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1.
Waste Manag ; 102: 598-612, 2020 Feb 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31778971

RESUMO

Circular economy principles aim to contribute towards sustainability and resilience through several simultaneous agendas including economic growth, social development and environmental responsibility. Stakeholders from each perspective have their own interests and priorities, which often result in conflict. There are several and varied methodologies which address the decision-making process, however in engineering spheres these techniques are usually limited to optimising resources, time or costs. Decisions that are comprehensive in scope and integrated across all affected systems are required to transition towards a circular economy, effective cross-disciplinary thinking is imperative and cooperation amongst diverse areas is essential. Game theory is a useful technique when analysing the interactions of stakeholders with multiple objectives and perspectives. This paper aims to critically review methodological approaches used in waste management practice and provide a guidance on how game theory differs from, and is complementary to, the primary decision-making tools available where cooperation is a feature too often missing. This review seeks to justify the development of game theory to complement waste management decision-making methods in civil engineering, where resource consumption and waste management is often voluminous. An application of game theory to a waste management example illustrates that this methodological approach is of complementary value. The contribution of this study to circular economy and solid waste agendas is to emphasise the capability of game theory to help facilitate conflict resolution, competition, and stakeholder consensus when capturing multiple (sometimes conflicting) values in line with circular economy principles.


Assuntos
Teoria do Jogo , Gerenciamento de Resíduos , Tomada de Decisões , Desenvolvimento Econômico , Resíduos Sólidos
2.
Waste Manag Res ; 38(3): 300-311, 2020 Mar.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31752649

RESUMO

The impacts of price and sustainability on municipal waste disposal demand have largely been ignored by waste management researchers. This paper considers a waste disposal supply chain that includes a disposal facility and a contractor. Both parties try to improve source sorting for waste collection to reduce the recycling cost at the disposal facility. Improving source sorting requires investment that would increase the price of the waste disposal service, thereby affecting the price-sensitive demand. The relationship between the service price and investments in waste sorting motives is analyzed in this paper via studying the trade-off between the optimal source sorting and the waste disposal service prices. Different scenarios based on the various players' power structures are developed. Nash and Stackelberg games have been applied in order to find the optimal decision values in each scenario. The impact of cost sharing on optimal supply chain decisions is also studied. The numerical results show that the waste supply chain is more profitable when it is working under an integrated management structure. Moreover, reducing the required investment motivates supply chain players to select higher levels of waste sorting at the source. A numerical example is provided, followed by some managerial insights.


Assuntos
Eliminação de Resíduos , Gerenciamento de Resíduos , Teoria do Jogo , Reciclagem , Resíduos Sólidos
3.
Nat Ecol Evol ; 4(1): 18-19, 2020 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31844193
4.
Nat Commun ; 10(1): 5507, 2019 12 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31796729

RESUMO

Social networks emerge as a result of actors' linking decisions. We propose a game-theoretical model of socio-strategic network formation on directed weighted graphs, in which every actors' benefit is a parametric trade-off between centrality measure, brokerage opportunities, clustering coefficient, and sociological network patterns. We use two different stability definitions to infer individual behavior of homogeneous, rational agents from network structure, and to quantify the impact of cooperation. Our theoretical analysis confirms results known for specific network motifs studied previously in isolation, yet enables us to precisely quantify the trade-offs in the space of user preferences. To deal with complex networks of heterogeneous and irrational actors, we construct a statistical behavior estimation method using Nash equilibrium conditions. We provide evidence that our results are consistent with empirical, historical, and sociological observations on real-world data-sets. Furthermore, our method offers sociological and strategic interpretations of random networks models, such as preferential attachment and small-world networks.


Assuntos
Comportamento , Teoria do Jogo , Rede Social , Austrália , Comércio , Bases de Dados como Assunto , Humanos , Relações Interpessoais , Casamento
5.
BMC Bioinformatics ; 20(Suppl 6): 475, 2019 Dec 10.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31823711

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: Neutrophils are one of the key players in the human innate immune system (HIIS). In the event of an insult where the body is exposed to inflammation triggering moieties (ITMs), neutrophils are mobilized towards the site of insult and antagonize the inflammation. If the inflammation is cleared, neutrophils go into a programmed death called apoptosis. However, if the insult is intense or persistent, neutrophils take on a violent death pathway called necrosis, which involves the rupture of their cytoplasmic content into the surrounding tissue that causes local tissue damage, thus further aggravating inflammation. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon fuels the inflammatory process by triggering the recruitment of additional neutrophils to the site of inflammation, aimed to contribute to the complete neutralization of severe inflammation. This delicate balance between the cost and benefit of the neutrophils' choice of death pathway has been optimized during the evolution of the innate immune system. The goal of our work is to understand how the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of the different death pathways of neutrophils, in response to various levels of insults, has been optimized over evolutionary time by using the concepts of evolutionary game theory. RESULTS: We show that by using evolutionary game theory, we are able to formulate a game that predicts the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis when exposed to various levels of insults. CONCLUSION: By adopting an evolutionary perspective, we identify the driving mechanisms leading to the delicate balance between apoptosis and necrosis in neutrophils' cell death in response to different insults. Using our simple model, we verify that indeed, the global cost of remaining ITMs is the driving mechanism that reproduces the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis observed in data and neutrophils need sufficient information of the overall inflammation to be able to pick a death pathway that presumably increases the survival of the organism.


Assuntos
Apoptose/imunologia , Biologia Computacional/métodos , Necrose/imunologia , Neutrófilos/imunologia , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Inflamação/imunologia
6.
J Environ Manage ; 251: 109592, 2019 Dec 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31569022

RESUMO

As a way to coordinate the interests of multi-government and solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, watershed ecological compensation system has been promoted in China. It is necessary to understand the influencing factors of watershed ecological compensation from the perspective of how interactions occur between different governments. This paper analyses the interaction among upstream governments, downstream governments and the central government in the Eastern Route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project, using evolutionary game theory. In particular, how ecological benefits are distributed between upstream and downstream governments is analyzed. Simultaneously, numerical simulation is used to analyze the effects of influencing factors on governments' behaviors. The results show that: (1) the initial willingness of governments to corporate affect their final behaviors; (2) upstream and downstream governments cannot spontaneously cooperate to implement watershed ecological compensation system without supervision of the central government; (3) opportunity costs only have a significant impact on upstream governments; (4) punishment on downstream governments can effectively influence the behaviors of governments at all levels; (5) high ecological compensation fee improve downstream governments' willness not to pay; (6) upstream governments get about 78% of ecological benefits due to the implementation of watershed ecological compensation system.


Assuntos
Ecologia , Governo , China , Ecossistema , Teoria do Jogo
7.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31569400

RESUMO

Often enough, social welfare and private benefit do not align for quasi-public goods/services. The inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) project provides a vivid example of this. In this paper, following the game-theoretical approach, we derive an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme to resolve these conflicts. We try to compare traditional supply chain management models with an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme, with an enforcement of coordination among firms. Using simulation techniques, we compute numerical estimates under three regimes: a standard equilibrium decision framework, a coordination decision model and a coordinated Ramsey pricing scheme. Our results show the relative welfare impact of different settings, revealing that the optimal pricing scheme based on the two-part tariff structure cannot only improve social welfare, but also ensure a target profit for participating firms. Lastly, our findings have strong policy implications for the government with profit regulation and the control of water resources.


Assuntos
Custos e Análise de Custo , Tomada de Decisões , Recursos Hídricos , Abastecimento de Água , Teoria do Jogo , Seguridade Social
8.
Int J Med Inform ; 132: 103982, 2019 12.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31605883

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: Previous research has studied the effects of games in pediatric wards, but none of it has focused on the impact of the hospital's school staff on the psychosocial state of the children nor on the gameplay itself. OBJECTIVES: To present the Tangibot application and evaluate its impact on the children's psychosocial state in the short term and the impact of the teacher on their psychosocial state, communications and coordination during the activity. METHODS: A study was conducted in a hospital classroom with 20 participants, who participated twice in the game: one with the teacher playing along and another without her. An observational scale was used by two evaluators in order to assess the impact on the children. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: The study revealed that the teacher has an impact on the children's communication and coordination procedures but has no impact on the psychosocial state of the participants. The teacher's impact was found to be positive about communications. Dialogue management significantly improves when the communication includes the teacher, which means speaking turns are observed more consistently. Information pooling also improves, and the participants ask the teacher more questions. Consensus is also reached more often and more easily, but this does not reflect on the performance, as the time management is evidently worse when the teacher is present, as is also the joint task orientation. On the other hand, it was found that the teacher does not have an impact on the psychosocial state of the participants during the game, and that it is the game itself which changes their state over time. In the case of affection, which reflects the participants' emotions of joy or boredom, their state improved significantly after a few minutes of play. The same thing occurred for physical activity, interest in the activity and interaction between peers, which increased in value in the first part of the game, although physical activity and interaction were reduced towards the end. No changes were found throughout the game in the number of complaints, nervousness or satisfied comments, which remained very low for all these aspects, showing that the game distracted them from their various symptoms. Based on these results, future work will explore the effects of gamification on the overall hospitalization perception, with special focus on the social opportunities during the hospital stay, to provide ways for the children to meet others during their treatment, to make the experience less painful and reduce their feelings of isolation. Some game strategies should also be evaluated to determine the ones that provide the best opportunities to improve the children's hospital experience.


Assuntos
Comunicação , Hospitalização/estatística & dados numéricos , Reabilitação/métodos , Interface Usuário-Computador , Jogos de Vídeo/estatística & dados numéricos , Criança , Pré-Escolar , Comportamento Cooperativo , Feminino , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Masculino , Ensino
9.
Phys Rev E ; 100(3-1): 032401, 2019 Sep.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31639934

RESUMO

Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the continuous-time two-player replicator dynamics, which for symmetric payoffs reduces to the Fisher equation of mathematical genetics. For a sufficiently rapid and cyclic (fine-grained) environment, the time-averaged population frequencies are shown to obey a replicator dynamics with a nonlinear fitness that is induced by environmental changes. The nonlinear terms in the fitness emerge due to populations tracking their time-dependent environment. These terms can induce a stable polymorphism, though they do not spoil the polymorphism that exists already without them. In this sense polymorphic populations are more robust with respect to their time-dependent environments. The overall fitness of the problem is still given by its time-averaged value, but the emergence of polymorphism during genetic selection can be accompanied by decreasing mean fitness of the population. The impact of the uncovered polymorphism scenario on the models of diversity is exemplified via the rock-paper-scissors dynamics, and also via the prisoner's dilemma in a time-periodic environment.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Meio Ambiente , Modelos Teóricos , Teoria do Jogo , Dinâmica não Linear , Dilema do Prisioneiro
10.
Phys Rev E ; 100(2-1): 022411, 2019 Aug.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31574646

RESUMO

So far, most studies on evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations have concentrated on a single update rule. However, given the impacts of the environment and individual cognition, individuals may use different update rules to change their current strategies. In light of this, the current paper reports on a study that constructed a mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamic by combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update processes. The target was to clarify the influences of the aspiration-driven process on the evolution of the level of cooperation by considering the behavior of a population in which individuals have two strategies available: cooperation and defection. Through a numerical analysis of unstructured populations and simulation analyses of structured populations and of the random-matching model, the following results were found. First, the mean fraction of cooperators varied alongside the probability with which the individual adopted the aspiration-driven update rule. In the Prisoner's Dilemma and coexistence games, the aspiration-driven update process promoted cooperation in the well-mixed population but inhibited it in structured ones and the random-matching model; however, in the coordination game, the aspiration-driven update process was seen to exert the opposite effect on cooperation by inhibiting the latter in a homogeneously mixed population but promoting it in structured ones and in the random-matching model. Second, the mean fraction of cooperators changed with the aspiration level in the differently structured populations and random-matching model, and there appeared a phase transition point. Third, the evolutionary characteristics of the mean fraction of cooperators maintained robustness in the differently structured populations and random-matching model. These results extend evolutionary game theory.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Teóricos
11.
Neural Netw ; 120: 108-115, 2019 Dec.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31500931

RESUMO

Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) demonstrates excellent performance on tasks that can be solved by trained policy. It plays a dominant role among cutting-edge machine learning approaches using multi-layer Neural networks (NNs). At the same time, Deep RL suffers from high sensitivity to noisy, incomplete, and misleading input data. Following biological intuition, we involve Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) to address some deficiencies of deep RL solutions. Previous studies in image classification domain demonstrated that standard NNs (with ReLU nonlinearity) trained using supervised learning can be converted to SNNs with negligible deterioration in performance. In this paper, we extend those conversion results to the domain of Q-Learning NNs trained using RL. We provide a proof of principle of the conversion of standard NN to SNN. In addition, we show that the SNN has improved robustness to occlusion in the input image. Finally, we introduce results with converting full-scale Deep Q-network to SNN, paving the way for future research to robust Deep RL applications.


Assuntos
Aprendizado de Máquina/normas , Teoria do Jogo
12.
PLoS Comput Biol ; 15(9): e1007212, 2019 09.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31525178

RESUMO

Cooperation is ubiquitous across all levels of biological systems ranging from microbial communities to human societies. It, however, seemingly contradicts the evolutionary theory, since cooperators are exploited by free-riders and thus are disfavored by natural selection. Many studies based on evolutionary game theory have tried to solve the puzzle and figure out the reason why cooperation exists and how it emerges. Network reciprocity is one of the mechanisms to promote cooperation, where nodes refer to individuals and links refer to social relationships. The spatial arrangement of mutant individuals, which refers to the clustering of mutants, plays a key role in network reciprocity. Besides, many other mechanisms supporting cooperation suggest that the clustering of mutants plays an important role in the expansion of mutants. However, the clustering of mutants and the game dynamics are typically coupled. It is still unclear how the clustering of mutants alone alters the evolutionary dynamics. To this end, we employ a minimal model with frequency independent fitness on a circle. It disentangles the clustering of mutants from game dynamics. The distance between two mutants on the circle is adopted as a natural indicator for the clustering of mutants or assortment. We find that the assortment is an amplifier of the selection for the connected mutants compared with the separated ones. Nevertheless, as mutants are separated, the more dispersed mutants are, the greater the chance of invasion is. It gives rise to the non-monotonic effect of clustering, which is counterintuitive. On the other hand, we find that less assortative mutants speed up fixation. Our model shows that the clustering of mutants plays a non-trivial role in fixation, which has emerged even if the game interaction is absent.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Análise por Conglomerados , Comportamento Cooperativo , Modelos Biológicos , Mutação , Algoritmos , Biologia Computacional , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Dinâmica Populacional
13.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31540283

RESUMO

In recent years, the outbreak of many school sports injury accidents aroused widespread public concern about liability determination of accident. Previous studies have examined the legal application of the liability principles from a law perspective, but few kinds of research attempted to analyze the progress of liability determination from the perspective of "law economics". To fill this research gap, we introduce the evolutionary game model, as an important theoretical tool of "law economics", to investigate how various factors influence the strategy selection of the parties, as well as examine what liability principle can effectively treat school sports injury accidents. The results indicate that the strategic selection of the subject of liability is significantly related to the accident compensation cost and the prevention cost of both parties. Moreover, we also find that both strict and proportional liability rules can play key roles in dealing with the issue of liability determination of school sports injury accidents, but the two liability rules have different effects on the strategic selection of parties. More specifically, compared to the strict liability principle, the proportional liability principle can motivate both the school and the students to adopt the active strategy of "appropriate caution" to prevent occurring sports injury accidents in schools.


Assuntos
Acidentes/legislação & jurisprudência , Traumatismos em Atletas , Responsabilidade Legal , Esportes/legislação & jurisprudência , Acidentes/economia , Traumatismos em Atletas/economia , Compensação e Reparação , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Responsabilidade Legal/economia , Instituições Acadêmicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Esportes/economia
14.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31540517

RESUMO

China has established the universal medical insurance system and individual out of pocket costs have decreased, however, the average healthcare expenditure of the Chinese population and the expenses of the whole society have increased substantially. One major challenge which impedes the progress of attaining sustainable development of the social healthcare system in China is that the number of hospital admissions is disproportionate. Superior hospitals are overcrowded, whereas subordinate hospitals are experiencing low admissions. In this paper, we apply the game theory model to coordinate the healthcare supply chain network, which is composed of the government, medical insurance fund, superior hospitals, subordinate hospitals and patients. Especially by taking the reference price effect into account, this paper analyzes different medical insurance reimbursement strategies and their influence on patient choice and the healthcare supply chain network. The result shows that the reference price effect increases the leverage of medical insurance, guides patients' choice, optimizes the allocation of medical resources and reduces the medical expends. In comparison to a decentralized decision- making strategy, a centralized decision- making strategy can stimulate both superior hospital and subordinate hospital's cooperative intentions which benefits the social healthcare system.


Assuntos
Assistência à Saúde/organização & administração , Órgãos Governamentais/organização & administração , Administração Hospitalar , Programas Nacionais de Saúde/organização & administração , China/epidemiologia , Assistência à Saúde/economia , Teoria do Jogo , Órgãos Governamentais/economia , Humanos , Reembolso de Seguro de Saúde , Programas Nacionais de Saúde/economia , Preferência do Paciente
15.
PLoS Comput Biol ; 15(9): e1007361, 2019 09.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31545788

RESUMO

The co-evolutionary dynamics of competing populations can be strongly affected by frequency-dependent selection and spatial population structure. As co-evolving populations grow into a spatial domain, their initial spatial arrangement and their growth rate differences are important factors that determine the long-term outcome. We here model producer and free-rider co-evolution in the context of a diffusive public good (PG) that is produced by the producers at a cost but evokes local concentration-dependent growth benefits to all. The benefit of the PG can be non-linearly dependent on public good concentration. We consider the spatial growth dynamics of producers and free-riders in one, two and three dimensions by modeling producer cell, free-rider cell and public good densities in space, driven by the processes of birth, death and diffusion (cell movement and public good distribution). Typically, one population goes extinct, but the time-scale of this process varies with initial conditions and the growth rate functions. We establish that spatial variation is transient regardless of dimensionality, and that structured initial conditions lead to increasing times to get close to an extinction state, called ε-extinction time. Further, we find that uncorrelated initial spatial structures do not influence this ε-extinction time in comparison to a corresponding well-mixed (non-spatial) system. In order to estimate the ε-extinction time of either free-riders or producers we derive a slow manifold solution. For invading populations, i.e. for populations that are initially highly segregated, we observe a traveling wave, whose speed can be calculated. Our results provide quantitative predictions for the transient spatial dynamics of cooperative traits under pressure of extinction.


Assuntos
Biologia Computacional/métodos , Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Teóricos , Dinâmica Populacional , Bactérias/citologia , Humanos , Neoplasias/fisiopatologia , Dinâmica não Linear , Comportamento Espacial , Fatores de Tempo
16.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31514308

RESUMO

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China's current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China's 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government's reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government's environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.


Assuntos
Participação da Comunidade , Política Ambiental , Teoria do Jogo , Setor Privado , Evolução Biológica , China , Conservação dos Recursos Naturais , Custos e Análise de Custo , Poluição Ambiental , Governo , Humanos
17.
PLoS Comput Biol ; 15(8): e1007253, 2019 08.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31433817

RESUMO

Phenotypic plasticity is a vital strategy for plants to deal with changing conditions by inducing phenotypes favourable in different environments. Understanding how natural selection acts on variation in phenotypic plasticity in plants is therefore a central question in ecology, but is often ignored in modelling studies. Here we present a new modelling approach that allows for the analysis of selection for variation in phenotypic plasticity as a response strategy. We assess selection for shade avoidance strategies of Arabidopsis thaliana in response to future neighbour shading signalled through a decrease in red:far-red (R:FR) ratio. For this, we used a spatially explicit 3D virtual plant model that simulates individual Arabidopsis plants competing for light in different planting densities. Plant structure and growth were determined by the organ-specific interactions with the light environment created by the vegetation structure itself. Shade avoidance plastic responses were defined by a plastic response curve relating petiole elongation and lamina growth to R:FR perceived locally. Different plasticity strategies were represented by different shapes of the response curve that expressed different levels of R:FR sensitivity. Our analyses show that the shape of the selected shade avoidance strategy varies with planting density. At higher planting densities, more sensitive response curves are selected for than at lower densities. In addition, the balance between lamina and petiole responses influences the sensitivity of the response curves selected for. Combining computational virtual plant modelling with a game theoretical analysis represents a new step towards analysing how natural selection could have acted upon variation in shade avoidance as a response strategy, which can be linked to genetic variation and underlying physiological processes.


Assuntos
Adaptação Fisiológica/efeitos da radiação , Modelos Biológicos , Plantas/efeitos da radiação , Adaptação Fisiológica/genética , Arabidopsis/genética , Arabidopsis/crescimento & desenvolvimento , Arabidopsis/efeitos da radiação , Evolução Biológica , Biomassa , Biologia Computacional , Simulação por Computador , Teoria do Jogo , Luz , Desenvolvimento Vegetal/genética , Desenvolvimento Vegetal/efeitos da radiação , Plantas/genética , Seleção Genética , Interface Usuário-Computador
18.
Behav Brain Sci ; 42: e145, 2019 08 13.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31407991

RESUMO

Our target article modeled conflict within and between groups as an asymmetric game of strategy and developed a framework to explain the evolved neurobiological, psychological, and sociocultural mechanisms underlying attack and defense. Twenty-seven commentaries add insights from diverse disciplines, such as animal biology, evolutionary game theory, human neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and political science, that collectively extend and supplement this model in three ways. Here we draw attention to the superordinate structure of attack and defense, and its subordinate means to meet the end of status quo maintenance versus change, and we discuss (1) how variations in conflict structure and power disparities between antagonists can impact strategy selection and behavior during attack and defense; (2) how the positions of attack and defense emerge endogenously and are subject to rhetoric and propaganda; and (3) how psychological and economic interventions can transform attacker-defender conflicts into coordination games that allow mutual gains and dispute resolution.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Teoria do Jogo , Animais , Humanos
19.
Behav Brain Sci ; 42: e121, 2019 08 13.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31408000

RESUMO

This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between psychology/neuroscience research and economics research in attack-and-defense by stipulating relevant literature, clarifying theoretical structures, and suggesting improvements in experimental designs and possible further investigations.


Assuntos
Economia Comportamental , Neurociências , Teoria do Jogo
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