Disposition of unclaimed embryos: an Ethics Committee opinion.

Programs should create and enforce written policies addressing the designation, retention, and disposal of unclaimed embryos. In the absence of program-specific policies, it is ethically permissible for a program or facility to consider embryos to have been unclaimed if a reasonable period of time has passed since contact with an individual or couple; efforts as outlined in the consent form have been made to contact the individual or couple; and no written instructions from the individual or couple with dispositional control exist concerning disposition. In such cases, programs or facilities may dispose of unclaimed embryos by removing them from storage and thawing without transfer. In the absence of specific written instructions, unclaimed embryos may not be donated to others for reproductive use or be used in research. This statement replaces the American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee document "Disposition of Abandoned Embryos" published in 2013.

The ethics of human-embryoids model: a call for consistency.

In this article, we discuss the ethics of human embryoids, i.e., embryo-like structures made from pluripotent stem cells for modeling natural embryos. We argue that defining our social priorities is critical to design a consistent ethical guideline for research on those new entities. The absence of clear regulations on these emerging technologies stems from an unresolved debate surrounding natural human embryo research and one common opinion that one needs to solve the question of the moral status of the human embryo before regulating their surrogate. The recent NIH funding restrictions for research on human embryoids have made scientists even more unlikely to raise their voices. As a result, the scientific community has maintained a low profile while longing for a more favorable socio-political climate for their research. This article is a call for consistency among biomedical research on human materials, trying to position human embryoids within a spectrum of existing practice from stem cell research or IVF to research involving human subjects. We specifically note that the current practices in infertility clinics of freezing human embryos or disposing of them without any consideration for their potential benefits contradicts the assumption of special consideration for human material. Conversely, creating human embryoids for research purposes could ensure that no human material be used in vain, always serving humankind. We argue here that it is time to reconsider the full ban on embryo research (human embryos and embryoids) beyond the 14-day rule and that research on those entities should obey a sliding scale combining the completeness of the model (e.g., complete vs. partial) and the developmental stage: with more advanced completeness and developmental stage of the considered entity, being associated with more rigorous evaluation of societal benefits, statements of intention, and necessity of such research.

The fate of surplus embryos: ethical and emotional impacts on assisted reproduction.

OBJECTIVE: This paper looked into the findings of a survey on the ethical and emotional aspects encircling the fate of surplus embryos in Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR). METHODS: Five staff members of a fertility clinic in the Brazilian State of São Paulo answered a semi-structured qualitative interview. RESULTS: The answers alluded to the different meanings assigned to embryos by medical staff (genetic material) and couples undergoing fertility treatment (potential child). The meaning couples assigned to their embryos, along with inherent uncertainty and distress, affected the choice of what would be done to surplus embryos. CONCLUSION: Psychological support may be helpful to two key groups present in assisted human reproduction: clinic staff, for support in their interactions with couples; and couples in need of support and awareness on surplus embryo donation.

A moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption.

Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three-premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the "some" are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing.

The main will of the patients of a private Italian IVF clinic for their aneuploid/affected blastocysts would be donation to research: a currently forbidden choice.

PURPOSE: Surplus cryopreserved affected/aneuploid blastocysts may be obtained after in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments with preimplantation genetic testing (PGT). These embryos are considered not suitable for transfer and may be discarded. Currently, in Italy, an embryo disposition decision (EDD) is not allowed and the frozen/vitrified blastocysts (even if affected/aneuploid) should be kept cryopreserved indefinitely. In this peculiar clinical, social, and legislative scenario, we aimed at assessing the attitudes of the patients towards the fate of these embryos, in case the local regulation would be changed and allow an EDD regarding the surplus affected/aneuploid embryos obtained after PGT. METHODS: A questionnaire with multiple answers was submitted to 832 patients who obtained affected/aneuploid embryos during a PGT cycle at our private IVF center. They were asked to choose between three putative options with related reasons: everlasting cryopreservation (only option currently available); discard or donate them to research. RESULTS: Overall, 149 patients (18%; 85 women and 64 men) answered the questionnaire. Among them, 84% (n = 126) would choose to donate their affected/aneuploid blastocysts to research, 9% (n = 13) would discard them and only 7% (n = 10) would keep them cryopreserved indefinitely. CONCLUSIONS: Donation of the affected/aneuploid blastocysts is the option chosen from most of the respondents (84%; 15% of the eligible patients). These patients are motivated from the altruistic will of incentivating the progress in IVF and/or stem cell research and supporting future couples to limit/solve their infertility/health issues.

2PN cell donation in Germany. Or: How the German Embryo Protection (Act) undermines itself.

In contrast to embryo donation, the permissibility of 2PN cell donation is highly controversial in Germany. This article is based on there being a legal loophole with respect to 2PN cell donation, which results from an inconsistency within the Embryo Protection Act on the normative status of 2PN cells. Following that thesis, the article argues that, on the basis of the normative criterion totipotency (i.e. the capacity to develop into a born human being), 2PN cells should also be considered human embryos within the meaning of the Act and thereby be protected by that Act in the same way as embryos. However, the normative assumption that 2PN cells should already be endowed with human dignity and the right to life has absurd consequences. Moreover, the consistent continuation of the Embryo Protection Act, as well as of the underlying ethical position or argumentation (i.e. the potentiality argument), leads to the even more absurd consequence of having to place every human somatic cell under the protection of human dignity and the right to life. As totipotency or the developmental potential therefore cannot delimit entities considered worthy of protection (i.e. human embryos) from entities considered not worthy of protection (i.e. 2PN cells, gametes, hESC, hiPSC and human somatic cells), it is not a suitable normative criterion. As a paradigmatic case, 2PN cell donation demonstrates that by retaining this normative criterion the now obsolete German Embryo Protection (Act) ultimately undermines itself.

'Compassionate transfer': an alternative option for surplus embryo disposition.

Compassionate transfer is a procedure wherein in vitro-created embryos are placed in a patient's cervix, vagina or uterus at an infertile period in the menstrual cycle where they are expected to perish. Patients report that they feel this procedure is a more natural means of disposition and provides them with the opportunity to grieve the loss of a potential child. However, some have argued that the procedure is an unnecessary, and illogical, addition to fertility treatment and that it detracts resources from medical care. Here, we introduce compassionate transfer as an alternative disposition option and argue that, for certain patients, it may constitute an ethical extension of fertility care that respects patient autonomy and psychosocial health.

Interests, obligations, and rights in gamete and embryo donation: an Ethics Committee opinion.

This Ethics Committee report outlines the interests, obligations, and rights of all parties involved in gamete and embryo donation: both males and females who choose to provide gametes or embryos for use by others, recipients of donated gametes and embryos, individuals born as a result of gamete or embryo donation, and the programs that provide donated gametes and embryos to patients. This document replaces the document "Interests, obligations, and rights of the donor in gamete donation," last published in 2014.

The point of no return: Up to what point should we be allowed to withdraw consent to the storage and use of embryos and gametes?

This article discusses when it is ethically acceptable to withdraw consent for the storage and use of embryos and gametes. Currently, the law in the UK states that consent to use of a gamete or embryo can be withdrawn up to the point of the embryo's transfer to the recipient's uterus or when the gamete is used in providing treatment services; that is, the 'point of no return'. In this article, we will consider other points of no return and argue that having a single point of no return, a one size fits all form of consent can, in some cases, lead to restrictions on individuals' autonomy and cause particular types of harm. Therefore, having different points of no return that fit different circumstances could extend autonomy and allow people to enter into agreements that are tailored more to their own particular needs and circumstances.

[Regulación de la donación de gametos y embriones en las técnicas de reproducción humana asistida: ¿anónima o abierta?]

The use of donated gametes and embryos in assisted reproduction techniques (ART) makes it necessary to examine interests that involve relevant ethical and legal considerations, which include the autonomy and privacy rights of the intended parents, donors' right to privacy and the right of the minors to know their genetic origin. This article presents arguments to consider policies of more openness to obtain information from donors in order to protect the child's best interest in knowing his/her genetic origins. It concludes with the situation in Mexico, where ART has been carried out with donated gametes since several years ago; however, due to the absence of regulations to control these procedures, each establishment imposes its own criteria for the operation of its programs.

El uso de gametos y embriones donados en técnicas de reproducción humana asistida hace necesario examinar intereses que implican consideraciones éticas y jurídicas relevantes, y estos incluyen los derechos de autonomía y privacidad de los padres de intención, el derecho a la privacidad de los donantes y el derecho de los menores a conocer su origen genético. En este artículo se exponen argumentos para considerar políticas de mayor apertura para la obtención de información de los donantes en aras de proteger el interés superior del niño y la niña a conocer sus orígenes genéticos. Concluye con la problemática en México, donde desde hace varios años se realizan técnicas de reproducción humana asistida con gametos donados, sin embargo, debido a la ausencia de una normatividad que regule estos procedimientos, cada establecimiento impone sus criterios para el funcionamiento de sus programas.

Abandoned frozen embryos in Argentina: a committee opinion.

Argentina, like many other countries in the region, faces the dilemma of what to do with the increasing accumulation of frozen embryos, which are often abandoned. This report aims to address the issue of abandoned frozen embryos, following the main concerns: 1) when is an embryo considered abandoned, according to regulatory documents; 2) how can the number of cryopreserved abandoned embryos be decreased; and 3) what are the current available options for discarding these abandoned embryos. Issues concerning the fate of abandoned embryos call for a revision of the technical aspects, as well as the symbolic aspects associated with the embryos and their options for discarding. Embryo disposal is a complex and intimate decision, which depends not only, on the quality of the cryopreserved embryo, but also on the social, cultural, economic, labor and health insurance aspects. In the absence of a formal regulatory framework for such decisions in Argentina, current practices and standard procedures face significant developmental hurdles. Among future actions to be developed in the short, medium and long term by this committee are building interdisciplinary teams, fostering patient-awareness, devising guidelines, and enforcing policies regarding embryo abandonment.

Embryo donation or embryo adoption? Conceptual and normative issues.

A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquishing in vitro fertilization surplus embryos for family building is whether we ought to think of it more in terms of donating these embryos or in terms of having them adopted. Deciding between these two alternatives is more than a matter of mere terminology. It has an impact on normative questions, e.g., on the question of what criteria for parent selection ought to be applied to the recipients of the embryos, and on the moral evaluation of the act of 'donating' the embryo or 'having it adopted'. In this article, I defend the view that we should conceptualize the relinquishment of spare embryos according to the adoption model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of the argument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adoption model in a theory of parental responsibility without implicitly elevating the moral status of the embryo. Section 3 contains a preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on geneticism as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental responsibility. In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and either rebut them or, insofar as they are justified, try to accommodate them into my view. In section 5, I point out some features that distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children. I contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the adoption model. Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifications of this view.

Informing offspring of their conception by gamete or embryo donation: an Ethics Committee opinion.

This document discusses the ethical implications of informing offspring about their conception using gamete or embryo donation. It replaces the 2013 ASRM Ethics Committee document of the same name (Fertil Steril 2013;100:45-9).

[Chapter 7. The frozen embryo in the light of a jurist : beyond qualification]. / Chapitre 7. L?embryon congelé sous le regard d?un juriste : au delà de la qualification.

The legal qualification of the embryo does not pose any particular difficulties : this human being is a bodily thing of human nature, devoid of legal personality.However the freezing affects its humanity : it is no more than a thing made in laboratory, out of time. Stored in liquid nitrogen, it does not die, so storage must be ended.As long as they respond to a specific parental project, the one for which they were made and kept, the frozen embryos are identified by this given project.They are unique and not interchangeable. On the other hand, without a parental project, frozen embryos that can be accommodated by any infertile couple or those given to research, become interchangeable gender things.Although human beings, they are treated as the elements and products of the human body, human things.