Medicare and Medicaid Program: Conditions of Participation for Home Health Agencies. Final rule.

This final rule revises the conditions of participation (CoPs) that home health agencies (HHAs) must meet in order to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The requirements focus on the care delivered to patients by HHAs, reflect an interdisciplinary view of patient care, allow HHAs greater flexibility in meeting quality care standards, and eliminate unnecessary procedural requirements. These changes are an integral part of our overall effort to achieve broad- based, measurable improvements in the quality of care furnished through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, while at the same time eliminating unnecessary procedural burdens on providers.

Developing a viable alternative to Medicare's physician payment strategy.

Since 1992 Medicare has reimbursed physicians on a fee-for-service basis that weights physician services according to the effort and expense of providing those services and converts the weights to dollars using a conversion factor. In 1997 Congress replaced an existing spending constraint with the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) to reduce reimbursements if overall physician spending exceeded the growth in the economy. Congress, however, has routinely overridden the SGR because of concerns that reduced payments to physicians would limit patients' access to care. Under continued pressure to override scheduled fee reductions or eliminate the SGR altogether, Congress is now considering legislation that would reimburse physicians to improve quality and lower costs-two things that the current system does not do. This article reviews several promising models, including patient-centered medical homes, accountable care organizations, and various payment bundling pilots, that could offer lessons for a larger reform of physician payment. Pilot projects that focus exclusively on alternative ways to reimburse physicians apart from payments to hospitals, such as payments for episodes of care, are also needed. Most promising, Congress is now showing bipartisan, bicameral interest in revising how Medicare reimburses physicians.

Regulatory neutrality is essential to establishing a level playing field for accountable care organizations.

Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are among the most widely discussed models for encouraging movement away from fee-for-service payment arrangements. Although ACOs have the potential to slow health spending growth and improve quality of care, regulating them poses special challenges. Regulations, particularly those that affect both ACOs and Medicare Advantage plans, could inadvertently favor or disfavor certain kinds of providers or payers. Such favoritism could drive efficient organizations from the market and thus increase costs or reduce quality of and access to care. To avoid this type of outcome, we propose a general principle: Regulation of ACOs should strive to preserve a level playing field among different kinds of organizations seeking the same cost, quality, and access objectives. This is known as regulatory neutrality. We describe the implications of regulatory neutrality in four key areas: antitrust, financial solvency regulation, Medicare governance requirements, and Medicare payment models. We also discuss issues relating to short-term versus long-term perspectives--to promote the goal of regulatory neutrality and allow the most efficient organizations to prevail in the marketplace.

Medicare program; establishing additional Medicare durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) supplier enrollment safeguards. Final rule.

This final rule will clarify, expand, and add to the existing enrollment requirements that Durable Medical Equipment and Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS) suppliers must meet to establish and maintain billing privileges in the Medicare program.

2007 survey of radiologists: source of income and impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.

A 2007 survey obtained information that facilitates estimates of the impact of the newly in effect Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) and upcoming antimarkup legislation. The survey was a stratified random sample survey of ACR radiologist members and practice leaders conducted in May and June 2007. In total, 601 responses were received from currently practicing radiologists. The response rate was 20%, and the margin of error was +/-4.3% at the 95% confidence level. The DRA placed a cap on technical-component payments from Medicare for nonhospital imaging services beginning in January 2007. The primary survey topics related to the effect of the DRA included the professional and technical components of income, income derived from Medicare patients, practice changes resulting from Medicare payment cuts, and outside readings. An average of 18% of radiologists' income is from technical-component sources. Radiologists whose percentages of income derived from the technical component were above average and included those aged 47 to 54 years, owners of outpatient imaging facilities, radiologists in the Northeast, and radiologists at nonacademic practices. After implementation of the DRA, practices were more likely to lay off staff members and cancel purchases of imaging equipment and less likely to reduce imaging services provided.

Medicare program; appeals of CMS or CMS contractor determinations when a provider or supplier fails to meet the requirements for Medicare billing privileges. Final rule.

This final rule implements a number of regulatory provisions that are applicable to all providers and suppliers, including durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) suppliers. This final rule establishes appeals processes for all providers and suppliers whose enrollment, reenrollment or revalidation application for Medicare billing privileges is denied and whose Medicare billing privileges are revoked. It also establishes timeframes for deciding enrollment appeals by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) or the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), or Board, within the DHHS; and processing timeframes for CMS' Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) contractors. In addition, this final rule allows Medicare FFS contractors to revoke Medicare billing privileges when a provider or supplier submits a claim or claims for services that could not have been furnished to a beneficiary. This final rule also specifies that a Medicare contractor may establish a Medicare enrollment bar for any provider or supplier whose billing privileges have been revoked. Lastly, the final rule requires that all providers and suppliers receive Medicare payments by electronic funds transfer (EFT) if the provider or supplier, is submitting an initial enrollment application to Medicare, changing their enrollment information, revalidating or re-enrolling in the Medicare program.

Medicare and Medicaid programs; hospital conditions of participation: laboratory services. Final rule.

This final rule finalizes the hospital conditions of participation requirements for hospitals that transfuse blood and blood components. It requires hospitals to: Prepare and follow written procedures for appropriate action when it is determined that blood and blood components the hospitals received and transfused are at increased risk for transmitting hepatitis C virus (HCV); quarantine prior collections from a donor who is at increased risk for transmitting HCV infection; notify transfusion recipients, as appropriate, of the need for HCV testing and counseling; and extend the records retention period for transfusion-related data to 10 years. The intent is to aid in the prevention of HCV infection and to create opportunities for disease prevention that, in most cases, can occur many years after recipient exposure to a donor.

Unhealthy trends: the future of physician services.

In this paper we review current trends in payment systems, work settings, favored services, and accountability mechanisms that characterize physician practice. Current trends are pointing to higher spending, more tiering of access to care by ability to pay, and a greater role for larger practices that include both primary care and specialist physicians. Medicare's purchasing role is policymakers' most powerful lever to alter negative trends. Making fee-for-service payment more accurately reflect cost structures could immediately address some of these issues. Medicare can lead longer-term efforts to incorporate more per episode and capitated elements into the payment system, revamping incentives for physicians.