Cognitive biases as an adaptive strategy in autism and schizophrenia spectrum: the compensation perspective on neurodiversity.

This article presents a novel theoretical perspective on the role of cognitive biases within the autism and schizophrenia spectrum by integrating the evolutionary and computational approaches. Against the background of neurodiversity, cognitive biases are presented as primary adaptive strategies, while the compensation of their shortcomings is a potential cognitive advantage. The article delineates how certain subtypes of autism represent a unique cognitive strategy to manage cognitive biases at the expense of rapid and frugal heuristics. In contrast, certain subtypes of schizophrenia emerge as distinctive cognitive strategies devised to navigate social interactions, albeit with a propensity for overdetecting intentional behaviors. In conclusion, the paper emphasizes that while extreme manifestations might appear non-functional, they are merely endpoints of a broader, primarily functional spectrum of cognitive strategies. The central argument hinges on the premise that cognitive biases in both autism and schizophrenia spectrums serve as compensatory mechanisms tailored for specific ecological niches.

Mental Health Experts as Objects of Epistemic Injustice-The Case of Autism Spectrum Condition.

This theoretical paper addresses the issue of epistemic injustice with particular reference to autism. Injustice is epistemic when harm is performed without adequate reason and is caused by or related to access to knowledge production and processing, e.g., concerning racial or ethnic minorities or patients. The paper argues that both mental health service users and providers can be subject to epistemic injustice. Cognitive diagnostic errors often appear when complex decisions are made in a limited timeframe. In those situations, the socially dominant ways of thinking about mental disorders and half-automated and operationalized diagnostic paradigms imprint on experts' decision-making processes. Recently, analyses have focused on how power operates in the service user-provider relationship. It was observed that cognitive injustice inflicts on patients through the lack of consideration of their first-person perspectives, denial of epistemic authority, and even epistemic subject status, among others. This paper shifts focus toward health professionals as rarely considered objects of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice affects mental health providers by harming their access to and use of knowledge in their professional activities, thus affecting the reliability of their diagnostic assessments.

How to Minimize the Impact of Experts' Non-rational Beliefs on Their Judgments on Autism.

The non-autistic majority often judges people on the autism spectrum through the prism of numerous stereotypes, prejudices, cognitive biases, or, generally speaking, non-rational beliefs. This causes problems in autistic people's everyday lives, as they often feel stigmatized, marginalized, and they internalize deficit-laden narratives about themselves. Unfortunately, experts, including health or law professionals, are not entirely immune to these non-rational beliefs, which affect their decision-making processes. This primarily happens when a mix of background knowledge, overconfidence, and haste co-occur. The resulting decisions may impact autistic people, e.g., by determining eligibility for the state's therapeutical and financial support. This paper shows how simplified reasoning and inference may influence experts' (medical examiners or court expert witnesses) decision-making processes concerning autistic people. It also proposes particular clues and strategies that could help experts cope with this risk and avoid making biased decisions.