A developmental perspective on the minimalist model: The case of respect for ownership.

The developmental evidence for children's respect for ownership reveals that children will enforce the property rights of third parties before they themselves respect other's property. This pattern of development suggests the need for clarification or modification of the minimalist model. Here, I consider three explanations for the gap between knowledge and behavior for respect of ownership.

Developmental risk sensitivity theory: the effects of socio-economic status on children's risky gain and loss decisions.

Evolutionary developmental theories propose that early environments shape human risk preferences. Developmental risk sensitivity theory (D-RST) focuses on the plasticity of risk preferences during childhood and makes predictions about the effect of reward size based on a child's social environment. By contrast, prospect theory predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses regardless of environment or status. We presented 4 to 10-year-olds (n = 194) with a set of trials in which they chose between a certain amount and a chance to receive more or nothing. Two trials were equal expected value choices that differed by stake size and two were unequal expected value choices. Children either received gain trials or loss trials. Social environment was assessed using socio-economic status (SES) and subjective social status. Results confirmed the predictions of D-RST for gains based on SES. Children from lower-SES families differentiated between the high- and low-value trials and made more risky decisions for the high-value reward compared with higher-SES children. Children from higher-SES families were more risk averse for both trial types. Decisions for loss trials did not conform completely to either theory. We discuss the results in relation to evolutionary developmental theories.

Socioeconomic status predicts children's moral judgments of novel resource distributions.

Children's moral judgments of resource distributions as having "fair" or "unfair" origins play an important role in early social cognition. What factors shape these judgments? The present study advances research on this question in two primary ways: First, while prior work has typically assigned children to an advantaged or disadvantaged position in an experimental setting, here we also investigated how relative objective and Subjective Socioeconomic Status (OSS and SSS) predicted children's judgments. Second, while prior work has asked children to judge distributions with known origins, here we presented children with novel and causally ambiguous distributions, thereby simulating children's initial encounter of resource distributions in the social world. We assessed participants' (n = 113, 6- to 9-year-olds) OSS and SSS and then introduced them to a machine that distributed Skittles on an unknown basis. Participants received half as many, twice as many, or the same number of Skittles as a peer in three between-subjects conditions, and then rated the machine's fairness. Results revealed that children who rated their families as wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher SSS) rated the machine as more fair. However, children from families that were actually wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher OSS) were more likely to rate the disadvantage-giving machine as unfair. Together, results represent the first evidence that OSS and SSS shape children's moral judgments of resource distributions, consistent with evidence that these two forms of socioeconomic status have unique impacts on adults' judgments of inequality. Implications for moral and social development are discussed.

Essentialization of Social Categories Across Development in Two Cultures.

Children display an "essentialist" bias in their everyday thinking about social categories. However, the degree and form of this bias varies with age and with the nature of the categories, as well as across cultures. This project investigated the development of the essentialist bias across five social categories (i.e., gender, nationality, religious affiliation, socioeconomic status (rich/poor), and sports-team supporter) in two countries. Children between 5 and 10 years of age in Turkey (Study 1, N = 74) and the United States (Study 2, N = 73), as well as adults in both countries (Study 3, N = 223), participated. Results indicate surprising cross-cultural parallels with respect to both the rank ordering of essentialist thinking across these five categories and increasing differentiation among them over development.

Children's Conceptions of Ownership for Self and Other: Categorical Ownership Versus Strength of Claim.

Children are capable of viewing object ownership as categorical and exclusive, but ownership claims can also vary by degree. This study investigated how children use these different conceptions of ownership in a giving and a taking task. In two studies, 4- to 7-year olds (N = 105) could give and take craft objects that they or another child had found (weaker claim) and made (stronger claim). In Study 1, no additional ownership information was given, and in Study 2 categorical ownership was stated ("these belong to you"). The results showed that children used categorical ownership for their own objects but used ownership strength for the other child's objects, taking more of the found items.

Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development.

The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments (N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.

Children's fairness in two Chinese schools: A combined ethnographic and experimental study.

Recent research has shown that children's sense of fairness is shaped in part by cultural practices, values, and norms. However, the specific social factors that motivate children's fairness decisions remain poorly understood. The current study combined an ethnographic approach with experimental tests of fairness (the Inequity Game) in two Chinese schools with qualitatively different practices and norms. In the "University school," children received explicit moral instruction on fairness reinforced by adults when supervising children's activities. By contrast, in the "Community school," children received less formal moral education and little adult supervision during play time, but norms of cooperation and fairness emerged through informal interactions with peers and other members of the community. Contrary to our predictions, children in both schools (N = 66) rejected both disadvantageous and advantageous allocations of resources in the test trials. However, in the very first practice trials, children from the Community school tended to reject all inequalities, whereas children from the University school tended to accept inequalities. We draw on the ethnographies of the schools to interpret these results, concluding that, despite the similarities in the experimental results, different motivations and social factors likely underlie the rejection of inequality in the two schools.

How children use accuracy information to infer informant intentions and to make reward decisions.

The ability to assess the value of the information one receives and the intentions of the source of that information can be used to establish cooperative relationships and to identify cooperative partners. Across two experiments, 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 204) received a note with correct, incorrect, or no information that affected their efforts on a search task. Children were told that all informants had played the game before and knew the location of the hidden reward. In the no information condition, children were told that the informant needed to leave before finishing the note and, thus, was not intentionally uninformative. Children rated the note with correct information as more helpful than the note with no information; incorrect information was rated least helpful. When asked about the informant's intentions, children attributed positive intentions when the information was correct and when they received unhelpful information but knew the informant was not intentionally uninformative. Children attributed less positive intentions to the informant when they received incorrect information. When given the chance to reward the informant, children rewarded the informant who provided correct information and no information equally; the informant who provided incorrect information received fewer rewards. Combined, these results suggest that young children assume that informants have positive intentions even when they provide no useful information. However, when the information provided is clearly inaccurate, children infer more negative intentions and reward those informants at lower rates. These results suggest that children tend to reward informants more based on their presumed intentions, placing less weight on the value of the information they provide.

Young children will lie to prevent a moral transgression.

Children believe that it is wrong to tell lies, yet they are willing to lie prosocially to adhere to social norms and to protect a listener's feelings. However, it is not clear whether children will lie instrumentally to intervene on behalf of a third party when a moral transgression is likely to occur. In three studies (N=270), we investigated the conditions under which 5- to 8-year-olds would tell an "interventional lie" in order to misdirect one child who was seeking another child in a park. In Study 1, older children lied more when the seeker intended to steal a toy from another child than when the seeker intended to give cookies to the child. In Study 2, the transgression (stealing) was held constant, but harm to the victim was either emphasized or deemphasized. Children at all ages were more likely to lie to prevent the theft when harm was emphasized. In Study 3, harm to the victim was held constant and the act of taking was described as either theft or a positive action. Children at all ages were more likely to lie when the transgression was emphasized. We conclude that by 5years of age, children are capable of lying to prevent a moral transgression but that this is most likely to occur when both the transgression and the harm to the victim are salient.

Variant at serotonin transporter gene predicts increased imitation in toddlers: relevance to the human capacity for cumulative culture.

Cumulative culture ostensibly arises from a set of sociocognitive processes which includes high-fidelity production imitation, prosociality and group identification. The latter processes are facilitated by unconscious imitation or social mimicry. The proximate mechanisms of individual variation in imitation may thus shed light on the evolutionary history of the human capacity for cumulative culture. In humans, a genetic component to variation in the propensity for imitation is likely. A functional length polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene, the short allele at 5HTTLPR, is associated with heightened responsiveness to the social environment as well as anatomical and activational differences in the brain's imitation circuity. Here, we evaluate whether this polymorphism contributes to variation in production imitation and social mimicry. Toddlers with the short allele at 5HTTLPR exhibit increased social mimicry and increased fidelity of demonstrated novel object manipulations. Thus, the short allele is associated with two forms of imitation that may underlie the human capacity for cumulative culture. The short allele spread relatively recently, possibly due to selection, and its frequency varies dramatically on a global scale. Diverse observations can be unified via conceptualization of 5HTTLPR as influencing the propensity to experience others' emotions, actions and sensations, potentially through the mirror mechanism.

Give as I give: Adult influence on children's giving in two cultures.

Adult influence on children's altruistic behavior may differ between cultural communities. We used an experimental approach to assess the influence of adult models on children's altruistic giving in a city in the United States and rural villages in India. Children between 3 and 8 years of age were tested with their parents in the United States (n=163) and India (n=154). Parents modeled either a generous or stingy donation; children then performed a similar task in private. Children in both communities were influenced by the stingy model, but only children in India increased their giving after viewing a generous model. The model's influence also increased with age in India. Results of a questionnaire revealed that parents in both communities believed that children learned sharing behavior from them. We consider these results in light of differences between these societies, including different socialization goals, cultural values, and content biases that may affect altruistic giving.

Children reject inequity out of spite.

When confronted with inequality, human children and adults sacrifice personal gain to reduce the pay-offs of other individuals, exhibiting apparently spiteful motivations. By contrast, sacrifice of personal gain by non-human animals is often interpreted as frustration. Spite may thus be a uniquely human motivator. However, to date, no empirical study has demonstrated that psychological spite actually drives human behaviour, leaving the motivation for inequity aversion unclear. Here, we ask whether 4- to 9-year-old children and adults reject disadvantageous inequity (less for self, more for peer) out of spite or frustration. We show that children, but not adults, are more likely to reject disadvantageous allocations when doing so deprives their peer of a better reward (spite) than when their peer has already received the better reward (frustration). Spiteful motivations are thus present early in childhood and may be a species-specific component of humans' developing cooperative and competitive behaviour.

Computational signatures of inequity aversion in children across seven societies.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General on Aug 10 2023 (see record 2023-96713-001). In the original article, there were affiliation errors for the first and 14th authors. The affiliations for Dorsa Amir are Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley; and Department of Psychology, Boston College. The affiliation for Katherine McAuliffe is Department of Psychology, Boston College. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Inequity aversion is an important factor in fairness behavior. Previous work suggests that children show more cross-cultural variation in their willingness to reject allocations that would give them more rewards than their partner-advantageous inequity-as opposed to allocations that would give them less than their partner-disadvantageous inequity. However, as past work has relied solely on children's decisions to accept or reject these offers, the algorithms underlying this pattern of variation remain unclear. Here, we explore the computational signatures of inequity aversion by applying a computational model of decision-making to data from children (N = 807) who played the Inequity Game across seven societies. Specifically, we used drift-diffusion models to formally distinguish evaluative processing (i.e., the computation of the subjective value of accepting or rejecting inequity) from alternative factors such as decision speed and response strategies. Our results suggest that variation in the development of inequity aversion across societies is best accounted for by variation in the drift rate-the direction and strength of the evaluative preference. Our findings underscore the utility of looking beyond decision data to better understand behavioral diversity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Possession is not always the law: with age, preschoolers increasingly use verbal information to identify who owns what.

Children can identify owners either by seeing a person in possession of an object (a visual cue) and inferring that they are the owner or by hearing testimony about a claim of ownership (a verbal cue). A total of 391 children between 2.5 and 6 years of age were tested in three experiments assessing how children identify owners when these two cues are in conflict. Children were presented with stories using two dolls and a toy. One doll possessed the toy, and children were told that the toy was either the possessor's or the nonpossessor's. Two forms of ownership statement were used: a third-person statement, "That is Billy's ball", and a first-person statement by one of the dolls, "That is my ball". The results show that by 4 years of age, children prioritize the verbal statements as a more reliable cue to ownership than physical possession. Younger children did not prioritize possession over the verbal cue to ownership but rather gave mixed responses. These results are discussed in terms of children's social experience outside of the home and their acceptance of testimony in other domains.

From "haves" to "have nots": Developmental declines in subjective social status reflect children's growing consideration of what they do not have.

Subjective social status (SSS), or a person's view of their own socioeconomic status, has important consequences for social cognition and wellbeing, yet little is known about its development before adolescence. Previous research finds that SSS declines during childhood. We sought to replicate this finding, and also to extend it by investigating what aspects of children's reasoning drive this developmental decline. To do so, we assessed four- to ten-year-old children's SSS using a MacArthur Ladder Task (n = 377), which has been validated for use with children in this age range. We then assessed children's open-ended rationales for their SSS judgments. Results indicated that SSS declined over child development, replicating previous work. We also confirmed that this decline corresponded with improvements in SSS accuracy; young children overestimated their SSS relative to their objective SES, but were relatively accurate by age ten. Moreover, trends in children's rationales revealed that developmental shifts in both SSS and SSS accuracy corresponded with children's references to what they do not have, but not with references to what they do have, nor with references to any particular status cues (e.g., houses, lifestyle). Thus, children may increasingly consider what they lack to determine their status. Implications for self-evaluation and social cognition are discussed.

Children Consider Procedures, Outcomes, and Emotions When Judging the Fairness of Inequality.

Children tend to view equal resource distributions as more fair than unequal ones, but will sometimes view even unequal distributions as fair. However, less is known about how children form judgments about inequality when different procedures are used. In the present study, we investigated children's consideration of procedures (i.e., resource-distributing processes), outcomes (i.e., the distributions themselves), and emotions (i.e., the emotional reactions of those receiving the resources) when judging the fairness of unequal resource distributions. Participants (N = 130, 3- to 8-year-olds) were introduced to a Fair Coin (different color on each side) and an Unfair Coin (same color on both sides). In two between-subjects conditions, they watched a researcher flip either the Fair or Unfair Coin in order to distribute resources unequally between two child recipients. Participants then rated the fairness of this event, provided verbal justifications for their ratings (coded for references to procedures and/or outcomes), and rated the emotional state of each recipient (from which an Emotion Difference Score was computed). Results revealed that participants rated the event as more fair in the Fair Coin than the Unfair Coin condition. References to the outcome in children's justifications predicted lower fairness ratings, while references to the procedure only predicted lower ratings in the Unfair Coin condition. Greater Emotion Difference Scores predicted lower fairness ratings, and this effect increased with age. Together, these results show that children consider procedures, outcomes, and emotions when judging the fairness of inequality. Moreover, results suggest age-related increases in consideration of recipients' emotions makes inequality seem less fair, even when fair procedures are used. Implications for the development of fairness are discussed.

The ontogeny of children's social emotions in response to (un)fairness.

Humans have a deeply rooted sense of fairness, but its emotional foundation in early ontogeny remains poorly understood. Here, we asked if and when 4- to 10-year-old children show negative social emotions, such as shame or guilt, in response to advantageous unfairness expressed through a lowered body posture (measured using a Kinect depth sensor imaging camera). We found that older, but not younger children, showed more negative emotions, i.e. a reduced upper body posture, after unintentionally disadvantaging a peer on (4,1) trials than in response to fair (1,1) outcomes between themselves and others. Younger children, in contrast, expressed more negative emotions in response to the fair (1,1) split than in response to advantageous inequity. No systematic pattern of children's emotional responses was found in a non-social context, in which children divided resources between themselves and a non-social container. Supporting individual difference analyses showed that older children in the social context expressed negative emotions in response to advantageous inequity without directly acting on this negative emotional response by rejecting an advantageously unfair offer proposed by an experimenter at the end of the study. These findings shed new light on the emotional foundation of the human sense of fairness and suggest that children's negative emotional response to advantageous unfairness developmentally precedes their rejection of advantageously unfair resource distributions.

Early representations of ownership.

To navigate a world filled with private property, children must be able to assign ownership information to objects and update that information when appropriate. In this chapter, the authors propose that children include ownership as an attribute of their object representations. Children can learn about ownership attributes either by witnessing owners acting on their property, a visual source, or by receiving information from the testimony of others, a verbal source. The authors consider the differences between these two forms of information and how they might conflict at the representational level, leading to difficulties in learning about ownership.

Children's understanding of economic demand: A dissociation between inference and choice.

Adults infer that resources that become scarce over time are in higher demand, and use this "demand inference" to guide their own economic decisions. However, it is unclear when children begin to understand and use economic demand. In six experiments, we investigated the development of demand inference and demand-based economic decisions in 4- to 10-year-old children and adults in the United States. In Experiments 1-5, we showed children two boxes with the same number of compartments but containing different numbers of face-down stickers and varied the information provided about how those differences arose (e.g. that other children had taken the stickers). In separate experiments, we asked children to buy or trade to get a sticker for themselves or to predict what other children would do. We also asked them which set of stickers they thought the other children had preferred to assess their ability to make a demand inference separately from their own choice. Across experiments, children were able to make a demand inference about children's past preferences by 6 years of age. However, children did not use this demand information when making choices for themselves or when predicting what another child would select in the future. In Experiment 6, we adapted the task for adults and found that adult participants inferred that the set containing fewer resources was in higher demand, and selected the higher demand resource for themselves at rates significantly above chance. The overall pattern of results suggests a dissociation between economic inference and economic decisions during early-to-middle childhood. We discuss implications for our understanding of the development of economic reasoning.

Costly fairness in children is influenced by who is watching.

Advantageous inequity aversion emerges relatively late in child development, yet the mechanisms explaining its late emergence are poorly understood. Here, we ask whether children begin to reject advantageous inequity, a costly form of fairness, once reputational concerns are in place. Specifically, we examine the role of peer monitoring in promoting fair behavior. In Study 1 (N = 212 pairs; Ages 6 to 9), we test whether children are less likely to reject advantageous allocations depending on who is aware of their behavior. Results show that children are more likely to accept advantageous allocations when their peer partner is unaware of their advantage. In Study 2 (N = 134 pairs; Ages 8 and 9), we show that this effect is driven specifically by whether the affected peer partners can see the allocation and not by whether third-party peer observers witness the decision. Together, these results shed light on the factors influencing fairness development in childhood and, more specifically, suggest that advantageous inequity aversion is influenced by a desire to appear fair to those getting the short end of the stick. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).