Toolbox of individual-level interventions against online misinformation.

The spread of misinformation through media and social networks threatens many aspects of society, including public health and the state of democracies. One approach to mitigating the effect of misinformation focuses on individual-level interventions, equipping policymakers and the public with essential tools to curb the spread and influence of falsehoods. Here we introduce a toolbox of individual-level interventions for reducing harm from online misinformation. Comprising an up-to-date account of interventions featured in 81 scientific papers from across the globe, the toolbox provides both a conceptual overview of nine main types of interventions, including their target, scope and examples, and a summary of the empirical evidence supporting the interventions, including the methods and experimental paradigms used to test them. The nine types of interventions covered are accuracy prompts, debunking and rebuttals, friction, inoculation, lateral reading and verification strategies, media-literacy tips, social norms, source-credibility labels, and warning and fact-checking labels.

Exemplar learners and rule learners: Stable tendencies or malleable preferences?

When learning new concepts, students tend to use either exemplar-based learning strategies (e.g., memorizing specific examples) or rule-based learning strategies (e.g., abstracting general rules). Prior research suggests that participants' strategy choices during learning depend on individuals' preexisting learning tendencies, with some people being exemplar learners and others rule learners. Yet, strategy choices are also influenced by how the study materials are taught (rule-focused or exemplar-focused). The present study examined how these two factors interact using an alphanumeric symbol addition task. We examined whether exemplar learners would switch to using rule-based strategies when given rule-focused training and if rule learners would fail to learn the rule when given exemplar-focused training. We found that both rule and exemplar learners used a rule-based strategy after a rule-focused training and neither group learned the rule after an exemplar-focused training. Our results suggest that individuals can be shaped to adopt either rule-based or exemplar-based strategies during learning, regardless of their inherent learning tendencies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The modulation and elimination of temporal organization in free recall.

Experiences occur in a continual succession, and the temporal structure of those experiences is often preserved in memory. The temporal contiguity effect of free recall reveals the temporal structure of memory: when a particular item is remembered, the next response is likely to come from a nearby list position. This effect is remarkably robust, appearing across a wide variety of methodological variations of the task. The temporal contiguity effect is also central to retrieved-context models, which propose temporal organization arises from the interaction of a temporal context representation with the contents of memory. Across six experiments, we demonstrate methodological manipulations that dramatically modulate and even eliminate temporal organization in free recall. We find that temporal organization is strongly modulated and in some cases potentially eliminated by strong semantic structure, the presence of retrieval practice, and a long list length. Other factors such as orienting task, paired-associate item structure, and retention interval duration have more subtle effects on temporal organization. In an accompanying set of simulations, we show that the modulation and elimination of the temporal organization follows lawful patterns predicted by the context maintenance and retrieval (CMR) retrieved-context model. We also find cases where CMR does not specifically predict the modulation of temporal organization, and in these cases our analysis suggests how the theory might be developed to account for these effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Repeatedly Encountered Descriptions of Wrongdoing Seem More True but Less Unethical: Evidence in a Naturalistic Setting.

When news about moral transgressions goes viral on social media, the same person may repeatedly encounter identical reports about a wrongdoing. In a longitudinal experiment (N = 607 U.S. adults from Mechanical Turk), we found that these repeated encounters can affect moral judgments. As participants went about their lives, we text-messaged them news headlines describing corporate wrongdoings (e.g., a cosmetics company harming animals). After 15 days, they rated these wrongdoings as less unethical than new wrongdoings. Extending prior laboratory research, these findings reveal that repetition can have a lasting effect on moral judgments in naturalistic settings, that affect plays a key role, and that increasing the number of repetitions generally makes moral judgments more lenient. Repetition also made fictitious descriptions of wrongdoing seem truer, connecting this moral-repetition effect with past work on the illusory-truth effect. The more times we hear about a wrongdoing, the more we may believe it-but the less we may care.

Combatting rumors around the French election: the memorability and effectiveness of fact-checking articles.

Across four studies, we examined the how design decisions influenced the effectiveness of fact-checking articles created by CrossCheck France during the 2017 French election. We measured both memory for the article and belief in the false rumor. We saw no difference in fact check efficacy based on the type of headline (question vs negation) or the number of newsroom logos present around the article (one, four, or seven). In addition, informative design features such as an icon identifying the type of misinformation were ignored by readers. Participants failed to remember many of the details from the article, but retrieval practice was beneficial in reducing forgetting over a 1-week delay. In both US and French samples, reading the fact check decreased belief in the false information, even 1 week later. However, the articles were much more effective in the US sample, who lacked relevant prior knowledge and political beliefs. Overall, fact-checking articles can be effective at reducing belief in false information, but readers tend to forget the details and ignore peripheral information.

Multiple-choice quizzes improve memory for misinformation debunks, but do not reduce belief in misinformation.

Fact-checkers want people to both read and remember their misinformation debunks. Retrieval practice is one way to increase memory, thus multiple-choice quizzes may be a useful tool for fact-checkers. We tested whether exposure to quizzes improved people's accuracy ratings for fact-checked claims and their memory for specific information within a fact check. Across three experiments, 1551 US-based online participants viewed fact checks (either health- or politics-related) with or without a quiz. Overall, the fact checks were effective, and participants were more accurate in rating the claims after exposure. In addition, quizzes improved participants' memory for the details of the fact checks, even 1 week later. However, that increased memory did not lead to more accurate beliefs. Participants' accuracy ratings were similar in the quiz and no-quiz conditions. Multiple-choice quizzes can be a useful tool for increasing memory, but there is a disconnect between memory and belief.

The effects of repetition on belief in naturalistic settings.

In our modern well-connected world, false information spreads quickly and is often repeated multiple times. From laboratory studies, we know that this repetition can be harmful as repetition increases belief. However, it is unclear how repetition affects belief in real-world settings. Here we examine a larger number of repetitions (16), more realistic timing of the repetitions (across 2 weeks), and more naturalistic exposures (text messages). Four hundred thirty five U.S. participants recruited from mTurk were texted true and false trivia statements across 15 days before rating the accuracy of each statement. Statements were seen either one, two, four, eight, or 16 times. We find clear evidence that repetition increases belief. Initial repetitions produced the largest increase in perceived truth, but belief continued to increase with additional repetitions. We introduce a simple computational model suggesting that current accounts are insufficient to explain this observed pattern and that additional theoretical assumptions (e.g., that initial repetitions are more strongly encoded) are required. Practically, the results imply that repeated exposure to false information during daily life can increase belief in that misinformation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The effects of repeating false and misleading information on belief.

False and misleading information is readily accessible in people's environments, oftentimes reaching people repeatedly. This repeated exposure can significantly affect people's beliefs about the world, as has been noted by scholars in political science, communication, and cognitive, developmental, and social psychology. In particular, repetition increases belief in false information, even when the misinformation contradicts prior knowledge. We review work across these disciplines, identifying factors that may heighten, diminish, or have no impact on these adverse effects of repetition on belief. Specifically, we organize our discussion around variations in what information is repeated, to whom the information is repeated, how people interact with this repetition, and how people's beliefs are measured. A key cross-disciplinary theme is that the most influential factor is how carefully or critically people process the false information. However, several open questions remain when comparing findings across different fields and approaches. We conclude by noting a need for more interdisciplinary work to help resolve these questions, as well as a need for more work in naturalistic settings so that we can better understand and combat the effects of repeated circulation of false and misleading information in society. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.

Cognitive mediators of US-China differences in early symbolic arithmetic.

Chinese children routinely outperform American peers in standardized tests of mathematics knowledge. To examine mediators of this effect, 95 Chinese and US 5-year-olds completed a test of overall symbolic arithmetic, an IQ subtest, and three tests each of symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude knowledge (magnitude comparison, approximate addition, and number-line estimation). Overall Chinese children performed better in symbolic arithmetic than US children, and all measures of IQ and number knowledge predicted overall symbolic arithmetic. Chinese children were more accurate than US peers in symbolic numerical magnitude comparison, symbolic approximate addition, and both symbolic and non-symbolic number-line estimation; Chinese and U.S. children did not differ in IQ and non-symbolic magnitude comparison and approximate addition. A substantial amount of the nationality difference in overall symbolic arithmetic was mediated by performance on the symbolic and number-line tests.

The Effect of Repetition on Truth Judgments Across Development.

According to numerous research studies, when adults hear a statement twice, they are more likely to think it is true compared with when they have heard it only once. Multiple theoretical explanations exist for this illusory-truth effect. However, none of the current theories fully explains how or why people begin to use repetition as a cue for truth. In this preregistered study, we investigated those developmental origins in twenty-four 5-year-olds, twenty-four 10-year-olds, and 32 adults. If the link between repetition and truth is learned implicitly, then even 5-year-olds should show the effect. Alternatively, realizing this connection may require metacognition and intentional reflection, skills acquired later in development. Repetition increased truth judgments for all three age groups, and prior knowledge did not protect participants from the effects of repetition. These results suggest that the illusory-truth effect is a universal effect learned at a young age.

The role of recalling previous errors in middle-school children's learning.

BACKGROUND: Committing errors is a common part of the learning process, and adults are more likely to correct errors that they can recall. However, preadolescent children's recall of previous errors (i.e., memory for errors) may be limited. AIMS: We examined children's ability to recall their past errors and tested whether recalling an error aids error correction. SAMPLES: We worked with 102 (Study 1) and 173 (Study 2) middle-school children in the United States. METHODS: In Study 1, children studied and were tested on their memory for math definitions. After reviewing the correct answers, children recalled their initial test answers and then took a final test. Reminders of past errors were provided for some children in Study 2. In two other conditions, children either recalled their past errors or studied the correct answers only. RESULTS: Children's recall of their past errors was poor, and errors that were recalled were no more likely to be corrected than errors that were not recalled. Across children, there was a positive association between memory for errors and error correction even after controlling for covariates. Being reminded of past errors and recalling past errors reduced error correction relative to studying the correct answers only. CONCLUSIONS: Preadolescents' memory for errors is very limited, their ability to recall past errors predicts error correction overall, and recalling an error or being reminded of an error does not facilitate error correction.

Examining the episodic context account: does retrieval practice enhance memory for context?

Retrieval practice, such as filling in blanks or taking quizzes, is firmly established as an effective study strategy. However, the underlying mechanism of how retrieval practice benefits memory is still unclear. One current theory, the episodic context account, proposes that retrieval enhances memory by reinstating a prior learning context. This retrieved context is then strengthened and updated to include context at the time of recall, which later serves as an effective retrieval cue. However, few studies have directly tested this hypothesis. We did so by examining participants' memory for the initial study context. Across three experiments, participants encoded cue-target pairs presented in different colors and either restudied or practiced retrieving the targets. If retrieval practice benefits memory by reinstating the prior episodic context, participants who successfully retrieved the items during practice should have enhanced memory for context details (i.e. font color) compared to participants who restudied the pairs. Contrary to this prediction, memory for font colors did not differ between the restudy condition and the retrieval practice condition. Even when font color was actively attended to and integrated with the to-be-remembered items, retrieval practice did not increase memory for this aspect of context. Our results suggest that the context reinstated during retrieval practice is limited in nature. Aspects of the context that are not essential to retrieval of the item are not strengthened by retrieval practice.

Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements.

Repetition increases the likelihood that a statement will be judged as true. This illusory truth effect is well established; however, it has been argued that repetition will not affect belief in unambiguous statements. When individuals are faced with obviously true or false statements, repetition should have no impact. We report a simulation study and a preregistered experiment that investigate this idea. Contrary to many intuitions, our results suggest that belief in all statements is increased by repetition. The observed illusory truth effect is largest for ambiguous items, but this can be explained by the psychometric properties of the task, rather than an underlying psychological mechanism that blocks the impact of repetition for implausible items. Our results indicate that the illusory truth effect is highly robust and occurs across all levels of plausibility. Therefore, even highly implausible statements will become more plausible with enough repetition.

Retrieval practice opportunities in middle school mathematics teachers' oral questions.

BACKGROUND: Tasks that involve retrieving information from memory, such as answering short answer questions, are more effective at improving learning than restudying, concept mapping, and other study techniques. However, little is known about how often teachers naturally provide these retrieval practice opportunities during lectures and classroom discussions. AIMS: To identify how often teachers ask questions that require retrieval, what types of retrieval questions they ask, and whether teachers in high-growth classrooms differ in their use of retrieval questions compared to teachers in low-growth classrooms. SAMPLE: The sample included twenty middle school mathematics classrooms that showed high growth on a test of mathematics achievement and twenty with low growth. For each classroom, we examined a videotape of one class period. METHODS: We coded the number of teacher questions in each lesson, and the number and type of questions that provided an opportunity for retrieval. RESULTS: We found wide variability in the frequency and type of questions asked across classrooms. On average, almost half of the non-classroom management questions provided an opportunity for retrieval. However, teachers in high- and low-growth classrooms asked similar numbers and types of retrieval questions. CONCLUSIONS: Teachers naturally use a wide variety of retrieval questions in their mathematics classrooms. As such, improving their use of retrieval opportunities will require only small changes to their natural practice, rather than large changes to their instructional style.

Improving Children's Knowledge of Fraction Magnitudes.

We examined whether playing a computerized fraction game, based on the integrated theory of numerical development and on the Common Core State Standards' suggestions for teaching fractions, would improve children's fraction magnitude understanding. Fourth and fifth-graders were given brief instruction about unit fractions and played Catch the Monster with Fractions, a game in which they estimated fraction locations on a number line and received feedback on the accuracy of their estimates. The intervention lasted less than 15 minutes. In our initial study, children showed large gains from pretest to posttest in their fraction number line estimates, magnitude comparisons, and recall accuracy. In a more rigorous second study, the experimental group showed similarly large improvements, whereas a control group showed no improvement from practicing fraction number line estimates without feedback. The results provide evidence for the effectiveness of interventions emphasizing fraction magnitudes and indicate how psychological theories and research can be used to evaluate specific recommendations of the Common Core State Standards.

Strategy use and strategy choice in fraction magnitude comparison.

We examined, on a trial-by-trial basis, fraction magnitude comparison strategies of adults with more and less mathematical knowledge. College students with high mathematical proficiency used a large variety of strategies that were well tailored to the characteristics of the problems and that were guaranteed to yield correct performance if executed correctly. Students with less mathematical proficiency sometimes used strategies similar to those of the mathematically proficient students, but often used flawed strategies that yielded inaccurate performance. As predicted by overlapping waves theory, increases in accuracy and speed were related to differences in strategy use, strategy choice, and strategy execution. When asked to choose the best strategy from among 3 possibilities-the strategy the student originally used, a correct alternative, and an incorrect alternative-students with lower fraction knowledge rarely switched from an original incorrect strategy to a correct alternative. This finding suggests that use of poor fraction magnitude comparison strategies stems in large part from lack of conceptual understanding of the requirements of effective strategies, rather than difficulty recalling or generating such strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record

Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth.

In daily life, we frequently encounter false claims in the form of consumer advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. Repetition may be one way that insidious misconceptions, such as the belief that vitamin C prevents the common cold, enter our knowledge base. Research on the illusory truth effect demonstrates that repeated statements are easier to process, and subsequently perceived to be more truthful, than new statements. The prevailing assumption in the literature has been that knowledge constrains this effect (i.e., repeating the statement "The Atlantic Ocean is the largest ocean on Earth" will not make you believe it). We tested this assumption using both normed estimates of knowledge and individuals' demonstrated knowledge on a postexperimental knowledge check (Experiment 1). Contrary to prior suppositions, illusory truth effects occurred even when participants knew better. Multinomial modeling demonstrated that participants sometimes rely on fluency even if knowledge is also available to them (Experiment 2). Thus, participants demonstrated knowledge neglect, or the failure to rely on stored knowledge, in the face of fluent processing experiences.

Learning misinformation from fictional sources: understanding the contributions of transportation and item-specific processing.

People often pick up incorrect information about the world from movies, novels and other fictional sources. The question asked here is whether such sources are a particularly potent source of misinformation. On the one hand, story-reading involves transportation into a fictional world, with a possible reduction in access to one's prior knowledge (likely reducing the chances that the reader will notice errors). On the other hand, stories encourage relational processing as readers create mental models, decreasing the likelihood that they will encode and remember more peripheral details like erroneous facts. To test these ideas, we examined suggestibility after readers were exposed to misleading references embedded in stories and lists that were matched on a number of dimensions. In two experiments, suggestibility was greater following exposure to misinformation in a list of sentences rather than a coherent story, even though the story was rated as more engaging than the list. Furthermore, processing the story with an item-specific processing task (inserting missing letters) increased later suggestibility, whereas this task had no impact on suggestibility when misinformation was presented within a list. The type of processing used when reading a text affects suggestibility more than engagement with the text.

Relations of different types of numerical magnitude representations to each other and to mathematics achievement.

We examined relations between symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude representations, between whole number and fraction representations, and between these representations and overall mathematics achievement in fifth graders. Fraction and whole number symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude understandings were measured using both magnitude comparison and number line estimation tasks. After controlling for non-mathematical cognitive proficiency, both symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude understandings were uniquely related to mathematics achievement, but the relation was much stronger for symbolic numbers. A meta-analysis of 19 published studies indicated that relations between non-symbolic numerical magnitude knowledge and mathematics achievement are present but tend to be weak, especially beyond 6 years of age.