A meta-analytic approach to the association between inhibitory control and parent-reported behavioral adjustment in typically-developing children: Differentiating externalizing and internalizing behavior problems.

Impairments in inhibitory control (IC) are traditionally seen as a vital aspect in the emergence and course of maladaptive behavior across early childhood. However, it is currently unclear whether this view applies to both the externalizing and internalizing domain of parent-reported behavioral adjustment. Furthermore, past (meta-analytic) developmental research and theory characterizing this association have largely neglected the vast heterogeneity of IC measures and conceptualizations. The present meta-analyses examined the association of IC with parent-reported externalizing (N = 3160, 21 studies) and internalizing (N = 1758, 12 studies) behavior problems, assessed with the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), in non-clinical populations of children aged 2-8 years. They further investigated the moderating effects of a priori IC categorization, according to a recently proposed two-factor model of IC ("Strength/Endurance" account, Simpson & Carroll, 2019). In line with previous research in the clinical domain, the current results corroborate the notion of a robust, but small association between IC and externalizing behavior problems (r = -0.11) in early childhood. However, although frequently proposed in the literature, no significant linear association could be identified with internalizing behavior problems. Furthermore, in both meta-analyses, no significant moderating effects of IC categorization could be revealed. These findings enhance our knowledge about the cognitive underpinnings of early-emerging maladaptive behavior, indicating that different subtypes of IC are statistically related with externalizing, but not internalizing behavior problems. Overall, the small association of IC ability with behavior problems in non-clinical populations provokes broader questions about the role of IC in behavioral adjustment.

Children understand communication intuitively, but indirect communication makes them think twice-Evidence from pupillometry and looking patterns.

Interpreting a speaker's communicative acts is a challenge children face permanently in everyday life. In doing so, they seem to understand direct communicative acts more easily than indirect communicative acts. The current study investigated which step in the processing of communicative acts might cause difficulties in understanding indirect communication. To assess the developmental trajectory of this phenomenon, we tested 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 105) using eye tracking and an object-choice task. The children watched videos that showed puppets during their everyday activities (e.g., pet care). For every activity, the puppets were asked which of two objects (e.g., rabbit or dog) they would rather have. The puppets responded either directly (e.g., "I want the rabbit") or indirectly (e.g., "I have a carrot"). Results showed that children chose the object intended by the puppets more often in the direct communication condition than in the indirect communication condition and that 5-year-olds chose correctly more than 3-year-olds. However, even though we found that children's pupil size increased while hearing the utterances, we found no effect for communication type before children had already decided on the correct object during object selection by looking at it. Only after this point-that is, only in children's further fixation patterns and reaction times-did differences for communication type occur. Thus, although children's object-choice performance suggests that indirect communication is harder to understand than direct communication, the cognitive demands during processing of both communication types seem similar. We discuss theoretical implications of these findings for developmental pragmatics in terms of a dual-process account of communication comprehension.

A model's natural group membership affects over-imitation in 6-year-olds.

The phenomenon of "over-imitation"-the copying of causally irrelevant actions-has influenced research of the past decade. Yet, the mechanisms underlying and factors affecting over-imitation are still under debate. This study aimed to contribute to this debate by investigating the role of the model's natural group membership in children's tendency to imitate irrelevant actions using a two-phase design. In Phase 1, 6-year-olds (N = 64) observed either an in-group model or an out-group model presenting a sequence of irrelevant actions, with only the last action bringing about the goal (target action) and retrieving a token. In Phase 2, the alternative model-the one that children had not seen in Phase 1-retrieved the token by performing the target action only. After the presentation in each phase, children were given the chance to retrieve the token themselves. Results indicated that children imitated the irrelevant actions to comparable levels from both models in Phase 1. In Phase 2, in contrast, over-imitation declined in children who observed the in-group model being successful with the target action only but not in children who observed the out-group model do so. Thus, children adapted their imitative behavior after observing the model of their own cultural group demonstrating a more efficient strategy. These findings speak for an integration of both social and instrumental accounts to explain the phenomenon of over-imitation.

Rational imitation declines within the second year of life: Changes in the function of imitation.

Cultural learning plays a crucial role in enabling children to fit into their social community by mastering culture-specific habits. Infants learn actions via imitation, and they seem to be sensitive to the context in which a model demonstrates these. They imitate rationally by copying unusual means to achieve a goal more when the model chooses this means voluntarily compared with when some constraints force the model to do so. We investigated the development of rational imitation. In a within-participants design, 18-, 24-, and 36-month-olds (N = 293) observed two unusual actions: Instead of using her hands, a model operated an apparatus by using her head or by sitting on the apparatus. The model did so once with her hands being occupied and once with her hands being free. Besides measuring participants' imitative responses, we analyzed the gaze behavior directed at the model during the response phase of the current study and of 14-month-olds (N = 82) from Gellén and Buttelmann's study (Child Development Research, Vol. 2017, art. 8080649 [2017]). Increasing age was accompanied by an increasing rate of overall imitation across conditions. None of the three older age groups selectively imitated the unusual actions significantly more often in the hands-free condition than in the hands-occupied condition. Thus, rational imitation seems to disappear during the second year of life. Furthermore, there was a significant increase between 14 and 24 months of age and beyond in children's tendency to gaze at the model after reenacting the observed action. Children's gaze behavior indicates that this pattern might be due to a growing underlying social component in early cultural learning.

Fourteen-month-olds selectively search for and use information depending on the familiarity of the informant in both laboratory and home contexts.

Infants are selective in their learning from others. However, there is only very limited research on the possible factors that shape this selectivity, especially when it comes to the impact of infants' familiarity with the informant and the context. The current study investigated whether 14-month-olds preferred to receive and use information provided by an unfamiliar informant (experimenter) compared with a familiar informant (parent) and whether this pattern depended on the context (home vs. laboratory). We tested infants either in the laboratory (n = 67) or in their home (n = 70). When both informants presented a novel object with positive or negative emotions, we measured infants' gaze behavior as an indicator for information search. When infants acted on the novel object themselves, we measured their exploratory behavior as an indicator of information use. Results revealed no effect of context on infants' information search and use. Rather, we found that the familiarity of informant had distinct effects on infant attention and object exploration. Namely, infants looked longer at the unfamiliar informant across contexts, but they explored more when the familiar informant presented the object compared with when the unfamiliar informant did so. Thus, during information search, 14-month-olds paid most attention to an unfamiliar source of information. However, participants explored the objects more when they came from a familiar source than when they came from an unfamiliar one. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

The influence of a bystander agent's beliefs on children's and adults' decision-making process.

The ability to attribute and represent others' mental states (e.g., beliefs; so-called "theory of mind") is essential for participation in human social interaction. Despite a considerable body of research using tasks in which protagonists in the participants' attentional focus held false or true beliefs, the question of automatic belief attribution to bystander agents has received little attention. In the current study, we presented adults and 6-year-olds (N=92) with an implicit computer-based avoidance false-belief task in which participants were asked to place an object into one of three boxes. While doing so, we manipulated the beliefs of an irrelevant human-like or non-human-like bystander agent who was visible on the screen. Importantly, the bystander agent's beliefs were irrelevant for solving the task. Still, children's decision making was significantly influenced by the bystander agent's beliefs even if this was a non-human-like self-propelled object. Such an influence did not become obvious in adults' deliberate decisions but occurred only in their reaction times, which suggests that they also processed the bystander agent's beliefs but were able to suppress the influence of such beliefs on their behavior regulation. The results of a control study (N=53) ruled out low-level explanations and confirmed that self-propelledness of agents is a necessary factor for belief attribution to occur. Thus, not only do humans spontaneously ascribe beliefs to self-propelled bystander agents, but those beliefs even influence meaningful decisions in children.

Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks.

De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.

Infant and adult pupil dilation in response to unexpected sounds.

Surprisingly occurring sounds outside the focus of attention can involuntarily capture attention. This study focuses on the impact of deviant sounds on the pupil size as a marker of auditory involuntary attention in infants. We presented an oddball paradigm including four types of deviant sounds within a sequence of repeated standard sounds to 14-month-old infants and to adults. Environmental and noise deviant sounds elicited a strong pupil dilation response (PDR) in both age groups. In contrast, moderate frequency deviants elicited a significant PDR in adults only. Moreover, a principal component analysis revealed two components underlying the PDR. Component scores differ, depending on deviant types, between age groups. Results indicate age effects of parasympathetic inhibition and sympathetic activation of the pupil size caused by deviant sounds with a high arousing potential. Results demonstrate that the PDR is a sensitive tool for the investigation of involuntary attention to sounds in preverbal children.

What you get is what you believe: eighteen-month-olds demonstrate belief understanding in an unexpected-identity task.

Based on recent findings of implicit studies, researchers have claimed that even infants can understand others' false beliefs. However, it is unclear whether infants are able to understand others' belief about an object's identity when this object can be represented in different ways. In a novel interactive unexpected-identity task derived from the appearance-reality paradigm, 18-month-olds helped an adult to achieve her goal based on the adult's belief about an object's identity. To do so, they needed to understand how this adult represented this object--according to its appearance or its real identity--and to generalize these representations to a category of objects. The results suggest that infants' false-belief understanding is as sophisticated as that of preschool children.

The ontogeny of the motivation that underlies in-group bias.

Humans demonstrate a clear bias toward members of their own group over members of other groups in a variety of ways. It has been argued that the motivation underlying this in-group bias in adults may be favoritism toward one's own group (in-group love), derogation of the out-group (out-group hate), or both. Although some studies have demonstrated in-group bias among children and infants, nothing is known about the underlying motivations of this bias. Using a novel game, we found that in-group love is already present in children of preschool age and can motivate in-group-biased behavior across childhood. In contrast, out-group hate develops only after a child's sixth birthday and is a sufficient motivation for in-group-biased behavior from school age onward. These results help to better identify the motivation that underlies in-group-biased behavior in children.

Eighteen-month-olds understand false beliefs in an unexpected-contents task.

Recent studies suggest that infants understand that others can have false beliefs. However, most of these studies have used looking time measures, and the few that have used behavioral measures are all based on the change-of-location paradigm, leading to claims that infants might use behavioral rules instead of mental state understanding to pass these tests. We investigated infants' false-belief reasoning using a different paradigm. In this unexpected-contents helping task, 18-month-olds were familiarized with boxes for blocks that contained blocks. When an experimenter subsequently reached for a box for blocks that now contained a spoon, infants based their choice of whether to give her a spoon or a block on her true or false belief about which object the block box contained. These results help to demonstrate the flexibility of infants' false-belief understanding.

Can domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use referential emotional expressions to locate hidden food?

Although many studies have investigated domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) use of human communicative cues, little is known about their use of humans' emotional expressions. We conducted a study following the general paradigm of Repacholi in Dev Psychol 34:1017-1025, (1998) and tested four breeds of dogs in the laboratory and another breed in the open air. In our study, a human reacted emotionally (happy, neutral or disgust) to the hidden contents of two boxes, after which the dog was then allowed to choose one of the boxes. Dogs tested in the laboratory distinguished between the most distinct of the expressed emotions (Happy-Disgust condition) by choosing appropriately, but performed at chance level when the two emotions were less distinct (Happy-Neutral condition). The breed tested in the open air passed both conditions, but this breed's differing testing setup might have been responsible for their success. Although without meaningful emotional expressions, when given a choice, these subjects chose randomly, their performance did not differ from that in the experimental conditions. Based on the findings revealed in the laboratory, we suggest that some domestic dogs recognize both the directedness and the valence of some human emotional expressions.

Selective imitation of in-group over out-group members in 14-month-old infants.

Recent research has shown that infants are more likely to engage with in-group over out-group members. However, it is not known whether infants' learning is influenced by a model's group membership. This study investigated whether 14-month-olds (N = 66) selectively imitate and adopt the preferences of in-group versus out-group members. Infants watched an adult tell a story either in their native language (in-group) or a foreign language (out-group). The adult then demonstrated a novel action (imitation task) and chose 1 of 2 objects (preference task). Infants did not show selectivity in the preference task, but they imitated the in-group model more faithfully than the out-group model. This suggests that cultural learning is beginning to be truly cultural by 14 months of age.

Great apes infer others' goals based on context.

In previous studies claiming to demonstrate that great apes understand the goals of others, the apes could potentially have been using subtle behavioral cues present during the test to succeed. In the current studies, we ruled out the use of such cues by making the behavior of the experimenter identical in the test phase of both the experimental and control conditions; the only difference was the preceding "context." In the first study, apes interpreted a human's ambiguous action as having the underlying goal of opening a box, or not, based on that human's previous actions with similar boxes. In the second study, chimpanzees learned that when a human stood up she was going to go get food for them, but when a novel, unexpected event happened, they changed their expectation-presumably based on their understanding that this new event led the human to change her goal. These studies suggest that great apes do not need concurrent behavioral cues to infer others' goals, but can do so from a variety of different types of cues-even cues displaced in time.

Infants differentiate between successful and failed communication in a false-belief context.

Communication is based on social interaction, that is, interlocutors sharing attention to the intentions that they communicate about. In this study, we asked whether infants are aware of the fact that for information to be transferred, both interlocutors need to be present and share attention. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm created to test infants' understanding of others' false beliefs, we asked whether 18-month-olds (n = 84) understood that correcting an agent's false belief via communication requires that the agent discerns the verbal statement. Participants saw how an agent put a toy into a box and left. An assistant then moved the toy into a cup. The intervention phase varied between three conditions: The agent and the assistant communicated about the actual location of the toy (full-communication), the agent was absent during the assistant's statement (incomplete-communication) or no communication took place (no-communication). At test, the agent reached into either the box or the cup. When no communication took place, infants expected the agent to search the toy at the original location. Full communication resulted in infants' expectations that the recipient's actions were altered, that is, the infants expected her to search the toy at the actual location. In contrast, incomplete communication did not yield clear expectations. Eighteen-month-olds thus seem to understand that for information to be transferred, it is a precondition that the recipient of the communicative act must be present and share attention during the communicator's statement. Only then communication can change a recipient's mental state.

The reliability of a model influences 14-month-olds' imitation.

Human infants have an enormous amount to learn from others to become full-fledged members of their culture. Thus, it is important that they learn from reliable, rather than unreliable, models. In two experiments, we investigated whether 14-month-olds (a) imitate instrumental actions and (b) adopt the individual preferences of a model differently depending on the model's previous reliability. Infants were shown a series of videos in which a model acted on familiar objects either competently or incompetently. They then watched as the same model demonstrated a novel action on an object (imitation task) and preferentially chose one of two novel objects (preference task). Infants' imitation of the novel action was influenced by the model's previous reliability; they copied the action more often when the model had been reliable. However, their preference for one of the novel objects was not influenced by the model's previous reliability. We conclude that already by 14 months of age, infants discriminate between reliable and unreliable models when learning novel actions.

Fourteen-month-olds' imitation is influenced more strongly by a model's competence than by a model's certainty.

Research has shown that infants are more likely to learn from certain and competent models than from uncertain and incompetent models. However, it is unknown which of these cues to a model's reliability infants consider more important. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether 14-month-old infants (n = 35) imitate and adopt tool choices selectively from an uncertain but competent compared to a certain but incompetent model. Infants watched videos in which an adult expressed either uncertainty but acted competently or expressed certainty but acted incompetently with familiar objects. In tool-choice tasks, the adult then chose one of two objects to operate an apparatus, and in imitation tasks, the adult then demonstrated a novel action. Infants did not adopt the model's choice in the tool-choice tasks but they imitated the uncertain but competent model more often than the certain but incompetent model in the imitation tasks. In Experiment 2, 14-month-olds (n = 33) watched videos in which an adult expressed only either certainty or uncertainty in order to test whether infants at this age are sensitive to a model's certainty. Infants imitated and adopted the tool choice from a certain model more than from an uncertain model. These results suggest that 14-month-olds acknowledge both a model's competence and certainty when learning novel actions. However, they rely more on a model's competence than on his certainty when both cues are in conflict. The ability to detect reliable models when learning how to handle cultural artifacts helps infants to become well-integrated members of their culture.

12- to 14-month-olds expect unconstrained agents to act efficiently: Event-related potential (ERP) evidence from the head-touch paradigm.

Behavioral research has shown that 12- but not 9-month-olds imitate an unusual and inefficient action (turning on a lamp with one's forehead) more when the model's hands are free. Rational-imitation accounts suggest that infants evaluate actions based on the rationality principle, that is, they expect people to choose efficient means to achieve a goal. Accordingly, infants' expectations should be violated when observing inefficient actions. However, this has yet to be clearly tested. Here, we conducted three electrophysiological experiments to assess infants' neural indices of violation of expectation (VOE) when observing hand- and head-touch actions. We presented infants with video sequences showing a model whose hands were either free (Experiments 1 and 3) or restrained (Experiment 2). Subsequent images depicted a person turning on a lamp or a toy soundbox using her hand or head. We analyzed the Negative central (Nc) component, associated with the amount of attentional engagement, and the N400 component, reflecting semantic violations. In line with rational-imitation accounts, results revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds (Experiment 1) but not 9-month-olds (Experiment 3) were surprised while observing an inefficient, hands-free, head touch, as indicated by an increased Nc amplitude and an N400-like component. In contrast, infants did not show differences in our measures of VOE between head- and hand-touch outcomes when the model's hands were restrained (Experiment 2). Thus, we suggest that 12- to 14-month-olds incorporate the action context when evaluating action outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of executive functions in kindergarteners' persistent and non-persistent behaviour.

The aim of the study was to examine whether cognitive skills are related to persistence. Thus, children's (N = 157, mean age: 5.9 years) persistent and non-persistent behaviours (i.e., cheating and off-task) were assessed in an unsolvable task. Additionally, we assessed children's executive functions and temperament. Analysis for persistence showed that cognitive inhibition and cognitive flexibility predicted children's persistent behaviour, beyond age and temperament. Analyses for non-persistent behaviours revealed that temperament and weak executive functions predicted cheating, while age predicted off-task behaviour. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? So far, persistence has been conceptualized as a temperamental sub-dimension of self-regulation. What does this study add? A child's persistence depends not only on temperament but also on cognitive inhibition and cognitive flexibility. There are qualitative differences between the two non-persistent behaviours cheating and off-task. While cheating is related to weaker cognitive skills, off-task behaviour seems mainly age-related.

Do great apes use emotional expressions to infer desires?

Although apes understand others' goals and perceptions, little is known about their understanding of others' emotional expressions. We conducted three studies following the general paradigm of Repacholi and colleagues (1997, 1998). In Study 1, a human reacted emotionally to the hidden contents of two boxes, after which the ape was allowed to choose one of the boxes. Apes distinguished between two of the expressed emotions (happiness and disgust) by choosing appropriately. In Studies 2 and 3, a human reacted either positively or negatively to the hidden contents of two containers; then the ape saw him eating something. When given a choice, apes correctly chose the container to which the human had reacted negatively, based on the inference that the human had just eaten the food to which he had reacted positively - and so the other container still had food left in it. These findings suggest that great apes understand both the directedness and the valence of some human emotional expressions, and can use this understanding to infer desires.