Continuity in false belief understanding from 33 to 52 months of age.

Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally-Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change.

Memory Monitoring and Control in Japanese and German Preschoolers.

Prior studies explored the early development of memory monitoring and control. However, little work has examined cross-cultural similarities and differences in metacognitive development in early childhood. In the present research, we investigated a total of 100 Japanese and German preschool-aged children's memory monitoring and control in a visual perception task. After seeing picture items, some of which were repeated, children were presented with picture pairs, one of which had been presented earlier and the other was a novel item. They then were asked to identify the previously presented picture. Children were also asked to evaluate their confidence about their selection, and to sort the responses to be used for being awarded with a prize at the end of the test. Both groups similarly expressed more confidence in the accurately remembered items than in the inaccurately remembered items, and their sorting decision was based on their subjective confidence. Japanese children's sorting more closely corresponded to memory accuracy than German children's sorting, however. These findings were further confirmed by a hierarchical Bayesian estimation of metacognitive efficiency. The present findings therefore suggest that early memory monitoring and control have both culturally similar and diverse aspects. The findings are discussed in light of broader sociocultural influences on metacognition.

Evidence for goal- and mixed evidence for false belief-based action prediction in 2- to 4-year-old children: A large-scale longitudinal anticipatory looking replication study.

Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in 3- to 4-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. [2017]. Developmental Science, 20(5), e12445). The present study is a large-scale replication attempt of this paradigm. The task was administered three times to the same sample of N = 185 children at 2, 3, and 4 years of age. Using the original stimuli, we did not replicate the original finding of above-chance belief-congruent looking in a combined score of two false belief conditions in either of the three age groups. Interestingly, the overall pattern of results was comparable to the original study. Post-hoc analyses revealed, however, that children performed above chance in one false belief condition (FB1) and below chance in the other false belief condition (FB2), thus yielding mixed evidence of children's false belief-based action predictions. Similar to the original study, participants' performance did not change with age and was not related to children's general language skills. This study demonstrates the importance of large-scaled replications and adds to the growing number of research questioning the validity and reliability of anticipatory looking false belief paradigms as a robust measure of children's implicit tracking of beliefs.

No links between genetic variation and developing theory of mind: A preregistered replication attempt of candidate gene studies.

Genetic variability is being discussed as a source of inter-individual differences in Theory of Mind development. Previous studies documented an association between variations in DRD4 VNTR 48 bp, OXTR rs53576, COMT rs4680, and Theory of Mind task performance. As empirical evidence on these associations is sparse, we conducted a preregistered replication attempt of a study reporting a link between DRD4 VNTR 48 bp and false belief understanding in 50-month-old children [Lackner, C., Sabbagh, M. A., Hallinan, E., Liu, X., & Holden, J. J. (2012). Developmental Science, 15(2), 272-280.]. Additionally, we attempted a replication of studies on the role of OXTR rs53576 and COMT rs4680 in Theory of Mind. In both replication attempts, we did not find any evidence for associations between the sampled genetic markers and Theory of Mind ability in a series of analyses. Extending the replication attempt of Lackner et al., we employed longitudinal data from several tasks and measurement points, which allowed us to run follow-up robustness checks with more reliable scores. These extensive analyses corroborated our null finding. This comprehensive non-replication is important to balance current research on genetic markers of Theory of Mind. In a combined evaluation of our own and previous studies, we point to substantial methodological issues that research on the genetic basis of Theory of Mind development faces. We conclude that these limitations currently prevent firm conclusions on genetic influences on Theory of Mind development.

Young children's metacognitive awareness of confounded evidence.

Young children selectively explore confounded evidence-when causality is ambiguous due to multiple candidate causes. This suggests that they have an implicit understanding that confounded evidence is uninformative. This study examined explicit understanding, or metacognitive awareness, of the informativeness of different qualities of evidence during early childhood. In two within-participants conditions, children (N = 60 5- and 6-year-olds) were presented with confounded and unconfounded evidence and were asked to evaluate and explain their knowledge of a causal relation. Children more frequently requested further information in the confounded condition than in the unconfounded condition. Nearly half of them referred to multiple candidate causes when explaining confounded evidence. Our data demonstrate that young children can reason explicitly about the informativeness of different kinds of evidence.

Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study.

Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children's metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.

Do ostensive cues affect object processing in children with and without autism? A test of natural pedagogy theory.

Theories suggest that the perception of others' actions and social cues leads to selective processing of object features. Most recently, natural pedagogy theory postulated that ostensive cues lead to a selective processing of an object's features at the expense of processing of its location. This study examined this hypothesis in 10-year-old children with and without autism spectrum condition (ASC) to better understand social information processing in ASC and the relevance of observing others in human object processing in general. Participants saw an agent either ostensively pointing to an object or non-ostensively grasping an object. Thereafter, the cued or uncued object changed either its location or identity. We assessed not only behavioral responses, but also participants' gaze behavior by means of eye tracking. In contrast to natural pedagogy theory, we found that in the non-ostensive grasping context, participants rather noticed an identity change than a location change. Moreover, location changes were more readily identified in the ostensive pointing context. Importantly, there was no difference between children with and without ASC. Our study shows that the perception of ostensively vs. non-ostensively framed actions leads to different processing of object features, indicating a close link between action perception, object processing, and social cues. Moreover, the lacking group difference in our study suggests that these basic perception-action processes are not impaired in autism.

Sensitivity to communicative and non-communicative gestures in adolescents and adults with autism spectrum disorder: saccadic and pupillary responses.

Nonverbal communication using social cues, like gestures, governs a great part of our daily interactions. It has been proposed that people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show a deviant processing of social cues throughout their social cognitive development. However, social cues do not always convey an intention to communicate. Hence, the aim of this study was to test the sensitivity of adolescents and adults with ASD and neurotypical controls to social cues of high communicative (pointing) and low communicative values (grasping). For this purpose, we employed a spatial cueing paradigm with both Cue Types and compared saccadic reaction times (SRTs) between conditions in which the target appeared at a location which was congruent versus incongruent with the direction of the cue. Results showed that both adolescents and adults with ASD had slower SRTs for the incongruent relative to the congruent condition for both Cue Types, reflecting sensitivity to these cues. Additionally, mental effort during the processing of these social cues was assessed by means of pupil dilation. This analysis revealed that, while individuals with and without ASD required more mental effort to process incongruent compared to the congruent cues, cues with higher communicative value posed more processing load for the ASD group. These findings suggest that the perception of social gestures is intact in ASD but requires additional mental effort for gestures with higher communicative value.

Scaling of Advanced Theory-of-Mind Tasks.

Advanced theory-of-mind (AToM) development was investigated in three separate studies involving 82, 466, and 402 elementary school children (8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds). Rasch and factor analyses assessed whether common conceptual development underlies higher-order false-belief understanding, social understanding, emotion recognition, and perspective-taking abilities. The results refuted a unidimensional scale and revealed three distinct AToM factors: social reasoning, reasoning about ambiguity, and recognizing transgressions of social norms. Developmental progressions emerged for the two reasoning factors but not for recognizing transgressions of social norms. Both social factors were significantly related to inhibition, whereas language development only predicted performance on social reasoning. These findings suggest that AToM comprises multiple abilities, which are subject to distinct cognitive influences. Importantly, only two AToM factors involve conceptual development.

Understanding of Goals, Beliefs, and Desires Predicts Morally Relevant Theory of Mind: A Longitudinal Investigation.

Developmental continuity between infants' understanding of intentional agency (goals, beliefs, and desires) and young children's attributions of moral intentions were studied in a 4-year longitudinal study (N = 77 children). First, goal encoding at the age of 7 months and implicit false belief understanding at 18 months were predictive of children's understanding of an accidental transgressor's moral intentions at the age of 5 years. Second, 24-month-olds' understanding of subjective desires was predictive of children's ability to understand an accidental transgressor's false belief at 5 years. These correlations remained significant when controlling for gender and verbal IQ. These findings support the theory that an early understanding of intentional agency is foundational for moral cognition in childhood.

When the body reveals the mind: Children's use of others' body orientation to understand their focus of attention.

A considerable amount of research has examined children's ability to rely on explicit social cues such as pointing to understand others' referential intentions. Yet, skillful social interaction also requires reliance on and learning from implicit cues (i.e., cues that are not displayed with the explicit intention to teach or inform someone). From an embodied point of view, orienting movements and body orientation are salient cues that reveal something about a person's intentional relations without being explicit communicative cues. In three experiments, the current study investigated the development of the ability to use body information in a word learning situation. To this end, we presented 2-year-old children, 3.5-year-old children, and adults with movies on an eye-tracking screen in which an actor oriented her upper body to one of two objects while uttering a novel word. The results show that the 3.5-year-old children and adults, but not the 2-year-old children, related the novel word to the referred object (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the actor oriented her body to one object while pointing to the other object, children of both age groups relied on the pointing cue (Experiment 3). This suggests that by 3.5 years children use another's body orientation as an indicator of her intentional relations but that they prioritize explicit social cues over the implicit body posture cues. Overall, the study supports theoretical views that an appreciation of others' intentional relations does not emerge as an all-or-nothing ability but rather emerges gradually during the course of early development.

Maternal Emotional Availability and Its Association with Maternal Psychopathology, Attachment Style Insecurity and Theory of Mind.

BACKGROUND/AIMS: High maternal emotional availability (EA) positively affects various domains of child development. However, the question of which factors promote or hinder maternal EA has not been investigated systematically. The present study investigated several maternal characteristics, namely maternal psychopathology, maternal attachment style insecurity, and theory of mind (ToM) as possible factors that influence maternal EA. METHODS: The sample was comprised of 56 mothers and their preschool-aged children. Half of the mothers were diagnosed with postpartum depression and or anxiety disorders according to DSM-IV, and the other half were healthy controls. RESULTS: The results showed that both low maternal attachment style insecurity and high ToM skills significantly predicted maternal EA sensitivity, independently from maternal postpartum and concurrent psychopathology and education. Moreover, maternal attachment style insecurity fully mediated the link between maternal postpartum psychopathology and sensitivity. CONCLUSION: The findings suggest that maternal attachment style security can buffer negative effects of maternal psychopathology on maternal sensitivity in the mother-child interaction.

The development of scientific thinking in elementary school: a comprehensive inventory.

The development of scientific thinking was assessed in 1,581 second, third, and fourth graders (8-, 9-, 10-year-olds) based on a conceptual model that posits developmental progression from naïve to more advanced conceptions. Using a 66-item scale, five components of scientific thinking were addressed, including experimental design, data interpretation, and understanding the nature of science. Unidimensional and multidimensional item response theory analyses supported the instrument's reliability and validity and suggested that the multiple components of scientific thinking form a unitary construct, independent of verbal or reasoning skills. A partial credit model gave evidence for a hierarchical developmental progression. Across each grade transition, advanced conceptions increased while naïve conceptions decreased. Independent effects of intelligence, schooling, and parental education on scientific thinking are discussed.

Which way to take? Infants select an efficient path to their goal.

In two experiments, we examined the development of the ability to select efficient means in order to attain a goal in 1.5- and 2-year-olds (N = 79) using a setup in which two paths led to a goal. One of the paths was shorter, and thus more efficient, than the other path. Experiment 1 showed a strong tendency in both age groups to choose the shorter path. In Experiment 2, the shorter path was initially blocked and became available only after infants repeatedly took the longer path. Children demonstrated increasing use of the more efficient path over time. The results of both experiments point to some abilities of efficient action selection in infants.

Developmental changes and the effect of self-generated feedback in metacognitive controlled spacing strategies in 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults.

The current study investigated the development of metacognitive monitoring-based control of spacing choices in children and adults. Moreover, we assessed whether metacognitive learning decisions are influenced by the effects of previous metacognitive decisions. We tested groups of 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults in a task with two learning blocks in which they needed to monitor their learning through judgments of learning (JoL) and in which they then needed to decide whether to space their study, mass it, or terminate it. Extending previous findings, our study provides the first evidence that already by 7 years of age children can make metacognitive controlled scheduling decisions. The results also revealed that adults had more clearly differentiated strategies related to their JoL. Furthermore, our study provides evidence that participants of all age groups improved their relative monitoring accuracy in the second learning block and adjusted their JoL. However, only adults changed their strategy choices.

Clarifying the range of social-cognitive processes subserving human teaching.

An evolutionary framework on human teaching is not well equipped to explain the nature of human teaching unless it specifies the subserving cognitive and motivational mechanisms. Only a theory that speculates on the psychological processes provides testable predictions and stimulates further empirical research.

Functional activity and effective connectivity of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex during processing of incongruent mental states.

The neurocognitive components of Theory of Mind reasoning remain poorly understood. In particular the role of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of other's mental states such as beliefs that are incongruent with one's own knowledge of reality is not clear-cut. It is unknown whether this region is involved in computing discrepant mental states or in subsequently resolving a response conflict between the discrepant others' and one's own beliefs. To test this, we adapted a false belief paradigm for the separate inspection of functional brain activity related to (1) the computation of diverging beliefs and (2) the subsequent consideration and selection of another's or one's own belief. Based on statistical parametric findings from functional neuroimaging, we employed dynamic causal modelling combined with Bayesian model selection to further characterize the interplay of resulting brain regions. In the initial computation of diverging beliefs, the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) and the bilateral temporoparietal cortex were crucially involved. The findings suggest that the bilateral temporal cortex engages in the construction and adjustment of diverging mental states by encoding relevant environmental information. The pMPFC inhibits this stimulus-bound processing which helps to compute discrepant mental states and process another's false belief decoupled from one's own perception of reality. In the subsequent question phase the right temporoparietal cortex showed increased activity related to switching to and reconsidering another's beliefs in order to select the correct response.

Metacognitive monitoring of oneself and others: developmental changes during childhood and adolescence.

The current study examined the development of people's knowledge about others' learning and memory processes. To this end, participants of four different age groups (6- and 7-year-old children, 8- to 10-year-old children, 14- and 15-year-old adolescents, and adults) observed another person performing a paired associate learning task, allocating either little or more time to the paired associates. Participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of recall by giving judgments of learning (JoLs) for every item pair (Other Task). In addition, we manipulated whether participants performed an equivalent task themselves (Self Task) before or after the evaluation of the other. Our results show significant developmental effects, with the older two age groups, but not the younger two age groups, differentiating between the short and long video sequences when giving JoLs in the Other Task. Moreover, the results revealed an impact of having performed the Self Task beforehand on participants' JoLs in the Other Task, suggesting that metacognitive knowledge about the other is informed by experiential cues during the actual (i.e., firsthand), learning process.

Neural correlates of prosocial behavior in infancy: different neurophysiological mechanisms support the emergence of helping and comforting.

The present study examined the neural processes related to different forms of prosocial behavior in infancy by means of a longitudinal study. At 14months, infants' resting state brain activation asymmetries were assessed by means of EEG. At 18months, we examined infants' instrumental helping, and at 24months infants' behavior in a comforting task. Behavioral analyses revealed a negative relation between infants' performances in the helping and comforting task. The EEG analysis showed that distinct neural patterns were related to each task. Greater left frontal cortical activation was associated with infants' understanding of the other's distress as well as empathic responding in the comforting task, whereas greater right temporal activation was related to infants' instrumental helping. These findings reveal the neural correlates of the earliest forms of prosocial action and show that different neurophysiological activation patterns are related to the emergence of instrumental helping and comforting in early development.

To get the grasp: seven-month-olds encode and selectively reproduce goal-directed grasping.

Infants need to analyze human behavior in terms of goal-directed actions in order to form expectations about agents' rationality. There is converging evidence for goal encoding during the first year of life from looking time as well as social learning paradigms using imitation procedures. However, conceptual interpretations of these abilities are challenged by low-level motor resonance accounts that propose task-specific lower level sensorimotor associations underlying looking time tasks rather than abstract conceptual knowledge. To test the differential predictions derived from the two accounts, we investigated within-child consistency of performance on different, but conceptually related, tasks requiring goal encoding. This study presented seven-month-old infants with a looking time task and an imitation task, both testing their ability to encode an action goal based on a reaching action, as well as a working memory task to control for the influence of general cognitive capacity. Results showed inter task convergence to be independent of working memory: infants who spent more time looking at goal change events in the looking time task were more likely to selectively reproduce the goal in the imitation task when the model had performed an intentional grasping action rather than a back-of-hand object contact. These findings support the view that low-level motor resonance mechanisms are not sufficient to explain the capacities of action understanding in infants.