Survival After Ditching in Motorized Aircraft, 1989-2022.

INTRODUCTION: Although an unintended aircraft landing on water (referred to as ditching) is a rare event, the potential for occupant injury/fatality increases immediately following the event due to adverse conditions. However, to date, few studies have addressed the subject. Herein, ditching events and post-ditching survival were investigated.METHODS: Ditchings (1982-2022) in the United States were identified from the National Transportation Safety Board database. Occupant injury severity, aircraft type, pilot experience, flight conditions, and number of occupants were extracted. Poisson distribution, the Chi-squared test (2-tailed), Mann-Whitney U test, and Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance were employed.RESULTS: A total of 96 ditchings were identified. A systematic survey was hampered by the lack of a standardized reporting matrix in the reports. In total, 77 reports were included in the analysis. Across all ditchings, 128 of 169 (76%) occupants survived ditching and were rescued. Importantly, the initial ditching event was survived by 95% of all occupants. However, 32 (19%) occupants died post-ditching by drowning (21/32 cases) or for undetermined reasons. Considering probability per ditching event, in 26 (34%) of all ditchings, one or more occupants was/were fatally injured.DISCUSSION: Initial survival of the emergency ditching is high. Drowning was the leading cause of death after ditching and reduced the overall survival to 76%. Further investigation is needed to identify risk factors for fatal outcomes and/or improve probability of survival after ditching.Schick VC, Boyd DD, Hippler C, Hinkelbein J. Survival after ditching in motorized aircraft, 1989-2022. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2024; 95(5):254-258.

Flight safety assessment based on a modified human error risk quantification approach.

In risk and safety assessments of aviation systems, engineers generally pay more attention to the risks of hardware or software failure and focus less on the risks caused by human errors. In this paper, a (FRAHE) method is proposed for identifying this critical error type and determining the risk severity of human errors. This method accounts for the human error probability as well as the impacts of human errors on the system. The fuzzy inference approach is employed in this paper to address the uncertainty and issues of imprecision that arise from insufficient information and scarce error data and a risk assessment model of human error is developed. The model can be used to precisely describe the relationship between the output risk severity and the input risk indicators, including the human error probability, the error impact probability, and the human error consequence. A case study of the approach task is presented to demonstrate the availability and reasonability of the model. The risk-based modeling method can not only provide valuable information for reducing the occurrence of critical errors but also be used to conduct prospective analyses to prevent unsafe incidents or aviation accidents.

A comparison of general aviation accidents involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private pilots.

INTRODUCTION: The extremely low accident rate for U.S air carriers relative to that of general aviation (∼1 and ∼60/million flight hours respectively) partly reflects advanced airman certification, more demanding recurrency training and stringent operational regulations. However, whether such skillset/training/regulations translate into improved safety for airline pilots operating in the general aviation environment is unknown and the aim of this study. METHODS: Accidents (1998-2017) involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private pilots (PPL-IFR) operating non-revenue light aircraft were identified from the NTSB accident database. An online survey informed general aviation flight exposure for both pilot cohorts. Statistics used proportion testing and Mann-Whitney U tests. RESULTS: In degraded visibility, 0 and 40% (χ2p = 0.043) of fatal accidents involving airline and PPL-IFR airmen were due to in-flight loss-of-control, respectively. For landing accidents, airline pilots were under-represented for mishaps related to airspeed mismanagement (p = 0.036) relative to PPL-IFR but showed a dis-proportionate count (2X) of ground loss-of-directional control accidents (p = 0.009) the latter likely reflecting a preference for tail-wheel aircraft. The proportion of FAA rule violation-related mishaps by airline pilots was >2X (7 vs. 3%) that for PPL-IFR airmen. Moreover, airline pilots showed a disproportionate (χ2p = 0.021) count of flights below legal minimum altitudes. Not performing an official preflight weather briefing or intentionally operating in instrument conditions without an IFR flight plan represented 43% of airline pilot accidents involving FAA rule infractions. CONCLUSIONS: These findings inform safety deficiencies for: (a) airline pilots, landing/ground operations in tail-wheel aircraft and lack of 14CFR 91 familiarization regulations regarding minimum operating altitudes and (b) PPL-IFR airmen in-flight loss-of-control and poor landing speed management. Practical Applications: For PPL-IFR airmen, training/recurrency should focus on unusual attitude recovery and managing approach speeds. Airline pilots should seek additional instructional time regarding landing tail-wheel aircraft and become familiar with 14CFR 91 rules covering minimum altitudes.

A birdstrike risk assessment model and its application at Ordos Airport, China.

Birdstrikes are an important threat to aviation safety. A standardized, scientific process for assessing birdstrike risk could prevent accidents, thereby improving the flight safety and reducing economic losses. However, China currently lacks a unified birdstrike risk assessment system. Here, we propose and validate a new model for assessing birdstrike risk in order to fill that need. The model consists of two elements. First, empirical data are collected on the occurrence of birds at the airport and in a surrounding 8 km buffer. Second, each species is evaluated with a risk assessment matrix that takes into account the number of birds, weight, flight altitude, a tendency to cluster, and range of activity. These five factors allow each species to be divided into one of three risk levels: high danger (level 3), moderate danger (level 2) and low danger (level 1). We propose corresponding birdstrike prevention measures for each level. We apply this method to the civil aviation airport in Ordos, China. We found that 20 of the 118 species of birds in and around the airport were high danger birds (level 3). To validate this process, we compared these species with records of birdstrike accidents in a database maintained by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) for 2007-2016. We found that 42% of the species we identified as high risk had been involved in at least one birdstrike accident, and that the remaining 58% belonged to families that appeared in the database. The high degree of overlap gives us high confidence in the practicality of our risk assessment model, which is based on the risk management concept of ISO 31000. Critically, this new model and method for predicting bird strike risk can be replicated at other airports around the world, even where no extensive records have been kept of past birdstrikes.

Comparative assessment of impact analysis methods applied to large commercial aircraft crash on reinforced concrete containment.

The precise evaluation of the potential damage caused by large commercial aircraft crash into civil structures, especially nuclear power plants (NPPs), has become essential design consideration. In this study, impact of Boeing 767 against rigid wall and outer containment building (reinforced concrete) of an NPP are simulated in ANSYS/LS-DYNA by using both force time history and missile target interaction methods with impact velocities ranging from 100 m/s to 150 m/s. The results show that impact loads, displacements, stresses for concrete and steel reinforcement, and damaged elements are higher in case of force time history method than missile target interaction method, making the former relatively conservative. It is observed that no perforation or scabbing takes place in case of 100 m/s impact speed, thus preventing any potential leakage. With full mass of Boeing 767 and impact velocity slightly above 100 m/s, the outer containment building can prevent local failure modes. At impact velocity higher than 120 m/s, scabbing and perforations are dominant. This concludes that in design and assessment of NPP structures against aircraft loadings, sufficient thickness or consideration of steel plates are essential to account for local failure modes and overall structural integrity. Furthermore, validation and application of detail 3D finite element and material models to full-scale impact analysis have been carried out to expand the existing database. In rigid wall impact analysis, the impact forces and impulses from FE analysis and Riera's method correspond well, which satisfies the recommendations of relevant standards and further ensure the accuracy of results in full-scale impact analysis. The methodology presented in this paper is extremely effective in simulating structural evaluation of full-scale aircraft impact on important facilities such as NPPs.

Applying AcciMap to test the common cause hypothesis using aviation near misses.

The common cause hypothesis, as applied here, proposes that similar networks of influencing factors may contribute to both adverse outcomes and near misses. This hypothesis has not been evaluated using a systems-thinking perspective. The aims of this study are to evaluate whether networks of contributory and protective factors exist within aviation serious near miss reports and to determine if the common cause hypothesis is applicable in this context. Sixteen incident reports from French civil aviation crash investigation bureau were analysed using the AcciMap method. Contributory and protective factors, and relationships between both were identified via coding of the reports. The results indicate that considering protective factors support a richer picture of incidents and provide support for the common cause hypothesis as measured by similar mean factor volume and sociotechnical levels for both contributory and protective factors. However, the findings also show the direction of relationships among protective and contributory factors may be indicative of a difference among adverse outcomes, near misses, and normal work. Future research should consider how a network of relationships may impact on the common contributory and protective factors found in near misses.

Accident Rates, Causes, and Occupant Injury Involving High-Performance General Aviation Aircraft.

BACKGROUND: Spatial disorientation, poor situational awareness, and aerodynamic stalls are often causal/contributory to general aviation accidents. To mitigate against the occurrence of these mishaps Cirrus Aircraft has, since 2002, introduced advanced avionics into their piston airplanes (Cirrus SR20/22). These airplanes are also certificated to more rigorous crashworthiness tests than legacy aircraft approved prior to these standards being codified. Herein, using for comparison two legacy aircraft fleets manufactured prior to 2002, we determined whether a reduced mishap rate for all accidents or relating to the aforementioned causes/contributing factors and/or diminished injury severity for survivable accidents were evident for Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes.METHODS: Accidents (2008-2017) involving Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes (manufactured 2002 or later) and Beechcraft 35/36 (Bonanza) and Mooney 20 models (both manufactured no later than 2001) (14CFR Part 91 rules) were identified (N = 136, 259, 164, respectively) from the NTSB database. Statistical analyses used Poisson distribution/contingency tables/ t- and Mann-Whitney tests.RESULTS: For each year within the 2013-2017 timespan the Cirrus SR20/22 all-accident rate was diminished 39-75% relative to both legacy fleets. Temporally, the fraction of fatal Cirrus SR20/22 accidents, initially higher, declined 50% achieving a lower, or comparable, proportion to the two legacy airframes. Fatal accident rates involving spatial disorientation/situational awareness/aerodynamic stalls were > 80% lower for Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes. For survivable mishaps, Cirrus SR20/22 aircraft showed a lower proportion (0.13 compared with 0.20-0.35) of fatal/serious injuries.CONCLUSION: Toward improving legacy aircraft safety, owners should be encouraged to upgrade their avionics for mitigating against the occurrence of such human-factor-related mishaps and install airbags to minimize injury severity.Boyd DD, Howell C. Accident rates, causes, and occupant injury involving high-performance general aviation aircraft. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(5):387-393.

Fatigue-Related Aviation Mishaps.

INTRODUCTION: Fatigue is a critical safety issue to U.S. Air Force (USAF) flight and ground crew. Nearly 15 yr of mishap reports were analyzed to determine how fatigue affects USAF operations with the goal of improving fatigue risk management policies and tools.METHODS: Summary data for 19,920 aviation mishap reports dating back to 2003 were collected from the Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS). Fatigue-related mishaps were identified based on designations provided within AFSAS. Other metrics examined were characteristics such as timing, cost, and aircraft metrics, among others. Contingency tables built from these metrics were used to assess fatigue-related trends across the aviation community.RESULTS: While only 3.88% of all mishaps were identified as fatigue-related, they are associated with 2.1 billion of medical expenses and property damage, or 18% of the 11.7 billion total cost of all mishaps included in the study. Nearly a quarter of the fatigue-related mishaps fall into the most severe mishap category and more than half occurred between 0100 and 0700, local time. Fatigue-related mishaps tended to be more common for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and ground operations.DISCUSSION: Fatigue is very costly to the USAF despite the relatively low incidence rate of fatigue-related mishaps. This is because larger proportions of severe mishaps were found to be fatigue-related. RPA and ground maintenance operators might be especially susceptible to fatigue and potentially lack adequate fatigue mitigation support and training tailored to their unique operational environment, suggesting a need to improve upon fatigue mitigation tools and strategies.Gaines AR, Morris MB, Gunzelmann G. Fatigue-related aviation mishaps. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(5):440447.

Aviation Sports Crashes in the Austrian Mountains: A 10-Year Retrospective Study.

INTRODUCTION: We aimed to describe the epidemiology and injury patterns of aviation sports crashes in the Austrian mountains and identify risk factors. METHODS: In this retrospective cohort study, out-of-hospital data on patients who sustained crashes when participating in aviation sports from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2015 were assessed. The out-of-hospital data were merged with in-hospital data obtained from Innsbruck Medical University Hospital. RESULTS: A total of 2037 persons were involved in 1856 aviation sports crashes. Data on 126 in-hospital patients were available. Wind and pilot error were the most common causes. Most injuries occurred in paragliders (n=111, 88%). Most commonly, paragliders sustained injuries to the lumbar spine and hang gliders to the thoracic spine. Rescue operations were undertaken mainly by helicopter emergency medical services (n=87, 69%) or combined rescue forces (ground and helicopter, n=100, 79%.). The Injury Severity Score was 15±15, with a peak in patients with isolated injuries of the lower extremities (n=38, 32%) and a second peak in patients with multiple trauma (n=44, 35%). CONCLUSIONS: In the Austrian mountains, wind and pilot errors are the most common causes of aviation crashes. Aviation sports crashes frequently resulted in severe injuries and multiple trauma. The lumbar spine is particularly at risk in paragliders, whereas the thoracic spine is commonly affected in hang gliders. Injuries frequently caused long-term paralysis and limitations in quality of life. To minimize long-term consequences and save lives, skilled and well-equipped teams may be beneficial to provide effective on-site care and safe transportation to a trauma center.

The Magnitude of the Spatial Disorientation Problem in Transport Airplanes.

INTRODUCTION: Loss-of-control (LOC) is the major cause of transport airplane mishaps. There have been many published reports and papers examining these accidents. While these studies did mention spatial disorientation (SD) as a cause or a factor, none of them analyzed it further. The present study uses transport and commuter airplane mishap data for a recent 35-yr period and examines the results of those mishaps involving spatial disorientation.METHOD: We identified LOC and SD accidents from five national aviation accident organizations and two independent groups. Only "normal" operations (air carrier, noncommercial transportation, ferry flights, and training) were considered. We reviewed transport and commuter airplane accidents using the published reports and identified 94 involving SD.RESULTS: We found the distribution of SD mishaps differs from LOC mishaps. During initial climb, there were relatively fewer SD mishaps (16%) than LOC mishaps (31%). During enroute climb SD has relatively more mishaps (18%) than LOC (11%). During go-around or missed approach phases, there were relatively more SD mishaps (21%) than LOC mishaps (4%). Perhaps the most significant observation was an increasing number of SD mishaps during the period reviewed.DISCUSSION: There are several possible reasons for the increasing numbers of SD mishaps over the study period from 1981 to 2016. Somatogravic illusion during go-around or missed approach accounts for only some of this increase. There is insufficient data to determine the reason for the remaining increase.Newman RL, Rupert AH. The magnitude of the spatial disorientation problem in transport airplanes. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(2):65-70.

Social Acceptance of Increased Usage of the Ballistic Parachute System in a General Aviation Aircraft.

BACKGROUND: An airframe parachute ("Chute") available in certain aircraft is designed to lower the airplane safely to the ground for emergency situations that occur 500 ft (152 m) above ground level (AGL): the "Chute altitude envelope." This study will explore the change in Chute use before and after 2012 to better understand factors that increased usage and improved accident outcomes.METHODS: Using the public National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database from January 1, 2001, through August 31, 2018, a regression model was developed to identify factors that may predict Chute use.RESULTS: In accidents occurring after January 1, 2013, pilots were 5 times more likely to use the Chute, while 2.9 times less likely to use the Chute when the accident involved pilot-related causes. The presence of passengers did not predict Chute use. Injuries were likely to be more severe when the Chute was used outside the Chute altitude envelope.DISCUSSION: In contrast to General Aviation (GA) overall, accidents outcomes in aircraft equipped with a Chute have seen great improvements between 2013 and 2018, with increased use of the Chute and improved injury outcomes. Results suggest that changes to pilot training in 2012 have increased the social acceptance of Chute use. Results highlight increased risk of injury outcomes for Chute use in accidents that occur outside the Chute altitude envelope.Kirby J. Social acceptance of increased usage of the ballistic parachute system in a general aviation aircraft. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(2):86-90.

Statistical learning for turboshaft helicopter accidents using logistic regression.

The objective of this work is to advance the understanding of helicopter accidents by examining and quantifying the association between helicopter-specific configurations (number of main rotor blades, number of engines, rotor diameter, and takeoff weight) and the likelihood of accidents. We leverage a dataset of 8,338 turboshaft helicopters in the U.S. civil fleet and 825 accidents from 2005 to 2015. We use the dataset to develop a logistic regression model using the method of purposeful selection, which we exploit for inferential purposes and highlight the novel insights it reveals. For example, one important question for the design and acquisition of helicopters is whether twin-engine turboshaft helicopters exhibit a smaller likelihood of accidents than their single-engine counterparts, all else being equal. The evidence-based result we derive indicates that the answer is contingent on other covariates, and that a tipping point exists in terms of the rotor diameter beyond which the likelihood of accidents of twin-engines is higher (worse) than that of their single-engine counterparts. Another important result derived here is the association between the number of main rotor blades and likelihood of accidents. We found that for single-engine turboshaft helicopters, the four-bladed ones are associated with the lowest likelihood of accidents. We also identified a clear coupling between the number of engines and the rotor diameter in terms of likelihood of accidents. In summary, we establish important relationships between the different helicopter configurations here considered and the likelihood of accident, but these are associations, not causal in nature. The causal pathway, if it exists, may be confounded or mediated by other variables not accounted for here. The results provided here lend themselves to a rich set of interpretive possibilities, and because of their significant safety implications they deserve careful attention from the rotorcraft community.

A Medical Review of Fatal High-G U.S. Aerobatic Accidents.

INTRODUCTION: Exposure to high G force is a known safety hazard in military aviation as well as civilian aerobatic flight. Tolerance to high G forces has been well studied in military pilots, but there is little research directed at civilian pilots who may have medications or medical conditions not permitted in military pilots.METHODS: In this case-control study, we identified 89 fatal high-G aerobatic accidents and 4000 fatal control accidents from 1995 through 2018 from the NTSB accident database and the FAA autopsy database. We retrieved medications and medical conditions from the FAA's pilot medical databases. Logistic regression models were used to explore the associations of drugs, medical conditions, height, and medical waivers with high-G accidents.RESULTS: Seven drugs (alprazolam, clonidine, ethanol, meclizine, phentermine, triamterene, and zolpidem) reached statistical significance in our models, but had such small case counts that we consider these findings to be uncertain, except for ethanol, which was found in seven cases. Of these, only triamterene was known to the FAA. Statistically significant medical predictors included only alcohol abuse (seven cases) and liver disease (only two cases).DISCUSSION: Our analysis found that the drug ethanol and the condition alcohol abuse are significantly associated with high-G accidents. Seven other factors were statistically significant, but should only be considered as hypothesis generating due to very low case counts. Our study does not suggest that restricting pilots with otherwise permissible medications or medical conditions from aerobatics is warranted.Mills WD, Greenhaw RM, Wang JMP. A medical review of fatal high-G U.S. aerobatic accidents. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(11):959-965.

U.S. Statement of Demonstrated Ability Aeromedical Waivers.

INTRODUCTION: The Statement of Demonstrated Ability (SODA) is a type of U.S. aeromedical waiver used for disqualifying conditions that are not expected to change. About 21,000 (2%) U.S. pilots possess a SODA waiver.METHODS: We matched all pilot medical exams from the FAA's medical certification database from 2002 through 2011 to their respective accidents in the National Transportation Safety Board accident database. The association of SODA waivers and SODA conditions with the odds of an accident were explored using logistic regression techniques.RESULTS: For 3rd class flight exams, the presence of a SODA waiver was not associated with the odds of an accident. For the 1st and 2nd class exams, the accident odds ratio (OR = 1.45) was statistically significant. Crop dusting operations accounted for 17 of the 40 accidents where SODAs were present and returned a significant accident OR = 1.68. SODAs were not associated with the odds of accidents during other commercial operations. Six SODA conditions (amputation, internal eye, external eye, visual fields, bone and joint, and miscellaneous) were also found to have elevated ORs but were based on very small accident counts. NTSB investigators and the authors reviewed all accidents and none thought the SODA condition to be contributory.DISCUSSION: SODA waivers were not associated with increased accident odds except for crop dusting operations. Six specific SODA conditions also had elevated odds of an accident, but there was no evidence they contributed to the accidents. Overall, U.S. pilots with SODA waivers appear to have a satisfactory safety record.Mills WD, Davis JT. U.S. Statement of Demonstrated Ability aeromedical waivers. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(12):1034-1040.

An analysis of human factors in fifty controlled flight into terrain aviation accidents from 2007 to 2017.

INTRODUCTION: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) account for a considerable amount of fatalities when compared to other accident categories. Human factors are deemed significant contributory causes in these accidents. This paper aims to identify the human factors involved with aviation accidents that resulted in CFIT. METHOD: The study used the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework to determine the factors involved in 50 CFIT accidents from 24 counties over a 10 year period, i.e. 2007-2017. Interviews with five senior aviation safety experts were used to provide a better comprehension of the human factors affecting the flight safety. RESULTS: The study identified 1289 individual causal and contributory human factors with unsafe actions and preconditions for unsafe actions being the main subcategories of the accidents. The study found that CFIT occur across a range of pilot experience and 44% of accidents occurred in cruise flight. Distraction, complacency and fatigue are all elements that flight crews may experience as contributors to CFIT during cruising. CONCLUSIONS: Human factors represent a major component of CFIT accidents. The analysis revealed a similar pattern of contributory and causal human factors across the various flight categories, with some noteworthy isolated variations. The prevalent factors were decision and skill-based errors along with communication, coordination and planning issues. Practical applications: Provision of specific CFIT awareness, pilot training focusing on improved decision-making and revision of basic flight skills, development of specific Global Positioning System routes for transiting high terrain areas are necessary to prevent CFIT accidents. Installation of Terrain Avoidance and Warning System and Ground Proximity Warning System and appropriate equipment training, specific CFIT Crew Resource Management training and improvement of organizational knowledge on the elements involved in CFIT are also recommended.

Safety in the nonoperating room anesthesia suite is not an accident: lessons from the National Transportation Safety Board.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: To review the findings of National Transportation Safety Board-related aviation near misses and catastrophes and apply these principles to the nonoperating room anesthesia (NORA) suite. RECENT FINDINGS: NORA is a specialty that has seen tremendous growth. In 2019, NORA contributes to a larger proportion of anesthesia practice than ever before. With this growth, the NORA anesthesiologist and team are challenged to provide safe, high-quality care for more patients, often with complex comorbidities, and are forced to utilize deeper levels of sedation and anesthesia than ever before. These added pressures create new avenues for human error and adverse outcomes. SUMMARY: Safety in modern anesthesia practice often draws comparison to the aviation industry. From distinct preoperational checklists, defined courses of action, safety monitoring and the process of guiding individuals through a journey, there are many similarities between the practice of anesthesia and flying an airplane. Consistent human performance is paramount to creating safe outcomes. Although human errors are inevitable in any complex process, the goal for both the pilot and physician is to ensure the safety of their passengers and patients, respectively. As the aviation industry has had proven success at managing human error with a dramatic improvement in safety, a deeper look at several key examples will allow for comparisons of how to implement these strategies to improve NORA safety.

Occupant Injury Severity in General Aviation Accidents Involving Excessive Landing Airspeed.

BACKGROUND: Of all phases of flight operations, accidents during landings are the most frequent. Of these, poor speed management during landing has ramifications for injury severity since: 1) impact forces increase as a square of forward velocity; and 2) an aerodynamic stall, associated with inadequate landing speed, imparts high vertical G forces. Herein, the proportion of landing accidents involving deficient airspeed control and occupant injury severity was determined.METHODS: General aviation landing accidents (1997-2016) were identified from the NTSB database. An accident involving high-airspeed (high-energy) was one for which the NTSB cited airplane porpoising, multiple bounces, or floating, whereas an inadequate airspeed related (low energy) mishap was one citing this term or in which an aerodynamic stall occurred. An anonymous online survey of certificated pilots was used to inform landing technique. Statistical analyses used Poisson distribution and Chi-squared tests.RESULTS: Relative to the earliest period (1997-2001), the landing accident rate was undiminished for more recent years (2007-2016). Of 235 accidents, 38% involved high-energy, whereas 4% were inadequate airspeed-related. For the former, 17% resulted in occupants with fatal-serious injuries, twofold higher than for mishaps with no evidence of mis-speed. Of 1392 survey respondents, 73% selected a landing airspeed higher than required for an under-maximum weight airplane.CONCLUSION: For landing accidents involving airspeed mismanagement, those related to excessive energy predominate and are associated with more severe injuries. Two mitigating strategies are advanced: 1) pilot training should discuss landing airspeed adjustment for aircraft weight; and 2) installation of inflatable restraints for reducing injury severity should be encouraged.Boyd DD. Occupant injury severity in general aviation accidents involving excessive landing airspeed. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2019; 90(4):355-361.