Klerman's "credo" reconsidered: neo-Kraepelinianism, Spitzer's views, and what we can learn from the past.

In 1978, G. Klerman published an essay in which he named the then-nascent "neo-Kraepelinian" movement and formulated a "credo" of nine propositions expressing the movement's essential claims and aspirations. Klerman's essay appeared on the eve of the triumph of neo-Kraepelinian ideas in the DSM-III. However, this diagnostic system has subsequently come under attack, opening the way for competing proposals for the future of psychiatric nosology. To better understand what is at stake, in this paper I provide a close reading and consideration of Klerman's credo in light of the past forty years of research and reflection. The credo is placed in the context of two equally seminal publications in the same year, one by S. Guze, the leading neo-Kraepelinian theorist, and the other by R. Spitzer and J. Endicott, defining mental disorder. The divergences between Spitzer and standard neo-Kraepelinianism are highlighted and argued to be much more important than is generally realized. The analysis of Klerman's credo is also argued to have implications for how to satisfactorily resolve the current nosological ferment in psychiatry. In addition to issues such as creating descriptive syndromal diagnostic criteria, overthrowing psychoanalytic dominance of psychiatry, and making psychiatry more scientific, neo-Kraepelinians were deeply concerned with the conceptual issue of the nature of mental disorder and the defense of psychiatry's medical legitimacy in response to antipsychiatric criticisms. These issues cannot be ignored, and I argue that proposals currently on offer to replace the neo-Kraepelinian system, especially popular proposals to replace it with dimensional measures, fail to adequately address them.

Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor.

Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction (failure of biologically designed functioning) and a value (harm) component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions need only be typically harmful to qualify as disorders. We argue that the proposed counterexamples are, in fact, considered harmful; thus, they fail to disconfirm the harm requirement: incapacity for exertion is inherently harmful, whether or not exertion occurs, cowpox is directly harmful irrespective of indirect benefits, and colorblindness and anosmia are considered harmful by those who consider them disorders. We also defend the typicality qualifier as viably addressing some apparently harmless disorders and argue that a dysfunction's harmfulness is best understood in dispositional terms.

Addiction from the harmful dysfunction perspective: How there can be a mental disorder in a normal brain.

Is addiction a medical disorder, and if so, what kind of disorder is it? Addiction is considered a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Critics argue that the brain changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity and learning in response to the intense rewards provided by addictive substances, thus addiction is not a disorder but rather a series of normal-range if problematic choices. Relying on the harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder to evaluate disorder versus nondisorder status, I argue that even if one accepts the critics' reinterpretation of NIDA's brain evidence and rejects the brain disease account, the critics' conclusion that addiction is not a medical disorder but is rather a matter of problematic nondisordered choice does not follow. This is because there is a further possible account of addiction, the evolutionary "hijack" view, that holds that addiction is due to the availability of substances and stimuli that were unavailable during human species evolution and that coopt certain brain areas concerned with human motivation, creating biologically undesigned peremptory desires. I argue that if the hijack theory is correct, then it opens up the possibility that addiction could be a true motivational medical disorder for which there is no underlying neurological-level dysfunction. Finally, I explore the implications of this account for how we see the social responsibility for addiction and how we attempt to control it.

Severity of complicated versus uncomplicated subthreshold depression: New evidence on the "Monotonicity Thesis" from the national comorbidity survey.

BACKGROUND: "Complicated" subthreshold depression (CsD) includes at least one of six pathosuggestive "complicated" symptoms: >6 months duration, marked role impairment, sense of worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic ideation, and psychomotor retardation. "Uncomplicated" subthreshold depression (UsD) has no complicated features. Whereas studies show that complicated (CMDD) versus uncomplicated (UMDD) major depression differ substantially in severity and prognosis, UsD and CsD severity has not been previously compared. This study evaluates UsD and CsD pathology validator levels and examines whether the complicated/uncomplicated distinction offers incremental concurrent validity over the standard number-of-symptoms dimension as a depression severity measure. METHODS: Using nationally representative community data from the National Comorbidity Survey, seven depression lifetime history subgroups were identified: one MDD screener symptom (n=1432); UsD (n=430); CsD (n=611); UMDD (n=182); and CMDD with 5-6 symptoms (n=518), 7 symptoms (n=217), and 8-9 symptoms (n=291). Severity was evaluated using five concurrent pathology validators: suicide attempt, interference with life, help seeking, hospitalization, and generalized anxiety disorder. RESULTS: CsD validator levels are substantially higher than both UsD and UMDD levels, and similar to mild CMDD, disconfirming the "monotonicity thesis" that severity increase with symptom number. Complicated/uncomplicated status predicts severity, and when complicatedness is controlled, number of symptoms no longer predicts validator levels. LIMITATIONS: Diagnoses were based on respondents' fallible retrospective symptom reports during a lay-administered structured interview, which may not yield diagnoses comparable to clinicians' assessments. CONCLUSION: CsD is more severe than UsD and comparable to mild MDD. Complicated status more validly indicates depression severity than the standard number-of-symptoms measure.

Symptom quality versus quantity in judging prognosis: Using NESARC predictive validators to locate uncomplicated major depression on the number-of-symptoms severity continuum.

BACKGROUND: Uncomplicated major depressive disorder (UMDD) is defined as MDD that does not include any of six pathosuggestive features: more than six months duration, marked functional impairment, sense of worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic ideation, and psychomotor retardation. Complicated MDD (CMDD) includes all episodes containing one or more of these features. UMDD has been shown to be lower than CMDD and indistinguishable from no-MDD-history on predictive pathology validators. This study's purpose is to establish where on the number-of-symptoms depressive continuum UMDD is located, using the criterion of predictive validity. METHODS: Using two-wave longitudinal community data, seven baseline depression history subgroups were identified: no MDD symptoms (n=23,214), one MDD screener symptom (n=609), subthreshold or "minor" depression (mD; 2-4 MDD symptoms; n=2,623), UMDD (n=505), and complicated MDD with 5-6 symptoms (n=1,106), 7 symptoms (n=1,200), and 8-9 symptoms (n=2,408). Predictive validity was evaluated by four follow-up variables: major depressive episode; generalized anxiety disorder; suicide attempt; and manic/hypomanic episode. RESULTS: UMDD predictive pathology validator rates are not significantly different from rates for subthreshold mD but significantly different from those for all other depression categories; UMDD is higher in symptoms but lower in validator levels than 5-6 symptom CMDD. LIMITATIONS: Baseline and follow-up diagnoses were based on respondents' fallible retrospective symptom reports in response to a lay-administered structured questionnaire, which may not yield diagnoses comparable to clinicians' assessments. CONCLUSION: Uncomplicated MDD's follow-up outcomes resemble subthreshold depression, not CMDD, even when CMDD has less symptoms. Clinical decisions should reflect the relatively benign prognosis of uncomplicated MDD.

Diagnostic Issues and Controversies in DSM-5: Return of the False Positives Problem.

The fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was the most controversial in the manual's history. This review selectively surveys some of the most important changes in DSM-5, including structural/organizational changes, modifications of diagnostic criteria, and newly introduced categories. It analyzes why these changes led to such heated controversies, which included objections to the revision's process, its goals, and the content of altered criteria and new categories. The central focus is on disputes concerning the false positives problem of setting a valid boundary between disorder and normal variation. Finally, this review highlights key problems and issues that currently remain unresolved and need to be addressed in the future, including systematically identifying false positive weaknesses in criteria, distinguishing risk from disorder, including context in diagnostic criteria, clarifying how to handle fuzzy boundaries, and improving the guidelines for "other specified" diagnosis.

The harmful dysfunction model of alcohol use disorder: revised criteria to improve the validity of diagnosis and prevalence estimates.

AIMS: To formulate harmful dysfunction (HD) diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder (AUD) and test whether they increase validity relative to standard DSM criteria, as evidenced by lowered prevalence, increased validator levels including service use, severity and family history and enhanced specificity. DESIGN: DSM-IV AUD, DSM-IV dependence, DSM-5 AUD and HD AUD definitions were compared on eight validity related tests using nationally representative community data. SETTING: United States. PARTICIPANTS: National Epidemiologic Survey of Alcoholism and Related Conditions (NESARC) respondents, aged 18-54 years (wave 1, n = 29 673; wave 2, n = 24 244). MEASURES: NESARC DSM-IV and DSM-5 criteria were taken from published studies. Whereas DSM-5 diagnosis requires any two AUD symptoms, HD criteria were constructed from NESARC items to require symptoms of both impaired-control dysfunction [withdrawal, drink to prevent/stop withdrawal, cannot stop/reduce drinking, or craving (wave 2 only)] and harm (sacrificed important activities, problems caring for home/family, job/school problems, health problems, psychological problems or problems with family/friends). Validators included service use, severity and family history, among others. Specificity was tested using a teen transient drinker criterion group. FINDINGS: Compared with DSM-5 AUD (DSM-IV results were similar), HD criteria yielded lower prevalence (95% confidence intervals): HD life-time 6.7% (6.2, 7.2%), 1-year 2.3% (2.0, 2.5%); and DSM-5 life-time 38.2% (36.5, 39.9%), 1-year 12.4% (11.7, 13.1%). HD AUD was higher than DSM-5 on pathology validators, including: life-time alcohol-related service use: HD 41.0% (38.1, 43.9%), DSM-5 11.5% (10.7, 12.3%); severity (number of life-time alcohol symptoms): HD 20.8 (20.4, 21.2), DSM-5 10.6 (10.4, 10.8); and family history of alcohol problems: HD 50.1% (47.3, 52.9), DSM-5 32.8% (31.6, 34.0). HD criteria eliminated 83% of a DSM-5 teen transient drinker false-positives criterion group. CONCLUSIONS: Prevalence estimates of alcohol use disorder are lowered and diagnostic validity improved when using 'harmful dysfunction' diagnostic criteria compared with standard DSM criteria, partly by reducing misdiagnosis of teenage transient drinkers.

The biostatistical theory versus the harmful dysfunction analysis, part 1: is part-dysfunction a sufficient condition for medical disorder?

Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of medical disorder claims that biological part-dysfunction (i.e., failure of an internal mechanism to perform its biological function), a factual criterion, is both necessary and sufficient for disorder. Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder agrees that part-dysfunction is necessary but rejects the sufficiency claim, maintaining that disorder also requires that the part-dysfunction causes harm to the individual, a value criterion. In this paper, I present two considerations against the sufficiency claim. First, I analyze Boorse's central argument for the sufficiency claim, the "pathologist argument," which takes pathologists' intuitions about pathology as determinative of medical disorder and conclude that it begs the question and fails to support the sufficiency claim. Second, I present four counterexamples from the medical literature in which salient part-dysfunctions are considered nondisorders, including healthy disease carriers, HIV-positive status, benign mutations, and situs inversus totalis, thus falsifying the sufficiency claim and supporting the harm criterion.

How Many People have Alcohol Use Disorders? Using the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis to Reconcile Prevalence Estimates in Two Community Surveys.

Community prevalence rates of alcohol use disorders (AUDs) provided by epidemiological studies using DSM-based diagnostic criteria pose several challenges: the rates appear implausibly high to many epidemiologists; they do not converge across similar studies; and, due to low service utilization by those diagnosed as disordered, they yield estimates of unmet need for services so high that credibility for planning purposes is jeopardized. For example, two early community studies using DSM diagnostic criteria, the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study (ECA) and the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), yielded lifetime AUD prevalence rates of 14 and 24%, respectively, with NCS unmet need for services 19% of the entire population. Attempts to address these challenges by adding clinical significance requirements to diagnostic criteria have proven unsuccessful. Hypothesizing that these challenges are due to high rates of false-positive diagnoses of problem drinking as AUDs, we test an alternative approach. We use the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of the concept of mental disorder as a guide to construct more valid criteria within the framework of the standard out-of-control model of AUD. The proposed HD criteria require harm and dysfunction, where harm can be any negative social, personal, or physical outcome, and dysfunction requires either withdrawal symptoms or inability to stop drinking. Using HD criteria, ECA and NCS lifetime prevalences converge to much-reduced rates of 6 and 6.8%, respectively. Due to higher service utilization rates, NCS lifetime unmet need is reduced to 3.4%. Service use and duration comparisons suggest that HD criteria possess increased diagnostic validity. Moreover, HD criteria eliminate 90% of transient teenage drinking from disorder status. The HD version of the out-of-control model thus potentially resolves the three classic prevalence challenges while offering a more rigorous approach to distinguishing AUDs from problematic drinking.

Diagnostic criteria as dysfunction indicators: bridging the chasm between the definition of mental disorder and diagnostic criteria for specific disorders.

According to the introduction to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Fifth Edition, each disorder must satisfy the definition of mental disorder, which requires the presence of both harm and dysfunction. Constructing criteria sets to require harm is relatively straightforward. However, establishing the presence of dysfunction is necessarily inferential because of the lack of knowledge of internal psychological and biological processes and their functions and dysfunctions. Given that virtually every psychiatric symptom characteristic of a DSM disorder can occur under some circumstances in a normally functioning person, diagnostic criteria based on symptoms must be constructed so that the symptoms indicate an internal dysfunction, and are thus inherently pathosuggestive. In this paper, we review strategies used in DSM criteria sets for increasing the pathosuggestiveness of symptoms to ensure that the disorder meets the requirements of the definition of mental disorder. Strategies include the following: requiring a minimum duration and persistence; requiring that the frequency or intensity of a symptom exceed that seen in normal people; requiring disproportionality of symptoms, given the context; requiring pervasiveness of symptom expression across contexts; adding specific exclusions for contextual scenarios in which symptoms are best understood as normal reactions; combining symptoms to increase cumulative pathosuggestiveness; and requiring enough symptoms from an overall syndrome to meet a minimum threshold of pathosuggestiveness. We propose that future revisions of the DSM consider systematic implementation of these strategies in the construction and revision of criteria sets, with the goal of maximizing the pathosuggestiveness of diagnostic criteria to reduce the potential for diagnostic false positives.

Selon l'introduction du Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux (DSM), 5e édition, chaque trouble doit satisfaire à la définition d'un trouble mental, qui exige la présence de préjudice et de dysfonctionnement. Construire des ensembles de critères requérant un dommage est relativement simple. Cependant, établir la présence d'une dysfonction est nécessairement inférentiel en raison du manque de connaissances des processus psychologique et biologique internes ainsi que de leurs fonctions et dysfonctions. Étant donné qu'à peu près chaque caractéristique d'un symptôme psychiatrique d'un trouble du DSM peut se manifester dans certaines circonstances chez une personne fonctionnant normalement, les critères diagnostiques basés sur les symptômes doivent être construits de manière à ce que les symptômes indiquent une dysfonction interne, et qu'ils soient donc intrinsèquement pathosuggestifs. Dans cet article, nous avons révisés les stratégies utilisées dans les groupements de critères en vue d'accroître la pathosuggestivité des symptômes pour faire en sorte que le trouble satisfasse aux exigences de la définition du trouble mental. Les stratégies sont notamment: exigence d'une durée et d'une persistance minimales; exigence que la fréquence ou l'intensité d'un symptôme excèdent celles observées chez une personne normale; exigence de la disproportion des symptômes, dans un contexte donné; exigence de l'omniprésence de l'expression des symptômes dans tout contexte; ajout d'exclusions spécifiques pour des scénarios contextuels dans lesquels les symptômes doivent être compris comme des réactions normales; combinaison des symptômes pour accroître la pathosuggestivité cumulative; et exigence d'un nombre suffisant de symptômes pour atteindre un seuil minimum de pathosuggestivité. Nous proposons que les futures révisions du DSM envisagent la mise en œuvre systématique de ces stratégies dans la construction et la révision des ensembles de critères, dans le but de maximiser la pathosuggestivité des critères diagnostiques et de réduire le potentiel de diagnostics faux positifs.

The importance and limits of harm in identifying mental disorder.

The In Review articles in this issue on normality and disorder by Dr Rachel Cooper and Dr Derek Bolton explore the importance of a value component of harm in the concept of mental disorder. They focus on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder's clinical significance criterion, requiring that symptoms cause significant distress or role impairment, as the expression of the harm component. As Dr Bolton argues, harm in the form of distress or role impairment has always been intimately tied to the concept of disorder and treatment decisions; as Dr Cooper argues, without the harm requirement, any disliked anomaly may be labelled a disorder. Moreover, as Cooper argues, a harm requirement is not incompatible with a natural kinds approach to distinguishing among disorders or to a categorical approach to disorder; the lack of zones of rarity on the harm continuum does not preclude categorical underlying causal processes. However, neither paper systematically develops arguments regarding the other component of disorder, the requirement that the harm must be caused by underlying dysfunction. The dysfunction component distinguishes disorders from the many other negative conditions in life. Cooper's identification of dysfunction with symptom severity ignores the fact that normal suffering can be severe, and Bolton's attempt to encompass risk of harm within harm yields an implausibly expansive conception of disorder. While the harm component is essential, clarification of the dysfunction component of the concept of disorder, pursued in part 2 of this In Review in the December 2013 issue, is also essential to establishing a coherent and plausibly limited domain of psychiatric disorder within the broader arena of harmful conditions.

Les articles In Review de ce numéro sur la normalité et le trouble, dont la Dre Rachel Cooper et le Dr Derek Bolton sont les auteurs, explorent l'importance d'un élément de valeur des dommages dans le concept d'un trouble mental. Ils se penchent sur le critère de significativité clinique du Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux, lequel dicte que les symptômes causent une détresse ou une incapacité fonctionnelle, constituant ainsi l'expression de la composante des dommages. Comme le défend le Dr Bolton, les dommages sous forme de détresse ou d'incapacité fonctionnelle ont toujours été intimement liés au concept de trouble et aux décisions de traitement; pour sa part, la Dre Cooper fait valoir que sans le critère des dommages, toute anomalie détestée peut être étiquetée de trouble. En outre, comme dit la Dre Cooper, une exigence de dommages n'est pas incompatible avec une approche des espèces naturelles pour distinguer parmi les troubles ou pour une approche catégorique du trouble; l'absence de zones de rareté sur le continuum des dommages n'empêche pas les processus catégoriques causaux sous-jacents. Cependant, aucun des deux articles ne développe systématiquement d'arguments à l'égard de l'autre composante du trouble, l'exigence que les dommages soient causés par une dysfonction sous-jacente. La composante dysfonction distingue les troubles de nombre d'autres affections négatives dans la vie. Quand la Dre Cooper identifie la dysfonction à la gravité des symptômes, elle ne tient pas compte du fait que la souffrance normale peut être grave, et la tentative de Bolton d'englober le risque de dommages dans les dommages produit une conception du trouble invraisemblablement élargie. Bien que la composante des dommages soit essentielle, la clarification de la composante dysfonction du concept du trouble, qui continue dans la 2e partie de cet In Review dans le numéro de décembre 2013, est également essentielle pour établir un domaine limité cohérent et plausible du trouble psychiatrique au sein de l'arène plus vaste des affections nuisibles.