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1.
Addict Behav ; 127: 107201, 2022 04.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34959078

RESUMO

Addiction is a complex biopsychosocial phenomenon, impacted by biological predispositions, psychological processes, and the social environment. Using mathematical and computational models that allow for surrogative reasoning may be a promising avenue for gaining a deeper understanding of this complex behavior. This paper reviews and classifies a selection of formal models of addiction focusing on the intra- and inter-individual dynamics, i.e., (neuro) psychological models and social models. We find that these modeling approaches to addiction are too disjoint and argue that in order to unravel the complexities of biopsychosocial processes of addiction, models should integrate intra- and inter-individual factors.


Assuntos
Comportamento Aditivo , Humanos , Modelos Psicológicos , Meio Social
2.
Perspect Psychol Sci ; 16(4): 698-706, 2021 07.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33482071

RESUMO

One particular weakness of psychology that was left implicit by Meehl is the fact that psychological theories tend to be verbal theories, permitting at best ordinal predictions. Such predictions do not enable the high-risk tests that would strengthen our belief in the verisimilitude of theories but instead lead to the practice of null-hypothesis significance testing, a practice Meehl believed to be a major reason for the slow theoretical progress of soft psychology. The rising popularity of meta-analysis has led some to argue that we should move away from significance testing and focus on the size and stability of effects instead. Proponents of this reform assume that a greater emphasis on quantity can help psychology to develop a cumulative body of knowledge. The crucial question in this endeavor is whether the resulting numbers really have theoretical meaning. Psychological science lacks an undisputed, preexisting domain of observations analogous to the observations in the space-time continuum in physics. It is argued that, for this reason, effect sizes do not really exist independently of the adopted research design that led to their manifestation. Consequently, they can have no bearing on the verisimilitude of a theory.


Assuntos
Teoria Psicológica , Psicologia/métodos , Psicologia/normas , Humanos , Conhecimento , Metanálise como Assunto , Projetos de Pesquisa , Processos Estocásticos
3.
Rev. latinoam. psicol ; 38(1): 137-148, mar. 2006.
Artigo em Espanhol | LILACS | ID: lil-637038

RESUMO

Consciousness, that experienced flow of subjective states, is one of the mysteries, and perhaps, the fundamental challenge of science until now. It is also a field of exploration specially active and fruitful, a field that has passed over the frontier of XIX and XX centuries, and recently arrived again with a strong impetus in the XXI century. However, there is a great controversy about the plausibility of a theoretical, analytical and formal (v.g.: computational) explanation of the phenomena that we associate with consciousness. Is it possible to establish a reductionist explanation of consciousness? Or in other words, is it possible to make a description of the conscious phenomena expressed in terms of functional and/or causal relationships? In this article I give some relevant elements to sketch the sufficiency of explanation of the connectionist computational paradigm, and how we could elucidate the formal principles embedded in the study of consciousness. The purpose of the present article is to suggest that the plausibility of the connectionist paradigm is supported by the following issues: (1) the level of fine-grained detail with which we define the representation and computability of conscious states, (2) the methodological and conceptual advances of brain sciences, and (3) the difference that we assume between the notions of simulation, modelling and computational representation of consciousness. With these ideas in mind, through the manuscript I will show a basic framework to understand why connectionism can be a plausible candidate to think about a formal theory of consciousness. Finally, in the light of the previous statements, I will point out some important issues to discuss the plausibility of a computational theory of consciousness.


La actividad conciente, ese devenir que experimentamos como una serie de estados de subjetividad, es uno de los misterios, y quizás el desafío fundamental de la ciencia contemporánea. Es también un campo de exploración especialmente activo y fructífero que sobrevivió la transición entre los siglos XIX y XX, y nuevamente ha tomado un fuerte impulso ahora en el XXI. Existe, sin embargo, una gran controversia sobre la plausibilidad de una explicación teórica, analítica y formal (v.g.: computacional) de los fenómenos que asociamos a la actividad conciente. ¿Es factible formular una explicación reduccionista de la actividad conciente, es decir, una descripción del fenómeno expresada en términos de relaciones funcionales y/o causales? Los párrafos del presente ensayo escudriñan algunos elementos relevantes a fin de establecer la suficiencia explicativa que tiene el paradigma computacional conexionista para dilucidar los principios formales imbricados en el estudio de la actividad conciente. El propósito que subyace la elaboración siguiente es sugerir que la viabilidad del conexionismo y del proyecto computacional depende de los siguientes aspectos: (1) El grado de refinamiento con el que se defina la representación y la computabilidad de los estados concientes, (2) Los avances metodológicos y conceptuales de las ciencias del cerebro, y (3) La distinción que se haga entre simulación, modelamiento y representación computacional de la actividad conciente. Con estas ideas en mente, a través del capítulo mostraré un esquema conceptual básico para entender por qué el paradigma conexionista puede ser un candidato plausible para pensar una teoría formal de la actividad conciente. Finalmente, a la luz de los planteamientos presentados, señalaré algunos aspectos importantes para establecer la viabilidad de una teoría computacional de la actividad conciente.

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