What Western Philosophers of Technology Might Learn from Li Bocong's Philosophy of Engineering.

This essay aims to rectify a failure on the part of Western philosophers of technology to attend to the creative philosophical work of Li Bocong at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. After a brief account of Li Bocong's personal contacts with the West and some remarks on his relationship to Marxism, we take up three aspects of his philosophy that can contribute to enlarging Western philosophical thinking about engineering and technology: (1) Li's analysis of engineering as more than design, (2) his argument for the relevance of the sociology of engineering, and (3) his conceptualization of engineering ethics as more than professional ethics.

What does the Thinking about Relationalism and Humanness in African Philosophy imply for Different Modes of Being Present in the Metaverse?

In this article, I interrogate whether the deployment and development of the Metaverse should take into account African values and modes of knowing to foster the uptake of this hyped technology in Africa. Specifically, I draw on the moral norms arising from the components of communal interactions and humanness in Afro-communitarianism to contend that the deployment of the Metaverse and its development ought to reflect core African moral values to foster its uptake in the region. To adequately align the Metaverse with African core values and thus foster its uptake among Africans, significant technological advancement that makes simulating genuine human experiences possible must occur. Additionally, it would be necessary for the developers and deployers to ensure that higher forms of spiritual activities can be had in the Metaverse to foster its uptake in Africa. Finally, I justify why the preceding points do not necessarily imply that the Metaverse will have a higher moral status than real life on the moral scale that can be grounded in Afro-communitarianism.

Historiography: Why Should Historians Pay More Attention to Philosophy of Technology?

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology marks the maturity of the philosophy of technology, which has lagged behind the history of technology as a distinct field. The book's thirty-two chapters span almost seven hundred pages, written by thirty-four authors from twelve countries. Shannon Vallor, professor of philosophy at University of Edinburgh, edited the volume and wrote its excellent introduction, which provides a historical framing that is largely absent from the rest of the volume. Although many of the remaining chapters are quite strong, the volume as a whole suffers from an unevenness that reflects the conceptual disunity of the field. Nevertheless, the volume shows the value of this field for historians of technology, especially as an alternative to the stale STS theories that many historians of technology draw on.

Engram Studies: A Call for Historical, Philosophical, and Sociological Approaches.

In this chapter, we identify three distinct avenues of research on the philosophical, historical, and sociopolitical dimensions of engram research. First, we single out the need to refine philosophical understandings of memory within neuroscientific research on the engram. Specifically, we question the place of constructivist and preservationist philosophical claims on memory in the formulation of the engram concept and its operationalization in contemporary neuroscience research. Second, we delve into the received historiography of the engram claiming its disappearance after Richard Semon's (1859-1918) coinage of the concept. Differently from this view, we underline that Semon's legacy is still largely undocumented: Unknown are the ways the engram circulated within studies of organic memory as well as the role Semon's ideas had in specific national contexts of research in neurosciences. Finally, another research gap on the engram concerns a socio-anthropological documentation of the factual and normative resources this research offers to think about memory in healthcare and society. Representations of memory in this research, experimental strategies of intervention into the engram, as well as their translational potential for neurodegenerative (e.g., Alzheimer's disease) and psychiatric (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder) conditions have not yet received scrutiny notwithstanding their obvious social and political relevance.All these knowledge gaps combined call for a strong commitment towards interdisciplinarity to align the ambitions of a foundational neuroscience of the engram with a socially responsible circulation of this knowledge. What role can the facts, metaphors, and interventional strategies of engram research play in the wider society? With what implications for philosophical questions at the foundation of memory, which have accompanied its study from antiquity? And what can neuro- and social scientists do jointly to shape the social and political framings of engram research?

Philosophy leading the way: An interdisciplinary approach to study communication of severe diagnoses.

This paper explores a brand-new interdisciplinary approach applied to an enduring problem: the communication of severe diagnoses. The moment when physicians explain the diagnosis to patients and their relatives is sensitive, particularly for a disease that is rarely diagnosed early. The first part of the article is dedicated to the context of this delicate doctor-patient interaction. With this framework in mind, the paper delves into the innovative interdisciplinary methodology developed in the pilot study Communi.CARE, conducted in a hospital in Northern Italy, which focuses on the diagnosis of pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC). SARS-CoV-2 impact on the study development is highlighted. The study aims to explore the topic by combining different areas of expertise, including medicine, philosophy, sociology, and psychology. The contribution of philosophy is here presented as essential: it has a leading role in the conception of the study, its development, and the elaboration of results. It is shown throughout the study, from methodology to the analysis of results. Strengths and weaknesses of the methodology are discussed. In conclusion, further philosophical considerations on effective and ethical communication in this delicate context are recommended.

Defending and Defining Environmental Responsibilities for the Health Research Sector.

Six planetary boundaries have already been exceeded, including climate change, loss of biodiversity, chemical pollution, and land-system change. The health research sector contributes to the environmental crisis we are facing, though to a lesser extent than healthcare or agriculture sectors. It could take steps to reduce its environmental impact but generally has not done so, even as the planetary emergency worsens. So far, the normative case for why the health research sector should rectify that failure has not been made. This paper argues strong philosophical grounds, derived from theories of health and social justice, exist to support the claim that the sector has a duty to avoid or minimise causing or contributing to ecological harms that threaten human health or worsen health inequity. The paper next develops ideas about the duty's content, explaining why it should entail more than reducing carbon emissions, and considers what limits might be placed on the duty.

Contrasting philosophical and scientific views in the long history of studying the generation of form in development.

Focusing on the opposing ways of thinking of philosophers and scientists to explain the generation of form in biological development, I show that today's controversies over explanations of early development bear fundamental similarities to the dichotomy of preformation theory versus epigenesis in Greek antiquity. They are related to the acceptance or rejection of the idea of a physical form of what today would be called information for the generating of the embryo as a necessary pre-requisite for specific development and heredity. As a recent example, I scrutinize the dichotomy of genomic causality versus self-organization in 20th and 21st century theories of the generation of form. On the one hand, the generation of patterns and form, as well as the constant outcome in development, are proposed to be causally related to something that is "preformed" in the germ cells, the nucleus of germ cells, or the genome. On the other hand, it is proposed that there is no pre-existing form or information, and development is seen as a process where genuinely new characters emerge from formless matter, either by immaterial "forces of life," or by physical-chemical processes of self-organization. I also argue that these different ways of thinking and the research practices associated with them are not equivalent, and maintain that it is impossible to explain the generation of form and constant outcome of development without the assumption of the transmission of pre-existing information in the form of DNA sequences in the genome. Only in this framework of "preformed" information can "epigenesis" in the form of physical and chemical processes of self-organization play an important role.

How teaching about peace and conflict in Northern Ireland reformulated our leadership teaching and learning philosophy.

In this reflective article, we offer innovative approaches to creating opportunities for leadership learning through questioning the intentions versus impacts of leading short-term study abroad courses. We consider the critical relevance of approaching a course like this from a learning disposition-recognizing our roles as learners, as well as facilitators of learning. We note the impacts of hegemony and identity, the effort and skills of dialoguing across difference, the complexities of constructive ambiguity, and the necessity to be adaptable as we navigate liminal spaces, concepts, and efforts for peace leadership. In the end, although this was a brief, 10-day experience, we came to realize our entire outlook on facilitating leadership learning shifted to recognize and grapple with these complexities.

On the relationship between scientific theory and ontology in everything flows.

In their anthology Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré argue that modern theories of biology imply that the fundamental structure of reality is processual at its core. In the present work, I first examine the implicit and explicit metaphysical presuppositions the editors make in order to allow for such an inference from scientific theory to ontology. After showing the difficulties of a naïve transfer of theoretical entities to fundamental ontology, I argue that the editors can nevertheless extend their claims beyond the mere articulation of different domain ontologies. This leads to the idea of a scientifically informed induction base for an ontology of processes.

BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH SENECA'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN MIND.

This paper regards Seneca's practical philosophy as ancestor to psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy and as a progenitor of ongoing contemporary praxis in applied ideas of mind. Facing forward into the Anthropocene, as psychoanalysis encounters Artificial Intelligence, the convergence with contemporary psychoanalytic psychotherapy of value concepts developed from Antiquity is discussed. Drawn from Seneca's Letters on Ethics, constellations of significant ideas present in ancient practical philosophy resonate with similar configurations developed two millennia later, and central to the practice of contemporary psychotherapy.

Neo-Confucianism and the Development of German Idealism.

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz's belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz's later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant's work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel's phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse.

Psychology as a Science of the Soul: Evangelos Christou's The Logos of the Soul (1963).

After Evangelos Christou (1923-1956) studied philosophy at King's College, Cambridge, with Wittgenstein and others, he earned a doctorate at the Jung Institute in Zürich. He then returned home to Alexandria, near which he died in a car crash. The Logos of the Soul, published posthumously, argued for a psychology that would be neither a natural scientific psychology, devoted to causal analyses, nor a philosophical discipline that analysed mental events. Psychology would be an autonomous science of the soul, an unknown distinct from body and mind. Science deals with bodies and behaviours; philosophy with the mental concepts and acts. Psychology deals with "psychological experience". Dreams and fantasies can be sources of psychological experience, but so can perceptual acts and mental acts. Meaning occurs when something encounters an ego or self in a psychological experience. Observation in psychology is participant observation, akin to witnessing of a drama. Psychological methods, such as psychotherapy, are both means of discovery and means of becoming. Christou's work brought together Jung's analytical psychology and mid-century British philosophy in order to stake out the ground for psychology that would be an empirical analysis of psychological experience and a logical analysis of the concepts used in that psychology.

Après qu'Evangelos Christou (1923­1956) ait étudié la philosophie au King's College à Cambridge, avec Wittgenstein et d'autres, il fit un doctorat à l'Institut Jung de Zurich. Il retourna ensuite à Alexandrie, où il mourut peu de temps après dans un accident de voiture. The Logos of the Soul, publié à titre posthume, plaide pour une psychologie qui ne serait ni une psychologie scientifique naturelle, dédiée aux analyses causales, ni une discipline philosophique qui analyse les événements du mental. La psychologie serait une science autonome de l'âme, une inconnue distincte du corps et du mental. La science traite des corps et des comportements; la philosophie s'occupe des concepts et des actes. La psychologie s'intéresse à « l'expérience psychologique ¼. Les rêves et les fantasmes peuvent être des sources d'expérience psychologique, mais il en est de même pour les actes de perception et les actes du mental. Le sens apparait quand quelque chose rencontre un moi ou un soi dans une expérience psychologique. L'observation en psychologie est une observation participative, qui s'apparente à être témoin d'une pièce dramatique. Les méthodes psychologiques, telles la psychothérapie, sont à la fois des moyens d'exploration et des moyens pour devenir. L'œuvre de Christou a relié la psychologie analytique de Jung et la philosophie britannique du milieu du siècle afin de revendiquer le terrain pour une psychologie qui serait une analyse empirique de l'expérience psychologique et une analyse logique des concepts utilisés dans cette psychologie.

Luego de estudiar filosofía en el King's College de Cambridge, con Wittgenstein y otros, Evangelos Christou (1923­1956) obtuvo un doctorado en el Instituto Jung de Zúrich. Posteriormente regresó a su casa en Alejandría, cerca de la cual murió en un accidente de auto. El Logos del alma, publicado póstumamente, abogaba por una psicología que no fuera ni una psicología científica natural, dedicada a los análisis causales, ni una disciplina filosófica que analizara los acontecimientos mentales. La psicología sería una ciencia autónoma del alma, lo desconocido distinto del cuerpo y de la mente. La ciencia se ocupa de los cuerpos y las conductas; la filosofía, de los conceptos y los actos mentales. La psicología se ocupa de la "experiencia psicológica". Los sueños y las fantasías pueden ser fuentes de experiencia psicológica, pero también los actos perceptivos y mentales. El sentido se produce cuando algo se encuentra con un ego o un self en una experiencia psicológica. La observación en psicología es una observación participante, similar a ser testigo de un drama. Los métodos psicológicos, como la psicoterapia, son a la vez medios de descubrimiento y medios de devenir. La obra de Christou reunió la psicología analítica de Jung y la filosofía británica de mediados de siglo para sentar las bases de una psicología que fuera un análisis empírico de la experiencia psicológica y un análisis lógico de los conceptos utilizados en esa psicología.

Berkeley on true motion.

Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of consistency with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of adequacy, namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the consistency and the adequacy problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science.

Explanation, teleology, and analogy in natural history and comparative anatomy around 1800: Kant and Cuvier.

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant's philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant's philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant's philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant's philosophy of science in crucial respects.

R.A. Fisher, indeterminism, and the fundamental theorem of natural selection.

This paper is about the relationship between R.A. Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection (FTNS) and the two major pieces that Fisher wrote on indeterminism, "Indeterminism and Natural Selection" (1934) and Creative Aspects of Natural Law (1950). I argue that the FTNS presents a picture of natural selection that is interestingly different from what we find in these two indeterminism pieces, pace some recent work that advances the opposite conclusion. I also identify as the source of this difference both the mathematical form of the FTNS (i.e., a differential equation) and Fisher's meta-scientific commitment to advancing "general" claims about evolution.

The problem of context revisited: Moving beyond the resources model.

The problem of context, which explores relations between societal conditions and science, has a long and contentious tradition in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. While the problem has received little explicit attention in recent years, two contemporary positions remain evident. First is the resources model, which seeks to maintain the autonomy of scientists by denying contextual influence, restricting the role of contexts to providing a pool of 'novel inputs'. Second is the contextual shaping position which recognizes that societal conditions influence science but remains conceptually vague and theoretically undeveloped. This paper argues, given current disciplinary conditions, the problem of context deserves renewed attention. In this paper I first review the history of the debate from the 1930s, highlighting several anxieties that continue to hamper the open study of the problem. After this historical review, I provide a critique of the resources model and assess the possibilities and shortfalls of the contextual shaping position. By addressing past and present perspectives, my goal is to move firmly beyond narrow accounts of context, as exemplified by the resources model. Instead, I propose a renewed program of research in which rich empirical studies are combined with equally rich theoretical work directed toward developing conceptual tools better able to capture the multiple intricacies evident in context-science relations.

Bringing thought experiments back into the philosophy of science.

To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them.

Descartes on certainty in deduction.

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many "acts of conceiving" it requires and-third-the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one's intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction.

"Naked life": the vital meaning of nutrition in Claude Bernard's physiology.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the vital meaning and strategic role that nutrition holds in Claude Bernard's  "biological philosophy", in the sense Auguste Comte gave to this expression, i.e. the theoretical part of biology. I propose that Bernard's nutritive perspective on life should be thought of as an  "interfield" object, following Holmes' category. Not only does nutrition bridge disciplines like physiology and organic chemistry, as well as levels of inquiry ranging from special physiology to the organism's total level, including the cell and protoplasm, but it also forms the genetic and structural foundation for Bernard's two fundamental axioms in general physiology: the necessary complementarity of destruction and creation (1) and the uniformity of this physiological law across all life forms, be it plants or animals (2). Because Bernard's nutritive theory is a major pivot for the re-ordering of life and its characterization, I argue that it must be located and understood in the scientific and metaphysical context of his time, of which he claims to be the heir and challenger-what I propose to characterize as the  "epistemic space" of nutrition, on the background of which Bernard builds his own  "logic". I then set out this logic of nutrition, focusing on three interrelated bernardian theses: the establishment of the theory of indirect nutrition as the basis for the notion of  "milieu intérieur"; the enduring conception of nutrition as a continuous generation; the emphasis on nutrition as a way of reshaping the form/matter relationship.