The "curse of knowledge" when predicting others' knowledge.

To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one's own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others' knowledge. We examine how one's knowledge influences the calibration and resolution of participants' estimates of novices' knowledge. Across four experiments, participants studied trivia questions and estimated the percentage of novice participants who would know the answer across multiple study/estimation rounds. When participants were required to answer the question before estimating what novices would know, studying the facts impaired both the calibration and resolution of the estimates. Studying the facts reduced the validity of one's experiences for predicting novices' knowledge, and estimators utilized their own experiences less when predicting novices' knowledge as they studied. Experimentally reducing reliance on one's own knowledge did not improve the accuracy of estimates. The results suggest that learning impairs the accuracy of judgments of others' knowledge, not because estimators rely too heavily on their own experiences, but because estimators lack diagnostic cues about others' knowledge.

Selecting effectively contributes to the mnemonic benefits of self-generated cues.

Self-generated memory cues support recall of target information more robustly than memory cues generated by others. Across two experiments, we tested whether the benefit of self-generated cues in part reflects a meta-mnemonic effect rather than a pure generation effect. In other words, can learners select better memory cues for themselves than others can? Participants generated as many possible memory cues for each to-be-remembered target as they could and then selected the cue they thought would be most effective. Self-selected memory cues elicited better cued recall than cues the generator did not select and cues selected by observers. Critically, this effect cannot be attributed to the process of generating a cue itself because all of the cues were self-generated. Further analysis indicated that differences in cue selection arise because generators and observers valued different cue characteristics; specifically, observers valued the commonality of the cue more than the generators, while generators valued the distinctiveness of a cue more than observers. Together, results suggest that self-generated cues are effective at supporting memory, in part, because learners select cues that are tailored to their specific memory needs.

Personal reminders: Self-generated reminders boost memory more than normatively related ones.

People generate reminders in a variety of ways (e.g. putting items in special places or creating to-do lists) to support their memories. Successful remindings can result in retroactive facilitation of earlier information; in contrast, failures to remind can produce interference between memory for related information. Here, we compared the efficacy of different kinds of reminders, including participant's self-generated reminders, reminders created by prior participants, and normatively associated reminders. Self-generated reminders boosted memory for the earlier target words more than normatively associated reminders in recall tests. Reminders generated by others enhanced memory as much as self-generated reminders when we controlled output order during recall. The results suggest that self-generated reminders boost memory for earlier studied information because they distinctly point towards the target information.

What characteristics make self-generated memory cues effective over time?

From writing to-do lists to creating mnemonic devices in school, people frequently generate cues to help them remember information. Creating memory cues is a vital aspect of metacognition and allows learners to somewhat control their retrieval circumstances. Across three experiments, we tested the extent to which self-generated memory cues fail at long retention intervals because they are based in fleeting mental states. Participants studied target words and generated mnemonic cues for themselves or for others. Cues intended for others showed greater cue-to-target associative strength, were less distinctive, and were less idiosyncratic (more common) than cues intended for oneself. However, the effectiveness of the cues in supporting recall did not differ by intended recipient at medium (∼3 days) or long (∼1 year) retention intervals. In the third experiment, we directly tested the stability of self-generated cues for oneself (compared to cues for others, descriptions of the target, and focused descriptions) by asking participants to generate cues twice for the same targets across a delay of 3 weeks. Cues intended for others were more stable than all other cues, but the stability of the cues did not affect long term retention. Implications for effective cue generation are discussed.

Predicting others' knowledge: Knowledge estimation as cue utilization.

Predicting what others know is vital to countless social and educational interactions. For example, the ability of teachers to accurately estimate what knowledge students have has been identified as a crucial component of effective teaching. I propose the knowledge estimation as cue-utilization framework, in which judges use a variety of available and salient metacognitive cues to estimate what others know. In three experiments, I tested three hypotheses of this framework: namely, that participants do not automatically ground estimates of others' knowledge in their own knowledge, that judgment conditions shift how participants weight different cues, and that participants differentially weight cues based upon their diagnosticity. Predictions of others' knowledge were dynamically generated by judges who weighed a variety of available and salient cues. Just as the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring of one's own learning depends upon the conditions under which judgments of self are elicited, the bases and accuracy of metacognitive judgments for others depends upon the conditions under which they are elicited.

Cueing others' memories.

Many situations require us to generate external cues to support later retrieval from memory. For instance, we create file names in order to cue our memory to a file's contents, and instructors create lecture slides to remember what points to make during classes. We even generate cues for others when we remind friends of shared experiences or send colleagues a computer file that is named in such a way so as to remind them of its contents. Here we explore how and how well learners tailor retrieval cues for different intended recipients. Across three experiments, subjects generated verbal cues for a list of target words for themselves or for others. Learners generated cues for others by increasing the normative cue-to-target associative strength but also by increasing the number of other words their cues point to, relative to cues that they generated for themselves. This strategy was effective: such cues supported higher levels of recall for others than cues generated for oneself. Generating cues for others also required more time than generating cues for oneself. Learners responded to the differential demands of cue generation for others by effortfully excluding personal, episodic knowledge and including knowledge that they estimate to be broadly shared.

Cue generation: How learners flexibly support future retrieval.

The successful use of memory requires us to be sensitive to the cues that will be present during retrieval. In many situations, we have some control over the external cues that we will encounter. For instance, learners create shopping lists at home to help remember what items to later buy at the grocery store, and they generate computer file names to help remember the contents of those files. Generating cues in the service of later cognitive goals is a complex task that lies at the intersection of metacognition, communication, and memory. In this series of experiments, we investigated how and how well learners generate external mnemonic cues. Across 5 experiments, learners generated a cue for each target word in a to-be-remembered list and received these cues during a later cued recall test. Learners flexibly generated cues in response to different instructional demands and study list compositions. When generating mnemonic cues, as compared to descriptions of target items, learners produced cues that were more distinct than mere descriptions and consequently elicited greater cued recall performance than those descriptions. When learners were aware of competing targets in the study list, they generated mnemonic cues with smaller cue-to-target associative strength but that were even more distinct. These adaptations led to fewer confusions among competing targets and enhanced cued recall performance. These results provide another example of the metacognitively sophisticated tactics that learners use to effectively support future retrieval.

When will bigger be (recalled) better? The influence of category size on JOLs depends on test format.

Although it is well known that organized lists of words (e.g., categories) are recalled better than unrelated lists, little research has examined whether participants can predict how categorical relatedness influences recall. In two experiments, participants studied lists of words that included items from big categories (12 items), small categories (4 items), and unrelated items, and provided immediate JOLs. In Experiment 1, free recall was highest for items from large categories and lowest for unrelated items. Importantly, participants were sensitive to the effects of category size on recall, with JOLs to items from big categories actually increasing over the study list. In Experiment 2, one group of participants was cued to recall all exemplars from the categories in a blocked manner, whereas the other group was cued in a random order. As expected, the random group did not show the recall benefit for big categories over small categories observed in free recall, while the blocked group did. Critically, the pattern of metacognitive judgments closely matched actual cued recall performance. Participants' JOLs were sensitive to the interaction between category size and output order, demonstrating a relatively sophisticated strategy that incorporates the interaction of multiple extrinsic cues in predicting recall.

Self-pacing study of faces of different races: metacognitive control over study does not eliminate the cross-race recognition effect.

People often recognize same-race faces better than other-race faces. This cross-race effect (CRE) has been proposed to arise in part because learners devote fewer cognitive resources to encode faces of social out-groups. In three experiments, we evaluated whether learners' other-race mnemonic deficits are due to "cognitive disregard" during study and whether this disregard is under metacognitive control. Learners studied each face either for as long as they wanted (the self-paced condition) or for the average time taken by a self-paced learner (the fixed-rate condition). Self-paced learners allocated equal amounts of study time to same-race and other-race faces, and having control over study time did not change the size of the CRE. In the second and third experiments, both self-paced and fixed-rate learners were given instructions to "individuate" other-race faces. Individuation instructions caused self-paced learners to allocate more study time to other-race faces, but this did not significantly reduce the size of the CRE, even for learners who reported extensive contact with other races. We propose that the differential processing that people apply to faces of different races and the subsequent other-race mnemonic deficit are not due to learners' strategic cognitive disregard of other-race faces.

Metacognition of the testing effect: guiding learners to predict the benefits of retrieval.

If the mnemonic benefits of testing are to be widely realized in real-world learning circumstances, people must appreciate the value of testing and choose to utilize testing during self-guided learning. Yet metacognitive judgments do not appear to reflect the enhancement provided by testing Karpicke & Roediger (Science 319:966-968, 2008). In this article, we show that under judicious conditions, learners can indeed reveal an understanding of the beneficial effects of testing, as well as the interaction of that effect with delay (experiment 1). In that experiment, subjects made judgments of learning (JOLs) for previously studied or previously tested items in either a cue-only or a cue-target context, and either immediately or after a 1-day delay. When subjects made judgments in a cue-only context, their JOLs accurately reflected the effects of testing, both immediately and at a delay. To evaluate the potential of exposure to such conditions for promoting generalized appreciation of testing effects, three further experiments elicited global predictions about restudied and tested items across two study/test cycles (experiments 2, 3, and 4). The results indicated that learners' global naïve metacognitive beliefs increasingly reflect the beneficial effects of testing when learners experience these benefits with increasing external support. If queried under facilitative circumstances, learners appreciate the mnemonic enhancement that testing provides on both an item-by-item and global basis but generalize that knowledge to future learning only with considerable guidance.

Generating mnemonics boosts recall of chemistry information.

Students frequently generate mnemonic cues to help them remember difficult or abstract information (Tullis & Maddox, Metacognition and Learning, 2020, 15, 129). Self-generated mnemonics have the potential to be particularly effective means of remembering target information because they can transform abstract information into meaningful units, connect information to existing schema, and create distinct retrieval routes to the targets. Across five experiments, we compared the effectiveness of self-generated mnemonics to mnemonics generated by others for remembering chemistry information. Generating one's own mnemonics consistently boosted recall for both the chemistry content and the mnemonic itself. However, experimentally boosting recall of mnemonics through retrieval practice did not affect recall of associated chemistry content. These results indicate that improved recall of chemistry content is not caused by better recall of the mnemonic itself; rather, generating a mnemonic involves deep and effortful processing of chemistry content that boosts recall more than reading someone else's mnemonic. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring.

Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505-514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64-78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125-141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417-450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners' metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one's learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.

Theories of intelligence influence self-regulated study choices and learning.

In student-regulated instruction, guiding one's study effectively and efficiently is crucial for successful learning. Yet, significant variability exists in how effectively learners regulate their own study. Here, we explored whether and how beliefs about the nature of intelligence affect learners' metacognitive control and ultimately the efficacy of their study choices. We manipulated learners' theories of intelligence across two experiments. Learners then studied a list of words for a later memory test, chose half of the words to restudy, and restudied their chosen items. Learners who were persuaded to believe intelligence was malleable chose to restudy more poorly learned items and ultimately learned more than learners who were persuaded to believe intelligence was fixed. Learners' underlying beliefs about the nature of intelligence may affect learners' goals and ultimately their metacognitive control. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Why does peer instruction benefit student learning?

In peer instruction, instructors pose a challenging question to students, students answer the question individually, students work with a partner in the class to discuss their answers, and finally students answer the question again. A large body of evidence shows that peer instruction benefits student learning. To determine the mechanism for these benefits, we collected semester-long data from six classes, involving a total of 208 undergraduate students being asked a total of 86 different questions related to their course content. For each question, students chose their answer individually, reported their confidence, discussed their answers with their partner, and then indicated their possibly revised answer and confidence again. Overall, students were more accurate and confident after discussion than before. Initially correct students were more likely to keep their answers than initially incorrect students, and this tendency was partially but not completely attributable to differences in confidence. We discuss the benefits of peer instruction in terms of differences in the coherence of explanations, social learning, and the contextual factors that influence confidence and accuracy.

The efficacy of learners' testing choices.

Practice tests provide large mnemonic benefits over restudying, but learners judge practice tests as less effective than restudying. Consequently, learners infrequently utilize testing when controlling their study and often choose to be tested only on well-learned items. In 5 experiments, we examined whether learners' choices about testing and restudying are effective for improving subsequent memory performance. Learners studied a list of word pairs and chose which items to restudy and which to test. Some of learners' choices were honored (by assigning those items to the chosen activity) and some of learners' choices were dishonored (by assigning those items to the opposite study activity). Surprisingly, and in contrast with all work to date on the metacognitive monitoring of testing effects, honoring learners' testing choices consistently resulted in better memory performance than dishonoring choices. This effect occurred principally because learners often chose to restudy difficult items, and those items did not benefit from testing. The effectiveness of learners' choices about testing casts the metacognition of testing in a new light: learners may not appreciate the benefits of testing, but they do have an understanding of circumstances in which the benefits of testing are minimal. (PsycINFO Database Record

Comparison versus reminding.

Comparison and reminding have both been shown to support learning and transfer. Comparison is thought to support transfer because it allows learners to disregard non-matching features of superficially different episodes in order to abstract the essential structure of concepts. Remindings promote memory for the individual episodes and generalization because they prompt learners to retrieve earlier episodes during the encoding of later related episodes and to compare across episodes. Across three experiments, we compared the consequences of comparison and reminding on memory and transfer. Participants studied a sequence of related, but superficially different, proverb pairs. In the comparison condition, participants saw proverb pairs presented together and compared their meaning. In the reminding condition, participants viewed proverbs one at a time and retrieved any prior studied proverb that shared the same deep meaning as the current proverb. Experiment 1 revealed that participants in the reminding condition recalled more proverbs than those in the comparison condition. Experiment 2 showed that the mnemonic benefits of reminding persisted over a one-week retention interval. Finally, in Experiment 3, we examined the ability of participants to generalize their remembered information to new items in a task that required participants to identify unstudied proverbs that shared the same meaning as studied proverbs. Comparison led to worse discrimination between proverbs related to studied proverbs and proverbs unrelated to studied proverbs than reminding. Reminding supported better memory for individual instances and transfer to new situations than comparison.

Scheduling scaffolding: the extent and arrangement of assistance during training impacts test performance.

Various kinds of assistance, including prompts, worked examples, direct instruction, and modeling, are widely provided to learners across educational and training programs. Yet, the effectiveness of assistance during training on long-term learning is widely debated. The authors examined how the extent and schedule of assistance during training on a novel mouse movement task impacted unassisted test performance. Learners received different schedules of assistance during training, including constant assistance, no assistance, probabilistic assistance, alternating assistance, and faded assistance. Constant assistance led to better performance during training than no assistance. However, constant assistance during training resulted in the worst unassisted test performance. Faded assistance during training resulted in the best test performance. This suggests that fading may allow learners to create an internal model of the assistance without depending on the assistance in a manner that impedes successful transfer to unassisted circumstances.

The reminding effect: presentation of associates enhances memory for related words in a list.

One aspect of successful cognition is the efficient use of prior relevant knowledge in novel situations. Remindings-stimulus-guided retrievals of prior events-allow us to link prior knowledge to current problems by prompting us to retrieve relevant knowledge from events that are distant from the present. Theorizing in research on higher cognition makes much use of the concept of remindings, yet many basic mnemonic consequences of remindings are untested. Here we consider implications of reminding-based theories of the effects of repetition on memory (Benjamin & Tullis, 2010; Hintzman, 2011). Those theories suggest that the spacing of repeated presentations of material benefits memory when the later experience reminds the learner of the earlier one. When applied to memory for related, rather than repeated, material, these theories predict a reminding effect: a mnemonic boost caused by a nearby presentation of a related item. In 7 experiments, we assessed this prediction by having learners study lists of words that contained related word pairs. Recall performance for the first presentation in related pairs was higher than for equivalent items in unrelated pairs, while recognition performance for items in related pairs did not differ from those in unrelated pairs. Remindings benefit only the recollection of the retrieved episodes.

Remindings influence the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli.

Remindings-stimulus-guided retrievals of prior events-may help us interpret ambiguous events by linking the current situation to relevant prior experiences. Evidence suggests that remindings play an important role in interpreting complex ambiguous stimuli (Ross & Bradshaw Memory & Cognition, 22, 591-605, 1994); here, we evaluate whether remindings will influence word interpretation and memory in a new paradigm. Learners studied words on distinct visual backgrounds and generated a sentence for each word. Homographs were preceded by a biasing cue on the same background three items earlier, preceded by a biasing cue on a different background three items earlier, or followed by a biasing cue on the same background three items later. When biasing cues preceded the homographs on the same backgrounds as the homographs, the meanings of the homographs in learner-generated sentences were consistent with the biasing cues more often than in the other two conditions. These results show that remindings can influence word interpretation. In addition, later memory for the homographs and cues was greater when the meaning of the homograph in the sentence was consistent with the earlier biasing cue, suggesting that remindings enhanced mnemonic performance. Remindings play an important role in how we interpret ambiguous stimuli and enhance memory for the involved material.

Criterion noise in ratings-based recognition: evidence from the effects of response scale length on recognition accuracy.

Rating scales are a standard measurement tool in psychological research. However, research has suggested that the cognitive burden involved in maintaining the criteria used to parcel subjective evidence into ratings introduces decision noise and affects estimates of performance in the underlying task. There has been debate over whether such decision noise is evident in recognition, with some authors arguing that it is substantial and others arguing that it is trivial or nonexistent. Here we directly assess the presence of decision noise by evaluating whether the length of a rating scale on which recognition judgments are provided is inversely related to performance on the recognition task. That prediction was confirmed: Rating scales with more options led to lower estimates of recognition than did scales with fewer options. This result supports the claim that decision noise contributes to recognition judgments and additionally suggests that caution is warranted when using rating scales more generally.