Spread in climate policy scenarios unravelled.

Analysis of climate policy scenarios has become an important tool for identifying mitigation strategies, as shown in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III report1. The key outcomes of these scenarios differ substantially not only because of model and climate target differences but also because of different assumptions on behavioural, technological and socio-economic developments2-4. A comprehensive attribution of the spread in climate policy scenarios helps policymakers, stakeholders and scientists to cope with large uncertainties in this field. Here we attribute this spread to the underlying drivers using Sobol decomposition5, yielding the importance of each driver for scenario outcomes. As expected, the climate target explains most of the spread in greenhouse gas emissions, total and sectoral fossil fuel use, total renewable energy and total carbon capture and storage in electricity generation. Unexpectedly, model differences drive variation of most other scenario outcomes, for example, in individual renewable and carbon capture and storage technologies, and energy in demand sectors, reflecting intrinsic uncertainties about long-term developments and the range of possible mitigation strategies. Only a few scenario outcomes, such as hydrogen use, are driven by other scenario assumptions, reflecting the need for more scenario differentiation. This attribution analysis distinguishes areas of consensus as well as strong model dependency, providing a crucial step in correctly interpreting scenario results for robust decision-making.

Safe and just Earth system boundaries.

The stability and resilience of the Earth system and human well-being are inseparably linked1-3, yet their interdependencies are generally under-recognized; consequently, they are often treated independently4,5. Here, we use modelling and literature assessment to quantify safe and just Earth system boundaries (ESBs) for climate, the biosphere, water and nutrient cycles, and aerosols at global and subglobal scales. We propose ESBs for maintaining the resilience and stability of the Earth system (safe ESBs) and minimizing exposure to significant harm to humans from Earth system change (a necessary but not sufficient condition for justice)4. The stricter of the safe or just boundaries sets the integrated safe and just ESB. Our findings show that justice considerations constrain the integrated ESBs more than safety considerations for climate and atmospheric aerosol loading. Seven of eight globally quantified safe and just ESBs and at least two regional safe and just ESBs in over half of global land area are already exceeded. We propose that our assessment provides a quantitative foundation for safeguarding the global commons for all people now and into the future.

Plastic futures and their CO2 emissions.

Plastics show the strongest production growth of all bulk materials and are already responsible for 4.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions1,2. If no new policies are implemented, we project a doubling of global plastic demand by 2050 and more than a tripling by 2100, with an almost equivalent increase in CO2 emissions. Here we analyse three alternative CO2 emission-mitigation pathways for the global plastics sector until 2100, covering the entire life cycle from production to waste management. Our results show that, through bio-based carbon sequestration in plastic products, a combination of biomass use and landfilling can achieve negative emissions in the long term; however, this involves continued reliance on primary feedstock. A circular economy approach without an additional bioeconomy push reduces resource consumption by 30% and achieves 10% greater emission reductions before 2050 while reducing the potential of negative emissions in the long term. A circular bioeconomy approach combining recycling with higher biomass use could ultimately turn the sector into a net carbon sink, while at the same time phasing out landfilling and reducing resource consumption. Our work improves the representation of material flows and the circular economy in global energy and emission models, and provides insight into long-term dynamics in the plastics sector.

Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions.

Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help to mitigate climate change by discouraging inefficient energy consumption and levelling the playing field for renewable energy. In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 commitment (at the G20 Leaders' Summit) to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and many national governments are using today's low oil prices as an opportunity to do so. In practical terms, this means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market prices. However, whether the removal of subsidies, even if implemented worldwide, would have a large impact on climate change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would have an unexpectedly small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions and would not increase renewable energy use by 2030. Subsidy removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2-12 per cent under low oil prices. Removing subsidies in most regions would deliver smaller emission reductions than the Paris Agreement (2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal replacing subsidized oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting from subsidizing, energy-exporting regions to non-subsidizing, importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal would result in the largest CO2 emission reductions in high-income oil- and gas-exporting regions, where the reductions would exceed the climate pledges of these regions and where subsidy removal would affect fewer people living below the poverty line than in lower-income regions.

Carbon for soils, not soils for carbon.

The role of soil organic carbon (SOC) sequestration as a 'win-win' solution to both climate change and food insecurity receives an increasing promotion. The opportunity may be too good to be missed! Yet the tremendous complexity of the two issues at stake calls for a detailed and nuanced examination of any potential solution, no matter how appealing. Here, we critically re-examine the benefits of global SOC sequestration strategies on both climate change mitigation and food production. While estimated contributions of SOC sequestration to climate change vary, almost none take SOC saturation into account. Here, we show that including saturation in estimations decreases any potential contribution of SOC sequestration to climate change mitigation by 53%-81% towards 2100. In addition, reviewing more than 21 meta-analyses, we found that observed yield effects of increasing SOC are inconsistent, ranging from negative to neutral to positive. We find that the promise of a win-win outcome is confirmed only when specific land management practices are applied under specific conditions. Therefore, we argue that the existing knowledge base does not justify the current trend to set global agendas focusing first and foremost on SOC sequestration. Away from climate-smart soils, we need a shift towards soil-smart agriculture, adaptative and adapted to each local context, and where multiple soil functions are quantified concurrently. Only such comprehensive assessments will allow synergies for land sustainability to be maximised and agronomic requirements for food security to be fulfilled. This implies moving away from global targets for SOC in agricultural soils. SOC sequestration may occur along this pathway and contribute to climate change mitigation and should be regarded as a co-benefit.

Global change scenarios in coastal river deltas and their sustainable development implications.

Deltas play a critical role in the ambition to achieve global sustainable development given their relatively large shares in population and productive croplands, as well as their precarious low-lying position between upstream river basin development and rising seas. The large pressures on these systems risk undermining the persistence of delta societies, economies, and ecosystems. We analyse possible future development in 49 deltas around the globe under the Shared Socio-economic and Representative Concentration Pathways until 2100. Population density, urban fraction, and total and irrigated cropland fraction are three to twelve times greater in these deltas, on average, than in the rest of the world. Maximum river water discharges are projected to increase by 11-33 % and river sediment discharges are projected to decrease 26-37 % on average, depending on the scenario. Regional sea-level rise reaches almost 1.0 m by 2100 for certain deltas in the worst-case scenario, increasing to almost 2.0 m of relative rise considering land subsidence. Extreme sea levels could be much higher still-reaching over 4.0 m by 2100 for six of the 49 deltas analysed. Socio-economic conditions to support adaptation are the weakest among deltas with the greatest pressures, compounding the challenge of sustainable development. Asian and African deltas stand out as having heightened socio-economic challenges-huge population and land use pressures in most Asian deltas and the Nile delta; low capacity for adaptation in most African deltas and the Irrawaddy delta. Although, deltas in other parts of the world are not immune from these and other pressures, either. Because of unique pressures and processes operating in deltas, as in other "hotspots" such as small islands, mountains, and semi-arid areas, we recommend greater consideration and conceptualisation of environmental processes in global sustainable development agendas and in the Integrated Assessment Models used to guide global policy.

Social tipping dynamics for stabilizing Earth's climate by 2050.

Safely achieving the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement requires a worldwide transformation to carbon-neutral societies within the next 30 y. Accelerated technological progress and policy implementations are required to deliver emissions reductions at rates sufficiently fast to avoid crossing dangerous tipping points in the Earth's climate system. Here, we discuss and evaluate the potential of social tipping interventions (STIs) that can activate contagious processes of rapidly spreading technologies, behaviors, social norms, and structural reorganization within their functional domains that we refer to as social tipping elements (STEs). STEs are subdomains of the planetary socioeconomic system where the required disruptive change may take place and lead to a sufficiently fast reduction in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The results are based on online expert elicitation, a subsequent expert workshop, and a literature review. The STIs that could trigger the tipping of STE subsystems include 1) removing fossil-fuel subsidies and incentivizing decentralized energy generation (STE1, energy production and storage systems), 2) building carbon-neutral cities (STE2, human settlements), 3) divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels (STE3, financial markets), 4) revealing the moral implications of fossil fuels (STE4, norms and value systems), 5) strengthening climate education and engagement (STE5, education system), and 6) disclosing information on greenhouse gas emissions (STE6, information feedbacks). Our research reveals important areas of focus for larger-scale empirical and modeling efforts to better understand the potentials of harnessing social tipping dynamics for climate change mitigation.

Extending shared socio-economic pathways for pesticide use in Europe: Pest-Agri-SSPs.

While pesticides are essential to agriculture and food systems to sustain current production levels, they also lead to significant environmental impacts. The use of pesticides is constantly increasing globally, driven mainly by a further intensification of agriculture, despite stricter regulations and higher pesticide effectiveness. To further the understanding of future pesticide use and make informed farm-to-policy decisions, we developed Pesticide Agricultural Shared Socio-economic Pathways (Pest-AgriSSPs) in six steps. The Pest-Agri-SSPs are developed based on an extensive literature review and expert feedback approach considering significant climate and socio-economic drivers from farm to continental scale in combination with multiple actors impacting them. In literature, pesticide use is associated with farmer behaviour and practices, pest damage, technique and efficiency of pesticide application, agricultural policy and agriculture demand and production. Here, we developed PestAgri-SSPs upon this understanding of pesticide use drivers and relating them to possible agriculture development as described by the Shared Socio-economic Pathways for European agriculture and food systems (Eur-Agri-SSPs).The Pest-AgriSSPs are developed to explore European pesticide use in five scenarios representing low to high challenges to mitigation and adaptation up to 2050. The most sustainable scenario (Pest-Agri-SSP1) shows a decrease in pesticide use owing to sustainable agricultural practices, technological advances and better implementation of agricultural policies. On the contrary, the Pest-Agri-SSP3 and Pest-Agri-SSP4 show a higher increase in pesticide use resulting from higher challenges from pest pressure, resource depletion and relaxed agricultural policies. Pest-Agri-SSP2 presents a stabilised pesticide use resulting from stricter policies and slow transitions by farmers to sustainable agricultural practices. At the same time, pest pressure, climate change and food demand pose serious challenges. Pest-Agri-SSP5 shows a decrease in pesticide use for most drivers, influenced mainly by rapid technological development and sustainable agricultural practices. However, Pest-Agri-SSP5 also presents a relatively low rise in pesticide use driven by agricultural demand, production, and climate change. Our results highlight the need for a holistic approach to tackle pesticide use, considering the identified drivers and future developments. The storylines and qualitative assessment provide a platform to make quantitative assumptions for numerical modelling and evaluating policy targets.

Costs and benefits of protecting linear landscape elements: Applying systematic conservation planning on a case study in the Netherlands.

Protecting and increasing linear landscape elements (LLEs) in agricultural lands is regarded as a possible solution for a transition to a more biodiverse agricultural system. However, optimizing the spatial configuration of LLEs protected areas is challenging, especially given the demand for land for food production. Systematic Conservation Planning (SCP) can address this challenge, by prioritizing cost-efficient protection areas. We used a SCP approach to look at the LLEs network in the Province of Noord-Brabant in the Netherlands, identifying the possible trade-off between optimizing species conservation, costs and the monetary values of ecosystem services (ES). For this we defined two scenarios. One scenario focuses on achieving species conservation targets at the minimum cost, and the other focuses on achieving targets while maximizing the benefits provided by ES. For each scenario, we further developed two land-management options, namely land-sharing and land-sparing. For each solution, we tested their cost-effectiveness by calculating implementation costs, economic benefits provided by ES, and cost/benefit ratios. First, our scenario analysis indicates that the economic benefits provided by ES always outweigh the implementation costs. Second, it shows that including ES as co-benefits in SCP (Maximize ES Scenario) yields more cost-efficient conservation solutions. Third, both land-sharing and land-sparing are possible cost-efficient approaches to achieve conservation targets. Our results are spatially explicit and identify crucial habitat areas for the conservation of the selected species, which represent 12-20% of the current unprotected network of LLEs. Our findings showcase net economic benefit of conserving species and LLEs, thus representing an additional reason for biodiversity conservation.

Afforestation for climate change mitigation: Potentials, risks and trade-offs.

Afforestation is considered a cost-effective and readily available climate change mitigation option. In recent studies afforestation is presented as a major solution to limit climate change. However, estimates of afforestation potential vary widely. Moreover, the risks in global mitigation policy and the negative trade-offs with food security are often not considered. Here we present a new approach to assess the economic potential of afforestation with the IMAGE 3.0 integrated assessment model framework. In addition, we discuss the role of afforestation in mitigation pathways and the effects of afforestation on the food system under increasingly ambitious climate targets. We show that afforestation has a mitigation potential of 4.9 GtCO2 /year at 200 US$/tCO2 in 2050 leading to large-scale application in an SSP2 scenario aiming for 2°C (410 GtCO2 cumulative up to 2100). Afforestation reduces the overall costs of mitigation policy. However, it may lead to lower mitigation ambition and lock-in situations in other sectors. Moreover, it bears risks to implementation and permanence as the negative emissions are increasingly located in regions with high investment risks and weak governance, for example in Sub-Saharan Africa. Afforestation also requires large amounts of land (up to 1,100 Mha) leading to large reductions in agricultural land. The increased competition for land could lead to higher food prices and an increased population at risk of hunger. Our results confirm that afforestation has substantial potential for mitigation. At the same time, we highlight that major risks and trade-offs are involved. Pathways aiming to limit climate change to 2°C or even 1.5°C need to minimize these risks and trade-offs in order to achieve mitigation sustainably.

Projecting terrestrial biodiversity intactness with GLOBIO 4.

Scenario-based biodiversity modelling is a powerful approach to evaluate how possible future socio-economic developments may affect biodiversity. Here, we evaluated the changes in terrestrial biodiversity intactness, expressed by the mean species abundance (MSA) metric, resulting from three of the shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) combined with different levels of climate change (according to representative concentration pathways [RCPs]): a future oriented towards sustainability (SSP1xRCP2.6), a future determined by a politically divided world (SSP3xRCP6.0) and a future with continued global dependency on fossil fuels (SSP5xRCP8.5). To this end, we first updated the GLOBIO model, which now runs at a spatial resolution of 10 arc-seconds (~300 m), contains new modules for downscaling land use and for quantifying impacts of hunting in the tropics, and updated modules to quantify impacts of climate change, land use, habitat fragmentation and nitrogen pollution. We then used the updated model to project terrestrial biodiversity intactness from 2015 to 2050 as a function of land use and climate changes corresponding with the selected scenarios. We estimated a global area-weighted mean MSA of 0.56 for 2015. Biodiversity intactness declined in all three scenarios, yet the decline was smaller in the sustainability scenario (-0.02) than the regional rivalry and fossil-fuelled development scenarios (-0.06 and -0.05 respectively). We further found considerable variation in projected biodiversity change among different world regions, with large future losses particularly for sub-Saharan Africa. In some scenario-region combinations, we projected future biodiversity recovery due to reduced demands for agricultural land, yet this recovery was counteracted by increased impacts of other pressures (notably climate change and road disturbance). Effective measures to halt or reverse the decline of terrestrial biodiversity should not only reduce land demand (e.g. by increasing agricultural productivity and dietary changes) but also focus on reducing or mitigating the impacts of other pressures.

Scenarios for Demand Growth of Metals in Electricity Generation Technologies, Cars, and Electronic Appliances.

This study provides scenarios toward 2050 for the demand of five metals in electricity production, cars, and electronic appliances. The metals considered are copper, tantalum, neodymium, cobalt, and lithium. The study shows how highly technology-specific data on products and material flows can be used in integrated assessment models to assess global resource and metal demand. We use the Shared Socio-economic Pathways as implemented by the IMAGE integrated assessment model as a starting point. This allows us to translate information on the use of electronic appliances, cars, and renewable energy technologies into quantitative data on metal flows, through application of metal content estimates in combination with a dynamic stock model. Results show that total demand for copper, neodymium, and tantalum might increase by a factor of roughly 2 to 3.2, mostly as a result of population and GDP growth. The demand for lithium and cobalt is expected to increase much more, by a factor 10 to more than 20, as a result of future (hybrid) electric car purchases. This means that not just demographics, but also climate policies can strongly increase metal demand. This shows the importance of studying the issues of climate change and resource depletion together, in one modeling framework.

Uncertain Environmental Footprint of Current and Future Battery Electric Vehicles.

The future environmental impacts of battery electric vehicles (EVs) are very important given their expected dominance in future transport systems. Previous studies have shown these impacts to be highly uncertain, though a detailed treatment of this uncertainty is still lacking. We help to fill this gap by using Monte Carlo and global sensitivity analysis to quantify parametric uncertainty and also consider two additional factors that have not yet been addressed in the field. First, we include changes to driving patterns due to the introduction of autonomous and connected vehicles. Second, we deeply integrate scenario results from the IMAGE integrated assessment model into our life cycle database to include the impacts of changes to the electricity sector on the environmental burdens of producing and recharging future EVs. Future EVs are expected to have 45-78% lower climate change impacts than current EVs. Electricity used for charging is the largest source of variability in results, though vehicle size, lifetime, driving patterns, and battery size also strongly contribute to variability. We also show that it is imperative to consider changes to the electricity sector when calculating upstream impacts of EVs, as without this, results could be overestimated by up to 75%.

Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C: a tale of turning around in no time?

We explore the feasibility of limiting global warming to 1.5°C without overshoot and without the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. For this purpose, we perform a sensitivity analysis of four generic emissions reduction measures to identify a lower bound on future CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. Final energy demand reductions and electrification of energy end uses as well as decarbonization of electricity and non-electric energy supply are all considered. We find the lower bound of cumulative fossil fuel and industry CO2 emissions to be 570 GtCO2 for the period 2016-2100, around 250 GtCO2 lower than the lower end of available 1.5°C mitigation pathways generated with integrated assessment models. Estimates of 1.5°C-consistent CO2 budgets are highly uncertain and range between 100 and 900 GtCO2 from 2016 onwards. Based on our sensitivity analysis, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require CDR or terrestrial net carbon uptake if 1.5°C-consistent budgets are smaller than 650 GtCO2 The earlier CDR is deployed, the more it neutralizes post-2020 emissions rather than producing net negative emissions. Nevertheless, if the 1.5°C budget is smaller than 550 GtCO2, temporary overshoot of the 1.5°C limit becomes unavoidable if CDR cannot be ramped up faster than to 4 GtCO2 in 2040 and 10 GtCO2 in 2050.This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

Climate extremes, land-climate feedbacks and land-use forcing at 1.5°C.

This article investigates projected changes in temperature and water cycle extremes at 1.5°C of global warming, and highlights the role of land processes and land-use changes (LUCs) for these projections. We provide new comparisons of changes in climate at 1.5°C versus 2°C based on empirical sampling analyses of transient simulations versus simulations from the 'Half a degree Additional warming, Prognosis and Projected Impacts' (HAPPI) multi-model experiment. The two approaches yield similar overall results regarding changes in climate extremes on land, and reveal a substantial difference in the occurrence of regional extremes at 1.5°C versus 2°C. Land processes mediated through soil moisture feedbacks and land-use forcing play a major role for projected changes in extremes at 1.5°C in most mid-latitude regions, including densely populated areas in North America, Europe and Asia. This has important implications for low-emissions scenarios derived from integrated assessment models (IAMs), which include major LUCs in ambitious mitigation pathways (e.g. associated with increased bioenergy use), but are also shown to differ in the simulated LUC patterns. Biogeophysical effects from LUCs are not considered in the development of IAM scenarios, but play an important role for projected regional changes in climate extremes, and are thus of high relevance for sustainable development pathways.This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

Reducing emissions from agriculture to meet the 2 °C target.

More than 100 countries pledged to reduce agricultural greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the 2015 Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Yet technical information about how much mitigation is needed in the sector vs. how much is feasible remains poor. We identify a preliminary global target for reducing emissions from agriculture of ~1 GtCO2 e yr-1 by 2030 to limit warming in 2100 to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. Yet plausible agricultural development pathways with mitigation cobenefits deliver only 21-40% of needed mitigation. The target indicates that more transformative technical and policy options will be needed, such as methane inhibitors and finance for new practices. A more comprehensive target for the 2 °C limit should be developed to include soil carbon and agriculture-related mitigation options. Excluding agricultural emissions from mitigation targets and plans will increase the cost of mitigation in other sectors or reduce the feasibility of meeting the 2 °C limit.

The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment.

Advances in the science and observation of climate change are providing a clearer understanding of the inherent variability of Earth's climate system and its likely response to human and natural influences. The implications of climate change for the environment and society will depend not only on the response of the Earth system to changes in radiative forcings, but also on how humankind responds through changes in technology, economies, lifestyle and policy. Extensive uncertainties exist in future forcings of and responses to climate change, necessitating the use of scenarios of the future to explore the potential consequences of different response options. To date, such scenarios have not adequately examined crucial possibilities, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, and have relied on research processes that slowed the exchange of information among physical, biological and social scientists. Here we describe a new process for creating plausible scenarios to investigate some of the most challenging and important questions about climate change confronting the global community.

Exploring global changes in nitrogen and phosphorus cycles in agriculture induced by livestock production over the 1900-2050 period.

Crop-livestock production systems are the largest cause of human alteration of the global nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) cycles. Our comprehensive spatially explicit inventory of N and P budgets in livestock and crop production systems shows that in the beginning of the 20th century, nutrient budgets were either balanced or surpluses were small; between 1900 and 1950, global soil N surplus almost doubled to 36 trillion grams (Tg) · y(-1) and P surplus increased by a factor of 8 to 2 Tg · y(-1). Between 1950 and 2000, the global surplus increased to 138 Tg · y(-1) of N and 11 Tg · y(-1) of P. Most surplus N is an environmental loss; surplus P is lost by runoff or accumulates as residual soil P. The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development scenario portrays a world with a further increasing global crop (+82% for 2000-2050) and livestock production (+115%); despite rapidly increasing recovery in crop (+35% N recovery and +6% P recovery) and livestock (+35% N and P recovery) production, global nutrient surpluses continue to increase (+23% N and +54% P), and in this period, surpluses also increase in Africa (+49% N and +236% P) and Latin America (+75% N and +120% P). Alternative management of livestock production systems shows that combinations of intensification, better integration of animal manure in crop production, and matching N and P supply to livestock requirements can effectively reduce nutrient flows. A shift in human diets, with poultry or pork replacing beef, can reduce nutrient flows in countries with intensive ruminant production.