The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner.

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain.

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

Being nice by choice: The effect of counterfactual reasoning on children's social evaluations.

The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice. Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice. Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice. Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.

The impact of free will beliefs on implicit learning.

A growing number of studies demonstrate that belief in free will (FWB) is dynamic, and can be reduced experimentally. Most of these studies assume that doing so has beneficial effects on behavior, as FWBs are thought to subdue unwanted automatic processes (e.g. racial stereotypes). However, relying on automatic processes can sometimes be advantageous, for instance during implicit learning (e.g. detecting and exploiting statistical regularities in the environment). In this registered report, we tested whether experimentally reducing FWBs positively affected implicit motor learning. We hypothesized that reducing FWBs would lead to both faster and stronger implicit learning, as measured using the alternating serial reaction time (ASRT) task. While we did show a manipulation effect on free will beliefs, there was no detectable effect on implicit learning processes. This finding adds to the growing body of evidence that free will belief manipulations do not meaningfully affect downstream behavior.

The role of free will beliefs in social behavior: Priority areas for future research.

Recent research has examined the consequences that holding views about free will has on social behavior. Specifically, through manipulating people's belief in free will, researchers have tested the psychological and behavioral consequences of free will belief change. However, findings of such manipulations have been shown to be relatively small and inconsistent. The purpose of this paper is to outline four key areas for researchers in this area to consider. We believe considering these areas will give a more nuanced understanding of the role of free will beliefs.

Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis.

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

Is punishment backward? On neurointerventions and forward-looking moral responsibility.

This article focuses on justified responses to "immoral" behavior and crimes committed by patients undergoing neuromodulation therapies. Such patients could be held morally responsible in the basic desert sense-the one that serves as a justification of severe practices such as backward-looking moral outrage, condemnation, and legal punishment-as long as they possess certain compatibilist capabilities that have traditionally served as the quintessence of free will, that is, reasons-responsiveness; attributability; answerability; the abilities to act in accordance with moral reasons, second-order volitions, or Deep Self. Recently leading compatibilist neuroethicists added the condition of not feeling alienated from desires motivating a person's action. This article argues against such attempts to determine conditions under which patients undergoing neuromodulation should be subject to negative reactive attitudes and legal punishment. Compatibilism should not be used to justify basic desert moral responsibility and legal punishment. Instead, a new way of thinking about the function of moral responsibility attribution is proposed for patients with neuromodulation. Their compatibilist capabilities should serve as important indicators for determining appropriate, forward-looking courses of action, such as quarantining and restorative treatment, to ensure the public safety and well-being of the patients.

Free Agency and Determinism: Is There a Sensible Definition of Computational Sourcehood?

Can free agency be compatible with determinism? Compatibilists argue that the answer is yes, and it has been suggested that the computer science principle of "computational irreducibility" sheds light on this compatibility. It implies that there cannot, in general, be shortcuts to predict the behavior of agents, explaining why deterministic agents often appear to act freely. In this paper, we introduce a variant of computational irreducibility that intends to capture more accurately aspects of actual (as opposed to apparent) free agency, including computational sourcehood, i.e., the phenomenon that the successful prediction of a process' behavior must typically involve an almost-exact representation of the relevant features of that process, regardless of the time it takes to arrive at the prediction. We argue that this can be understood as saying that the process itself is the source of its actions, and we conjecture that many computational processes have this property. The main contribution of this paper is technical, in that we analyze whether and how a sensible formal definition of computational sourcehood is possible. While we do not answer the question completely, we show how it is related to finding a particular simulation preorder on Turing machines, we uncover concrete stumbling blocks towards constructing such a definition, and demonstrate that structure-preserving (as opposed to merely simple or efficient) functions between levels of simulation play a crucial role.

How Psychiatrists' Beliefs on Free Will Influence Their Clinical Practice.

BACKROUND: Literature suggests that most people believe in free will and that this belief is associated with more prosocial behavior. However, with the advent of neuroscience, free will seems to have been progressively excluded from psychiatry. This paper is a narrative literature review of the ways in which mental health professionals' premises and beliefs in free will influence their clinical practice. METHODS: The Scopus database was searched for papers concerning free will and psychiatric practice, 24 papers were included. This review looks at explicit links made by authors between free will and clinical practice as well as logical threads linking a premise of free will to clinical implications. RESULTS: The results suggest that belief in free will leads to trying to strengthen free will in patients. It also appears to be associated with using meaning in psychotherapy, with self-blame in patients, and with ethical questions such as involuntary psychiatric care and assisted suicide requests. Some authors believe the concept of free will should be discarded to make place for concepts such as autonomy, agency, decision-making capacity and self-control. CONCLUSION: While definitional ambiguity and paucity of data are limiting, the results indicate that mental health professionals' beliefs concerning free will can influence their clinical practice. Concepts such as autonomy and agency can sometimes hide psychiatrists' underlying beliefs. Increasing mental health professionals' awareness of their beliefs could be beneficial for psychiatric care.

"One more time": time loops as a tool to investigate folk conceptions of moral responsibility and human agency.

In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have investigated folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, and their compatibility with determinism. To determine whether laypeople are "natural compatibilists" or "natural incompatibilists", they have used vignettes describing agents living in deterministic universes. However, later research has suggested that participants' answers to these studies are plagued with comprehension errors: either people fail to really accept that these universes are deterministic, or they confuse determinism with something else. This had led certain experimenters to conclude that maybe folk intuitions about the compatibility of free will with determinism could not be empirically investigated. Here, we propose that we should refrain from embracing this pessimistic conclusion, as scenarios involving time loops might allow experiments to bypass most of these methodological issues. Indeed, scenarios involving time loops belong both to the philosophical literature on free will and to popular culture. As such, they might constitute a bridge between the two worlds. We present the results of five studies using time loops to investigate people's intuitions about determinism, free will and moral responsibility. The results of these studies allow us to reach two conclusions. The first is that, when people are introduced to determinism through time loops, they do seem to understand what determinism entails. The second is that, at least in the context of time loops, people do not seem to consider determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-023-04245-9.

Automata, reason, and free will: Leibniz's critique of Descartes on animal and human nature.

This paper argues that Leibniz's use of the concept of "automaton" to characterize the nature of souls and bodies of living beings constitutes a systematic critique of Descartes' earlier use of automata. Whereas Descartes conceived non-human animals in terms of mechanical automata, he also denied that the human rational soul can be modeled on the nature of an automaton. In contrast, Leibniz understood living things to involve both an organic body, or "natural automaton," as well as an immaterial soul, or "spiritual automaton," that spontaneously produces its own perceptions. In extending the concept of the automaton to souls, Leibniz rejected key Cartesian assumptions about animals and free will and draws on the concept of the automaton to understand a range of cognitive capacities including volition. Leibniz thus occupies a distinctive place in the history of the use of automata to understand the nature of living things.

Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert.

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility.

Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions.

Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will-especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an "easy" decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to "easy" than "hard" decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making.

Free will strikes back: Steady-state movement-related cortical potentials are modulated by cognitive control.

In psychology and neuroscience, opposition to free will has asserted that any degree of perceived self-control or choice is a mere epiphenomenon which provides no meaningful influence on action. The present research tested the validity of this conclusion by designing a paradigm in which the potential effect of self-monitoring on motor output could be investigated. Using a repetitive finger tapping task that evokes automatic patterns in participants tapping responses, we have obtained evidence that (1) participants may voluntarily reduce the predictability of their tapping patterns (2) by exercising cognitive control that (3) modulates response-locked steady-state movement-related potentials over primary and supplementary motor areas. These findings challenge the most radical accounts of the nonexistence of free will and instead provide support for a more balanced model of human behaviour in which cognitive control may constrain automatic response tendencies in response preparation and action execution.

A longitudinal evaluation of free will related cognitions in obsessive-compulsive disorder.

BACKGROUND: Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often feel compelled to perform (compulsive) behaviors, thus raising questions regarding their free will beliefs and experiences. In the present study, we investigated if free will related cognitions (free will beliefs or experiences) differed between OCD patients and healthy subjects and whether these cognitions predicted symptom changes after a one-year follow up. METHODS: Sixty OCD outpatients were assessed for their beliefs in and experiences of free will at baseline and after one year of treatment. A subsample of 18 OCD patients had their beliefs compared to 18 age and gender matched healthy controls. A regression analysis was performed to investigate whether free will cognitions at baseline were able to predict long-term OCD severity scores. RESULTS: Patients with OCD and healthy controls do not seem to differ in terms of their beliefs in free will (U = 156.0; p = 0.864). Nonetheless, we found significant negative correlation between (i) duration of illness and strength of belief in determinism (ρ = -0.317; p = 0.016), (ii) age and perception of having alternative possibilities (ρ = -0.275; p = 0.038), and (iii) symptoms' severity and perception of having alternative possibilities (ρ = -0.415; p = 0.001). On the other hand, the experience of being an owner of ones' actions was positive correlated with the severity of symptoms (ρ = 0.538; p < 0.001) and were able to predict the severity of OCD symptoms at the follow up assessment. CONCLUSIONS: Older individuals or those with a greater severity of symptoms seem to have a perception of decreased free will. In addition, patients with a longer duration of illness tend to have a lower strength of belief in determinism. Finally, the experience of being the owner of the compulsions, along with the baseline severity of symptoms, can be a predictor of a worse outcome in the OCD sample.

A jury of scientists: Formal education in biobehavioral sciences reduces the odds of punitive criminal sentencing.

This study examines how formal education in biological and behavioral sciences may impact punishment intuitions (views on criminal sentencing, free will, responsibility, and dangerousness) in cases involving neurobiological evidence. In a survey experiment, we compared intuitions between biobehavioral science and non-science university graduates by presenting them with a baseline case without a neurobiological explanation for offending followed by one of two cases with a neurobiological explanation (described as either innate or acquired biological influences to offending). An ordinal logistic regression indicated that both science and non-science graduates selected significantly more severe punishments for the baseline case as compared to when an innate neurobiological explanation for offending was provided. However, across all cases, science graduates selected significantly less severe sentences than non-science graduates, and only science graduates' decisions were mediated by free will and responsibility attributions. Findings are discussed in relation to scientific understandings of behavior, the impact of science education on attitudes towards punishment, and potential criminal-legal implications.

Involuntary classroom transition moderates the effect of Present Hedonistic perspective on the belief in free will.

Mitigation plans during the early stages of COVID-19 provided a unique, antagonistic environment in which drastic changes occurred quickly and did so with minimal freedom of choice (e.g., involuntary transition from in-person to online classroom). As such, individuals of different beliefs and perspectives would respond differently to these mitigations. We examined the interaction between the Present-Hedonistic (PH) perspective and involuntary classroom transition on the belief in free will (N = 131). PH-oriented individuals exhibit a strong desire for choice while also welcome new opportunities and change. Importantly, the perceived freedom of choice and capacity for change also serve as foundational constructs to the belief in free will. Our results revealed that involuntary transition weakened the free will belief in those with lower PH but did not affect those of higher PH orientation. These findings suggest that the interplay between the perception of choice and capacity for change account for how individuals responded to the COVID-19 pandemic mitigation plans.

[Free responsibility of the decision for an assisted suicide]. / Zur Freiverantwortlichkeit der Entscheidung für einen assistierten Suizid.

The verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on assisted suicide has led to lively debates in the medical world, in the German Federal Parliament and the civil society. In the conception of the German Federal Constitutional Court the determination of free responsibility is of central importance for a protection concept that aims to minimize an uncontrolled assistance to suicide; however, the forensic aspects of this task need to be substantiated. This article comments on this from a psychiatric aspect in order to include the perspective of our discipline in the progression of the discussion.

[Suicide prevention in the context of assisted suicide]. / Suizidprävention im Kontext des assistierten Suizids.

The verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court from 26 February 2020 made it clear that every person is granted the right to end his or her own life, provided it is the person's own free will. It is also within his or her rights to utilize assistance in doing so, if such assistance is offered. This freedom to end one's life and to utilize assistance is not limited to terminal illnesses or situations of unbearable suffering. However, the High Court has also demanded that lawmakers ensure the safety of vulnerable people by making certain that the decision for suicide is in fact made out of the person's own free will. This free decision-making capability can be substantially impaired by acute psychosocial stressors, by mental illnesses but also by third party influence. Therefore, a liberalization of assisted suicide must unconditionally be accompanied by a massive strengthening of suicide prevention measures, which clearly prioritize the help to live over the help to die. This article reviews the scientifically established methods for suicide prevention and makes demands to lawmakers to comprehensively implement such measures.

The Potential of a Thick Present through Undefined Causality and Non-Locality.

This paper elaborates on the interpretation of time and entanglement, offering insights into the possible ontological nature of information in the emergence of spacetime, towards a quantum description of gravity. We first investigate different perspectives on time and identify in the idea of a "thick present" the only element of reality needed to describe evolution, differences, and relations. The thick present is connected to a spacetime information "sampling rate", and it is intended as a time symmetric potential bounded between a causal past of irreversible events and a still open future. From this potential, spacetime emerges in each instant as a space-like foliation (in a description based on imaginary paths). In the second part, we analyze undefined causal orders to understand how their potential could persist along the thick present instants. Thanks to a C-NOT logic and the concept of an imaginary time, we derive a description of entanglement as the potential of a logically consistent open choice among imaginary paths. We then conceptually map the imaginary paths identified in the entanglement of the undefined orders to Closed Time-like Curves (CTC) in the thick present. Considering a universe described through information, CTC are interpreted as "memory loops", elementary structures encoding the information potential related to the entanglement in both time and space, manifested as undefined causality and non-locality in the emerging foliation. We conclude by suggesting a possible extension of the introduced concepts in a holographic perspective.