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2.
Front Public Health ; 12: 1373747, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38628846

RESUMO

The quality and safety of agricultural products are related to people's lives and health, economic development, and social stability, and have always been a hot issue of concern to the government and society. The rapid development of digital traceability technology in the digital environment has brought new opportunities for the supervision of agricultural product quality and safety, but the frequent occurrence of agricultural product safety incidents in recent years has exposed many problems such as the lack of governmental supervision, unstandardized production process of enterprises, and weak consumer awareness. To improve the cooperation efficiency of stakeholders and ensure the quality and safety of agricultural products, this paper proposes a dynamic model based on evolutionary game theory. The model incorporates the government, agricultural product producers, and farmers, and evaluates the stability and effectiveness of the system under different circumstances. The results of the study show that there are multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies in the tripartite evolutionary game model of agricultural product quality and safety supervision, and there are corresponding evolutionary stabilization conditions. There are several factors affecting the stability of the system, the most important of which are government regulation, severe penalties for agricultural product producers, and incentives. When these factors reach a certain threshold, the stakeholder cooperation mechanism can establish an evolutionarily stable strategy. This study contributes to the understanding of the operational mechanism of stakeholder cooperation in agricultural product quality and safety regulation in the digital environment and provides decision support and policy recommendations for stakeholders to promote the sustainable development and optimization of agricultural product quality and safety regulation.


Assuntos
Agricultura , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Desenvolvimento Sustentável , Governo
3.
Sci Rep ; 14(1): 7903, 2024 04 04.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38570552

RESUMO

In Public Goods Games (PGG), the temptation to free-ride on others' contributions poses a significant threat to the sustainability of cooperative societies. Therefore, societies strive to mitigate this through incentive systems, employing rewards and punishments to foster cooperative behavior. Thus, peer punishment, in which cooperators sanction defectors, as well as pool punishment, where a centralized punishment institution executes the punishment, is deeply analyzed in previous works. Although the literature indicates that these methods may enhance cooperation on social dilemmas under particular contexts, there are still open questions, for instance, the structural connection between graduated punishment and the monitoring of public goods games. Our investigation proposes a compulsory PGG framework under Panoptical surveillance. Inspired by Foucault's theories on disciplinary mechanisms and biopower, we present a novel mathematical model that scrutinizes the balance between the severity and scope of punishment to catalyze cooperative behavior. By integrating perspectives from evolutionary game theory and Foucault's theories of power and discipline, this research uncovers the theoretical foundations of mathematical frameworks involved in punishment and discipline structures. We show that well-calibrated punishment and discipline schemes, leveraging the panoptical effect for universal oversight, can effectively mitigate the free-rider dilemma, fostering enhanced cooperation. This interdisciplinary approach not only elucidates the dynamics of cooperation in societal constructs but also underscores the importance of integrating diverse methodologies to address the complexities of fostering cooperative evolution.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Punição , Modelos Teóricos , Teoria do Jogo , Grupo Associado
4.
Nat Commun ; 15(1): 3125, 2024 Apr 11.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38600076

RESUMO

Collective cooperation is essential for many social and biological systems, yet understanding how it evolves remains a challenge. Previous investigations report that the ubiquitous heterogeneous individual connections hinder cooperation by assuming individuals update strategies at identical rates. Here we develop a general framework by allowing individuals to update strategies at personalised rates, and provide the precise mathematical condition under which universal cooperation is favoured. Combining analytical and numerical calculations on synthetic and empirical networks, we find that when individuals' update rates vary inversely with their number of connections, heterogeneous connections actually outperform homogeneous ones in promoting cooperation. This surprising property undercuts the conventional wisdom that heterogeneous structure is generally antagonistic to cooperation and, further helps develop an efficient algorithm OptUpRat to optimise collective cooperation by designing individuals' update rates in any population structure. Our findings provide a unifying framework to understand the interplay between structural heterogeneity, behavioural rhythms, and cooperation.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Comportamento Cooperativo , Humanos , Teoria do Jogo , Algoritmos
5.
Chaos ; 34(4)2024 Apr 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38572947

RESUMO

Feedback loops between strategies and the environment are commonly observed in socio-ecological, evolution-ecological, and psychology-economic systems. However, the impact of mutations in these feedback processes is often overlooked. This study proposes a novel model that integrates the public goods game with environmental feedback, considering the presence of mutations. In our model, the enhancement factor of the public goods game combines positive and negative incentives from the environment. By employing replicator-mutator (RM) equations, we provide an objective understanding of the system's evolutionary state, focusing on identifying conditions that foster cooperation and prevent the tragedy of the commons. Specifically, mutations play a crucial role in the RM dynamics, leading to the emergence of an oscillatory tragedy of the commons. By verifying the Hopf bifurcation condition, we establish the existence of a stable limit cycle, providing valuable insights into sustained oscillation strategies. Moreover, the feedback mechanism inherent in the public goods game model offers a fresh perspective on effectively addressing the classic dilemma of the tragedy of the commons.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Retroalimentação , Evolução Biológica , Mutação
6.
PLoS One ; 19(3): e0300386, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38489340

RESUMO

The paper aims to conduct an analysis of pricing strategies in a dual channel supply chain under external uncertainty, utilizing Interval numbers theory and Game theory as the theoretical basis. The focus is on maximizing the expected profits of manufacturers and retailers. Four models are considered: centralized decision-making, manufacturer's Stackelberg, retailer's Stackelberg strategy, and vertical Nash model, with the decision variable being the product price. By solving the game model, the paper compares the optimal decisions under the four models and conducts sensitivity analysis to reflect the influence of key parameters and analyze their relationships. The ultimate goal is to optimize profits under various circumstances by adjusting market potential and price parameters to determine the best price level. The findings suggest that decision-maker's risk indicators have a greater impact on decision results when market demand is less sensitive to price, and that the size of the market has a negative correlation with the impact of decision-maker's risk indicators on decision results.


Assuntos
Comportamento do Consumidor , Teoria do Jogo , Incerteza , Custos e Análise de Custo , Comércio/métodos
7.
PLoS One ; 19(3): e0298355, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38489344

RESUMO

In order to delve into the dynamic evolution process and influencing factors of information sharing decisions among stakeholders under supply chain collaboration, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with suppliers and retailers as the primary entities. Within this model, a combined approach of game theory and prospect theory is employed, integrating prospect value functions and weight functions to create an information sharing prospect value matrix. A comprehensive analysis is conducted on the strategic choices and benefits of entities considering the psychological perception of information sharing, and critical factors influencing the stability of information sharing evolution results are explored through numerical simulations using Matlab. The key findings of this study are as follows: Firstly, from the perspective of supply chain collaboration, the probability of entities evolving into information sharing is negatively correlated with the cost of information sharing and positively correlated with the benefits generated by information coordination. Secondly, looking at supply chain collaboration, entities are more likely to engage in information sharing behavior when they exhibit a lower level of risk aversion, indicating greater rationality, when facing profits; conversely, they are more likely to participate in information sharing when they display a higher degree of risk preference, indicating less rationality, in the face of losses. Furthermore, the lesser sensitivity of suppliers and retailers to losses is more likely to drive the system towards an information-sharing state. Based on the primary findings mentioned above, this study offers recommendations for enhancing trust, constructing information exchange platforms, and adjusting psychological awareness. These suggestions contribute to improving information sharing among entities within the supply chain, thus enhancing the overall efficiency and collaboration of the supply chain.


Assuntos
Teoria do Jogo , Disseminação de Informação , Comportamento do Consumidor , Probabilidade
8.
Phys Rev E ; 109(2-1): 024107, 2024 Feb.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38491644

RESUMO

Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation. This work theoretically analyzes and numerically explores an aspiration-driven strategy updating in a well-mixed population playing games. The payoffs of the game matrix and the aspiration are condensed into just two parameters that allow a comprehensive description of the dynamics. We find continuous and abrupt transitions in the cooperation density with excellent agreement between theory and the Gillespie simulations. Under strong selection, the system can display several levels of steady cooperation or get trapped into absorbing states. These states are still relevant for experiments even when irrational choices are made due to their prolonged relaxation times. Finally, we show that for the particular case of the prisoner dilemma, where defection is the dominant strategy under imitation mechanisms, the self-evaluation update instead favors cooperation nonlinearly with the level of aspiration. Thus, our work provides insights into the distinct role between imitation and self-evaluation with no learning dynamics.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Evolução Biológica , Dilema do Prisioneiro , Aprendizagem
9.
Sci Rep ; 14(1): 5989, 2024 03 19.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38503778

RESUMO

This study aims to demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) can empower research on the evolution of human behavior, based on evolutionary game theory, by using an evolutionary model positing that instructing LLMs with high-level psychological and cognitive character descriptions enables the simulation of human behavior choices in game-theoretical scenarios. As a first step towards this objective, this paper proposes an evolutionary model of personality traits related to cooperative behavior using a large language model. In the model, linguistic descriptions of personality traits related to cooperative behavior are used as genes. The deterministic strategies extracted from LLM that make behavioral decisions based on these personality traits are used as behavioral traits. The population is evolved according to selection based on average payoff and mutation of genes by asking LLM to slightly modify the parent gene toward cooperative or selfish. Through experiments and analyses, we clarify that such a model can indeed exhibit evolution of cooperative behavior based on the diverse and higher-order representation of personality traits. We also observed repeated intrusion of cooperative and selfish personality traits through changes in the expression of personality traits. The words that emerged in the evolved genes reflected the behavioral tendencies of their associated personalities in terms of semantics, thereby influencing individual behavior and, consequently, the evolutionary dynamics.


Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Comportamento Cooperativo , Humanos , Teoria do Jogo , Idioma , Personalidade
10.
Biosystems ; 238: 105180, 2024 Apr.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38467237

RESUMO

The Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) is one of the simple test-beds for the probabilistic nature of the human decision-making process. Behavioral experiments have been conducted on this game for decades and show a violation of the so-called sure-thing principle, a key principle in the rational theory of decision. Quantum probabilistic models can explain this violation as a second-order interference effect, which cannot be accounted for by classical probability theory. Here, we adopt the framework of generalized probabilistic theories and approach this explanation from the viewpoint of quantum information theory to identify the source of the interference. In particular, we reformulate one of the existing quantum probabilistic models using density matrix formalism and consider different amounts of classical and quantum uncertainties for one player's prediction about another player's action in PDG. This enables us to demonstrate that what makes possible the explanation of the violation is the presence of quantum coherence in the player's initial prediction and its conversion to probabilities during the dynamics. Moreover, we discuss the role of other quantum information-theoretical quantities, such as quantum entanglement, in the decision-making process. Finally, we propose a three-choice extension of the PDG to compare the predictive powers of quantum probability theory and a more general probabilistic theory that includes it as a particular case and exhibits third-order interference.


Assuntos
Teoria do Jogo , Modelos Estatísticos , Humanos , Dilema do Prisioneiro , Probabilidade , Incerteza
11.
J Evol Biol ; 37(4): 451-463, 2024 Apr 14.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38459964

RESUMO

The threshold public goods game is one of the best-known models of non-linear public goods dilemmas. Cooperators and defectors typically coexist in this game when the population is assumed to follow the so-called structured deme model. In this article, we develop a dynamical model of a general N-player game in which there is no deme structure: Individuals interact with randomly chosen neighbours and selection occurs between randomly chosen pairs of individuals. We show that in the deterministic limit, the dynamics in this model leads to the same replicator dynamics as in the structured deme model, i.e., coexistence of cooperators and defectors is typical in threshold public goods game even when the population is completely well mixed. We extend the model to study the effect of density dependence and density fluctuation on the dynamics. We show analytically and numerically that decreasing population density increases the equilibrium frequency of cooperators till the fixation of this strategy, but below a critical density cooperators abruptly disappear from the population. Our numerical investigations show that weak density fluctuations enhance cooperation, while strong fluctuations suppress it.


Assuntos
Clorofluorcarbonetos , Comportamento Cooperativo , Éteres , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Densidade Demográfica , Evolução Biológica
12.
J R Soc Interface ; 21(212): 20230698, 2024 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38471530

RESUMO

Theoretical models prescribe how institutions can promote cooperation in a population by imposing appropriate punishments or rewards on individuals. However, many real-world institutions are not sophisticated or responsive enough to ensure cooperation by calibrating their policies. Or, worse yet, an institution might selfishly exploit the population it governs for its own benefit. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in the presence of an institution that is autonomous, in the sense that it has its own interests that may or may not align with those of the population. The institution imposes a tax on the population and redistributes a portion of the tax revenue to cooperators, withholding the remaining revenue for itself. The institution adjusts its rates of taxation and redistribution to optimize its own long-term, discounted utility. We consider three types of institutions with different goals, embodied in their utility functions. We show that a prosocial institution, whose goal is to maximize the average payoff of the population, can indeed promote cooperation-but only if it is sufficiently forward-looking. On the other hand, an institution that seeks to maximize welfare among cooperators alone will successfully promote collective cooperation even if it is myopic. Remarkably, even a selfish institution, which seeks to maximize the revenue it withholds for itself, can nonetheless promote cooperation. The average payoff of the population increases when a selfish institution is more forward-looking, so that a population under a selfish regime can sometimes fare better than under anarchy. Our analysis highlights the potential benefits of institutional wealth redistribution, even when an institution does not share the interests of the population it governs.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Modelos Teóricos , Evolução Biológica
13.
J R Soc Interface ; 21(212): 20230720, 2024 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38471531

RESUMO

Understanding human behaviour in decision problems and strategic interactions has wide-ranging applications in economics, psychology and artificial intelligence. Game theory offers a robust foundation for this understanding, based on the idea that individuals aim to maximize a utility function. However, the exact factors influencing strategy choices remain elusive. While traditional models try to explain human behaviour as a function of the outcomes of available actions, recent experimental research reveals that linguistic content significantly impacts decision-making, thus prompting a paradigm shift from outcome-based to language-based utility functions. This shift is more urgent than ever, given the advancement of generative AI, which has the potential to support humans in making critical decisions through language-based interactions. We propose sentiment analysis as a fundamental tool for this shift and take an initial step by analysing 61 experimental instructions from the dictator game, an economic game capturing the balance between self-interest and the interest of others, which is at the core of many social interactions. Our meta-analysis shows that sentiment analysis can explain human behaviour beyond economic outcomes. We discuss future research directions. We hope this work sets the stage for a novel game-theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance of language in human decisions.


Assuntos
Tomada de Decisões , Teoria do Jogo , Humanos , Inteligência Artificial , Idioma , Interação Social
14.
J R Soc Interface ; 21(212): 20240019, 2024 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38471533

RESUMO

Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders-who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs-and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their 'sticky effect'-an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a 'copying the majority' strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human-machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Punição , Humanos , Teoria do Jogo , Evolução Biológica
15.
J R Soc Interface ; 21(212): 20230723, 2024 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38471536

RESUMO

Direct reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation when players are sufficiently equal, such that they have similar influence on each other. In the light of ubiquitous inequality, this raises the question of how reciprocity evolves among unequal players. Existing studies on inequality mainly focus on payoff-driven learning rules, which rely on the knowledge of others' strategies. However, inferring one's strategy is a difficult task even if the whole interaction history is known. Here, we consider aspiration-driven learning rules, where players seek strategies that satisfy their aspirations based on their own information. Under aspiration-driven learning rules, we explore the evolutionary dynamics among players with inequality in endowments and productivity. We model the interactions among unequal players with asymmetric games and characterize the condition where cooperation is feasible. Remarkably, we find that aspiration-driven learning rules lead to a higher level of cooperation than payoff-driven ones over a wide range of inequality. Moreover, our results show that high aspiration levels are conducive to the evolution of cooperation when more productive players are equipped with higher endowments. Our work highlights the advantages of aspiration-driven learning for promoting cooperation among unequal players and suggests that aspiration-based decision-making may be more beneficial for the collective.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria do Jogo , Aprendizagem , Evolução Biológica
16.
PLoS One ; 19(3): e0297307, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38446770

RESUMO

Mixed-species biofilms of Candida albicans and Staphylococcus aureus pose a significant clinical challenge due to their resistance to the human immune system and antimicrobial therapy. Using evolutionary game theory and nonlinear dynamics, we analyse the complex interactions between these organisms to understand their coexistence in the human host. We determine the Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies of the game between C. albicans and S. aureus and point out different states of the mixed-species biofilm. Using replicator equations we study the fungal-bacterial interactions on a population level. Our focus is on the influence of available nutrients and the quorum sensing molecule farnesol, including the potential therapeutic use of artificially added farnesol. We also investigate the impact of the suggested scavenging of C. albicans hyphae by S. aureus. Contrary to common assumptions, we confirm the hypothesis that under certain conditions, mixed-species biofilms are not universally beneficial. Instead, different Nash equilibria occur depending on encountered conditions (i.e. varying farnesol levels, either produced by C. albicans or artificially added), including antagonism. We further show that the suggested scavenging of C. albicans' hyphae by S. aureus does not influence the overall outcome of the game. Moreover, artificially added farnesol strongly affects the dynamics of the game, although its use as a medical adjuvant (add-on medication) may pose challenges.


Assuntos
Hepatopatia Gordurosa não Alcoólica , Infecções Estafilocócicas , Humanos , Staphylococcus aureus , Candida albicans , Farneseno Álcool/farmacologia , Teoria do Jogo , Biofilmes
17.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ; 121(11): e2317736121, 2024 Mar 12.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38451941

RESUMO

Empiricists often struggle to apply game theory models to real-life cases of animal cooperation. One reason is that many examples of cooperation occur in stable groups, where individuals form social bonds that influence exchanges of help in ways that are not well described by previous models, including the extent of reciprocity and how relationships are initiated. We present a game theory model exploring the conditions under which social bonds between group members promote cooperation. In the model, bonds build up from exchanges of help in a similar way as the strength of association increases in learning, as in the Rescorla-Wagner rule. The bonds in turn affect partner choice and influence helping amounts. The model has a mechanism of reciprocity for bonded pairs, which can evolve toward either loose or strict reciprocation. Several aspects of the model are inspired by observations of food sharing in vampire bats. We find that small social neighborhoods are required for the evolutionary stability of helping, either as small group sizes, or if bonded members of larger groups can form temporary (daily) smaller groupings. The costs of helping need to be fairly low, while the benefits can be substantial. The form of reciprocity that evolves is neither immediate nor very strict. Individuals in need request help based on bond strength, but there is also an evolved preference for initiating bonds with new group members. In contrast, if different groups come into temporary contact, the evolved tendency is to avoid forming bonds between groups.


Assuntos
Quirópteros , Comportamento Cooperativo , Animais , Evolução Biológica , Alimentos , Teoria do Jogo , Características de Residência
18.
Front Public Health ; 12: 1325166, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38371237

RESUMO

Introduction: Currently in China, there is a lack of well-defined and viable incentive mechanisms at the governmental and hospital levels to support the development of young medical talents, thereby hindering their growth Existing studies primarily investigate the current state and trajectory of incentives, yet they inadequately address the distinctive characteristics of various stakeholders involved in medical talent incentive processes, particularly the lack of research on incentive mechanisms with Chinese attributes. Methods: This study adopts evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of replication and the strategies for achieving evolutionary stability in the comprehensive development of young medical talents, considering both scenarios with and without supportive policies. Results: In the absence of any supportive policy measures, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) point is O(0,0), the unstable equilibrium point is C(1,1), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point C(1,1), which means that the young medical talents and medical institutions adopt a combination of strategies (actively seeking comprehensive development and taking incentive measures). Under the scenario with supportive policies, the ESS point is C(1,1), the unstable equilibrium point is O(0,0), and the saddle points are A(0,1), B(1,0). The initial state of the system is at the unstable equilibrium point O(0,0), which means that young medical talents and medical institutions adopt (N,N) strategy combinations (inactively seeking comprehensive development, implementing no incentive measure). Discussion: (1) Government incentives play a crucial role in motivating young medical talents to seek comprehensive development. (2) The level of government incentive support for young medical talents should exceed the cost increment of individual efforts. Additionally, the policy support provided by the government to medical institutions should surpass the incentive support offered by these institutions to young medical talents. This will enhance the motivation and encouragement efforts of medical institutions in actively promoting comprehensive development among young medical talents. (3) With the backing of certain government incentive policies, medical institutions implementing incentive measures and young medical talents actively seeking comprehensive development will establish a virtuous cycle of mutual promotion.


Assuntos
Motivação , Políticas , Governo , Teoria do Jogo , China
19.
PLoS One ; 19(2): e0297213, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38335192

RESUMO

It is widely known how the human ability to cooperate has influenced the thriving of our species. However, as we move towards a hybrid human-machine future, it is still unclear how the introduction of artificial agents in our social interactions affect this cooperative capacity. In a one-shot collective risk dilemma, where enough members of a group must cooperate in order to avoid a collective disaster, we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a hybrid population. In our model, we consider a hybrid population composed of both adaptive and fixed behavior agents. The latter serve as proxies for the machine-like behavior of artificially intelligent agents who implement stochastic strategies previously learned offline. We observe that the adaptive individuals adjust their behavior in function of the presence of artificial agents in their groups to compensate their cooperative (or lack of thereof) efforts. We also find that risk plays a determinant role when assessing whether or not we should form hybrid teams to tackle a collective risk dilemma. When the risk of collective disaster is high, cooperation in the adaptive population falls dramatically in the presence of cooperative artificial agents. A story of compensation, rather than cooperation, where adaptive agents have to secure group success when the artificial agents are not cooperative enough, but will rather not cooperate if the others do so. On the contrary, when risk of collective disaster is low, success is highly improved while cooperation levels within the adaptive population remain the same. Artificial agents can improve the collective success of hybrid teams. However, their application requires a true risk assessment of the situation in order to actually benefit the adaptive population (i.e. the humans) in the long-term.


Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Desastres , Humanos , Interação Social , Evolução Biológica , Inteligência , Teoria do Jogo
20.
PLoS One ; 19(2): e0297120, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38300943

RESUMO

Human error plays a significant role in crane safety. To increase the accuracy and rationality of human error risk prioritization for crane operations, this study proposes a risk prioritization model for human errors in crane operations based on the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and the improved combination weighting model of game theory (ICWGT). The ICWGT integrates the risk-factor weights obtained via subjective and objective methods. Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are used to describe experts' uncertainty information. Then, the CPT is applied to handle the assessment of experts' risk attitudes in the decision process. The human error risk ranking of crane operations is obtained according to the overall prospect values calculated using the CPT. A case study of human error in overhead crane operations was conducted, and sensitivity and comparison analyses confirmed the feasibility of the proposed model. The proposed ranking mechanism for human error risk priority in crane operations is helpful for crane risk management.


Assuntos
Teoria do Jogo , Gestão de Riscos , Humanos , Incerteza
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