psychology and neuroscience more generally (§4). The upshot is an ambitious but well-defined framework within which aesthetics and cognitive science can partner up to illuminate crucial aspects of the human mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience.

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind.

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: The motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: Recent events have made it painfully clear that conspiracy beliefs can tear deep rifts in society and that we still have not found an adequate, de-escalating response to this. To understand the appeal of conspiracy theories and find new, humanizing ways to talk about them, we propose in this perspective paper to start from the universal human need to autonomously make discoveries through personal knowledge-generating actions. Indeed, psychological research shows that the aha experiences that accompany subjective discoveries create confidence in and perceived ownership of ideas that may be exploited by conspiracy theories. We hypothesize that people experiencing more uncertainty and/or epistemic exclusion in society will especially feel the need to re-establish autonomous epistemic agency and discovery. While this explanation starts from shared human experiences and practices, it also illustrates the potential of those processes to lead to a narrowed world and ossified cognition.

Mental distress through the prism of predictive processing theory.

We review the predictive processing theory's take on goals and affect, to shed new light on mental distress and how it develops into psychopathology such as in affective and motivational disorders. This analysis recovers many of the classical factors known to be important in those disorders, like uncertainty and control, but integrates them in a mechanistic model of adaptive and maladaptive cognition and behavior. We derive implications for treatment that have so far remained underexposed in existing predictive processing accounts of mental disorder, specifically with regard to the model-dependent construction of value, the importance of model validation (evidence), and the introduction and learning of new, adaptive beliefs that relieve suffering.

Structural and contextual priors affect visual search in children with and without autism.

Bayesian predictive coding theories of autism spectrum disorder propose that impaired acquisition or a broader shape of prior probability distributions lies at the core of the condition. However, we still know very little about how probability distributions are learned and encoded by children, let alone children with autism. Here, we take advantage of a recently developed distribution learning paradigm to characterize how children with and without autism acquire information about probability distributions. Twenty-four autistic and 25-matched neurotypical children searched for an odd-one-out target among a set of distractor lines with orientations sampled from a Gaussian distribution repeated across multiple trials to allow for learning of the parameters (mean and variance) of the distribution. We could measure the width (variance) of the participant's encoded distribution by introducing a target-distractor role-reversal while varying the similarity between target and previous distractor mean. Both groups performed similarly on the visual search task and learned the distractor distribution to a similar extent. However, the variance learned was much broader than the one presented, consistent with less informative priors in children irrespective of autism diagnosis. These findings have important implications for Bayesian accounts of perception throughout development, and Bayesian accounts of autism specifically. LAY SUMMARY: Recent theories about the underlying cognitive mechanisms of autism propose that the way autistic individuals estimate variability or uncertainty in their perceptual environment may differ from how typical individuals do so. Children had to search an oddly tilted line in a set of lines pointing in different directions, and based on their response times we examined how they learned about the variability in a set of objects. We found that autistic children learn variability as well as typical children, but both groups learn with less precision than typical adults do on the same task.

Visual affects: Linking curiosity, Aha-Erlebnis, and memory through information gain.

Current theories propose that our sense of curiosity is determined by the learning progress or information gain that our cognitive system expects to make. However, few studies have explicitly tried to quantify subjective information gain and link it to measures of curiosity. Here, we asked people to report their curiosity about the intrinsically engaging perceptual 'puzzles' known as Mooney images, and to report on the strength of their aha experience upon revealing the solution image (curiosity relief). We also asked our participants (279) to make a guess concerning the solution of the image, and used the distribution of these guesses to compute the crowdsourced semantic entropy (or ambiguity) of the images, as a measure of the potential for information gain. Our results confirm that curiosity and, even more so, aha experience is substantially associated with this semantic information gain measure. These findings support the expected information gain theory of curiosity and suggest that the aha experience or intrinsic reward is driven by the actual information gain. In an unannounced memory part, we also established that the often reported influence of curiosity on memory is fully mediated by the aha experience or curiosity relief. We discuss the implications of our results for the burgeoning fields of curiosity and psychoaesthetics.

The dark side of thinking through other minds.

We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view.

Like what you see: Generalization of social learning determines art appreciation.

We examine whether a stimulus generalization framework can provide insight in how experience shapes evaluative responses to artworks. Participants received positive information about one artwork and negative information about another artwork. Afterwards, we tested their evaluative responses not only to these artworks but also to similar artworks, which allowed us to assess generalization. Results showed that the artwork that was paired with positive information and the artwork that was similar to it were evaluated more positively than the other artworks. These findings confirm that theories that aim to explain art appreciation could benefit from taking learning and its generalization into account.

Explaining hyper-sensitivity and hypo-responsivity in autism with a common predictive coding-based mechanism.

Ward's signal detection theory-based framework elucidates some aspects of interindividual differences in sensitivity, but, we argue, obscures others. Specifically, it disregards the important challenge of inferring the meaning of sensory inputs. Within Bayesian predictive coding accounts, the meaning is given by inferences to more deeply hidden causes of sensory inputs and is generally the basis for initiating context-appropriate (e.g., social) behavior. As such, when inference of hierarchical causes is hampered, as accounts of autism based on deficient precision estimation imply, a form of hyporesponsivity can emerge (together with the hypersensitivity already highlighted by Ward).

Intact perceptual bias in autism contradicts the decreased normalization model.

One recent, promising account of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) situates the cause of the disorder in an atypicality in basic neural information processing, more specifically in how activity of one neuron is modulated by neighboring neurons. The canonical neural computation that implements such contextual influence is called divisive (or suppressive) normalization. The account proposes that this normalization is reduced in ASD. We tested one fundamental prediction of this model for low-level perception, namely that individuals with ASD would show reduced cross-orientation suppression (leading to an illusory tilt perception). 11 young adults with an ASD diagnosis and 12 age-, gender-, and IQ-matched control participants performed a psychophysical orientation perception task with compound grating stimuli. Illusory tilt perception did not differ significantly between groups, indicating typical divisive normalization in individuals with ASD. In fact, all individuals with ASD showed a considerable orientation bias. There was also no correlation between illusory tilt perception and autistic traits as measured by the Social Responsiveness Scale. These results provide clear evidence against the decreased divisive normalization model of ASD in low-level perception, where divisive normalization is best characterized. We evaluate the broader existing evidence for this model and propose ways to salvage and refine the model.

In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception.

A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.

Sensory Prediction Errors Are Less Modulated by Global Context in Autism Spectrum Disorder.

BACKGROUND: Recent predictive coding accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suggest that a key deficit in ASD concerns the inflexibility in modulating local prediction errors as a function of global top-down expectations. As a direct test of this central hypothesis, we used electroencephalography to investigate whether local prediction error processing was less modulated by global context (i.e., global stimulus frequency) in ASD. METHODS: A group of 18 adults with ASD was compared with a group of 24 typically developed adults on a well-validated hierarchical auditory oddball task in which participants listened to short sequences of either five identical sounds (local standard) or four identical sounds and a fifth deviant sound (local deviant). The latter condition is known to generate the mismatch negativity (MMN) component, believed to reflect early sensory prediction error processing. Crucially, previous studies have shown that in blocks with a higher frequency of local deviant sequences, top-down expectations seem to attenuate the MMN. We predicted that this modulation by global context would be less pronounced in the ASD group. RESULTS: Both groups showed an MMN that was modulated by global context. However, this effect was smaller in the ASD group as compared with the typically developed group. In contrast, the P3b, as an electroencephalographic marker of conscious expectation processes, did not differ across groups. CONCLUSIONS: Our results demonstrate that people with ASD are less flexible in modulating their local predictions (reflected in MMN), thereby confirming the central hypothesis of contemporary predictive coding accounts of ASD.

Intact animacy perception during chase detection in ASD.

We explored the strength of implicit social inferences in adolescents with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) using a chasing paradigm in which participants judged the absence/presence of a chase within a display of four seemingly randomly moving dots. While two of these dots always moved randomly, the two others could fulfill the role of being either the chasing (wolf) or chased (sheep) dot. In the chase-present (but not the chase-absent) trials the wolf displayed chasing behavior defined by the degree to which the dot reliably moved towards the sheep (chasing subtlety). Previous research indicated that chasing subtlety strongly influenced chase detection in typically developing (TD) adults. We intended to replicate and extend this finding to adolescents with and without ASD, while also adding either a social or a non-social cue to the displays. Our results confirmed the importance of chasing subtlety and indicated that adding social, but not non-social, information further improved chase detection performance. Interestingly, the performance of adolescents with ASD was less dependent on chasing subtlety than that of their TD counterparts. Nonetheless, adolescents with and without ASD did not differ in their use of the added social (or non-social) cue.

Local-global processing bias is not a unitary individual difference in visual processing.

A large body of research reports individual differences in local and global visual processing in relation to expertise, culture and psychopathology. However, recent research has suggested that various different measures of local-global processing are not strongly associated with one another, calling its construct validity into question. The current study sought to further explore the validity of local-global processing biases in perception by developing three tasks based on two existing paradigms: the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Navon hierarchical letters task. The newly developed tasks aimed to control for stimulus and response factors that may have impacted upon the reliability of previous research. They were administered to a large sample of undergraduate students (N>100). The results of two new versions of the EFT indicated that disembedding performance is influenced by the structure of the embedding context. In addition, global precedence and interference in the Navon task remained present even when local attentional approaches to global hierarchical stimuli were restricted. Inter-task correlations within the EFT were high but low between the EFT and the Navon task, lending support to the notion that local-global processing is not a monolithic construct, but representative of a number of distinct perceptual abilities and biases. Future research may use these task distinctions to pinpoint more precisely which aspects of perceptual processing characterise specific (clinical) participant populations.

Disentangling signal and noise in autism spectrum disorder.

Predictive coding has recently been welcomed as a fruitful framework to understand autism spectrum disorder. Starting from an account centered on deficient differential weighting of prediction errors (based in so-called precision estimation), we illustrate that individuals with autism have particular difficulties with separating signal from noise, across different tasks. Specifically, we discuss how deficient precision-setting is detrimental for learning in unstable environments, for context-dependent assignment of salience to inputs, and for robustness in perception, as illustrated in coherent motion paradigms.