Judging Truth.

Deceptive claims surround us, embedded in fake news, advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. How do people know what to believe? Truth judgments reflect inferences drawn from three types of information: base rates, feelings, and consistency with information retrieved from memory. First, people exhibit a bias to accept incoming information, because most claims in our environments are true. Second, people interpret feelings, like ease of processing, as evidence of truth. And third, people can (but do not always) consider whether assertions match facts and source information stored in memory. This three-part framework predicts specific illusions (e.g., truthiness, illusory truth), offers ways to correct stubborn misconceptions, and suggests the importance of converging cues in a post-truth world, where falsehoods travel further and faster than the truth.

Neural basis of goal-driven changes in knowledge activation.

Depending on a person's goals, different aspects of stored knowledge are accessed. Decades of behavioral work document the flexible use of knowledge, but little neuroimaging work speaks to these questions. We used representational similarity analysis to investigate whether the relationship between brain activity and semantic structure of statements varied in two tasks hypothesized to differ in the degree to which knowledge is accessed: judging truth (semantic task) and judging oldness (episodic task). During truth judgments, but not old/new recognition judgments, a left-lateralized network previously associated with semantic memory exhibited correlations with semantic structure. At a neural level, people activate knowledge representations in different ways when focused on different goals. The present results demonstrate the potential of multivariate approaches in characterizing knowledge storage and retrieval, as well as the ways that it shapes our understanding and long-term memory.

Expertise effects in the Moses illusion: detecting contradictions with stored knowledge.

People frequently miss contradictions with stored knowledge; for example, readers often fail to notice any problem with a reference to the Atlantic as the largest ocean. Critically, such effects occur even though participants later demonstrate knowing the Pacific is the largest ocean (the Moses Illusion) [Erickson, T. D., & Mattson, M. E. (1981). From words to meaning: A semantic illusion. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 20, 540-551]. We investigated whether such oversights disappear when erroneous references contradict information in one's expert domain, material which likely has been encountered many times and is particularly well-known. Biology and history graduate students monitored for errors while answering biology and history questions containing erroneous presuppositions ("In what US state were the forty-niners searching for oil?"). Expertise helped: participants were less susceptible to the illusion and less likely to later reproduce errors in their expert domain. However, expertise did not eliminate the illusion, even when errors were bolded and underlined, meaning that it was unlikely that people simply skipped over errors. The results support claims that people often use heuristics to judge truth, as opposed to directly retrieving information from memory, likely because such heuristics are adaptive and often lead to the correct answer. Even experts sometimes use such shortcuts, suggesting that overlearned and accessible knowledge does not guarantee retrieval of that information.

On Known Unknowns: Fluency and the Neural Mechanisms of Illusory Truth.

The "illusory truth" effect refers to the phenomenon whereby repetition of a statement increases its likelihood of being judged true. This phenomenon has important implications for how we come to believe oft-repeated information that may be misleading or unknown. Behavioral evidence indicates that fluency, the subjective ease experienced while processing information, underlies this effect. This suggests that illusory truth should be mediated by brain regions previously linked to fluency, such as the perirhinal cortex (PRC). To investigate this possibility, we scanned participants with fMRI while they rated the truth of unknown statements, half of which were presented earlier (i.e., repeated). The only brain region that showed an interaction between repetition and ratings of perceived truth was PRC, where activity increased with truth ratings for repeated, but not for new, statements. This finding supports the hypothesis that illusory truth is mediated by a fluency mechanism and further strengthens the link between PRC and fluency.

Correcting false memories: Errors must be noticed and replaced.

Memory can be unreliable. For example, after reading The new baby stayed awake all night, people often misremember that the new baby cried all night (Brewer, 1977); similarly, after hearing bed, rest, and tired, people often falsely remember that sleep was on the list (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In general, such false memories are difficult to correct, persisting despite warnings and additional study opportunities. We argue that errors must first be detected to be corrected; consistent with this argument, two experiments showed that false memories were nearly eliminated when conditions facilitated comparisons between participants' errors and corrective feedback (e.g., immediate trial-by-trial feedback that allowed direct comparisons between their responses and the correct information). However, knowledge that they had made an error was insufficient; unless the feedback message also contained the correct answer, the rate of false memories remained relatively constant. On the one hand, there is nothing special about correcting false memories: simply labeling an error as "wrong" is also insufficient for correcting other memory errors, including misremembered facts or mistranslations. However, unlike these other types of errors--which often benefit from the spacing afforded by delayed feedback--false memories require a special consideration: Learners may fail to notice their errors unless the correction conditions specifically highlight them.

Multiple-choice tests stabilize access to marginal knowledge.

Marginal knowledge refers to knowledge that is stored in memory, but is not accessible at a given moment. For example, one might struggle to remember who wrote The Call of the Wild, even if that knowledge is stored in memory. Knowing how best to stabilize access to marginal knowledge is important, given that new learning often requires accessing and building on prior knowledge. While even a single opportunity to restudy marginal knowledge boosts its later accessibility (Berger, Hall, & Bahrick, 1999), in many situations explicit relearning opportunities are not available. Our question is whether multiple-choice tests (which by definition expose the learner to the correct answers) can also serve this function and, if so, how testing compares to restudying given that tests can be particularly powerful learning devices (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). In four experiments, we found that multiple-choice testing had the power to stabilize access to marginal knowledge, and to do so for at least up to a week. Importantly, such tests did not need to be paired with feedback, although testing was no more powerful than studying. Overall, the results support the idea that one's knowledge base is unstable, with individual pieces of information coming in and out of reach. The present findings have implications for a key educational challenge: ensuring that students have continuing access to information they have learned.

Learning misinformation from fictional sources: understanding the contributions of transportation and item-specific processing.

People often pick up incorrect information about the world from movies, novels and other fictional sources. The question asked here is whether such sources are a particularly potent source of misinformation. On the one hand, story-reading involves transportation into a fictional world, with a possible reduction in access to one's prior knowledge (likely reducing the chances that the reader will notice errors). On the other hand, stories encourage relational processing as readers create mental models, decreasing the likelihood that they will encode and remember more peripheral details like erroneous facts. To test these ideas, we examined suggestibility after readers were exposed to misleading references embedded in stories and lists that were matched on a number of dimensions. In two experiments, suggestibility was greater following exposure to misinformation in a list of sentences rather than a coherent story, even though the story was rated as more engaging than the list. Furthermore, processing the story with an item-specific processing task (inserting missing letters) increased later suggestibility, whereas this task had no impact on suggestibility when misinformation was presented within a list. The type of processing used when reading a text affects suggestibility more than engagement with the text.

Recent study, but not retrieval, of knowledge protects against learning errors.

Surprisingly, people incorporate errors into their knowledge bases even when they have the correct knowledge stored in memory (e.g., Fazio, Barber, Rajaram, Ornstein, & Marsh, 2013). We examined whether heightening the accessibility of correct knowledge would protect people from later reproducing misleading information that they encountered in fictional stories. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of target general knowledge questions and their correct answers either a few minutes (high accessibility of knowledge) or 1 week (low accessibility of knowledge) before exposure to misleading story references. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants instead retrieved the answers to the target general knowledge questions either a few minutes or 1 week before the rest of the experiment. Reading the relevant knowledge directly before the story-reading phase protected against reproduction of the misleading story answers on a later general knowledge test, but retrieving that same correct information did not. Retrieving stored knowledge from memory might actually enhance the encoding of relevant misinformation.

Ageing and the Moses illusion: older adults fall for Moses but if asked directly, stick with Noah.

Many people respond "two" to the question "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?", even though they know the reference should be to Noah. The Moses Illusion demonstrates a failure to apply stored knowledge (Erickson & Mattson, 1981). Of interest was whether older adults' robust knowledge bases would protect them from vulnerability to this illusion. Of secondary interest were any age differences in the memorial consequences of the illusion, and whether older adults' prior knowledge would protect them from later reproducing information from distorted questions (e.g., later saying that Moses took two animals of each kind on the ark). Surprisingly, older adults fell for the Moses Illusion more often than did younger adults. However, falling for the illusion did not affect older adults' later memory; they were less suggestible than young adults. Most importantly, older adults were more likely to recover from exposure to distorted questions and respond correctly. Explanations of these findings, drawing on theories of cognitive ageing, are discussed.

Heuristic decision-making across adulthood.

In general, research on aging and decision-making has grown in recent years. Yet, little work has investigated how reliance on classic heuristics may differ across adulthood. For example, younger adults rely on the availability of information from memory when judging the relative frequency of plane crashes versus car accidents, but it is unclear if older adults are similarly reliant on this heuristic. In the present study, participants aged 20-90 years old made judgments that could be answered by relying on five different heuristics: anchoring, availability, recognition, representativeness, and sunk-cost bias. We found no evidence of age-related differences in the use of the classic heuristics-younger and older adults employed anchoring, availability, recognition, and representativeness to equal degrees in order to make decisions. However, replicating past work, we found age-related differences in the sunk-cost bias-older adults were more likely to avoid this fallacy compared to younger adults. We explain these different patterns by drawing on the distinctive roles that stored knowledge and personal experience likely play across heuristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Memorial consequences of testing school-aged children.

A large literature shows that retrieval practice is a powerful tool for enhancing learning and memory in undergraduates (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). Much less work has examined the memorial consequences of testing school-aged children. Our focus is on multiple-choice tests, which are potentially problematic since they minimise retrieval practice and also expose students to errors (the multiple-choice lures). To examine this issue, second graders took a multiple-choice general knowledge test (e.g., What country did the Pilgrims come from: England, Germany, Ireland, or Spain?) and later answered a series of short answer questions, some of which corresponded to questions on the earlier multiple-choice test. Without feedback, the benefits of prior testing outweighed the costs for easy questions. However, for hard questions, the large increase in multiple-choice lure answers on the final test meant that the cost of prior testing outweighed the benefits when no feedback was provided. This negative testing effect was eliminated when children received immediate feedback (consisting of the correct answer) after each multiple-choice selection. Implications for educational practice are discussed.

Inferring facts from fiction: reading correct and incorrect information affects memory for related information.

People can acquire both true and false knowledge about the world from fictional stories. The present study explored whether the benefits and costs of learning about the world from fictional stories extend beyond memory for directly stated pieces of information. Of interest was whether readers would use correct and incorrect story references to make deductive inferences about related information in the story, and then integrate those inferences into their knowledge bases. Participants read stories containing correct, neutral, and misleading references to facts about the world; each reference could be combined with another reference that occurred in a later sentence to make a deductive inference. Later they answered general knowledge questions that tested for these deductive inferences. The results showed that participants generated and retained the deductive inferences regardless of whether the inferences were consistent or inconsistent with world knowledge, and irrespective of whether the references were placed consecutively in the text or separated by many sentences. Readers learn more than what is directly stated in stories; they use references to the real world to make both correct and incorrect inferences that are integrated into their knowledge bases.

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test.

A key educational challenge is how to correct students' errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.

Individual Differences in Structure Building: Impacts on Comprehension and Learning, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Support for Less Able Structure Builders.

In this article, we highlight an underappreciated individual difference: structure building. Structure building is integral to many everyday activities and involves creating coherent mental representations of conversations, texts, pictorial stories, and other events. People vary in this ability in a way not generally captured by other better known concepts and individual difference measures. Individuals with lower structure-building ability consistently perform worse on a range of comprehension and learning measures than do individuals with higher structure-building ability, both in the laboratory and in the classroom. Problems include a range of comprehension processes, including encoding factual content, inhibiting irrelevant information, and constructing a cohesive situation model of a text or conversation. Despite these problems, recent research is encouraging in that techniques to improve the learning outcomes for low-ability structure builders have been identified. We argue that the accumulated research warrants the recognition of structure building as an important individual difference in cognitive functioning and that additional theoretical work is needed to understand the underpinnings of structure-building deficits.

A comparison of memories of fiction and autobiographical memories.

People consume, remember, and discuss not only memories of lived experiences, but also events from works of fiction, such as books, movies, and TV shows. We argue that these memories of fiction represent an important category of event memory, best understood within an autobiographical memory framework. How do fictional events yield psychological realities even when they are known to be invented? We explored this question in three studies by comparing the memory content, phenomenological qualities, and functional roles of naturally occurring personal memories to memories of fiction. In Studies 1 and 2, we characterized the subjective experience of memories of fiction by adapting established measures of autobiographical remembering, such as the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003), Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and items from the Thinking About Life Experiences Scale (Bluck et al., 2005; Pillemer et al., 2015). In Study 3, we investigated similarities and differences in personal memories and memories of fiction for events from childhood or the recent past. In doing so, we observed the impact of a unique property of memories of fiction: their ability to be repeatedly reexperienced in their original form. Taken together, we argue that memories of fiction can be considered similar to other forms of autobiographical remembering and describe a theoretical framework for understanding memories of fiction in the context of other event memories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Transfer of category learning to impoverished contexts.

Learning often happens in ideal conditions, but then must be applied in less-than-ideal conditions - such as when a learner studies clearly illustrated examples of rocks in a book but then must identify them in a muddy field. Here we examine whether the benefits of interleaving (vs. blocking) study schedules, as well as the use of feature descriptions, supports the transfer of category learning in new, impoverished contexts. Specifically, keeping the study conditions constant, we evaluated learners' ability to classify new exemplars in the same neutral context versus in impoverished contexts in which certain stimulus features are occluded. Over two experiments, we demonstrate that performance in new, impoverished contexts during test is greater for participants who received an interleaved (vs. blocked) study schedule, both for novel and for studied exemplars. Additionally, we show that this benefit extends to both a short (3-min) or long (48-h) test delay. The presence of feature descriptions during learning had no impact on transfer. Together, these results extend the growing literature investigating how changes in context during category learning or test impacts performance and provide support for the use of interleaving to promote the far transfer of category knowledge to impoverished contexts.

Predicting others' knowledge in younger and older adulthood.

Our beliefs about aging affect how we interact with others. For example, people know that episodic memory declines with age, and as a result, older adults' memories are less likely to be trusted. However, not all aspects of remembering decline with age; semantic memory (knowledge) increases across adulthood and is relatively unaffected in healthy aging. In the current work, we examined people's awareness of this pattern. Participants estimated the knowledge of hypothetical younger and older adults; in some studies, they also predicted and demonstrated their own knowledge on the same measures. Across studies, both younger and older adults estimated that older adults would perform better on a knowledge test, demonstrating awareness that knowledge is not impaired with aging. Furthermore, people's beliefs about their own knowledge influenced the predictions they made about others' knowledge. We discuss how this work informs theories of metacognition and contributes to positive self-perceptions in older adulthood.

Prior exposure increases judged truth even during periods of mind wandering.

Much of our day is spent mind-wandering-periods of inattention characterized by a lack of awareness of external stimuli and information. Whether we are paying attention or not, information surrounds us constantly-some true and some false. The proliferation of false information in news and social media highlights the critical need to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying our beliefs about what is true. People often rely on heuristics to judge the truth of information. For example, repeated information is more likely to be judged as true than new information (i.e., the illusory truth effect). However, despite the prevalence of mind wandering in our daily lives, current research on the contributing factors to the illusory truth effect have largely ignored periods of inattention as experimentally informative. Here, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge, investigating whether mind wandering during initial exposure to information has an effect on later belief in the truth of that information. That is, does the illusory truth effect occur even when people report not paying attention to the information at hand. Across three studies we demonstrate that even during periods of mind wandering, the repetition of information increases truth judgments. Further, our results suggest that the severity of mind wandering moderated truth ratings, such that greater levels of mind wandering decreased truth judgements for previously presented information.

Ironic effects of drawing attention to story errors.

Readers learn errors embedded in fictional stories and use them to answer later general knowledge questions (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003). Suggestibility is robust and occurs even when story errors contradict well-known facts. The current study evaluated whether suggestibility is linked to participants' inability to judge story content as correct versus incorrect. Specifically, participants read stories containing correct and misleading information about the world; some information was familiar (making error discovery possible), while some was more obscure. To improve participants' monitoring ability, we highlighted (in red font) a subset of story phrases requiring evaluation; readers no longer needed to find factual information. Rather, they simply needed to evaluate its correctness. Readers were more likely to answer questions with story errors if they were highlighted in red font, even if they contradicted well-known facts. Although highlighting to-be-evaluated information freed cognitive resources for monitoring, an ironic effect occurred: Drawing attention to specific errors increased rather than decreased later suggestibility. Failure to monitor for errors, not failure to identify the information requiring evaluation, leads to suggestibility.

Externalizing autobiographical memories in the digital age.

People externalize their autobiographical memories by creating representations that exist outside of their minds. Externalizations often serve personal and social functions, consistent with theorized functions of autobiographical memory. With new digital technologies, people are documenting more memories than ever and are sharing them with larger audiences. However, these technologies do not change the core cognitive processes involved in autobiographical memory, but instead present novel situations that affect how these processes are deployed. Smartphones allow events to be recorded as they unfold, thus directing attention and sometimes impairing memory. Social media increase the frequency of reviewing and sharing records which reactivate memories, potentially strengthening or updating them. Overall, externalization in the digital age changes what people attend to and remember about their own experiences.