Young children experience both regret and relief in a gain-or-loss context.

Recent research has provided compelling evidence that children experience the negative counterfactual emotion of regret, by manipulating the presence of a counterfactual action that would have led to participants receiving a better outcome. However, it remains unclear if children similarly experience regret's positive counterpart, relief. The current study examined children's negative and positive counterfactual emotions in a novel gain-or-loss context. Four- to 9-year-old children (N = 136) were presented with two opaque boxes concealing information that would lead to a gain or loss of stickers, respectively. Half of the children chose between two keys that matched each box, whereas the other half were compelled to select one box because only one of the two keys matched. After seeing inside the alternative, non-chosen box, children were significantly more likely to report a change in emotion when they could have opened that box than when they could not have. The effects were similar for children who lost stickers and won stickers, and neither effect varied with age. These findings suggest that children may become capable of experiencing regret and relief around the same time, although their expression of these counterfactual emotions may vary with actual and counterfactual gains and losses.

What are the odds? Preschoolers' ability to distinguish between possible, impossible, and probabilistically distinct future outcomes.

Previous research has suggested that infants are able to distinguish between possible and impossible events and make basic probabilistic inferences. However, much of this research has focused on children's intuitions about past events for which the outcome is already determined but unknown. Here, we investigated children's ability to use probabilistic information to guide their choices and actively shape future events. In two experiments, we examined whether children could successfully direct a marble through a series of tubes, selecting between routes where success was possible, impossible, or guaranteed (i.e., 50% vs. 0%, or 50% vs. 100%; Experiment 1), and routes where success was mutually possible but probabilistically distinct (e.g., 33% vs. 50%; Experiment 2). In total, we tested 136 two- to five-year-old children (76 males), recruited predominantly through a museum in Brisbane, Australia. In Experiment 1, we found that while younger children typically did not perform above chance, the vast majority of 4- and 5-year-olds consistently distinguished between possible and impossible or guaranteed outcomes. In Experiment 2, children of all ages had greater difficulty with distinguishing between two possible outcomes with different likelihoods than between possible and impossible/guaranteed outcomes, although some individual 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated competence when making both distinctions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Counterfactual choices and moral judgments in children.

When making moral judgments of past actions, adults often think counterfactually about what could have been done differently. Considerable evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking emerges around age 6, but it remains unknown how this development influences children's moral judgments. Across two studies, Australian children aged 4-9 (N = 236, 142 Females) were told stories about two characters who had a choice that led to a good or bad outcome, and two characters who had no choice over a good or bad outcome. Results showed that 4- and 5-year-olds' moral judgments were influenced only by the actual outcome. From age 6, children's moral judgments were also influenced by the counterfactual choices that had been available to the characters.

Early childhood educators' mental state language and children's theory of mind in the preschool setting.

The study examined the presence and nature of a relationship between 13 early childhood educators' mental state language (MSL) and 77 preschool children's (3- to 5 years) Theory of Mind (ToM). Educator language samples were elicited during two naturalistic group-time contexts, wordless picture book storytelling and an instructional building task. MSL was coded according to a comprehensive scheme that captures facets of MSL content and quality. To account for well-established determinants of ToM, a range of child- and family-level factors were also measured. Results indicated no significant relationship between educator MSL during group level instruction and children's ToM in the preschool setting. Although these findings challenge the assumption that educators' MSL is important for children's ToM development, important future directions are discussed.

Creativity and flexibility in young children's use of external cognitive strategies.

A cardinal feature of adult cognition is the awareness of our own cognitive struggles and the capacity to draw upon this awareness to offload internal demand into the environment. In this preregistered study conducted in Australia, we investigated whether 3-8-year-olds (N = 72, 36 male, 36 female, mostly White) could self-initiate such an external metacognitive strategy and transfer it across contexts. Children watched as an experimenter demonstrated how to mark the location of a hidden prize, thus helping them successfully retrieve that prize in the future. Children were then given the opportunity to spontaneously adopt an external marking strategy across six test trials. Children who did so at least once were then introduced to a conceptually similar but structurally distinct transfer task. Although most 3-year-olds deployed the demonstrated strategy in the initial test phase, none of them modified that strategy to solve the transfer task. By contrast, many children aged 4 years and older spontaneously devised more than one previously unseen reminder-setting strategy across the six transfer trials, with this tendency increasing with age. From age 6, children deployed effective external strategies on most trials, with the number, combination, and order of unique strategies used varying widely both within and across the older age groups. These results demonstrate young children's remarkable flexibility in the transferral of external strategies across contexts and point to pronounced individual differences in the strategies children devise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Counterfactual thinking elicits emotional change in young children.

Adults often reason about what might have happened had they chosen an alternative course of action in the past, which can elicit the counterfactual emotion of regret. It is unclear whether young children's emotions are similarly impacted by counterfactual thinking about past possibilities. In this study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N = 160) opened one of two boxes, which concealed small and large prizes, respectively. Some children had the means to open either box, whereas other children only had the means to open one box. After seeing that the prize they did not obtain was larger than the one they did obtain, children were significantly more likely to report a negative change in emotion when the non-obtained prize had been a straightforward counterfactual possibility than when it had not. This shows that even young children experience counterfactual emotions following choices, which may ultimately drive them to make better choices in the future. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny.

Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Young children spontaneously devise an optimal external solution to a cognitive problem.

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.

Children boost their cognitive performance with a novel offloading technique.

Ninety-seven children aged 4-11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem-solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1.

Do Monkeys and Young Children Understand Exclusive "Or" Relations? A Commentary on Ferrigno et al. (2021).

Ferrigno et al. (2021) claim to provide evidence that monkeys can reason through the disjunctive syllogism (given A or B, not A, therefore B) and conclude that monkeys therefore understand logical "or" relations. Yet their data fail to provide evidence that the baboons they tested understood the exclusive "or" relations in the experimental task. For two mutually exclusive possibilities-A or B-the monkeys appeared to infer that B was true when A was shown to be false, but they failed to infer that B was false when A was shown to be true. In our own research, we recently found an identical response pattern in 2.5- to 4-year-old children, whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated that they could make both inferences. The monkeys' and younger children's responses are instead consistent with an incorrect understanding of A and B as having an inclusive "or" relation. Only the older children provided compelling evidence of representing the exclusive "or" relation between A and B.

An old problem revisited: How sensitive is time-based prospective memory to age-related differences?

Prospective memory (PM) tasks that impose strong demands on strategic monitoring decline more in late adulthood relative to tasks dependent on more automatic cue detection processes. This finding has proven robust to numerous manipulations, with one exception: time-based PM. However, conventional time-based tasks may inadvertently present time-related yet still event-based cues. At the same time, prior studies have failed to consider whether time-based age differences vary according to the degree of deliberate strategic processing required to access these cues. In this study, 53 younger and 40 older participants completed three time-based PM conditions in which a response had to be executed when a sand timer completed a cycle. In one condition, this timer could only be accessed by explicit, deliberate monitoring (by pressing a specific key), in a second, it could also be accessed more perfunctorily (simply by altering ones' visual focus)-and in the third, could not be accessed at all (forcing participants to rely solely on internal temporal estimation processes). Negative age differences emerged in both conditions where participants were able to access the timer, but not in the condition where the timer was hidden. These data provide novel evidence of age-related preservation in at least some aspects of the temporal processing required to support time-based PM. They also suggest that younger and older adults can and do engage in monitoring when given this option, but that only the former group may be able to benefit, even when this monitoring can be conducted relatively perfunctorily. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The early ontogeny of infants' imitation of on screen humans and robots.

Traditionally, infants have learned how to interact with objects in their environment through direct observations of adults and peers. In recent decades these models have been available over different media, and this has introduced non-human agents to infants' learning environments. Humanoid robots are increasingly portrayed as social agents in on screen, but the degree to which infants are capable of observational learning from screen-based robots is unknown. The current study thus investigated how well 1- to 3-year-olds (N = 230) could imitate on-screen robots relative to on-screen and live humans. Participants exhibited an imitation deficit for robots that varied with age. Furthermore, the well-known video deficit did not replicate as expected, and was weak and transient relative to past research. Together, the findings documented here suggest that infants are learning from media in ways that differ from past generations, but that this new learning is nuanced when novel technologies are involved.

The man and the machine: Do children learn from and transmit tool-use knowledge acquired from a robot in ways that are comparable to a human model?

Robots are an increasingly prevalent presence in children's lives. However, little is known about the ways in which children learn from robots and whether they do so in the same way as they learn from humans. To investigate this, we adapted a previously established imitation paradigm centered on inefficient tool use. Children (3- to 6-year-olds; N = 121) were measured on their acquisition and transmission of normative knowledge modeled by a human or a robot. Children were more likely to adopt use of a normative tool and to transmit this knowledge to another when shown how to do so by the human than when shown how to do so by the robot. Older children (5- and 6-year-olds) were less likely than younger children (3- and 4-year-olds) to select the normative tool. Our findings suggest that preschool children are capable of copying and transmitting normative techniques from both human and robot models, albeit at different rates and dependent on age.

Does Neonatal Imitation Exist? Insights From a Meta-Analysis of 336 Effect Sizes.

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation (d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators (QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

When efficiency attenuates imitation in preschool children.

Children recognise the social value of imitation but do not opt for tools that are 'normative' if they are also dysfunctional. We investigated whether children would replicate a normative method in a tool-learning task if it was instrumentally functional but less efficient than an alternative. Four- to six-year-old children were presented with a sticker-retrieving task and two equally functional tool options that differed in efficiency. The inefficient tool was highlighted as the normative option. Verbal descriptors that established the normative value of the inefficient tool (e.g., 'everybody' uses this) did not motivate children to use it. The majority of children opted for instrumental efficiency over conformity.

When can young children reason about an exclusive disjunction? A follow up to.

Mody and Carey (2016) investigated children's capacity to reason by the disjunctive syllogism by hiding stickers within two pairs of cups (i.e., there is one sticker in cup A or B, and one in cup C or D) and then showing one cup to be empty. They found that children as young as 3 years of age chose the most likely cup (i.e., not A, therefore choose B; and disregard C and D) and suggested that these children were representing the dependent relationship between A and B by applying the logical operator "or". However, it is possible that children succeeded using simpler strategies, such as avoiding the empty cup and choosing within the manipulated pair. We devised a new version of the task in which a sticker was visibly removed from one of the four cups so that 2.5- to 5-year-old children (N = 100) would fail if they relied on such strategies. We also included a conceptual replication of Mody and Carey's (2016) original condition. Our results replicated their findings and showed that even younger children, 2.5 years of age, could pass above chance levels. Yet, 2.5-, 3- and 4-year-olds failed the new condition. Only 5-year-old children performed above chance in both conditions and so provided compelling evidence of deductive reasoning from the premise "A or B", where "or" is exclusive. We propose that younger children may instead conceive of the relationship between A and B as inclusive "or" across both versions of the task.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition.

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading.

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.