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1.
Waste Manag ; 124: 325-338, 2021 Apr 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33647558

RESUMO

Online recycling has become an increasingly popular research hotspot. However, few studies have focused on its potential service functions such as online promotion and offline recycling. In this study, considering such service functions, four models, namely, the manufacturer recycling channel (Model A), recycler recycling channel (Model B), online channel recycling (Model C) and manufacturer's self-built platform + recycling channel (Model D), are established, and derived the corresponding profit functions of supply chain members. Game theory was utilized to optimize service quality control strategies and supply chain member profits within the different models. Using numerical simulation, we examined the influence of both the upper recycling incentive limit and market demand on the optimal recycling channel strategies and profits. When the upper limit of the recovery incentive amount λ∈(0,3), the actual price and service quality to consumers under the manufacturer's self-built platform + recycling channel (Model D) are better than other channels, and the optimal manufacturer and online platform profits initially increased and then decreased with increases in the recycling incentive upper limit. We also found that the optimal recycler profit increased as the upper limit of the recycling incentive increased, and that optimal supply chain member profits increased when market size D0∈(0,100).


Assuntos
Resíduo Eletrônico , Teoria do Jogo , Reciclagem
2.
Nat Commun ; 12(1): 1148, 2021 02 19.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33608511

RESUMO

The overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians' decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians' equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem's complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.


Assuntos
Antibacterianos , Resistência Microbiana a Medicamentos , Teoria do Jogo , Antibacterianos/uso terapêutico , Infecções Bacterianas/tratamento farmacológico , Biologia Computacional , Farmacorresistência Bacteriana , Farmacorresistência Viral , Humanos , Medicina Preventiva/métodos , Viroses
3.
Nature ; 590(7847): 529, 2021 02.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33627806
4.
PLoS One ; 16(2): e0246110, 2021.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33524057

RESUMO

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, many healthcare facilities have suffered from shortages in medical resources, particularly in Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach to schedule PPE orders among healthcare facilities. In this PPE game, each independent healthcare facility optimises its own storage utilisation in order to keep its PPE cost at a minimum. Such a model can reduce peak demand considerably when applied to a variable PPE consumption profile. Experiments conducted for NHS England regions using actual data confirm that the challenge of securing PPE supply during disasters such as COVID-19 can be eased if proper stock management procedures are adopted. These procedures can include early stockpiling, increasing storage capacities and implementing measures that can prolong the time period between successive infection waves, such as social distancing measures. Simulation results suggest that the provision of PPE dedicated storage space can be a viable solution to avoid straining PPE supply chains in case a second wave of COVID-19 infections occurs.


Assuntos
/epidemiologia , Surtos de Doenças , Teoria do Jogo , Equipamento de Proteção Individual/provisão & distribução , Simulação por Computador , Geografia , Humanos
5.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33440706

RESUMO

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers' reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers' reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer's optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.


Assuntos
Carbono , Comércio , Comportamento do Consumidor , Contratos , Teoria do Jogo
6.
Waste Manag ; 122: 26-35, 2021 Mar 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33476959

RESUMO

In an effort to regulate waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling, the Chinese government has issued China-WEEE regulations and a fund policy. In accordance with the 2012 fund policy, the government collects funds from producers and subsidizes recycling enterprises. However, this policy has encountered difficulties. The 2016 White Paper on WEEE Recycling, Treatment and Reuse states that while the funds collected from producers were 2.61 billion Yuan, the subsidies provided to recycling enterprises were 4.714 billion Yuan, which is a gap of 2.104 billion Yuan. In addition, this policy did not incentivize producers to invest in WEEE recycling. Our paper aims to answering the following questions: (1) What is the impact of the current WEEE processing fund policy? (2) How can producers' green innovation in WEEE recycling be promoted? We use evolutionary game theory to investigate the strategies used by producers and recyclers and explore their evolutionary behaviors under two policies: the 2012 fund policy (the current policy) and the Fund Relief Policy (a newly designed policy). The results indicate that the Fund Relief Policy can motivate producers' green innovation behavior, improve the profitability of recyclers, and alleviate the financial pressure on government to a certain extent.


Assuntos
Resíduo Eletrônico , Gerenciamento de Resíduos , China , Resíduo Eletrônico/análise , Eletrônica , Teoria do Jogo , Reciclagem
7.
Nat Commun ; 12(1): 260, 2021 01 11.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33431873

RESUMO

Spite, costly behavior that harms others, presents an evolutionary puzzle: given that both the actor and recipient do worse, how could it emerge? We show that dynamically evolving interaction networks provide a novel explanation for the evolution of costly harm. Previous work has shown that anti-correlated interaction (e.g., negative assortment or negative relatedness) among behavioral strategies in populations can lead to the evolution of costly harm. We show that these approaches are blind to important features of interaction brought about by a co-evolution of network and behavior and that these features enable the emergence of spite. We analyze a new model in which agents can inflict harm on others at a cost to themselves, and simultaneously learn how to behave and with whom to interact. We find spite emerges reliably under a wide range of conditions. Our model reveals that when interactions occur in dynamic networks the population can exhibit correlated and anti-correlated behavioral interactions simultaneously, something not possible in standard models. In dynamic networks spite evolves due to transient and partial anti-correlated interaction, even when other behaviors are positively correlated and average degree of correlated interaction in the population is low.


Assuntos
Comportamento , Rede Social , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Aprendizagem , Modelos Teóricos
8.
Proc Biol Sci ; 287(1941): 20202250, 2020 12 23.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33323079

RESUMO

Societies rely on individual contributions to sustain public goods that benefit the entire community. Several mechanisms, that specify how individuals change their decisions based on past experiences, have been proposed to explain how altruists are not outcompeted by selfish counterparts. A key aspect of such strategy updates involves a comparison of an individual's latest payoff with that of a random neighbour. In reality, both the economic and social milieu often shapes cooperative behaviour. We propose a new decision heuristic, where the propensity of an individual to cooperate depends on the local strategy environment in which she is embedded as well as her wealth relative to that of her neighbours. Our decision-making model allows cooperation to be sustained and also explains the results of recent experiments on social dilemmas in dynamic networks. Final cooperation levels depend only on the extent to which the strategy environment influences altruistic behaviour but are largely unaffected by network restructuring. However, the extent of wealth inequality in the community is affected by a subtle interplay between the environmental influence on a person's decision to contribute and the likelihood of reshaping social ties, with wealth-inequality levels rising with increasing likelihood of network restructuring in some situations.


Assuntos
Altruísmo , Comportamento Cooperativo , Modelos Teóricos , Teoria do Jogo , Características de Residência
9.
Proc Biol Sci ; 287(1941): 20202630, 2020 12 23.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33323083

RESUMO

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game 'institutional evolution' with the more familiar within-game 'behavioural evolution'. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on 'attractor' games. Agents use their 'institutional preferences' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Biológicos , Animais , Humanos , Pressão
10.
PLoS One ; 15(12): e0244196, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33370350

RESUMO

Climatic and other extreme events threaten the globalized economy, which relies on increasingly complex and specialized supply-chain networks. Disasters generate (i) direct economic losses due to reduced production in the locations where they occur, and (ii) to indirect losses from the supply shortages and demand changes that cascade along the supply chains. Firms can use inventories to reduce their risk of shortages. Since firms are interconnected through the supply chain, the level of inventory hold by one firm influences the risk of shortages of the others. Such interdependencies lead to systemic risks in supply chain networks. We introduce a stylized model of complex supply-chain networks in which firms adjust their inventory to maximize profit. We analyze the resulting risks and inventory patterns using evolutionary game theory. We report the following findings. Inventories significantly reduce disruption cascades and indirect losses at the expense of a moderate increase in direct losses. The more fragmented a supply chain is, the less beneficial it is for individual firms to maintain inventories, resulting in higher systemic risks. One way to mitigate such systemic risks is to prescribe inventory sizes to individual firms-a measure that could, for instance, be fostered by insurers. We found that prescribing firm-specific inventory sizes based on their position in the supply chain mitigates systemic risk more effectively than setting the same inventory requirements for all firms.


Assuntos
Desastres/economia , Desenvolvimento Econômico/estatística & dados numéricos , Modelos Logísticos , Modelos Econômicos , Teoria do Jogo , Alocação de Recursos
11.
PLoS One ; 15(12): e0243827, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33326464

RESUMO

Game-based learning and self-regulated learning have long been valued as effective approaches to language education. However, little research has been conducted to investigate their integration, namely, game-based self-regulated language learning (GBSRLL). This study aims to conceptualise GBSRLL based on the combination of theoretical analysis, thematic evolution analysis, and social network analysis on the research articles in the fields of game-based language learning and self-regulated language learning. The results show that GBSRLL is a new interdisciplinary field emerging since the period from 2018 to 2019. Self-regulated learning strategies that can be performed in GBSRLL, the effects of GBSRLL on learners' affective states, and the features in GBSRLL were the prominent research topics in this field. Its theoretical foundation centres on the positive correlations between learner motivation, self-efficacy, and autonomy and the implementation of game-based learning and self-regulated learning. It is feasible to conduct GBSRLL due to the strong supportiveness of game mechanics for various phases and strategies of self-regulated learning. More contributions to this new interdisciplinary field are called for, especially from the aspects of the long-term effects of GBSRLL on academic performance and the useful tools and technologies for implementing GBSRLL.


Assuntos
Bibliometria , Teoria do Jogo , Idioma , Aprendizagem , Modelos Teóricos , Autoeficácia , Humanos , Pesquisa Interdisciplinar , Motivação
12.
Nat Commun ; 11(1): 5161, 2020 10 14.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33057001

RESUMO

Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Tomada de Decisão Compartilhada , Processos Grupais , Fatores Socioeconômicos , Tomada de Decisões , Feminino , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Masculino , Motivação
13.
PLoS One ; 15(10): e0240961, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33095788

RESUMO

In this paper, the interaction strategies and the evolutionary game analysis of the actions taken by the government and the public in the early days of the epidemic are incorporated into the natural transmission mechanism model of the epidemic, and then the transmission frequency equations of COVID-19 epidemic is established. According to the cumulative confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the UK and China, the upper limit of the spread of COVID-19 in different evolutionary scenarios is set. Using SPSS to perform logistic curve fitting, the frequency fitting equations of cumulative confirmed cases under different evolution scenarios are obtained respectively. The analysis result shows that the emergency response strategy adopted by the government in the early days of the epidemic can effectively control the spread of the epidemic. Combined with the transmission frequency equation of COVID-19 epidemic, measures taken by the government are analyzed. The influence of each measure on the frequency variable is judged and then the influence on the spread of the epidemic is obtained. Finally, based on the above analysis, the government is advised to adhere to the principles of scientific, initiative and flexibility when facing major epidemics.


Assuntos
Betacoronavirus , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Teoria do Jogo , Regulamentação Governamental , Controle de Infecções/legislação & jurisprudência , Modelos Estatísticos , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , China/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/transmissão , Infecções por Coronavirus/virologia , Emergências , Previsões/métodos , Governo , Humanos , Modelos Logísticos , Pneumonia Viral/transmissão , Pneumonia Viral/virologia
14.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32872529

RESUMO

The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China's construction industry. Additionally, the government's reward-penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government's reward-penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies' evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government's reward-penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government's reward-penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward-penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.


Assuntos
Indústria da Construção , Teoria do Jogo , Gerenciamento de Resíduos , China , Materiais de Construção , Governo , Humanos , Reciclagem , Recompensa , Desenvolvimento Sustentável
15.
PLoS One ; 15(9): e0239299, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32997678

RESUMO

Currently, there is no satisfying answer to how cooperation arises rationally in a single-play prisoner's dilemma game with complete information. When player types are known, as well as payoffs and actions, economic analysis through payoff-optimizing computation does not provide a clear path for cooperation. We propose a new form of game-the 'expected' game-and illustrate its implications for theory and practice based on the prisoner's dilemma example. We prove that cooperation can be a rational choice for players in reality in such games defined by a weighted set of payoffs of two or more different reference games.


Assuntos
Tomada de Decisões , Teoria do Jogo , Dilema do Prisioneiro , Humanos , Método de Monte Carlo
16.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ; 117(37): 22787-22792, 2020 09 15.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32873647

RESUMO

While it is undeniable that the ability of humans to cooperate in large-scale societies is unique in animal life, it remains open how such a degree of prosociality is possible despite the risks of exploitation. Recent evidence suggests that social networks play a crucial role in the development of prosociality and large-scale cooperation by allowing cooperators to cluster; however, it is not well understood if and how this also applies to real-world social networks in the field. We study intrinsic social preferences alongside emerging friendship patterns in 57 freshly formed school classes (n = 1,217), using incentivized measures. We demonstrate the existence of cooperative clusters in society, examine their emergence, and expand the evidence from controlled experiments to real-world social networks. Our results suggest that being embedded in cooperative environments substantially enhances the social preferences of individuals, thus contributing to the formation of cooperative clusters. Partner choice, in contrast, only marginally contributes to their emergence. We conclude that cooperative preferences are contagious; social and cultural learning plays an important role in the development and evolution of cooperation.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Amigos/psicologia , Rede Social , Adolescente , Evolução Cultural , Feminino , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Aprendizagem , Masculino , Comportamento Social
17.
PLoS One ; 15(8): e0235953, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32841253

RESUMO

The most crucial challenge in the functioning of the wireless networks is the efficient utilization of radio resources. A significant element of resource handling is power regulation. With increasing requirement of wireless data transmission services, it is essential to devise energy harvesting techniques for mobile devices. In this research, a new methodology has been proposed for distributed power regulation in cognitive radio, networks of CR are grounded on non-cooperation game phenomenon and pricing technique. QoS (Quality of service) of the user of CR is anticipated as a beneficial activity through pricing as well as dissemination of energy generating as an unbeneficial game wherein the consumers increase their overall efficacy. The price is defined as an actual function of transmission power to upraise the pricing of the most distant consumers. The proposed mathematical model shows that the proposed game model has a Nash equilibrium and is also unique. Furthermore, in order to make the proposed algorithm valid for green communication within the wireless network, the best response technique was proposed. Finally, simulation results showed that the proposed energy harvesting technique, grounded on a unique function of the utilization, reduces the consumption of transmission power and greatly improves the convergence speed; which are suitable for the vision of the 5G networks.


Assuntos
Custos e Análise de Custo/métodos , Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Econômicos , Ondas de Rádio , Tecnologia sem Fio/economia , Algoritmos , Simulação por Computador
18.
BMC Bioinformatics ; 21(1): 356, 2020 Aug 12.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32787845

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: Complex human health conditions with etiological heterogeneity like Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often pose a challenge for traditional genome-wide association study approaches in defining a clear genotype to phenotype model. Coalitional game theory (CGT) is an exciting method that can consider the combinatorial effect of groups of variants working in concert to produce a phenotype. CGT has been applied to associate likely-gene-disrupting variants encoded from whole genome sequence data to ASD; however, this previous approach cannot take into account for prior biological knowledge. Here we extend CGT to incorporate a priori knowledge from biological networks through a game theoretic centrality measure based on Shapley value to rank genes by their relevance-the individual gene's synergistic influence in a gene-to-gene interaction network. Game theoretic centrality extends the notion of Shapley value to the evaluation of a gene's contribution to the overall connectivity of its corresponding node in a biological network. RESULTS: We implemented and applied game theoretic centrality to rank genes on whole genomes from 756 multiplex autism families. Top ranking genes with the highest game theoretic centrality in both the weighted and unweighted approaches were enriched for pathways previously associated with autism, including pathways of the immune system. Four of the selected genes HLA-A, HLA-B, HLA-G, and HLA-DRB1-have also been implicated in ASD and further support the link between ASD and the human leukocyte antigen complex. CONCLUSIONS: Game theoretic centrality can prioritize influential, disease-associated genes within biological networks, and assist in the decoding of polygenic associations to complex disorders like autism.


Assuntos
Algoritmos , Teoria do Jogo , Redes Reguladoras de Genes , Estudos de Associação Genética , Transtorno do Espectro Autista/genética , Estudo de Associação Genômica Ampla , Humanos , Mapeamento de Interação de Proteínas , Reprodutibilidade dos Testes
19.
Nat Commun ; 11(1): 3885, 2020 08 04.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32753599

RESUMO

Humans routinely engage in many distinct interactions in parallel. Team members collaborate on several concurrent projects, and even whole nations interact with each other across a variety of issues, including trade, climate change and security. Yet the existing theory of direct reciprocity studies isolated repeated games. Such models cannot account for strategic attempts to use the vested interests in one game as a leverage to enforce cooperation in another. Here we introduce a general framework of multichannel games. Individuals interact with each other over multiple channels; each channel is a repeated game. Strategic choices in one channel can affect decisions in another. With analytical equilibrium calculations for the donation game and evolutionary simulations for several other games we show that such linkage facilitates cooperation. Our results suggest that previous studies tend to underestimate the human potential for reciprocity. When several interactions occur in parallel, people often learn to coordinate their behavior across games to maximize cooperation in each of them.


Assuntos
Comportamento de Escolha , Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Psicológicos , Simulação por Computador , Humanos , Dilema do Prisioneiro
20.
PLoS One ; 15(8): e0236354, 2020.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32750058

RESUMO

With the rising environmental concerns among consumers all over the world, sustainability has received considerable attention, and numerous enterprises are adopting various practices such as investing in energy-saving to improve sustainability in supply chains. However, many previous researches always assume that decision makers are perfectly rational and neglect the behavioral concerns of decision makers. This paper considers a two-stage sustainable supply chain with behavioral concerns in order to develop more realistic models, and mainly focuses on the energy-saving and pricing decisions in the decentralized system, as well as how to improve energy-saving level and profits. We develop decentralized decision-making models under two types of behavioral concerns: fairness concern and risk aversion, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader. The effect of the behavioral concerns on the optimal decisions and corresponding profits is discussed in detail. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the fairness behavior always causes a negative effect on the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, while it could benefit the retailer in profits. The risk aversion behavior always benefits the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, whereas it could make the retailer suffer. Note that both the optimal energy-saving level and corresponding profit of the total supply chain under two types of behavioral concerns are lower than that in the centralized system, thereby we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win outcome and the energy-saving level can be improved. In addition, some managerial implications through our analytical and numerical results are summarized in this paper.


Assuntos
Comércio/economia , Conservação de Recursos Energéticos/economia , Conservação dos Recursos Naturais/economia , Custos e Análise de Custo/economia , Comportamento do Consumidor/economia , Tomada de Decisões , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Assunção de Riscos
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