Empirically testing a relationship between cooperation and the prime numbers.

ABSTRACT

Theoretical models suggest a relationship between cooperation and the prime numbers. In environments where agents play multiple one-shot prisoner's dilemma games per generation, cooperators evolve to fixation more frequently when cooperating on a cyclical schedule with a prime-number period length. This finding parrots classic predator-prey models showing selection for prime-number prey life cycles. Here, I report an empirical test of the former models using previously published data concerning humans playing one-shot public goods games across multiple time points-i.e. an analogue to multiple one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. I find very modest evidence of cyclicality at prime-numbered time intervals, though results indicate rough agreement between theoretical predictions and observed rates of full cooperation across time points. Analyses of individual decisions find increased contributions to the public good at prime-number time points and separate placebo tests indicate a 4-in-1000 chance of spuriously estimating this effect. However, when exploratory analyses exclude low-value prime-numbered time points, the magnitude of the estimated effect decreases and the hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected, implying that low-value, prime-number time points drive estimates, contrary to theoretical model predictions. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis of increased cooperation at prime-number time points-at least among humans playing public goods games.