Comparative cognition: Practical shortcomings and some potential ways forward.

The objectives in the field of comparative cognition are clear; efforts are devoted to revealing the selection pressures that shape the brains and cognitive abilities of different species and understanding cognitive processes in differently structured brains. However, our progress on reaching these objectives is slow, mostly because of several major practical challenges. In this review, we discuss 2 major shortcomings: (a) the poor systematics and low magnitude of the phylogenetic comparisons made, and (b) the weak comparability of the results caused by interfering species-specific confounding factors (perceptual, motivational, and morphological) alongside an insufficient level of standardisation of the methodologies. We propose a multiple-level comparative approach that emphasises the importance of achieving more direct comparisons within taxonomic groups at genus or family level as the first step before comparing between distantly related groups. We also encourage increasing interdisciplinary efforts to execute "team-science" approach in building a systematic and direct large-scale phylogenetic comparisons of bigger cognitive test batteries that produce reliable species-representative data. We finally revisit some existing suggestions that allow us to maximise standardisation while minimising species-specific confounding factors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Wolfgang Köhler's the mentality of apes and the animal psychology of his time

In 1913, the Anthropoid Station for psychological and physiological research in chimpanzees and other apes was founded by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin) near La Orotava, Tenerife. Eugene Teuber, its first director, began his work at the Station with several studies of anthropoid apes’ natural behavior, particularly chimpanzee body language. In late 1913, the psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, the second and final director of the Station, arrived in Tenerife. During his stay in the Canary Islands, Köhler conducted a series of studies on intelligent behavior in chimpanzees that would become classics in the field of comparative psychology. Those experiments were at the core of his book Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen (The Mentality of Apes), published in 1921. This paper analyzes Köhler's experiments and notions of intelligent behavior in chimpanzees, emphasizing his distinctly descriptive approach to these issues. It also makes an effort to elucidate some of the theoretical ideas underpinning Köhler's work. The ultimate goal of this paper is to assess the historical significance of Köhler's book within the context of the animal psychology of his time (AU)

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Primate polemic: commentary on Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014).

Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014, pp. 115-131) take issue with recent attempts to account for so-called metacognitive behavior in nonhuman animals in terms of simple processes of associative reinforcement learning. Their arguments rely on appeals to unconvincing and equivocal empirical evidence, and a misrepresentation of the nature of associative learning. Although the existing data do not rule out the possibility that animals possess "true" metacognitive abilities, neither do they currently mandate this conclusion. The suggestion that simple mechanisms might give rise to complex behaviors ties in with recent attempts in cognitive and social psychology, and behavioral neuroscience, to explain human behavior in terms of similar, simple mechanisms. As such this perspective should be seen as an opportunity for comparative psychology, not a threat.

Metacognition as discrimination: commentary on Smith et al. (2014).

Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014, pp. 115-131) critique recent "low-level" associative process models of nonhuman metacognition. We agree with many aspects of their critique. However, the alternative account they offer may not help specify the mechanisms of metacognition. We propose a middle-ground approach, based on the methods of comparative psychophysics, by which metacognition is treated as a discrimination problem.

Two concepts of metacognition.

This comment distinguishes two concepts of metacognition that are often conflated by Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014, pp. 115-131). Animal metacognition: A tale of two comparative psychologies. Journal of Comparative Psychology. One refers to any executively controlled process, the other to metarepresentational processes. It is argued that more progress will be made by comparative researchers if they target their investigations separately at these two phenomena, as well as studying the relationships between them.

Animal metacognition: a tale of two comparative psychologies.

A growing literature considers whether animals have capacities that are akin to human metacognition (i.e., humans' capacity to monitor their states of uncertainty and knowing). Comparative psychologists have approached this question by testing a dolphin, pigeons, rats, monkeys, and apes using perception, memory, and food-concealment paradigms. As part of this consideration, some associative modelers have attempted to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in low-level, associative terms-an important goal if achievable. The authors summarize the empirical and theoretical situation regarding these associative descriptions. The associative descriptions in the animal-metacognition literature fail to encompass important phenomena. The sharp focus on abstract, mathematical associative models creates serious interpretative problems. The authors compare these failed associative descriptions with an alternative theoretical approach within contemporary comparative psychology. The alternative approach has the potential to strengthen comparative psychology as an empirical science and integrate it more fully within the mainstream of experimental psychology and cognitive science.

Thermoregulatory competence and behavioral expression in the young of altricial species--revisited.

The behavioral and physiological thermoregulatory capabilities of newborn and infant mammals have been studied for over half a century. Psychobiologists have noted that the infants of altricial species (e.g., rats) have physical and physiological limitations such that heat loss overwhelms heat production, thus forcing a reliance on behavioral thermoregulation for the maintenance of body temperature. Recent evidence, however, suggests that a modification of this view is justified. Specifically, throughout a range of moderately cold air temperatures, nonshivering thermogenesis by brown adipose tissue contributes significantly to the infant rat's behavioral and physiological adaptations to cold challenge. Given the prominent use of altricial species for the study of infant behavior, increased understanding of the infant's physiological responses to cold and the effect of thermal factors on behavior is warranted.