Controversy About Withdrawal of Postresuscitation Care After Cardiac Arrest.

With increasing focus in the last decade on post-cardiac arrest care in pediatrics, return of spontaneous circulation, survival rates, and neurologic outcome have improved. As part of this postarrest care, both the American Heart Association and the American Academy of Neurology state it is reasonable to consider targeted temperature management in pediatric comatose patients, although this care is challenging and time sensitive, with many gaps in knowledge remaining. Many pediatric patients will still not survive or will suffer severe neurocognitive impairment despite the therapeutic arsenal provided. Adult guidelines suggest providing postarrest supportive care and limiting prognosis discussions with families until after 72 hours of therapy, but pediatric clinicians are advised to consider a multitude of factors given the lack of data. What, then, should clinicians do if family members of a patient who has been resuscitated request the withdrawal of all life support in the 24 hours immediately postarrest? In this Ethics Rounds, we present such a case and the responses of different clinicians and bioethicists.

[Clinical Ethics on Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: Focusing on Discussions and Future Challenges Regarding Withdrawal of Ventilator Support].

Although there are many ethical issues related to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, one of the most controversial issue is the withdrawal of ventilator support. This problem has a significant impact not only on the decision to "remove", but also on the decision to "wear" it. In particular, if the withdrawal of ventilator support was to be legalized, there is a concern that its legislation may exert a 'silent pressure.' Therefore, rather than explicitly defining the withdrawal of ventilator support, as a "legal right," we prefer the installation of a policy in which the details of individual cases are carefully scrutinized, allowing for justifiable non-compliance with the law in special cases.

The Briggsian Heresy? Should Previously Expressed Wishes Determine Best Interests in Decisions Relating to Withdrawal of Clinically-Assisted Nutrition and Hydration?

This paper examines the Court of Protection decision in Briggs v Briggs. It considers whether the approach of the Court, which gave effective decisive weight to a patient's previously expressed wishes about whether he should be kept alive in a minimally conscious state, is a proper application of the 'best interests' test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It assesses whether the Briggs approach is effectively applying a 'substituted judgement' test and considers the difficulties in ascertaining what a person's actual wishes are.

Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for patients with depression: thought-provoking remarks.

Euthanasia and medical assistance in dying entail daunting ethical and moral challenges, in addition to a host of medical and clinical issues, which are further complicated in cases of patients whose decision-making skills have been negatively affected or even impaired by psychiatric disorders. The authors closely focus on clinical depression and relevant European laws that have over the years set firm standards in such a complex field. Pertaining to the mental health realm specifically, patients are required to undergo a mental competence assessment in order to request aid in dying. The way psychiatrists deal and interact with decisionally capable patients who have decided to end their own lives, on account of sufferings which they find to be unbearable, may be influenced by subjective elements such as ethical and cultural biases on the part of the doctors involved. Moreover, critics of medical aid in dying claim that acceptance of such practices might gradually lead to the acceptance or practice of involuntary euthanasia for those deemed to be nothing more than a burden to society, a concept currently unacceptable to the vast majority of observers. Ultimately, the authors conclude, the key role of clinicians should be to provide alternatives to those who feel so hopeless as to request assistance in dying, through palliative care and effective social and health care policies for the weakest among patients: lonely, depressed or ill-advised people.

It is never lawful or ethical to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness.

In English law there is a strong (though rebuttable) presumption that life should be maintained. This article contends that this presumption means that it is always unlawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients in permanent vegetative state (PVS) and minimally conscious state (MCS), and that the reasons for this being the correct legal analysis mean also that such withdrawal will always be ethically unacceptable. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, the medical uncertainties inherent in the definition and diagnosis of PVS/MCS are such that, as a matter of medical fact, it can never be established, with the degree of certainty necessary to rebut the presumption, that it is not in the patient's best interest to remain alive. And second (and more controversially and repercussively), that even if permanent unconsciousness can be unequivocally demonstrated, the presumption is not rebutted. This is because there is plainly more to human existence than consciousness (or consciousness the markers of which can ever be demonstrated by medical investigations). It can never be said that the identity of the patient whose best interests are at stake evaporates (so eliminating the legal or ethical subject) when that person ceases to be conscious. Nor can it be said that the best interests of an unconscious person do not mandate continued biological existence. We simply cannot know. That uncertainty is legally conclusive, and (subject to resource allocation questions and views about the relevance of family wishes and the previously expressed wishes of the patient) should be ethically conclusive.

Little Sparrow.

Discovering the healing value of a garden sanctuary.

Allow natural death versus do-not-resuscitate: titles, information contents, outcomes, and the considerations related to do-not-resuscitate decision.

BACKGROUND: As the "do not resuscitate" (DNR) discussion involves communication, this study explored (1) the effects of a title that included "allow natural death", and of information contents and outcomes of the decision; and (2) the information needs and consideration of the DNR decision, and benefits and barriers of the DNR discussion. METHODS: Healthy adults (n = 524) were presented with a scenario with different titles, information contents, and outcomes, and they rated the probability of a DNR decision. A questionnaire including information needs, consideration of the decision, and benefits and barriers of DNR discussion was also used. RESULTS: There was a significantly higher probability of signing the DNR order when the title included "allow natural death" (t = - 4.51, p < 0.001), when comprehensive information was provided (F = 60.64, p < 0.001), and when there were worse outcomes (F = 292.16, p < 0.001). Common information needs included remaining life period and the prognosis. Common barriers were the families' worries and uncertainty about future physical changes. CONCLUSION: The title, information contents, and outcomes may influence the DNR decisions. Health-care providers should address the concept of natural death, provide comprehensive information, and help patients and families to overcome the barriers.

What am I? A philosophical account of personhood and its applications to people with brain injury.

This article identifies the dilemma faced by clinical staff when asked to support the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in a patient in a vegetative state. On the one hand, they are expected to treat the patient as a person in their daily interactions; on the other, they are asked to withdraw treatment on the grounds that it is futile, which may seem to run counter to treating people as persons. The article highlights that similar debates exist within the philosophical community about the nature of personhood and describes two philosophical accounts of personhood. The aim is to help clinicians articulate the reasons for their intuitions more clearly, and thus justify their beliefs.

Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking.

Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED) is a deliberate, self-initiated attempt to hasten death in the setting of suffering refractory to optimal palliative interventions or prolonged dying that a person finds intolerable. Individuals who consider VSED tend to be older, have a serious but not always imminently terminal illness, place a high value on independence, and have significant illness burden. VSED can theoretically be performed independent of clinician assistance and therefore avoids many of the ethical and legal concerns associated with physician-assisted dying or other palliative measures of last resort, However, VSED is an intense process fraught with new sources of somatic and emotional suffering for individuals and their caregivers, so VSED is best supervised by an experienced, well-informed clinician who can provide appropriate pre-intervention assessment, anticipatory guidance, medical treatment of symptoms, and emotional support. Before initiation of VSED, clinicians should carefully screen for inadequately treated psychiatric conditions, unaddressed symptoms, existential suffering, and evidence of coercion-consultation from palliative medicine, psychiatry, or ethics is often indicated. The most common symptoms encountered after starting VSED are extreme thirst, hunger, dysuria, progressive disability, delirium, and somnolence. Although physiologically similar to cessation of artificial nutrition and hydration, the onset and management of symptoms is often different. We propose an organized system for evaluating individual appropriateness for VSED, anticipatory guidance, and management of symptoms associated with VSED. A brief review of ethical and legal considerations follows.

A Morally Permissible Moral Mistake? Reinterpreting a Thought Experiment as Proof of Concept.

This paper takes the philosophical notion of suberogatory acts or morally permissible moral mistakes and, via a reinterpretation of a thought experiment from the medical ethics literature, offers an initial demonstration of their relevance to the field of medical ethics. That is, at least in regards to this case, we demonstrate that the concept of morally permissible moral mistakes has a bearing on medical decision-making. We therefore suggest that these concepts may have broader importance for the discourse on medical ethics and should receive fuller consideration by those working the field. The focus of the discussion we present is on a particular thought experiment originally presented by Sulmasy and Sugarman. Their case formed the basis of an exchange about the moral equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. The analysis Sulmasy and Sugarman set out is significant because, contrary to common bioethical opinion, it implies that the difference between withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment holds, rather than lacks, moral significance. Following a brief discussion of rejoinders to Sulmasy and Sugarman's article, we present a constructive reinterpretation of the thought experiment, one that draws on the idea of suberogatory acts or "morally permissible moral mistakes." Our analysis, or so we suggest, accounts for the differing moral intuitions that the case prompts. However, it also calls into question the degree to which this thought experiment can be thought of as illustrating the moral (non)equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-saving treatment. Rather, we conclude that it primarily illuminates something about the ethical parameters of healthcare when family members, particularly parents, are involved in decision-making.

Limitación de tratamiento de soporte vital en una Unidad de Cuidado Intensivo pediátrica chilena: 2004-2014 / Limitation of Vital Support in a Chilean Pediatric Intensive Care Unit: 2004-2014

Resumen Objetivo: Describir las frecuencias y características del proceso de Limitación de Tratamiento de So porte Vital (LTSV) en pacientes de la Unidad de Cuidados Intensivos Pediátricos (UCI) entre 2004 2014. Pacientes y Método: Estudio retrospectivo, observacional descriptivo a partir de dos registros de la UCI del Hospital Roberto del Río: 1) ficha clínica individual de seguimiento y 2) ficha de registro de indicadores de calidad incluida LTSV, ambos actualizados diariamente al iniciar la visita clínica. Desde estos registros se analizaron los casos con dilemas bioéticos en los que se propuso LTSV du rante su hospitalización en UCI ("LTSV intra-UCI"). Se menciona la población rechazada de ingresar a UCI ("LTSV pre-UCI") y los fallecidos con LTSV en cama básica. Resultados: De 7.821 ingresos a UCI en el 1,51% (118 pacientes) se establece una LTSV: ONI (Orden de No Innovación) en 78,8% de los casos, retiro de medidas terapéuticas en 14,4% y suspensión de ventilación mecánica en 6,8%. En 23,7% el diagnóstico de base fue neurológico u oncológico, para cada uno. La condición fisiopatológica predominante para una LTSV fue neurológica (39%). El tiempo de estadía en UCI triplica el promedio de estada de los egresos totales de UCI, pero es de amplia variabilidad. Conclusiones: Es factible realizar una LTSV en UCI cuando el equipo incorpora esta perspectiva al trabajo diario junto a la familia. Hay una amplia variabilidad individual en las características del proceso de LTSV, propio del ámbito de la ética clínica.

Abstract Objective: Describe the frequency and characteristics of PICU patients who undergo a process of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (LTSV), between 2004 y 2014. Patients and Method: A retrospective, observational descriptive study, using two documents for quality assessment in the PICU of Hospital Roberto del Río: 1) daily individual patient tracking log and 2) daily record of quality indicators, including LTSV, both updated daily at the morning visit. All PICU patients with an ethical dilemma during their PICU stay in which a LTSV was proposed were included. We men tion patients rejected for admission in the ICU and those who died in basic units of the hospital with LTSV. Results: In 118 patients of 7821 PICU admissions (1,5%) we determined a LTSV: ONR (Non Resuscitation Order) for all of them, ONI (Non Innovation Order) in 78,8%, withdrawal of some therapeutics in 14,4% and withdrawal of active mechanical ventilation in 6,8%. The basic diagnosis was 23,7% for each neurologic and oncologic diseases. The predominant pathophysiologic condition leading to a LTSV was severe chronic neurologic damage (39%). The length of stay was threefold the mean PICU stay, with a large variability due to expectable individual factors when ethic decisions are involved. Conclusion: LTSV is feasible when the team is involved and this perspective is part of daily clinical analysis. The wide individual variability in the LTSV process is expectable in ethical decisions.

Two kinds of physician-assisted death.

I argue that the concept 'physician-assisted suicide' covers two procedures that should be distinguished: giving someone access to humane means to end his own life, and taking co-responsibility for the safe and effective execution of that plan. In the first section I explain the distinction, in the following sections I show why it is important. To begin with I argue that we should expect the laws that permit these two kinds of 'assistance' to be different in their justificatory structure. Laws that permit giving access only presuppose that the right to self-determination implies a right to suicide, but laws that permit doctors to take co-responsibility may have to appeal to a principle of mercy or beneficence. Actually this difference in justificatory structure can to some extent be found in existing regulatory systems, though far from consistently. Finally I argue that if one recognizes a right to suicide, as Oregon and other American states implicitly do, and as the European Court of Human Rights has recently done explicitly, one is committed to permit the first kind of 'assistance' under some conditions.

The ethics of and the appropriate legislation concerning killing people and letting them die: a response to Merkel.

With regard to ethics and legislation, what is the significant difference between a doctor terminating the life-supporting treatment of a patient in the course of his job and a greedy relative of the patient doing the same thing to inherit his wealth? Merkel offers an interesting and inventive answer to this question in terms of the improper violation of personal boundaries. However, despite Merkel's claim to the contrary, his answer does not directly address the question of the relevant ethical similarities and differences between killing and letting die in general. Furthermore, it does not provide the basis a plausible rationale for legislation concerning killing and letting die. The questions of whether letting someone die is ethically the same as killing someone and whether it should be treated the same way by the criminal law are not the same as or tantamount to the question of whether or not it involves the transgression of another person's boundaries.

[Speaking about life and death in neonatology: How can communication with families be optimized?] / Parler de la vie et de la mort en néonatologie : comment optimiser la communication avec les parents ?

Technological progress and improved clinical knowledge have increased survival of neonates who would previously have died. Survival is sometimes accompanied by a risk of short- or long-term adverse outcomes, which may lead to complex decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining interventions. These decisions are among the most difficult decisions in pediatric practice. They also involve communicating with parents and are emotionally charged. Many articles examining end-of-life decisions in neonatology state the need for healthcare providers to be caring, compassionate, and human without offering clear, practical advice. In this article, the way in which neonates die and the ethical decision-making surrounding these decisions will be reviewed. Guidelines to reflect on the life trajectories of neonates will be offered, as well as recommendations to optimize communication with families during these difficult moments.