Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Does inhibitory control spill over to eating behaviors? Two preregistered studies of inhibitory spillover effects on food intake and reactions to food stimuli.

Overweight and obesity are worldwide conditions associated with detrimental medical and psychosocial outcomes. As inhibitory control deficits are thought to contribute to weight gain, they are a worthwhile target for new approaches. Previous research has shown that the execution of inhibitory control in one domain leads to a concurrent increase of inhibitory control in another domain, an effect denoted as inhibitory spillover effect (ISE). Therefore, we assumed that exertion of inhibitory control in a food-unrelated domain in overweight and normal weight individuals will decrease food intake in a simultaneous bogus taste test (BTT; study 1) as well as increase food-specific response inhibition ability in a stop signal task (SST; study 2). We assumed stronger effects in overweight individuals. In both studies ISE was induced via cognitive priming and compared to a neutral condition in a group of overweight (OW: n = 46 for study 1, n = 46 for study 2) and normal weight (NW: n = 46 for study 1, n = 46 for study 2) individuals. In the ISE condition with an inhibitory control priming task, participants had to learn and retain control-related words while simultaneously performing a BTT (study 1) or SST (study 2). In the neutral condition, participants followed the same protocol, albeit memorizing neutral (i.e., control-unrelated) words. There was no significant interaction of weight group × cognitive priming condition neither regarding food intake (study 1) nor regarding food-related response inhibition (study 2). Cognitive priming, as implemented in the present studies, does not instigate an ISE strong enough to improve inhibitory control during food intake or food-related response inhibition. Relevant practical and theoretical aspects as well as implications for future research on the ISE are discussed.

Does a white bear help you eat less? The impact of the inhibitory spillover effect on eating behaviour.

OBJECTIVE: Overweight and obesity are global problems with negative physical, social, and psychological outcomes. Besides other factors, inhibitory control deficits contribute to weight gain and development of overweight. The inhibitory spillover effect (ISE) improves inhibitory control through transfer of inhibitory control capacity from one domain to an unrelated, second domain. For ISE to occur, one inhibitory control task is executed simultaneously with a second, non-control related task thereby increasing inhibitory control in this task. METHOD: In this preregistered study, we tested the ISE induced through thought suppression in contrast to a neutral task in participants with normal weight and overweight (N = 92). A simultaneously conducted bogus taste test served as outcome measure for food intake. RESULTS: We found neither an interaction effect between group affiliation and condition nor an effect of group affiliation. However, contrary to our expectations, we found higher food intake in participants with active ISE compared to the neutral task. CONCLUSIONS: This result might indicate rebound effects of applied thought suppression which led to the experience of loss of control and therefore undermined maintenance and function of the ISE. This main result was robust to all moderator variables. We elaborate further factors for the finding, theoretical implications, and future research directions.

Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs.

Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity-variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity-estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs-indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.

Facilitation of simultaneous control? A meta-analysis of the inhibitory spillover effect.

Impaired inhibitory control is a core transdiagnostic mechanism in psychopathology. Directly targeting inhibitory control in intervention studies has, however, produced only little improvement. Recently, promising improvements in inhibitory control were shown by capitalizing on the inhibitory spillover effect (ISE). The central requirement of ISE is a simultaneous execution of two tasks, allowing for improved inhibitory control in the target task when control is simultaneously recruited in an induction task. The magnitude of the ISE remains to be assessed. In this preregistered meta-analysis, we synthesized eligible data from studies across psychology with the central requirement of simultaneity; thus, we deliberately included also studies meeting this requirement without the explicit aim to investigate the ISE. Results confirmed previous evidence of the ISE and documented a statistically significant small effect size (g = 0.27). Of the different induction types, cognitive induction showed the largest effects, whereas physiological and attentional induction tasks were less effective. In contrast, motor induction did not result in a significant ISE. Due to high between-study heterogeneity, we analyzed several preregistered and exploratory moderators, out of which only duration of the experimental sequence, group affiliation, and planned investigation of the ISE were significant. Sensitivity analyses yielded no indication of a publication bias. Taken together, this meta-analysis suggests that the ISE is a small, but substantial and robust effect. Future research should investigate how the ISE is applied best to reap its practical value in new treatment approaches for individuals with inhibition impairments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

It's good and it's bad: Sampling processes can generate decision-framing effects.

Framing a choice in terms of gains versus losses can have a dramatic impact on peoples' decisions, sometimes completely reversing their choices. This decision-framing effect is often assumed to stem from individuals' inherent motivational biases to react more strongly to negative information. However, more recent work suggests these decision biases can also stem from biases in the information samples based on which people make their decisions. Here, we test how biases in the frequency of information people have about each decision option can produce decision-framing effects via a sampling process. Specifically, we hypothesize that a gain versus loss framing determines whether people probe their memories for positive or negative information about each decision option. This can lead to inaccuracy if there are biases in the amount of information people have about each option. That is, when people have more information about one option, it is possible that they retrieve both more positive and more negative information about it, creating a bias to select it as being both more and less likely to result in success, depending on decision framing. Three experiments show that people's decisions are more accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when a high (vs. low) frequency option has a higher proportion of success; but decisions are less accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when the high frequency option has a lower proportion of success. The current results suggest that decision-framing effects do not necessarily indicate a motivational bias. Instead, sampling processes may underlie decision-framing effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Bridging the gap between autonomous and predetermined paradigms: The role of sampling in evaluative learning.

Whereas most evaluative learning paradigms remove participants' autonomy over the information they receive, other research traditions have demonstrated that information sampling has an important role in learning. We investigated the impact of information sampling on a central evaluative learning paradigm: evaluative conditioning. We compared a traditional evaluative conditioning paradigm with a paradigm in which participants have autonomy over the stimulus pairings they receive. Participants in the high-autonomy condition showed a strong preference for positively paired CSs. Nevertheless, the strength of evaluative conditioning effects was independent of autonomy. Moreover, high-autonomy participants, but not their low-autonomy counterparts, demonstrated a relationship between sampling frequency and evaluations, in line with the interpretation that sampled stimuli become more positive, whereas ignored stimuli become more negative over the course of the learning phase. The present research provides a cornerstone for integrating several research traditions within and beyond the evaluative learning literature, providing a foundation for new insights and more comprehensive theories of evaluative learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Learning of affective meaning: revealing effects of stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure.

Charles E. Osgood's theory of affective meaning defines affect as interplay of three meaning dimensions - evaluation, potency, and activity - that represent the central constituents of our affective ecology. Based on a rigorous Brunswikian sampling procedure, we selected a representative set of stimuli that mirror this ecology. A germane informative analysis explicates and corroborates the sampling approach. We then report two experiments testing whether these dimensions of affective meaning can be learnt by means of stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure. Our findings yield evidence for (1) stimulus pairing effects on evaluation and activity, and (2) stimulus exposure effects on potency and activity. Overall, the findings reveal that stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure differentially influence the learning of dimensions of affective meaning. We discuss implications of this research for current emotion theories as well as its contribution to research in the cognition-emotion interface. Finally, we argue that the implementation of representative design by virtue of Brunswikian sampling promotes theory development and opens new research avenues for an original and creative science of cognition and emotion.

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of the Olson and Fazio (2001) Study.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when "aware" participants were excluded using the original criterion-therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about "unaware" evaluative-conditioning effects.

Implicit? What Do You Mean? A Comprehensive Review of the Delusive Implicitness Construct in Attitude Research.

This article provides a comprehensive review of divergent conceptualizations of the "implicit" construct that have emerged in attitude research over the past two decades. In doing so, our goal is to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of conceptual ambiguities associated with this terminology. We identify three main conceptualizations of the "implicitness" construct: the procedural conceptualization (implicit-as-indirect), the functional conceptualization (implicit-as-automatic), and the mental theory conceptualization (implicit-as-associative), as well as two hybrid conceptualizations (implicit-as-indirect-and-automatic, implicit-as-driven-by-affective-gut-reactions). We discuss critical limitations associated with each conceptualization and explain that confusion also arises from their coexistence. We recommend discontinuing the usage of the "implicit" terminology in attitude research and research inspired by it. We offer terminological alternatives aimed at increasing both the precision of theorization and the practical value of future research.

Automatic processes in evaluative learning.

This special issue of Cognition and Emotion assembles recent advances in theorising and empirical research on the automaticity of evaluative learning. Based on a taxonomy of automatic processes in evaluative learning, we distinguish between processes that are involved in translating evaluative experiences into evaluative mental representations (acquisition), and processes that translate these representations into evaluative biases in perception, thought, and action (activation and application). We emphasise that automaticity concerns the operating conditions of these processes (unawareness, unintentionality, uncontrollability, efficiency), not their operating principles, and thus can vary within specific processes (e.g. inferences can occur in either an automatic or non-automatic fashion). We review and discuss contemporary theories and methodological approaches to automatic processes in evaluative learning against the backdrop of our framework, and we highlight the contributions of the papers of this special issue to the question whether and when evaluative changes can occur in an automatic manner.

What is learned in approach-avoidance tasks? On the scope and generalizability of approach-avoidance effects.

Previous research has shown that approaching a stimulus makes it more positive, while avoiding a stimulus makes it more negative. The present research demonstrates that approach-avoidance behaviors have the potential to charge stimulus attributes such as color with evaluative meaning. This evaluation carries over to other stimuli with that feature. We address the latter point by assessing the influence of colors that were approached or avoided on the perceived attractiveness of persons wearing those colors. We show that wearing a certain color makes people appear more attractive when this color is associated with approach rather than avoidance. In line with a self-perception account of these effects, we obtained approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes only when participants carried out approach-avoidance behaviors toward these colors or imagined doing so. This set of experiments adds to the evaluative learning literature by demonstrating approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes and that these effects carry over to new classes of stimuli and new tasks. Moreover, we systematically investigated boundary conditions for these effects. Finally, with this research we introduce an ontogenetic perspective to research into colors and their influence on psychological functioning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Revisiting the divide between deontology and utilitarianism in moral dilemma judgment: A multinomial modeling approach.

We investigate the psychological bases underlying moral dilemma judgment with the help of multinomial processing tree modeling, and consider how determinants of dilemma judgment should best be conceptualized. We argue that, for conceptual as well as empirical reasons, norms and consequences should be considered as more intimately linked with one another than their systematic juxtaposition in dilemma research may suggest, and propose that norm-endorsement should be viewed through a consequentialist lens as well. Investigating this proposal, we introduce a variant of the CNI model of moral dilemma judgment, which focuses on the use of proscriptive norms only. In five experiments, we validate this proCNI model and assess the parameters' sensitivity to different types of consequences and personal involvement. Our findings suggest that the parameter representing "norms" is sensitive to consequences as well, such that norms do not guide moral judgment unless they are expected to produce tangible consequences. Thus, present research suggests that the split between norms and "consequences" (or "deontology" and "utilitarianism") as determinants of judgment is artificial. We suggest that, ultimately, viewing dilemma judgments through a consequentialist lens may be a useful approach for advancing theoretical development in the field of dilemma research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Are there two independent evaluative conditioning effects in relational paradigms? Dissociating the effects of CS-US pairings and their meaning.

Recent research into evaluative conditioning (EC) shows that information about the relationship between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli can exert strong effects on the size and direction of the EC effect. Additionally, the co-occurrence of these stimuli seems to exert an orthogonal effect on evaluations. This finding has been interpreted as support for two independent types of EC effects. However, previous research devoted to this question relied on aggregated evaluative measures, allowing for alternative interpretations. In four experiments, we developed and validated a multinomial processing tree model that distinguishes effects of the pairings from effects of the meaning of the pairings. Our findings suggest that two independent EC effects contribute to overall evaluative change in a relational EC paradigm. The model that we developed offers a helpful method for future research in that it allows for an assessment of the effects of manipulations on processes rather than overall performance on an evaluative measure.

Investigating attitudinal ambivalence via sequential priming: Evidence for the simultaneous and unintentional activation of opposite evaluations.

This research tested a central assumption of attitudinal ambivalence research: ambivalent attitude objects simultaneously trigger positive and negative evaluations. It further specifies at which stage this activation is likely to produce an evaluative conflict. Experiments 1 to 3 involved 2 evaluative priming paradigms, in which ambivalent stimuli served either as primes or as targets. The Ambivalent Primes Paradigm tested the degree to which the concurrent and unintentional activation of positivity and negativity influences responding to univalent targets. The Ambivalent Targets Paradigm tested the degree to which ambivalent targets entail an evaluative response conflict irrespective of prime valence. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed slower responses on ambivalent trials compared with congruent trials in both paradigms. Employing a longer stimulus onset asynchrony, Experiment 3 attested to the short-lived nature of the joint activation of opposite evaluations triggered by ambivalent primes. In contrast, the deliberate categorization of ambivalent targets was not affected by this procedural variation. Finally, by relying on a valent/neutral categorization task, Experiments 4 and 5 indicate that conflicts triggered by ambivalent stimuli occur at the response selection rather than the exposure stage. Our findings lend original empirical support to the assumption that positivity and negativity are activated simultaneously and unintentionally in ambivalent attitude objects. Moreover, the present research suggests that ambivalence generates a conflict only if the task at hand requires a univalent categorization. We discuss the extent to which the activation of ambivalent attitudes may be automatic and the implications of our findings for dual-process models of attitudes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Does attitude acquisition in evaluative conditioning without explicit CS-US memory reflect implicit misattribution of affect?

Research that dissociates different types of processes within a given task using a processing tree approach suggests that attitudes may be acquired through evaluative conditioning in the absence of explicit encoding of CS-US pairings in memory. This research distinguishes explicit memory for the CS-US pairings from CS-liking acquired without encoding of CS-US pairs in explicit memory. It has been suggested that the latter effect may be due to an implicit misattribution process that is assumed to operate when US evocativeness is low. In the present research, the latter assumption was supported neither by two high-powered experiments nor by complementary meta-analytic evidence, whereas evocativeness exerted an influence on explicit memory. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the view that CS-liking acquired without encoding of CS-US pairs in explicit memory reflects an implicit misattribution process at learning. Hence, the underlying learning process is awaiting further empirical scrutiny.

Effects of incidental emotions on moral dilemma judgments: An analysis using the CNI model.

Effects of incidental emotions on moral dilemma judgments have garnered interest because they demonstrate the context-dependent nature of moral decision-making. Six experiments (N = 727) investigated the effects of incidental happiness, sadness, and anger on responses in moral dilemmas that pit the consequences of a given action for the greater good (i.e., utilitarianism) against the consistency of that action with moral norms (i.e., deontology). Using the CNI model of moral decision-making, we further tested whether the three kinds of emotions shape moral dilemma judgments by influencing (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, or (c) general preference for inaction versus action regardless of consequences and moral norms (or some combination of the three). Incidental happiness reduced sensitivity to moral norms without affecting sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction versus action. Incidental sadness and incidental anger did not show any significant effects on moral dilemma judgments. The findings suggest a central role of moral norms in the contribution of emotional responses to moral dilemma judgments, requiring refinements of dominant theoretical accounts and supporting the value of formal modeling approaches in providing more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Does evaluative conditioning depend on awareness? Evidence from a continuous flash suppression paradigm.

The role of awareness in evaluative learning has been thoroughly investigated with a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches. We investigated evaluative conditioning (EC) without awareness with an approach that conceptually provides optimal conditions for unaware learning - the Continuous Flash Suppression paradigm (CFS). In CFS, a stimulus presented to one eye can be rendered invisible for a prolonged duration by presenting a high-contrast dynamic pattern to the other eye. The suppressed stimulus is nevertheless processed. First, Experiment 1 established EC effects in a pseudo-CFS setup without suppression. Experiment 2 then employed CFS to suppress conditioned stimuli (CSs) from awareness while the unconditioned stimuli (USs) were visible. While Experiment 1 and 2 used a between-participants manipulation of CS suppression, Experiments 3 and 4 both manipulated suppression within participants. We observed EC effects when CSs were not suppressed, but found no EC effects when the CS was suppressed from awareness. We relate our finding to previous research and discuss theoretical implications for EC. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral decision-making.

Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology-consequences and norms-are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Anomalies in the detection of change: When changes in sample size are mistaken for changes in proportions.

Detecting changes, in performance, sales, markets, risks, social relations, or public opinions, constitutes an important adaptive function. In a sequential paradigm devised to investigate detection of change, every trial provides a sample of binary outcomes (e.g., correct vs. incorrect student responses). Participants have to decide whether the proportion of a focal feature (e.g., correct responses) in the population from which the sample is drawn has decreased, remained constant, or increased. Strong and persistent anomalies in change detection arise when changes in proportional quantities vary orthogonally to changes in absolute sample size. Proportional increases are readily detected and nonchanges are erroneously perceived as increases when absolute sample size increases. Conversely, decreasing sample size facilitates the correct detection of proportional decreases and the erroneous perception of nonchanges as decreases. These anomalies are however confined to experienced samples of elementary raw events from which proportions have to be inferred inductively. They disappear when sample proportions are described as percentages in a normalized probability format. To explain these challenging findings, it is essential to understand the inductive-learning constraints imposed on decisions from experience.