On Dolly and the scandalous nature of life sciences and Where bioethics really begins.

25 years ago, Dolly the sheep and the cloning issue stood in the focus of widespread and heated societal and ethical discussions that, for the bigger part, were not rational. In the aftermath of Dolly, in Europe bioethics was established as a discipline that is hyper-sceptical critic of science. Bioethics seen from the point of view of science is nebulous to many researchers, such as Lewis Wolpert, who called bioethics "a gross load of nonsense". It appears that the image of science in bioethics and society has as much suffered and moved away from the factual truth, as the image of bioethics and society has suffered in science since the Dolly event. It is time to return to a reasonable view of science, bioethics and society - and of Dolly the sheep.

¿Máquinas biotecnológicas o seres sintientes? Una aproximación antiespecista a la clonación de animales no humanos / Biotecnological machines or sentient beings? An antispeciesist approach to nonhuman animal cloning / Màquines biotecnològiques o éssers sintients? Una aproximació antiespecista a la clonació d'animals no humns

La clonación y transgénesis animal son prácticas biotecnológicas en auge, para nada exentas de problemáticas éticas en lo que respecta al uso que hacen de los animales no humanos. En este artículo se examinan los diversos ámbitos de aplicación de la clonación animal (médico-farmacéutico, industria alimentaria, recreación de especies extintas, clonación de animales de compañía e industria artística y deportiva) y se revisan los principales argumentos éticos que cuestionan la clonación y la transgénesis animal desde una perspectiva antiespecista. Esta perspectiva sostiene que los animales no humanos son merecedores de consideración moral como sujetos de vidas significativas, y no únicamente como medios para la realización de fines humanos

Animal cloning and animal transgenesis are growing biotechnological practices, not at all exempt from ethical problems regarding the use they make of non-human animals. This article examines the different areas of application of animal cloning (medical-pharmaceutical, food industry, recreating of extinct species, cloning of companion animals and the art and sport industries) and reviews the main ethical arguments that question cloning and animal transgenesis from an antispeciesist perspective. This perspective argues that non-human animals deserve moral consideration as subjects of meaningful lives, and not only as means for the achievement of human ends

La clonació i transgènesi animal són pràctiques biotecnològiques creixents i no exemptes de problemàtiques ètiques pel que fa a l'ús que fan dels animals no humans. En aquest article s'examinen els diversos àmbits d'aplicació de la clonació animal (metge-farmacèutic, indústria alimentària, recreació d'espècies extintes, clonació d'animals de companyia i indústria artística i esportiva) i es revisen els principals arguments ètics que qüestionen la clonació i la transgènesi animal des d'una perspectiva antiespecista. Aquesta perspectiva sosté que els animals no humans són mereixedors de consideració moral com a subjectes de vides significatives, i no únicament com a mitjans per a la realització de finalitats humanes

A matter of life and longer life.

While the major scientific discoveries that would extend the length and health of human lives are not yet here, the research that could create them is already underway. As prospects for a world in which extended and improved lives inches closer into reality, the discourse about what to consider as we move forward grows richer, with corporate executives, ideologues, scientists, theologians, ethicists, investigative journalists, and philosophers taking part in imagining and anticipating the rich array of humanity's possible futures. Drawing from in-depth interviews with key stakeholders (n = 22), we offer empirical insights into key values and beliefs animating the "longevity movement," including what constitutes an ideal human state, the imperative to intervene, and the role of individual liberty and concerns for equality. Emerging from these interviews are common concerns about reducing suffering, preserving diversity in visions of successful aging and how best to promote access to a future that may not remain hypothetical for long.

[CRISPR babies: technology and transgression]. / Bébés CRISPR - Anatomie d'une transgression.

Analysing the data recently presented by Jiankui He and assuming that it is authentic shows that the goal of abolishing the expression of CCR5 may have been reached for one of the resulting twins, although this remains to be proven. However, the canonical delta32 mutation has not been achieved. The various preliminary experiments and controls give some confidence that major off-target modifications have not occurred; again, this is difficult to exclude. Clearly, the requirements of perfect technical mastery of the process have not been met, to say nothing of the requirements for complete transparency and full societal approval.

In vitro gametogenesis and reproductive cloning: Can we allow one while banning the other?

In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproductive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is notable when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might expect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both technologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be overcome, and are presumably not the sole reason why cloning is being condemned. We therefore assess the non-safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG.

Unexpected Creatures: Procreative Liberty and the Frankenstein Ballet.

One of the most recent and original adaptations of Mary Wollstonecraft (Godwin) Shelley's Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is the ballet version choreographed by Liam Scarlett and performed by the Royal Ballet in 2016 and the San Francisco Ballet in 2017 and 2018. What emerges from this translation is an economical, emotionally wrenching, and visually elegant drama of family tragedy from which we can draw a cautionary tale about contemporary bioethical dilemmas in family making that new and forthcoming biomedical technologies present. This performance of bodies interacting suggests the need for an ethics of acceptance and recognition as people navigate complex familial relationships involving procreative liberty, questions of moral personhood, and parental obligation. In the Frankenstein ballet, the narrative genre of dance-what I'll call "story in the flesh"-invites viewers to identify with the characters and enter into the complexity of interpersonal relations. The ballet becomes a compelling testimony about possible unintended outcomes set in motion by well-intended fallible humans like themselves.

On Cute Monkeys and Repulsive Monsters.

When I heard that a laboratory in China had cloned two long-tailed macaques, I thought of Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein. When academics write about the novel, many point out that the reason the creature becomes a "monster" is not that he has any inherently evil qualities but that Victor Frankenstein, the creature's "mother," immediately rejects him. All later problems can be traced to the fact that Frankenstein does not take responsibility for his creation. While I do not disagree with this, we need to think beyond (or before) Frankenstein's rejection to the reason he rejects it. I would like to suggest that this reason reveals something about how bioethics judges new biological technologies. I suggest that what causes Frankenstein to feel revulsion toward his creation is its unsettling mix of the beautiful and the ugly.

Rereading Frankenstein: What If Victor Frankenstein Had Actually Been Evil?

As we reread Mary Shelley's Frankenstein at two hundred years, it is evident that Victor Frankenstein is both a mad scientist (fevered, obsessive) and a bad scientist (secretive, hubristic, irresponsible). He's also not a very nice person. He's a narcissist, a liar, and a bad "parent." But he is not genuinely evil. And yet when we reimagine him as evil-as an evil scientist and as an evil person-we can learn some important lessons about science and technology, our contemporary society, and ourselves.

Ethics and cloning.

Background: Scientists have cloned animals since the late 19th century, but the crucial step for ethics was the cloning of the first mammal by somatic cell nuclear transfer in 1997. This suggested that scientists could also clone, and possibly enhance, human beings. Sources of data: This survey examines ethical literature on cloning since the 1960s. Areas of agreement: The one ethical area of agreement in this issue is that we should not try to create new human beings by somatic cell nuclear transfer now. Areas of controversy: Ethicists disagree, however, on what justifies this norm. Some appeal to preference satisfaction and freedom from external constraints, others question this approach by more profound religious and moral considerations. Growing points: The discussion is currently not progressing, as the same arguments have been in use since the 1970s. Areas timely for developing research: Philosophers should prepare deeper analyses of the presuppositions of the ethical arguments used in the discussion before the issue surfaces again.

Ethical Concerns About Human Genetic Enhancement in the Malay Science Fiction Novels.

Advancements in science and technology have not only brought hope to humankind to produce disease-free offspring, but also offer possibilities to genetically enhance the next generation's traits and capacities. Human genetic enhancement, however, raises complex ethical questions, such as to what extent should it be allowed? It has been a great challenge for humankind to develop robust ethical guidelines for human genetic enhancement that address both public concerns and needs. We believe that research about public concerns is necessary prior to developing such guidelines, yet the issues have not been thoroughly investigated in many countries, including Malaysia. Since the novel often functions as a medium for the public to express their concerns, this paper explores ethical concerns about human genetic enhancement expressed in four Malay science fiction novels namely Klon, Leksikon Ledang, Transgenesis Bisikan Rimba and Transgenik Sifar. Religion has a strong influence on the worldview of the Malays therefore some concerns such as playing God are obviously religious. Association of the negative image of scientists as well as the private research companies with the research on human genetic enhancement reflects the authors' concerns about the main motivations for conducting such research and the extent to which such research will benefit society.

De-extinction and Conservation.

We are living in what is widely considered the sixth major extinction. Most ecologists believe that biodiversity is disappearing at an alarming rate, with up to 150 species going extinct per day according to scientists working with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Part of the reason the loss signified by biological extinction feels painful is that it seems irremediable. These creatures are gone, and there's nothing to be done about it. In recent years, however, the possibility has been broached that, just possibly, something can be done, in at least some cases. Human ingenuity, a contributing factor in the extinction crisis, might achieve their "de-extinction"-in at least some cases, and with sometimes significant qualifications about whether the original species had been "recreated" and whether it could resume its original place in the environment. De-extinction is an entry point into a larger set of questions about how biotechnological tools can support, coexist with, or undermine the goals of conservation and about the very meaning of conservation. Are we beings in control of the world or beings who prosper by accommodating ourselves to webs of symbiotic interdependencies? Are we creators or creatures, or both-and if both, then how can we achieve the balance between them that might be called humility? The interplay of perfecting and accommodating is not unique to human beings-perhaps it characterizes all forms of life on Earth-but with humans, these modes of being are distinctive, and our technology greatly expands their scale and effects. It is such questions that the ten essays in this special report explore.

De-extinction and Barriers to the Application of New Conservation Tools.

Decades of globally coordinated work in conservation have failed to slow the loss of biodiversity. To do better-even if that means nothing more than failing less spectacularly-bolder thinking is necessary. One of the first possible conservation applications of synthetic biology to be debated is the use of genetic tools to resurrect once-extinct species. Since the currency of conservation is biodiversity and the discipline of conservation biology was formed around the prevention of species extinctions, the prospect of reversing extinctions might have been expected to generate unreserved enthusiasm. But it was not universal acclaim that greeted the coming-out party for "de-extinction" that was the TEDx conference and accompanying National Geographic feature in 2013. Why the concern, the skepticism, even the hostility among many conservationists about the idea of restoring lost species? And how does this professional concern relate to public perception and support for conservation? This essay explores the barriers to the acceptance of risky new genomic-based conservation tools by considering five key areas and associated questions that could be addressed in relation to any new conservation tool. I illustrate these using the specific example of de-extinction, and in doing so, I consider whether de-extinction would necessarily be the best first point of engagement between conservation biology and synthetic biology.

De-extinction and Conservation Genetics in the Anthropocene.

One interesting feature of de-extinction-particularly with respect to long-extinct species such as the passenger pigeon, thylacine, and mammoth-is that it does not fit neatly into the primary rationales for adopting novel ecosystem-management and species-conservation technologies and strategies: efficiency and necessity. The efficiency rationale is that the new technology or strategy enables conservation biologists to do what they already do more effectively. Why should researchers embrace novel information technologies? Because they allow scientists to better track, monitor, map, aggregate, and analyze species behaviors, biological systems, and human-environment interactions. This enables better decision-making about how to protect species, which areas to conserve, and how to reduce anthropogenic impacts on ecological systems. Many projects in conservation genomics are justified in this way. But de-extinction is not a more efficient or necessary means to some conservation aim that is already recognized as acceptable or important. In fact, because it is focused on reconstituting approximations of nonexistent species, rather than maintaining extant ones, the social and ethical assessment of de-extinction is not limited to asking whether it is a good means. We can ask as well whether de-extinction is a worthwhile "conservation" goal in the first place.

De-extinction and Taking Control of Earth's "Metabolism".

In a laboratory on a university campus in Santa Cruz, California, Ben Novak is doing everything he can to bring Ectopistes migratorius back from the dead. Using techniques now available in genome reading and gene synthesis, he and paleogenomicist Beth Shapiro hope that, by 2032, a flock of passenger pigeons ten thousand or more strong will have resumed an ecologically significant role in the mast forests of the Eastern United States. Novak knows-and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) affirms-that the challenges involved in making de-extinction work are far from solely genetic. Novak is doing an ecological risk assessment of passenger pigeon reintroduction to figure out whether flocks of the resurrected species would pose any special hazards to ecosystems. Ecological harm is one of several worries attending the prospect of de-extinction. Among other concerns are the possible harm that individuals born through this process might suffer and the possible introduction of disease vectors. But I want to step back from these immediate questions and think about some conceptual ones that operate in the background. Technology can be a grand shaper of cultural norms and expectations, and de-extinction should be looked at in relation to a number of emerging technologies. This paper will examine the degree to which de-extinction is part of a more widespread restructuring of ethical relationships to the surrounding world that are under way at the hands of emerging technologies. This restructuring is part of an ongoing shift in how to think about conservation in the new epoch of the Anthropocene.

Reflections on the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and Models of Public Bioethics.

The National Bioethics Advisory Commission, of which I was a member, was established by a 1995 executive order that identified its "first priority" as "the protection of the rights and welfare of human research subjects." Not surprisingly, then, most of NBAC's work focused on research involving human subjects or participants. A second priority concerned "issues in the management and use of genetics information, including but not limited to, human gene patenting." NBAC's charter (in contrast to the executive order) listed this charge as "part B" of the "first priority." Nonetheless, NBAC never fully developed it. In addition to responding to requests and recommendations from the National Science and Technology Council, NBAC could accept suggestions from Congress and the public for bioethical issues it should consider, and it could also identify other issues to consider and set priorities among them. From its first meeting on October 4, 1996, until its charter expired on October 3, 2001, NBAC produced six reports, with 120 recommendations. In this essay, I make a few observations about principles and moral reasoning in NBAC's deliberations and about NBAC's attention to religious beliefs in the context of two bioethical controversies, provide a rough evaluation of NBAC's impact, and consider three possible models for future public bioethics directed at federal public policy.

"I am Your Mother and Your Father!" In Vitro Derived Gametes and the Ethics of Solo Reproduction.

In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men's non-reproductive cells and sperm from women's. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: 'solo reproduction'. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation-and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes.