Connected in Bad Times and in Good Times: Empathy Induces Stable Social Closeness.

Humans need social closeness to prosper. There is evidence that empathy can induce social closeness. However, it remains unclear how empathy-related social closeness is formed and how stable it is as time passes. We applied an acquisition-extinction paradigm combined with computational modeling and fMRI, to investigate the formation and stability of empathy-related social closeness. Female participants observed painful stimulation of another person with high probability (acquisition) and low probability (extinction) and rated their closeness to that person. The results of two independent studies showed increased social closeness in the acquisition block that resisted extinction in the extinction block. Providing insights into underlying mechanisms, reinforcement learning modeling revealed that the formation of social closeness is based on a learning signal (prediction error) generated from observing another's pain, whereas maintaining social closeness is based on a learning signal generated from observing another's pain relief. The results of a reciprocity control study indicate that this feedback recalibration is specific to learning of empathy-related social closeness. On the neural level, the recalibration of the feedback signal was associated with neural responses in anterior insula and adjacent inferior frontal gyrus and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus/temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings show that empathy-related social closeness generated in bad times, that is, empathy with the misfortune of another person, transfers to good times and thus may form one important basis for stable social relationships.

Children and adults' intuitions of what people can believe.

Two preregistered studies tested how 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and adults judged the possibility of holding alternative beliefs (N = 240, 110 females, U.S. sample, mixed ethnicities, data collected from September 2020 through October 2021). In Study 1, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were supported by evidence (but judged they could without this evidential constraint). In Study 2, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were moral beliefs (but judged they could without this moral constraint). Young children viewed moral beliefs as more constrained than adults. These results suggest that young children already have sophisticated intuitions of the possibility of holding various beliefs and how certain beliefs are constrained.

Disagreement reduces overconfidence and prompts exploration in young children.

Can the experience of disagreement lead young children to reason in more sophisticated ways? Across two preregistered studies, four- to six-year-old US children (N = 136, 50% female, mixed ethnicities, data collected 2020-2022) experienced either a disagreement or an agreement with a confederate about a causal mechanism after being presented with ambiguous evidence. We measured (1) children's confidence in their belief before and after the (dis)agreement, and (2) how long children searched for information about the correct answer. Disagreement, especially with an expert (Experiment 2), reduced overconfidence and prompted children to search longer for information, compared to agreement. Together, our findings suggest possibilities for interventions aimed at fostering humility and learning across the lifespan.

Social mindfulness and prosociality vary across the globe.

Humans are social animals, but not everyone will be mindful of others to the same extent. Individual differences have been found, but would social mindfulness also be shaped by one's location in the world? Expecting cross-national differences to exist, we examined if and how social mindfulness differs across countries. At little to no material cost, social mindfulness typically entails small acts of attention or kindness. Even though fairly common, such low-cost cooperation has received little empirical attention. Measuring social mindfulness across 31 samples from industrialized countries and regions (n = 8,354), we found considerable variation. Among selected country-level variables, greater social mindfulness was most strongly associated with countries' better general performance on environmental protection. Together, our findings contribute to the literature on prosociality by targeting the kind of everyday cooperation that is more focused on communicating benevolence than on providing material benefits.

Chimpanzee and Human Risk Preferences Show Key Similarities.

Risk preference impacts how people make key life decisions related to health, wealth, and well-being. Systematic variations in risk-taking behavior can be the result of differences in fitness expectations, as predicted by life-history theory. Yet the evolutionary roots of human risk-taking behavior remain poorly understood. Here, we studied risk preferences of chimpanzees (86 Pan troglodytes; 47 females; age = 2-40 years) using a multimethod approach that combined observer ratings with behavioral choice experiments. We found that chimpanzees' willingness to take risks shared structural similarities with that of humans. First, chimpanzees' risk preference manifested as a traitlike preference that was consistent across domains and measurements. Second, chimpanzees were ambiguity averse. Third, males were more risk prone than females. Fourth, the appetite for risk showed an inverted-U-shaped relation to age and peaked in young adulthood. Our findings suggest that key dimensions of risk preference appear to emerge independently of the influence of human cultural evolution.

Chimpanzees prepare for alternative possible outcomes.

When facing uncertainty, humans often build mental models of alternative outcomes. Considering diverging scenarios allows agents to respond adaptively to different actual worlds by developing contingency plans (covering one's bases). In a pre-registered experiment, we tested whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) prepare for two mutually exclusive possibilities. Chimpanzees could access two pieces of food, but only if they successfully protected them from a human competitor. In one condition, chimpanzees could be certain about which piece of food the human experimenter would attempt to steal. In a second condition, either one of the food rewards was a potential target of the competitor. We found that chimpanzees were significantly more likely to protect both pieces of food in the second relative to the first condition, raising the possibility that chimpanzees represent and prepare effectively for different possible worlds.

Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation underlying helping in early childhood.

We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-, and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an individual or watch as another person provided help. Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging, we measured children's positive emotions through changes in postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual and watching another person help was equally rewarding; 5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive emotions following helping were greater when an audience was watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional, strategic motivation to improve their reputation by helping.

Children's developing ability to adjust their beliefs reasonably in light of disagreement.

Two preregistered experiments (N = 218) investigated children's developing ability to respond reasonably to disagreement. U.S. children aged 4-9, and adults (50% female, mostly white) formed an initial belief, and were confronted with the belief of a disagreeing other, whose evidence was weaker, stronger than, or equal to participants' evidence. With age, participants were increasingly likely to maintain their initial belief when their own evidence was stronger, adopt the other's belief when their evidence was weaker, and suspend judgment when both had equally strong evidence. Interestingly, 4- to 6-year-olds only suspended judgment reliably when this was assessed via the search for additional information (Experiment 2). Together, our experiments suggest that the ability to respond reasonably to disagreement develops over the preschool years.

Do chimpanzees reason logically?

Psychologists disagree about the development of logical concepts such as or and not. While some theorists argue that infants reason logically, others maintain that logical inference is contingent on linguistic abilities and emerges around age 4. In this Registered Report, we conducted five experiments on logical reasoning in chimpanzees. Subjects (N = 16; 10 females; M = 24 years) participated in the same setup that has been administered to children: the two-, three-, and four-cup-task. Chimpanzees performed above chance in the two-cup-, but not in the three-cup-task. Furthermore, chimpanzees selected the logically correct option more often in the test than the control condition of the four-cup-task. We discuss possible interpretations of these findings and conclude that our results are most consistent with non-deductive accounts.

Chimpanzees consider freedom of choice in their evaluation of social action.

Judgements of wrongdoing in humans often hinge upon an assessment of whether a perpetrator acted out of free choice: whether they had more than one option. The classic inhibitors of free choice are constraint (e.g. having your hands tied together) and ignorance (e.g. being unaware that an alternative exists). Here, across two studies, we investigate whether chimpanzees consider these factors in their evaluation of social action. Chimpanzees interacted with a human experimenter who handed them a non-preferred item of food, either because they were physically constrained from accessing the preferred item (Experiment 1) or because they were ignorant of the availability of the preferred item (Experiment 2). We found that chimpanzees were more likely to accept the non-preferred food and showed fewer negative emotional responses when the experimenter was physically constrained compared with when they had free choice. We did not, however, find an effect of ignorance on chimpanzee's evaluation. Freedom of choice factors into chimpanzees' evaluation of how they are treated, but it is unclear whether mental state reasoning is involved in this assessment.

How children revise their beliefs in light of reasons.

We investigate how the ability to respond appropriately to reasons provided in discourse develops in young children. In Study 1 (N = 58, Germany, 26 girls), 4- and 5-, but not 3-year-old children, differentiated good from bad reasons. In Study 2 (N = 131, Germany, 64 girls), 4- and 5-year-old children considered both the strength of evidence for their initial belief and the quality of socially provided reasons for an alternative view when deciding whether to change their minds. Study 3 (N = 80, the United States, 42 girls, preregistered) shows that 4- and 5-year-old children also consider meta-reasons (reasons about reasons) in their belief revision. These results suggest that by age 4, children possess key critical thinking capacities for participating in public discourse.

Tolerability of High-Dose Venlafaxine After Switch From Escitalopram in Nonresponding Patients With Major Depressive Disorder.

BACKGROUND: Within a single depressive episode, most patients receive different antidepressants because of an inadequate response to the first-line antidepressant. A commonly used strategy is to switch from a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor to a selective serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor. However, little is known about the tolerability of this switch with consideration of dose and drug concentration in blood. METHODS: After 4 weeks of inadequate response to escitalopram (10-20 mg/d), medication was switched to another 4 weeks of venlafaxine (VF, 150-375 mg/d) in 234 depressed patients. Serum concentrations, depression severity, and adverse drug reactions (ADRs) were assessed weekly. RESULTS: The switch of medication led to an increase of ADRs such as reduced salivation (+11%), orthostatic dizziness (+11%), and sweating (+9.8%). The most frequent ADRs during treatment with VF were reduced salivation (28.6%), sweating (24.6%), and orthostatic dizziness (15.8%). In patients receiving high-dose VF, a significant improvement of depressive symptomatology was observed, and most ADRs decreased during the course of treatment, even in patients above the therapeutic reference range. LIMITATIONS: Patients and physicians were aware of medication, and there was no direct comparison with the herein presented switch of medication. IMPLICATIONS: This study provides important information about the tolerability of a commonly used antidepressant treatment strategy. More detailed information about putative ADRs may help clinicians increase compliance through effective patient education. Because ADRs of VF were associated with the plasma concentration, therapeutic drug monitoring is recommended to guide the therapy and manage problems of tolerability.

The influence of friendship and merit on children's resource allocation in three societies.

Recent work has suggested that principles of fairness that seem like natural laws to the Western mind, such as sharing more of the spoils with those who contributed more, can in fact vary significantly across populations. To build a better understanding of the developmental roots of population differences with respect to fairness, we investigated whether 7-year-old children (N = 432) from three cultural backgrounds-Kenya, China, and Germany-consider friendship and merit in their distribution of resources and how they resolve conflicts between the two. We found that friendship had considerable and consistent influence as a cross-culturally recurrent motivation: children in all three cultures preferentially shared with a friend rather than with a neutral familiar peer. On the other hand, the role of merit in distribution seemed to differ cross-culturally: children in China and Germany, but not in Kenya, selectively distributed resources to individuals who worked more. When we pitted friendship against merit, there was an approximately even split in all three cultures between children who favored the undeserving friend and children who shared with the hard-working neutral individual. These results demonstrate commonalities and variability in fairness perceptions across distinct cultures and speak to the importance of cross-cultural research in understanding the development of the human mind.

Robust valence-induced biases on motor response and confidence in human reinforcement learning.

In simple instrumental-learning tasks, humans learn to seek gains and to avoid losses equally well. Yet, two effects of valence are observed. First, decisions in loss-contexts are slower. Second, loss contexts decrease individuals' confidence in their choices. Whether these two effects are two manifestations of a single mechanism or whether they can be partially dissociated is unknown. Across six experiments, we attempted to disrupt the valence-induced motor bias effects by manipulating the mapping between decisions and actions and imposing constraints on response times (RTs). Our goal was to assess the presence of the valence-induced confidence bias in the absence of the RT bias. We observed both motor and confidence biases despite our disruption attempts, establishing that the effects of valence on motor and metacognitive responses are very robust and replicable. Nonetheless, within- and between-individual inferences reveal that the confidence bias resists the disruption of the RT bias. Therefore, although concomitant in most cases, valence-induced motor and confidence biases seem to be partly dissociable. These results highlight new important mechanistic constraints that should be incorporated in learning models to jointly explain choice, reaction times and confidence.

Contextual influence on confidence judgments in human reinforcement learning.

The ability to correctly estimate the probability of one's choices being correct is fundamental to optimally re-evaluate previous choices or to arbitrate between different decision strategies. Experimental evidence nonetheless suggests that this metacognitive process-confidence judgment- is susceptible to numerous biases. Here, we investigate the effect of outcome valence (gains or losses) on confidence while participants learned stimulus-outcome associations by trial-and-error. In two experiments, participants were more confident in their choices when learning to seek gains compared to avoiding losses, despite equal difficulty and performance between those two contexts. Computational modelling revealed that this bias is driven by the context-value, a dynamically updated estimate of the average expected-value of choice options, necessary to explain equal performance in the gain and loss domain. The biasing effect of context-value on confidence, revealed here for the first time in a reinforcement-learning context, is therefore domain-general, with likely important functional consequences. We show that one such consequence emerges in volatile environments, where the (in)flexibility of individuals' learning strategies differs when outcomes are framed as gains or losses. Despite apparent similar behavior- profound asymmetries might therefore exist between learning to avoid losses and learning to seek gains.

Higher BDNF plasma levels are associated with a normalization of memory dysfunctions during an antidepressant treatment.

One important symptom of patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) is memory dysfunction. However, little is known about the relationship between memory performance and depression severity, about the course of memory performance during antidepressant treatment as well as about the relationship between memory performance and brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF). Memory function [learning and delayed recall) was assessed in 173 MDD patients (mean age 39.7 ± 11.3 years] treated by a pre-defined treatment algorithm within the early medication change (EMC) study at baseline, days 28 and 56. Depression severity was assessed in weekly intervals, BDNF plasma levels were measured at baseline, days 14 and 56, BDNF exon IV and p11 methylation status at baseline. Linear mixed regression models revealed that the course of depression severity was not associated with the course of learning or delayed recall in the total group. 63 (36%) of the investigated patients showed memory deficits (percent range ≤ 16) at baseline. Of those, 26(41%) patients experienced a normalization of their memory deficits during treatment. Patients with a normalization of their delayed recall performance had significantly higher plasma BDNF levels (p = 0.040) from baseline to day 56 than patients with persistent deficits. Baseline BDNF exon IV promoter and p11 gene methylation status were not associated with memory performance. Our results corroborate a concomitant amelioration of learning and delayed recall dysfunctions with successful antidepressant therapy in a subgroup of patients and support a role of BDNF in the neural mechanisms underlying the normalization of memory dysfunctions in MDD. ClinicalTrials.gov number: NCT00974155; EudraCT: 2008-008280-96.

Effects of age on depressive symptomatology and response to antidepressant treatment in patients with major depressive disorder aged 18 to 65 years.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence that symptomatology in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) changes with age. However, studies comparing depressive symptomatology between different age groups during antidepressant therapy are rare. We compared demographic and clinical characteristics in depressed patients of different age groups at baseline and during treatment. METHODS: 889 MDD inpatients were divided into four age groups (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-65 yrs.). Demographic and clinical characteristics including depressive symptomatology (assessed by the Inventory of Depressive Symptoms) were assessed at baseline and weekly during treatment. RESULTS: At baseline, young patients (18-29 years) significantly more often reported cognitive symptoms like irritability, suicidality, negative self-concept and interpersonal sensitivity and more often suffered from drug abuse and comorbid personality disorders. Late middle aged patients (50-65 years) significantly more often suffered from neuro-vegetative symptoms such as reduced general interest, sexual interest and sleep disturbances and more often showed a recurrent MDD and comorbid physical disorders. During therapy, symptoms such as interpersonal sensitivity in young patients and low interest in sex in late middle aged patients persisted until the end of treatment while all other symptoms declined until day 56. LIMITATIONS: The herein presented age differences in depressive symptomatology only hold true for the study medication and are not generalizable to other antidepressants agents. CONCLUSION: There are substantial differences in the clinical presentation of depression between age groups. Whereas many of these differences disappear during treatment, some differences persisted until the end of treatment. These findings my help to more specifically tailor the treatment of depressed patients.

Time ambiguity during intertemporal decision-making is aversive, impacting choice and neural value coding.

We are often presented with choices that differ in their more immediate versus future consequences. Interestingly, in everyday-life, ambiguity about the exact timing of such consequences frequently occurs, yet it remains unknown whether and how time-ambiguity influences decisions and their underlying neural correlates. We developed a novel intertemporal fMRI choice task in which participants make choices between sooner-smaller (SS) versus later-larger (LL) monetary rewards with systematically varying levels of time-ambiguity. Across trials, delay information of the SS, the LL, or both rewards was either exact (e.g., in 5 weeks), of low ambiguity (4 week range: e.g., in 3-7 weeks), or of high ambiguity (8 week range: e.g., in 1-9 weeks). Choice behavior showed that the majority of participants preferred options with exact delays over those with ambiguous delays, indicating time-ambiguity aversion. Consistent with these results, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed decreased activation during ambiguous versus exact trials. In contrast, intraparietal sulcus activation increased during ambiguous versus exact trials. Furthermore, exploratory analyses suggest that more time-ambiguity averse participants show more insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation during subjective value (SV)-coding of ambiguous versus exact trials. Lastly, the best-fitting computational choice models indicate that ambiguity impacts the SV of options via time perception or via an additive ambiguity-related penalty term. Together, these results provide the first behavioral and neural signatures of time-ambiguity, pointing towards a unique profile that is distinct from impatience. Since time-ambiguity is ubiquitous in real-life, it likely contributes to shortsighted decisions above and beyond delay-discounting.