Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.

Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both.

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession-what we will call "pathocentric" and "interest-centric" views-conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest-centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.

Who has a meaningful life? A care ethics analysis of selective trait abortion.

Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author's background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society's lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.

Revisiting the evolution of the Hippocratic Oath in obstetrics and gynecology.

Hippocrates, an influential figure in ancient Greek medicine, is best known for his lasting contribution, the Hippocratic Oath, which includes a significant message about obstetrics and gynecology. Given the Oath's status as a widely regarded ethical code for medical practice, it requires critical evaluation. The message of the Oath, as it related to obstetrics and gynecology, is expressed in ancient Greek by the phrase "οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω" which translates directly to "I will not give to any woman a harming pessary." The words fetus and abortion were not present in the original Greek text of the Oath. Yet, this message of the Hippocratic Oath has been interpreted often as a prohibition against abortion. In this article, we present a critical linguistic and historical analysis and argue against the notion that the Hippocratic Oath was prohibiting abortion. We provide evidence that the words "foetum" (fetus) and "abortu" (abortion) were inserted in the Latin translations of the Oath, which then carried on in subsequent English versions. The addition of the words "fetus" and "abortion" in the Latin translations significantly altered the Oath's original meaning. Unfortunately, these alterations in the translation of the Hippocratic Oath have been accepted over the years because of cultural, religious, and social reasons. We assert that because the original Hippocratic Oath did not contain language related to abortion, it should not be construed as prohibiting it. The interpretation of the Oath should be based on precise and rigorous translation and speculative interpretations should be avoided.

Navigating the post-Dobbs landscape: ethical considerations from a perinatal perspective.

Restrictive abortion laws have impacts reaching far beyond the immediate sphere of reproductive health, with cascading effects on clinical and ethical aspects of neonatal care, as well as perinatal palliative care. These laws have the potential to alter how families and clinicians navigate prenatal and postnatal medical decisions after a complex fetal diagnosis is made. We present a hypothetical case to explore the nexus of abortion care and perinatal care of fetuses and infants with life-limiting conditions. We will highlight the potential impacts of limited abortion access on families anticipating the birth of these infants. We will also examine the legally and morally fraught gray zone of gestational viability where both abortion and resuscitation of live-born infants can potentially occur, per parental discretion. These scenarios are inexorably impacted by the rapidly changing legal landscape in the U.S., and highlight difficult ethical dilemmas which clinicians may increasingly need to navigate.

Termination of pregnancy in lupus nephritis: A bioethical analysis with the integrative method.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Termination of pregnancy in patients with rheumatic diseases is controversial and a bioethical analysis is rarely performed. In this study we analysed the case of a pregnant patient with lupus nephritis unresponsive to treatment, for whom termination of pregnancy is considered. METHODS: The integrative model was applied combining different normative ethical theories. RESULTS: From a utilitarian perspective, termination of pregnancy is justifiable, seeking the greatest benefit for the greatest number of stakeholders. Deontology justifies both terminating and continuing the pregnancy, focusing on the action itself and on autonomy. In virtue ethics the importance of decisions rests with the person who performs the action seeking flourishing; termination of pregnancy would be justifiable. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Interruption of pregnancy is a justifiable solution following the integrative model. Bioethical analysis of paradigmatic cases is essential to ensure the best possible action and as a precedent for future similar situations in rheumatology.

Ethical research when abortion access is legally restricted.

Risks and benefits of some clinical research may be altered.

Legal Risks and Ethical Dilemmas for Clinicians in the Aftermath of Dobbs.

This Viewpoint discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court's ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization, which triggered abortion bans or restrictions in half of states, presents serious legal risks to clinicians and major ethical dilemmas.

Confronting the Medical Community's Complicity in Marginalizing Abortion Care.

This Viewpoint discusses the exclusion of abortion care from many established medical sources (such as hospitals) and from coverage by many major payers and how the health care system should legitimize and ensure clinician training in safe abortion care.

Abortion Rights after Artificial Wombs: Why Decriminalisation is Needed Ahead of Ectogenesis.

Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allow part of human gestation to occur outside the body. Bioethical and legal scholars have argued that artificial wombs will challenge defences of abortion based in arguments for protecting bodily autonomy, for a pregnant person could have the foetus transferred to an artificial womb instead of being terminated. Drawing on examples from the common law jurisdictions of Canada, the USA, and the UK, I assess three ways scholars have argued abortion might be defended after ectogenesis (through redefining foetal viability, through a property right, and through a right to avoid genetic parenthood). I argue that while each of these proposals has strategic merit, each has significant legal and ethical limitations. Taking the normative position that abortion will remain a vital healthcare resource, I make the case for protecting abortion rights from a challenge posed by ectogenesis by focusing on decriminalisation.

If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis.

Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as persons.

Amnesty International's updated policy on abortion: A resource for medical providers.

Treating abortion as a matter of reproductive autonomy is essential to promoting health, complying with medical ethics, and advancing human rights. When pregnant people can make autonomous decisions about their pregnancies, their health and human rights outcomes improve. Additionally, medical providers that support autonomous sexual and reproductive health decision-making can provide care in line with the highest ethical standards and promote pregnant individuals' human rights. This article highlights Amnesty International's updated institutional abortion policy which uses a reproductive autonomy frame to promote the full realization of human rights for all pregnant people. The policy relies on decades of evidence, the organization's learning from abortion research and advocacy around the world, and evolving human rights law and standards. While not specifically developed for a medical audience, Amnesty International's updated policy can be a useful resource for providers who seek to promote reproductive autonomy and achieve better health outcomes for their patients.

Tensions Between Ethics and the Law: Examination of a Legal Case by Two Midwives Invoking a Conscientious Objection to Abortion in Scotland.

This paper examines a legal case arising from a workplace grievance that progressed to being heard at the UK's Supreme Court. The case of Doogan and Wood versus Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board concerned two senior midwives in Scotland, both practicing Roman Catholics, who exercised their perceived rights in accordance with section 4(1) of the Abortion Act not to participate in the treatment of women undergoing abortions. The key question raised by this case was: "Is Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board entitled to require the midwives to delegate, supervise and support staff in the treatment of patients undergoing termination of pregnancy?" The ethical issues concerning conscientious objection to abortion have been much debated although the academic literature is mainly concerned with the position of medical practitioners rather than what the World Health Organization terms "mid-level professionals" such as midwives. This paper examines the arguments put forward by the midwives to justify their refusal to carry out tasks they felt contravened their legal right to make a conscientious objection. We then consider professional codes, UK legislation and church legislation. While the former are given strong weighting the latter was been ignored in this case, although cases in other European countries have been prevented from escalating to such a high level by the intervention of prominent church figures. The paper concludes by stating that the question put to the courts remains as yet unanswered but offers some recommendations for future policy making and research.

Medical Termination Of Pregnancy For Psychosocial Reasons.

The requesting of medical termination of pregnancy (MTP) for psychosocial reasons invites several questions concerning progress in medicine as well raising necessary and legitimate ethical questions. The law currently permits MTP for maternal reasons at any stage of pregnancy if the woman's health is at a significant risk. However, conceptions of mental health risks remain a grey area and present difficulties in terms of psychiatric assessment. When dealing with a patient suffering from a psychiatric disorder, questions must be asked on the reasons behind the request as well as questions concerning free and clear consent. It must also be taken into account that the progressive nature of pregnancy means patient care must be provided relatively quickly. These cases invite discussion on medical decisions, on both a moral and rational level, and the legitimacy of the basis on which the medical decision is taken in the context of MTP for psychosocial reasons.