Emotion regulation during encoding reduces negative and enhances neutral mnemonic discrimination in individuals with depressive symptoms.

Individuals with depression exhibit dysfunctional emotion regulation, general episodic memory deficits, and a negativity bias, where negative experiences are better remembered. Recent work suggests that the negativity bias in depression may be driven by enhanced mnemonic discrimination, a memory measure that relies on hippocampal pattern separation - a computation that processes experiences with overlapping features as unique. Previously, we found that individuals with depressive symptoms show enhanced negative and impaired neutral mnemonic discrimination. The current study aimed to investigate emotion regulation as an approach toward modifying memory encoding of negative and neutral events in individuals with depressive symptoms. Here we show that applying psychological distancing (a cognitive reappraisal strategy characterized by taking a third-person perspective toward negative events) during encoding was associated with reduced negative and enhanced neutral mnemonic discrimination during retrieval in individuals with depressive symptoms. These results suggest that applying emotion regulation techniques during encoding may provide an effective approach toward altering dysfunctional memory in those with depressive symptoms. Given that pharmacological treatments often fail to treat depression, emotion regulation provides a powerful and practical approach toward modifying cognitive and emotional processes. Future neuroimaging studies will be important to determine how emotion regulation impacts the neural mechanisms underlying these findings.

Contextual influence of reinforcement learning performance of depression: evidence for a negativity bias?

BACKGROUNDS: Value-based decision-making impairment in depression is a complex phenomenon: while some studies did find evidence of blunted reward learning and reward-related signals in the brain, others indicate no effect. Here we test whether such reward sensitivity deficits are dependent on the overall value of the decision problem. METHODS: We used a two-armed bandit task with two different contexts: one 'rich', one 'poor' where both options were associated with an overall positive, negative expected value, respectively. We tested patients (N = 30) undergoing a major depressive episode and age, gender and socio-economically matched controls (N = 26). Learning performance followed by a transfer phase, without feedback, were analyzed to distangle between a decision or a value-update process mechanism. Finally, we used computational model simulation and fitting to link behavioral patterns to learning biases. RESULTS: Control subjects showed similar learning performance in the 'rich' and the 'poor' contexts, while patients displayed reduced learning in the 'poor' context. Analysis of the transfer phase showed that the context-dependent impairment in patients generalized, suggesting that the effect of depression has to be traced to the outcome encoding. Computational model-based results showed that patients displayed a higher learning rate for negative compared to positive outcomes (the opposite was true in controls). CONCLUSIONS: Our results illustrate that reinforcement learning performances in depression depend on the value of the context. We show that depressive patients have a specific trouble in contexts with an overall negative state value, which in our task is consistent with a negativity bias at the learning rates level.

Implicit intertemporal trajectories in cognitive representations of the self and nation.

Individual selves and the collectives to which people belong can be mentally represented as following intertemporal trajectories-progress, decline, or stasis. These studies examined the relation between intertemporal trajectories for the self and nation in American and British samples collected at the beginning and end of major COVID-19 restrictions. Implicit temporal trajectories can be inferred from asymmetries in the cognitive availability of positive and negative events across different mentally represented temporal periods (e.g., memory for the past and the imagined future). At the beginning of COVID-19 restrictions, both personal and collective temporal thought demonstrated implicit temporal trajectories of decline, in which future thought was less positive than memory. The usually reliable positivity biases in personal temporal thought may be reversable by major public events. This implicit trajectory of decline attenuated in personal temporal thought after the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions. However, collective temporal thought demonstrated a pervasive negativity bias across temporal domains at both data collection points, with the collective future more strongly negative than collective memory. Explicit beliefs concerning collective progress, decline, and hope for the national future corresponded to asymmetries in the cognitive availability of positive and negative events within collective temporal thought.

Can You Tell Who Scores? An Assessment of the Recognition of Affective States Based on the Nonverbal Behavior of Amateur Tennis Players in Competitive Matches.

The purpose of the present study was to assess whether the recognition of tennis players' affective state associated with their nonverbal behavior would be influenced by (a) the importance of the situation, (b) the point outcome, and (c) the tennis expertise of the observer. Two hundred sixty-nine participants (Mage = 30.51 years; 116 female; 79 tennis club members) watched video excerpts showing the nonverbal behavior of amateur tennis players during competitive matches immediately after the end of a rally and were asked to estimate whether the player had just won or lost the point. Results indicate that the recognition rates were higher for situations closer to the end of a game, closer to the end of a set, and with a tighter score during a game. Moreover, recognition rates were higher for lost than for won points, while the tennis expertise of participants had no influence on the recognition rates.

Political Orientation as Psychological Defense or Basic Disposition? A Social Neuroscience Examination.

Psychological views on political orientation generally agree that conservatism is associated with negativity bias but disagree on the form of that association. Some view conservatism as a psychological defense that insulates from negative stimuli and events. Others view conservatism as a consequence of increased dispositional sensitivity to negative stimuli and events. Further complicating matters, research shows that conservatives are sometimes more and sometimes less sensitive to negative stimuli and events. The current research integrates these opposing views and results. We reasoned that conservatives should typically be less sensitive to negative stimuli if conservative beliefs act as a psychological defense. However, when core components of conservative beliefs are threatened, the psychological defense may fall, and conservatives may show heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli. In two ERP studies, participants were randomly assigned to either an ostensibly real economic threat or a nonthreatening control condition. To measure reactivity to negative stimuli, we indexed the P3 component to aversive white noise bursts in an auditory oddball paradigm. In both studies, the relationship between increased conservatism and P3 mean amplitude was negative in the control condition but positive in threat condition (this relationship was stronger in Study 2). In Study 2, source localization of the P3 component revealed that, after threat, conservatism was associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, regions associated with conflict-related processes. These results demonstrate that the link between conservatism and negativity bias is context-dependent, i.e., dependent on threat experiences.

Cross-national evidence of a negativity bias in psychophysiological reactions to news.

What accounts for the prevalence of negative news content? One answer may lie in the tendency for humans to react more strongly to negative than positive information. "Negativity biases" in human cognition and behavior are well documented, but existing research is based on small Anglo-American samples and stimuli that are only tangentially related to our political world. This work accordingly reports results from a 17-country, 6-continent experimental study examining psychophysiological reactions to real video news content. Results offer the most comprehensive cross-national demonstration of negativity biases to date, but they also serve to highlight considerable individual-level variation in responsiveness to news content. Insofar as our results make clear the pervasiveness of negativity biases on average, they help account for the tendency for audience-seeking news around the world to be predominantly negative. Insofar as our results highlight individual-level variation, however, they highlight the potential for more positive content, and suggest that there may be reason to reconsider the conventional journalistic wisdom that "if it bleeds, it leads."

Continued influence of misinformation in times of COVID-19.

Health-related misinformation, especially in times of a global health crisis, can have severe negative consequences on public health. In the current studies, we investigated the persuasive impact of COVID-19-related misinformation, and whether the valence of the misinformation and recipients' degree of overconfidence affect this impact. In two pre-registered experimental studies, participants (N = 403; N = 437) were exposed to either a positive or a negative news article describing a fictional hospital's high COVID-19 recovery/mortality rates. Half of the participants subsequently received a correction. Attitudes towards the hospital were measured before and after exposure. Results of both studies showed that, as expected, corrections reduced the persuasive impact of misinformation. But whereas some persuasive impact remained for corrected negative misinformation (a continued influence effect), it reversed for corrected positive information, causing people to have more negative attitudes towards the hospital than before exposure to any information (a backfire effect). These results corroborate prior suggestions that continued influence effects are asymmetric: negative misinformation is harder to neutralise than positive misinformation. Participants' overconfidence degrees did not have a moderating role in misinformation effects. Even though corrections decrease the persuasive impact of health-related misinformation, continued influence remains for negative misinformation.

Is negativity bias intuitive for liberals and conservatives?

Previous research suggests that conservatives (right-wingers) tend to show more negativity bias than liberals (left-wingers) in several tasks. However, the majority of these studies are based on correlational findings and do not provide information on the cognitive underpinnings of this tendency. The current research investigated whether intuition promotes negativity bias and mitigates the ideological asymmetry in this domain in three underrepresented, non-western samples (Turkey). In line with the previous literature, we defined negativity bias as the tendency to interpret ambiguous faces as threatening. The results of the lab experiment revealed that negativity bias increases under high-cognitive load overall. In addition, this effect was moderated by the participants' political orientation (Experiment 1). In other words, when their cognitive resources were depleted, liberals became more like conservatives in terms of negativity bias. However, we failed to conceptually replicate this effect using time-limit manipulations in two online preregistered experiments during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the baseline negativity bias is thought to be already at peak. Thus, the findings provide no strong evidence for the idea that intuition promotes negativity bias and that liberals use cognitive effort to avoid this perceptual bias.

Improving cognitive functioning in major depressive disorder with psychedelics: A dimensional approach.

The high symptomatic and biological heterogeneity of major depressive disorder (MDD) makes it very difficult to find broadly efficacious treatments that work against all symptoms. Concentrating on single core symptoms that are biologically well understood might consist of a more viable approach. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework is a trans-diagnostic dimensional approach that focuses on symptoms and their underlying neurobiology. Evidence is accumulating that psychedelics may possess antidepressant activity, and this can potentially be explained through a multi-level (psychobiological, circuitry, (sub)cellular and molecular) analysis of the cognitive systems RDoC domain. Cognitive deficits, such as negative emotional processing and negativity bias, often lead to depressive rumination. Psychedelics can increase long-term cognitive flexibility, leading to normalization of negativity bias and reduction in rumination. We propose a theoretical model that explains how psychedelics can reduce the negativity bias in depressed patients. At the psychobiological level, we hypothesize that the negativity bias in MDD is due to impaired pattern separation and that psychedelics such as psilocybin help in depression because they enhance pattern separation and hence reduce negativity bias. Pattern separation is a mnemonic process that relies on adult hippocampal neurogenesis, where similar inputs are made more distinct, which is essential for optimal encoding of contextual information. Impairment in this process may underlie the negative cognitive bias in MDD by, for example, increased pattern separation of cues with a negative valence that can lead to excessive deliberation on aversive outcomes. On the (sub) cellular level, psychedelics stimulate hippocampal neurogenesis as well as synaptogenesis, spinogenesis and dendritogenesis in the prefrontal cortex. Together, these effects help restoring resilience to chronic stress and lead to modulation of the major connectivity hubs of the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala. Based on these observations, we propose a new translational framework to guide the development of a novel generation of therapeutics to treat the cognitive symptoms in MDD.

Exploring valence bias as a metric for frontoamygdalar connectivity and depressive symptoms in childhood.

Negativity bias is a core feature of depression that is associated with dysfunctional frontoamygdalar connectivity; this pathway is associated with emotion regulation and sensitive to neurobiological change during puberty. We used a valence bias task (ratings of emotional ambiguity) as a potential early indicator of depression risk and differences in frontoamygdalar connectivity. Previous work using this task demonstrated that children normatively have a negative bias that attenuates with maturation. Here, we test the hypothesis that persistence of this negativity bias as maturation ensues may reveal differences in emotion regulation development, and may be associated with increased risk for depression. In children aged 6-13 years, we tested the moderating role of puberty on relationships between valence bias, depressive symptoms, and frontoamygdalar connectivity. A negative bias was associated with increased depressive symptoms for those at more advanced pubertal stages (within this sample) and less regulatory frontoamygdalar connectivity, whereas a more positive bias was associated with more regulatory connectivity patterns. These data suggest that with maturation, individual differences in positivity biases and associated emotion regulation circuitry confer a differential risk for depression. Longitudinal work is necessary to determine the directionality of these effects and explore the influence of early life events.

The dynamic process of ambiguous emotion perception.

Everyday social interactions hinge on our ability to resolve uncertainty in nonverbal cues. For example, although some facial expressions (e.g. happy, angry) convey a clear affective meaning, others (e.g. surprise) are ambiguous, in that their meaning is determined by the context. Here, we used mouse-tracking to examine the underlying process of resolving uncertainty. Previous work has suggested an initial negativity, in part via faster response times for negative than positive ratings of surprise. We examined valence categorizations of filtered images in order to compare faster (low spatial frequencies; LSF) versus more deliberate processing (high spatial frequencies; HSF). When participants categorised faces as "positive", they first exhibited a partial attraction toward the competing ("negative") response option, and this effect was exacerbated for HSF than LSF faces. Thus, the effect of response conflict due to an initial negativity bias was exaggerated for HSF faces, likely because these images allow for greater deliberation than the LSFs. These results are consistent with the notion that more positive categorizations are characterised by an initial attraction to a default, negative response.

The affect of negativity: testing the Foreign Language Effect in three types of valence framing and a moral dilemma.

In decision-making people react differently to positive wordings than to negatives, which may be caused by negativity bias: a difference in emotional force of these wordings. Because emotions are assumed to be activated more strongly in one's mother tongue, we predict a Foreign Language Effect, being that such framing effects are larger in a native language than in a foreign one. In two experimental studies (N = 475 and N = 503) we tested this prediction for balanced and unbalanced second language users of Spanish and English and for three types of valence framing effects. In Study 1 we observed risky-choice framing effects and attribute framing effects, but these were always equally large for native and foreign-language speakers. In our second study, we added a footbridge dilemma to the framing materials. Only for this task we did observe a Foreign Language Effect, indicating more utilitarian choices when the dilemma is presented in L2. Hence, across two studies, we find no Foreign Language Effect for three types of valence framing but we do find evidence for such an effect in a moral decision task. We discuss several alternative explanations for these results.

Source memory and social exchange in young children.

Reciprocal interactions require memories of social exchanges; however, little is known about how we remember social partner actions, especially during childhood when we start forming peer-to-peer relationships. This study examined if the expectation-violation effect, which has been observed in adults' source memory, exists among 5-6-year-old children. Forty participants played a coin collection game where they either received or lost coins after being shown an individual with a smiling or angry expression. This set-up generated congruent (smiling-giver and angry-taker) versus incongruent (smiling-taker and angry-giver) conditions. In the subsequent tasks, the children were asked to recall which actions accompanied each individual. The children considered the person with incongruent conditions as being stranger than the person with congruent conditions, suggesting that the former violated the children's emotion-based expectations. However, no heightened source memory was found for the incongruent condition. Instead, children seem to better recognise the action of angry individuals than smiling individuals, suggesting that angry facial expressions are more salient for children's source memory in a social exchange.

Mood-congruent biases in facial emotion perception and their gender dependence.

Due to mood-congruency effects, we expect the emotion perceived on a face to be biased towards one's own mood. But the findings in the scant literature on such mood effects in normal healthy populations have not consistently and adequately supported this expectation. Employing effective mood manipulation techniques that ensured that the intended mood was sustained throughout the perception task, we explored mood-congruent intensity and recognition accuracy biases in emotion perception. Using realistic face stimuli with expressive cues of happiness and sadness, we demonstrated that happy, neutral and ambiguous expressions were perceived more positively in the positive than in the negative mood. The mood-congruency effect decreased with the degree of perceived negativity in the expression. Also, males were more affected by the mood-congruency effect in intensity perception than females. We suggest that the greater salience and better processing of negative stimuli and the superior cognitive ability of females in emotion perception are responsible for these observations. We found no evidence for mood-congruency effect in the recognition accuracy of emotions and suggest with supporting evidence that past reports of this effect may be attributed to response bias driven by mood.

A rational route to transformative decisions.

According to Paul (Transformative experience, 1st edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge to decision theory since their value cannot be anticipated. Building on Pettigrew's (in: Lambert, Schwenkler (eds) Becoming someone new: essays on transformative experience, choice, and change, Oxford University Press, pp 100-121, 2020) redescription, this paper presents a new approach to how and when transformative decisions can nevertheless be made rationally. Thanks to fundamental higher-order facts that apply to any kind of experience, an agent always at least knows the general shape of the utility space. This in combination with the knowledge about the non-transformative alternative in the choice set can enable rational decision-making despite the presence of a transformative experience. For example, this paper's approach provides novel arguments for why gender transition (cf. McKinnon in Res Philosophica 92(2):419-440, 2015) or staying childfree (cf. Barnes in Philos Phenomenol Res 91(3):775-786, 2015) can be rational.

The impact of emotional expressions on children's trust judgments.

Research on the development of selective trust has shown that young children do not indiscriminately trust all potential informants. They are likely to seek and endorse information from individuals who have proven competent or benign in the past. However, research on trust among adults raises the possibility that children might also be influenced by the emotions expressed by potential informants. In particular, they might trust individuals expressing more positive emotion. Indeed, young children's trust in particular informants based on their past behaviour might be undermined by their currently expressed emotions. To examine this possibility, we tested the selective trust of fifty 4- and 5-year-olds in two steps. We first confirmed that children are likely to invest more trust in individuals expressing more positive emotion. We then showed that even if children have already formed an impression of two potential informants based on their behavioural record, their choices about whose claims to trust are markedly influenced by the degree of positive emotion currently expressed by the two informants. By implication, the facial emotions expressed by potential informants can undermine young children's selective trust based on the behavioural record of those informants.

Negativity bias in false memory: moderation by neuroticism after a delay.

The negativity bias is the tendency for individuals to give greater weight, and often exhibit more rapid and extreme responses, to negative than positive information. Using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott illusory memory paradigm, the current study sought to examine how the negativity bias might affect both correct recognition for negative and positive words and false recognition for associated critical lures, as well as how trait neuroticism might moderate these effects. In two experiments, participants studied lists of words composed of semantic associates of an unpresented word (the critical lure). Half of the lists were comprised of positive words and half were comprised of negative words. As expected, individuals remembered negative list words better than positive list words, consistent with a negativity bias in correct recognition. When tested immediately (Experiment 1), individuals also exhibited greater false memory for negative versus positive critical lures. When tested after a 24-hr delay (Experiment 2), individuals higher in neuroticism maintained greater false memory for negative versus positive critical lures, but those lower in neuroticism showed no difference in false memory between negative and positive critical lures. Possible mechanisms and implications for mental health disorders are discussed.

The impact of emotional faces on younger and older adults' attentional blink.

The attentional blink (AB) is the impaired ability to detect a second target (T2) when it follows shortly after the first (T1) among distractors in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP). Given questions about the automaticity of age differences in emotion processing, the current study examined whether emotion cues differentially impact the AB elicited in older and younger adults. Twenty-two younger (18-22 years) and 22 older adult participants (62-78 years) reported on the emotional content of target face stimulus pairs embedded in a RSVP of scrambled-face distractor images. Target pairs included photo-realistic faces of angry, happy, and neutral expressions. The order of emotional and neutral stimuli as T1 or T2 and the degree of temporal separation within the RSVP systematically varied. Target detection accuracy was used to operationalise the AB. Although older adults displayed a larger AB than younger adults, no age differences emerged in the impact of emotion on the AB. Angry T1 faces increased the AB of both age groups. Neither emotional T2 attenuated the AB. Negative facial expressions held the attention of younger and older adults in a comparable manner, exacerbating the AB and supporting a negativity bias instead of a positivity effect in older adults.

The Relative Power of Negativity: The Influence of Language Intensity on Perceived Strength.

Negative utterances and words have been found to be stronger than positive utterances and words, but what happens if positive and negative utterances are intensified? Two online experiments were carried out in which participants judged the strength of (un)intensified positive and negative evaluations in written dialogues. Both studies showed intensified language was perceived as stronger than unmarked language (i.e., language that was not intensified), and negative evaluations were stronger than positive evaluations. What is more, intensification and polarity interact; the increment of perceived strength for intensified positive adjectives (Study 1) and purely intensified adverbs (really, very; Study 2) was bigger than the increment in perceived strength of intensified negative adjective and adverbs. When a meaningful intensifier (deliciously, disgustingly) was used, the negativity effect remained. The findings were discussed within cognitive frameworks such as relevance theory, theory of mind, and theory on verbal aggression.

Political Orientation Predicts Credulity Regarding Putative Hazards.

To benefit from information provided by other people, people must be somewhat credulous. However, credulity entails risks. The optimal level of credulity depends on the relative costs of believing misinformation and failing to attend to accurate information. When information concerns hazards, erroneous incredulity is often more costly than erroneous credulity, given that disregarding accurate warnings is more harmful than adopting unnecessary precautions. Because no equivalent asymmetry exists for information concerning benefits, people should generally be more credulous of hazard information than of benefit information. This adaptive negatively biased credulity is linked to negativity bias in general and is more prominent among people who believe the world to be more dangerous. Because both threat sensitivity and beliefs about the dangerousness of the world differ between conservatives and liberals, we predicted that conservatism would positively correlate with negatively biased credulity. Two online studies of Americans supported this prediction, potentially illuminating how politicians' alarmist claims affect different portions of the electorate.