Do more hours in center-based care cause more externalizing problems? A cross-national replication study.

Whether high quantities of center-based care cause behavior problems is a controversial question. Studies using covariate adjustment for selection factors have detected relations between center care and behavior problems, but studies with stronger internal validity less often find such evidence. We examined whether within-child changes in hours in center-based care predicted changes in externalizing problems in toddlers and preschoolers (N = 10,105; 49% female; data collection 1993-2012) in seven studies, including from Germany, Netherlands, Norway, two from Canada and two from the U.S. Race/ethnicity data were only collected in the United States (57% and 80% White; 42% and 13% African-American; 1.2% and 5% Latinx). Meta-analyses showed no association (r = .00, p = .88) between hours in center-based care and externalizing problems.

The Costs and Benefits of Investing in Universal Preschool: Evidence From a Spanish Reform.

This study provides a cost-benefit analysis of expanding access to universal preschool education, focusing on a Spanish reform that lowered the age of eligibility for publicly provided universal preschool from age 4 to age 3. Benefits in terms of child development and maternal employment are estimated using evidence on the causal effects of this reform. In the baseline estimation the benefit-cost ratio is over 4, indicating sizeable net societal benefits of the preschool investment. The results show that the child development effects are the major determinant of the cost-benefit ratio; the employment gains for parents appear to play a relatively minor role. Overall, the cost-benefit analysis provides support for investing in high-quality preschool education.

Training in two-tier labor markets: The role of job match quality.

This study examines training investments in two-tier labor markets, focusing on the role of job match quality. Temporary workers are in general more likely than permanent workers to leave their employer and therefore are less likely to receive employer-funded training. However, as firms prefer to continue productive job matches, we hypothesize that the negative effect of holding a temporary contract on the probability to be trained diminishes with the quality of the job match. Using a recent longitudinal survey from the Netherlands, we find that temporary workers indeed participate less frequently in firm-sponsored training. However, this effect is fully driven by mismatches: holding a temporary contract does not significantly decrease the probability to receive training for workers in good job matches. Depending on match quality, a temporary job can either be a stepping stone or a dead-end.